

**TEXT FLY WITHIN
THE BOOK ONLY**

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_162030

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

PREVIOUS WORKS BY PROFESSOR RITTER

DIE QUINTILIANISCHEN DECLAMATIONEN

UNTERSUCHUNGEN ÜBER PLATO

PLATOS GESETZE, KOMMENTAR ZUM GRIECHISCHEN TEXT

PLATOS GESETZE, DARSTELLUNG DES INHALTS

PLATONS DIALOGE, INHALTSDARSTELLUNGEN

NEUE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ÜBER PLATON

PLATON, SEIN LEBEN, SEINE SCHRIFTEN, SEINE LEHRE

SCHULPOLITIK, WÜTSCHEN UND HOFFNUNGEN ZUR NEUGESTALT-
UNG DES DEUTSCHEN SCHULWESENS

SOKRATES

etc., etc.

The
ESSENCE OF PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY

by
CONSTANTIN RITTER
Professor of Philosophy, Tübingen

TRANSLATED BY
ADAM ALLESÄ
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
St. John's College, Annapolis,
Maryland

LONDON
GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
MUSEUM STREET

The German original, "Kerngedanken der platonischen Philosophie"
was first published in Munich in 1931

FIRST PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH IN 1933

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Professor Constantin Ritter needs no introduction to students of Plato. For nearly half a century he has been writing books and articles on Plato. But in spite of his tremendous achievements and of the fact that the best Plato scholars are indebted to him, he has remained largely unknown to wide circles of students of philosophy. The reason, no doubt, is that he writes in a language which is none too well known by many students of philosophy in the Western Hemisphere. I consider it a privilege, therefore, to make this volume on Plato's philosophy accessible to the English reading public. It embodies the researches of a lifetime; and as the German title, *Kerngedanken der platonischen Philosophie*, indicates, it contains the essence of Professor Ritter's monumental two-volume work on Plato.¹

In translating this work I kept two things constantly in mind. First, I tried to be as faithful to the original as possible. I did not paraphrase, except perhaps a little in one or two small sections. It was my purpose to let Professor Ritter speak. Second, I attempted to the best of my ability to let Professor Ritter speak as good English as possible. This was not always easy; nor was I always very successful. As for this, the reader must judge for himself. I wish that it had been possible to submit the entire translation to Professor Ritter for his criticism and suggestions. He read a few pages of the manuscript, and the results were such that I greatly regret that he could not read all of it.

For assistance with the translation, special acknowledgment is due to my wife whose time was greatly encroached upon and whose patience, no doubt, was at times unduly tried. I also wish to express my gratitude to Dr. J. E. Turner, Reader

¹ *Platon, Sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre*. Vol. I, C. H. Beck, München, 1910, pp. 588. Vol. II, C. H. Beck, München, 1923, pp. 910.

in Philosophy in the University of Liverpool, who kindly read the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I alone, however, am responsible for the imperfections and shortcomings of the translation.

ADAM ALLES

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND

PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

My researches in Plato were the occasion for acquainting myself thoroughly with similar investigations in other countries. In this connection, I learned most from English scholars, whose whole manner of research and interpretation especially appealed to me. It was, therefore, a great satisfaction and encouragement to me to observe that English scholars in turn regarded my work as worthy of consideration. My *Untersuchungen über Plato* (1888) was welcomed in a friendly manner by Lewis Campbell, with whose chronological determinations my investigations were in remarkably close agreement. When, after many carefully planned attempts, I had finally completed (1923) my comprehensive new interpretation of Plato's life, literary activity, and philosophy, I was honoured by A. E. Taylor, who in dedicating his splendid book, *Plato, The Man and His Work*, "To all true lovers of Plato, quick and dead," singled me out in particular.¹

Science does not allow itself to be completely hampered by national boundaries. Since Latin has ceased to be the language of the educated world, however, the particular languages of the individual cultural peoples constitute hindrances and limits, which not everyone can overcome. I gladly assented, therefore, when Professor Adam Alles asked my permission to translate

¹ In the concluding paragraph of the Preface, Professor Taylor says: "To two living scholars I must make very special acknowledgment. How much I owe to the published writings of my friend and colleague in Scotland, Professor Burnet, will be apparent on almost every page of my book; . . . I owe no less to Professor C. Ritter of Tübingen, who has given us, as part of the work of a life devoted to Platonic researches, the best existing commentary on the *Laws* and the finest existing full-length study of Plato and his philosophy as a whole. One cannot despair of one's kind when one remembers that such a work was brought to completion in the darkest years Europe has known since 1648. It is a great honour to me that Dr. Ritter has allowed me to associate his name with this poor volume."—TRANSLATOR.

into English the present volume which, under the title *Kerngedanken der platonischen Philosophie*, is an outline of my comprehensive work on Plato.

The friendly request that I, as the author, write a short preface to the translation served as an exhortation to add something worth while, which is not contained in the original German text. I came across a note of mine which shows an attempt to present more clearly the much contested meaning of the doctrine of Ideas. I shall copy this note at this point, because I believe that its content will be accepted as a welcome supplement to pp. 153 ff., 170 ff., 184 ff., 218 ff.

The note is as follows: The universal Idea of reason thinks in us, the spiritual individuals, just as the universal Idea of the knife cuts in the individual knives, or as the universal Idea of the tree, e.g., blossoms and bears fruit in the individual cherry tree. That this individual tree exists is only possible because, in the general arrangement of the materials and of the powers of the earth, the possibility (or rather in a concrete instance the necessity) for the coming into existence of the trees (more precisely of the cherry tree, the apple tree, the nut tree, the oak, the fir, etc.) is given, and the actuality of individual conditions (e.g., change of seasons, etc.) which determine the growth of these trees is also given. Similarly spiritual individuals and spiritual events, "history" in all its determinedness, are possible only because their cause is given, is determined in the totality of cosmic powers. We are not justified in conceiving this cause after the pattern of concrete and individual objects—as Aristotle's critique attempts to do; this is, indeed, contrary to what Plato means by the "Idea." We can only say with confidence that it is the cause of all the processes which uniformly repeat themselves in constant renewal; these processes we describe with the same words. Without such a cause our predications concerning generic characteristics of the individual which language alone can express would be unfounded, foolish talk. On the other hand, in describing these generic characteristics of the individual

appearance and the individual event, we describe the cause itself as exactly as any cause can possibly be described whose reality exists in its activity, and can therefore be determined only by its effects.

In conclusion I should like to direct a critical remark against the recent attempts, oft repeated, to stamp Plato as a mystic. These are wholly based on forged passages of the *Epistles*, which I can only consider as inferior achievements of spiritual poverty which seeks to take refuge in occultism. I am astonished that anyone can hail them as enlightened wisdom, as the final result of Platonic philosophizing. With reference to this point I can confidently direct English readers to Richards' *Platonica*, pp. 271 ff.

CONSTANTIN RITTER

TÜBINGEN,

June 15, 1932

P R E F A C E

In the brief presentation which I here attempt to give of Plato's philosophy, I have naturally had to omit the proof for certain expositions. Whoever will refer to my other works will there discover what he may find missing here. Above all I must always refer to my two-volume work, *Platon, Sein Leben, seine Schriften, seine Lehre* (C. H. Beck, München, 1910, 1923). I have again given painstaking care to the indices. I believe that with their aid all passages which are of similar content can easily be brought together. I hope that no one will be frightened away by the use of Greek words and whole sentences in the footnotes. In isolated places in the text where I have made use of a Greek word, the translation or an explanation is added as soon as possible.

Even now we have no satisfactory picture of Plato. The only reliable bust that we have is the herm Castellani (Berlin), which is a crude and late copy. Among the other busts related to it, that at Holkam Hall is the most acceptable. In it, however, certain parts of the face are restorations. We must therefore accept it as it is.

The *Württembergische Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften* granted me a sum of money to defray part of the expense of publishing this book. For this aid I express my gratitude to them.

C. RITTER

TÜBINGEN,

October 27, 1930

CONTENTS

	PAGE
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE	7
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION	9
PREFACE	13
INTRODUCTION	21
1. Plato's life, p. 21	
2. His literary activity, p. 27	
3. Summary statement of the contents of the book, p. 34	

PART ONE

THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO'S YOUTH AND EARLY MANHOOD TO THE SECOND SICILIAN JOURNEY (367)

CHAPTER

I.	THE ETHICAL CONTENT OF THE EARLY DIALOGUES	37
1.	The <i>Lesser Hippias</i> , p. 37	
2.	The <i>Laches</i> , p. 40	
3.	The <i>Protagoras</i> , p. 42	
4.	The <i>Charmides</i> , p. 45	
5.	The <i>Euthyphro</i> , p. 46	
6.	The <i>Apology</i> , p. 47	
7.	The <i>Crito</i> , p. 48	
8.	The <i>Gorgias</i> , p. 49	
	(Comparison of the <i>Protagoras</i> and the <i>Gorgias</i> ; ethics as the doctrine of duties, of virtue, and of goods, pp. 57 f.)	
9.	The <i>Greater Hippias</i> , p. 61	
10.	The <i>Euthydemus</i> , p. 62	
11.	The <i>Menexenus</i> , p. 62	
12.	The <i>Lysis</i> , p. 63	
13.	The <i>Symposium</i> , p. 66	
14.	The <i>Phaedo</i> , p. 68	
15.	The <i>Republic</i> , p. 71	
	The constitution of the state and that of the soul, p. 73	
	The relation between virtue and happiness, p. 75	
	The Idea of the good, p. 80	
	Eros, p. 85	

II. ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE EARLIER DIALOGUES (TO 367)

87

1. The *Phaedo*, p. 87 (the "Idea," pp. 89 ff.)
2. The *Symposium*, p. 95
3. The *Cratylus*, p. 97
4. The *Laches*, the *Protagoras*, the *Euthyphro*, p. 100; the *Greater Hippias* and the *Euthydemus*, p. 101
5. The *Meno*, p. 102 (Comparison of the *Meno* and the other dialogues, thus far discussed, with the *Phaedo*, p. 100)
6. The *Republic*, p. 105 (Degrees of Being and of knowledge, pp. 107 ff.)
7. The *Phaedrus*, p. 109 (The myth about the soul's journey through the heavens, p. 110)
8. Summary statement and critical considerations, p. 111
9. Comparison with modern thinkers (Goethe, Schuppe, Chamberlain), pp. 115 ff.
10. Learning as recollection, p. 120 (Plato's use of the myth)
11. Being, Becoming, Non-Being as objects of knowledge, of opinion, of ignorance (not-knowing), pp. 123 ff
12. The Idea of the good again considered, p. 129
13. The turning-point between the *Phaedrus* and the *Theaetetus*, p. 133
14. The *Theaetetus*, knowledge is not identical with sense-perception, nor with opinion, nor with correct opinion, pp. 135 ff.
15. Supplement to these negative results. The moral realm; the philosopher and the man of affairs, pp. 140 ff.

PART TWO

THE DIALOGUES OF LATER YEARS FROM THE SECOND SICILIAN JOURNEY ON (AFTER 367)

I. EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF THE LATER DIALOGUES

147

A. THE *PARMENIDES*

147

1. The content, p. 147
2. Exposition and objections, p. 153
3. Classes of Ideas, p. 158
4. *Part II* of the *Parmenides*, p. 161
5. Result of the discussion and a comparison with other dialogues, p. 164

CONTENTS

17

CHAPTER

PAGE

B.	THE <i>SOPHIST</i>	167
	1. Conceptions of Being, p. 167	
	2. The meaning of the predication of Being, p. 170	
	3. Hints at a more profound definition of Being, p. 174	
	4. The "friends of the Ideas," p. 175	
C.	THE <i>STATESMAN</i>	176
	1. Two types of comparative attributes; pure and applied science, p. 178. (Law of development, p. 179; teleology, p. 180)	
	2. The "Idea" as the norm, p. 181 (Truth, p. 183)	
	3. Comprehensive meaning of the Idea, p. 184	
D.	THE <i>PHILEBUS</i>	189
	1. Four classes of reality (the rationality of the cause of development, p. 189)	
	2. The relation of unity (monads) to plurality, p. 194	
E.	THE <i>TIMAEUS</i>	198
	1. The problem of explaining the cosmos, p. 198	
	2. Teleological and aetiological explanations, p. 200; principle of irrationality (space). The number of elements (similarity with <i>Philebus</i> , p. 202). The difference between rational knowledge and true opinion proves the difference of the content in question, p. 203	
	3. Comparison with earlier dialogues, p. 204	
	4. Difficulties in determining the irrational. (Difference between <i>Timaeus</i> and <i>Philebus</i>), p. 207	
	5. Inferences with reference to the old theory of Ideas, p. 211	
	6. Ideas of different orders and degrees; their subjective and objective nature, p. 213 (Ideas as prototypes, p. 215 f)	
	7. The place of the Ideas, p. 218	
	8. The unity between the <i>Timaeus</i> and the other dialogues of Plato's old age, p. 223	
	9. The <i>Laws</i> , p. 223 (Retrospect and prospect)	
	10. Comparison with Meinong, p. 224	
	11. Comparison with Husserl, p. 226	

II. PLATO'S LOGIC

230

Introduction

1. The Laws of Thought, p. 232
2. The categories (and the negative definition), p. 233
3. Formation of concepts and the system of concepts, p. 236 (Rules governing the formation of concepts, p. 242; essence, p. 244 ff)
4. Deduction and manner of proof, p. 249; relation of doctrine of Ideas to logic, p. 253; determining the definition of knowledge, vainly attempted in the *Theaetetus*, p. 255; inference by analogy, p. 256

III. PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

258

1. Central thoughts, p. 258
2. Fundamental concepts of physics (matter, mass, gravity, direction, motion), p. 261
3. Types of motion, p. 263
4. Types of motion determined by the fundamental nature of things, p. 264
5. Relation of matter to space, p. 266
6. Difficulties inherent in the concepts of space and time, p. 267
7. Probability instead of truth, p. 269
8. Botany and zoology, p. 271
9. The soul as principle of motion, p. 271
10. Astronomy, p. 272
11. Geognosy, p. 275
12. Mathematics, p. 276
13. Teleology, p. 279 (Comparison with Kant and Laplace)

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

14. Parts of the soul, etc., p. 281
15. Thinking, perception, retention, and forgetting, p. 282
16. Sense-stimuli (psychic levels), p. 285
17. Fusion of sensations (e.g., anger, jealousy, love's longing, the comic). Desires as source of pleasure (and pre-supposition for virtue and vice); intermediate condition between pain and pleasure; causes of contrasts; true and false (pure and impure) sensations, p. 288
18. Happiness, p. 292
19. Love (its description in the *Symposium* and in the *Phaedrus*), p. 294
20. Types of character. Concept of the soul, p. 300

IV. THE PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE LATER DIALOGUES

303

A. ETHICS

303

1. Insight and faith (holiness and duty), p. 303
2. Scale of values, p. 304
3. Particular virtues, p. 306
4. The moral ideal, p. 308
5. Civic and philosophic virtue, p. 309
6. Vices, p. 312
7. Eudemonism and intellectual determinism in the *Laws*, p. 313
8. The fundamental principles of penal justice, p. 315 (Involuntariness of bad actions)
9. Comparison with other ethical systems, p. 319

CHAPTER

PAGE

B. POLITICS

319

- The constitution of the state according to the *Republic*
1. Only the most talented and most carefully educated in the knowledge of human nature and human problems are experts and are called upon to rule, p. 320 (Progressive perfection of the well-ordered state, p. 323 f.)
 2. The three classes of the state, p. 324
 3. Guardians have no family responsibilities, p. 326; equal rights for men and women, p. 327
 4. Objections, p. 328 (the majority of human beings neglected; slavery; community of wives and children)
 5. The ideal state and reality, p. 332 (Defective forms of the state, p. 335 f.)
 6. The *Statesman*: Philosopher and statesman contrasted with the sophist, p. 337; comparison with *Republic*, p. 339 (Six types of the temporary state; legislation, p. 339)
 7. The *Laws*: Fundamental principles (like those of the *Republic* and of the *Statesman*), p. 340
 8. Historical studies reveal that the happiness of the state depends on the right combination of monarchy and democracy, p. 342
 9. Population and economic structure, p. 342
 10. Schedule of work; compulsory education; games and festivals, p. 344
 11. Theory of education (supervision of art by the state), p. 346
 12. Selection and promotion of the ablest (council of state), p. 349
 13. Laws governing marriage and the family; the position of women, p. 350
 14. Offices of the state, p. 352
 15. Details concerning legislation (the position of judges, etc.), p. 354

V. PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

357

1. Supervision of art, p. 357. (Plato's artistic nature; his rejection of Homer and the tragedians; his judgment concerning the Athenian theatre)
2. Purpose and true evaluation of art (the beautiful as expression of the good), p. 360; formal conditions of beauty, p. 362 (Idea and Eros, p. 364; symmetry. Good and bad taste, p. 366)
3. Art as imitation, p. 366
4. Attempt at a Platonic poetics, p. 367

VI. PLATO'S THOUGHTS CONCERNING GOD

370

1. The concept of God a creation of the imagination, p. 370
2. Question concerning the immanence and transcendence of God, p. 371
3. Personality of God, p. 373
4. God as the highest Idea: the other Ideas as Ideas of divine purpose, p. 374
5. God bound by necessity, p. 376
6. The highest goal of divine creative activity, p. 378
7. God the measure of all things, p. 379
8. Plato's theodicy, p. 380
9. Court for trying heresies, p. 382
10. Man's relation to God, p. 384 (Prayer, p. 386; Eros, p. 387). Freedom of the will (once more, intellectual determinism, eudemonism, and morality), p. 389; conclusion, p. 390

INDEX OF DIALOGUES

391

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

393

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

397

INTRODUCTION

1. Plato was a descendant of one of the foremost families of the ancient Attic aristocracy. On the paternal side he was descended from King Codrus; on the maternal he was related to Solon. Critias, the well-known leader of the Thirty, was his mother's cousin. Plato was probably born in 427, or perhaps even a year or two earlier. His childhood and youth, therefore, fall into the period of the Peloponnesian war with all its excitement and vicissitudes. The Golden Age of Athens was past. Pericles had died of the plague, which had taken its toll in thousands of the population of Attica. A feeling of insecurity, of emptiness and of lack of leadership arose; it was as though the experienced pilot of a ship were missing and in addition the crew had been reduced. But the city of Athens was still resplendent with the beauty of the magnificent buildings which Pericles had given it. In spite of the growing distress of war, the cultural and intellectual life of Athens was still in its full vigour and activity. Each year outstanding poets competed for the honour of enhancing the celebration of the Dionysiac Festivals with their creations.¹ Rhetoric, which had a real, practical value in the Athenian democracy, was more and more developed; and in connection with it Attic prose was gradually brought to the height of its perfection—e.g., it was during these years of bitter warfare that Thucydides produced his great work, the style of which has always been regarded as exemplary.

Plato was six or seven years of age when, in the year 421,

¹ To be specific: Aeschylus died 456. The *Antigone* was presented on the stage in 442, and the *Medea* in 431. The presentation of *King Oedipus*, *Hippolytus*, the *Acharnians*, the *Knights*, the *Clouds*, and the *Birds* took place during Plato's childhood. The *Trojans* was scheduled for 415, the *Electra* of Euripides for 413; *Philoctetes* for 409, *Orestes* and *Plutus* for 408; the *Bacchae* and *Iphigenia in Aulis* for 406, the *Frogs* for 405, *Oedipus Coloneus* (second presentation?), 401.

peace was concluded with Sparta, and Athens could once more look to a period of economic and intellectual development. The adaptable nature of the Athenian populace recovered quickly from the burden of war; its fickle nature and readiness to undertake new projects, however, lacked the guidance of a conscientious and responsible leader. Thus it happened that Alcibiades easily persuaded the Athenians to undertake the Sicilian venture, which brought about a renewal of the struggle with Sparta. The failure of this conflict foreboded the inevitable decline of the proud city and the destruction of its power. In the summer of 415, the largest and most magnificent fleet which Athens had ever possessed sailed from Piraeus for Sicily. In September, 413, came the crushing news of the loss of this fleet, as well as of those ships which had been sent to its aid. Plato was old enough to be deeply and permanently impressed by these events, which marked the turning-point in the history of Athens. Even though we have no specific reference on this point, we may assume that in the later years of the war, when he had reached the age for military service, military training received much of his time and attention. Without doubt, Plato together with his two brothers (we definitely know of their service¹) served in the cavalry, which was engaged in hard battles during the years 409 and 407. It is also probable that Plato personally participated in the battle of Arginusae in 406, the greatest naval battle in history until that of Jutland. Athens was in such extreme danger at this time that every available citizen was drafted for service. A few years earlier Plato seems to have become acquainted with Socrates. For a time his uncle Critias also cultivated the friendship of Socrates—presumably Critias thought of profiting by Socrates' skill in the use of words in order to further his own ambitious plans for power. The acquaintance with Socrates became epoch-making for Plato's further development. From now on, Socrates becomes his guiding star in thought and in action.

¹ *Republic*, 368a.

We are told that before his meeting with Socrates Plato had been carefully educated in all the arts with which the son of an aristocratic and wealthy family should be familiar, that he had won literary and gymnastic prizes, had seriously tried his hand at poetry, and was planning to enter as one of the contestants for the prize in tragedy at one of the Dionysiac Festivals; but when he applied the standard set for him by Socrates, he consigned his poems to the flames. In accordance with family tradition, he felt that he should be active in politics. His nearest relatives (in addition to Critias, his mother's cousin, and Charmides, her brother) could assist him in this aspiration. After the final defeat of Athens, the arbitrary rule of the Thirty was set up and Plato was asked by them to share their power. Here again it was the influence of Socrates which kept him from taking this step. But after the speedy fall of the Thirty, he was not averse from becoming an aspirant for a political position in accordance with the laws of his city. Under the democracy, however, the conscienceless and unjust prosecution and condemnation of Socrates took place. Plato found it impossible to work with those who permitted or were guilty of this act; he withdrew more and more from the scene of politics and bided his time. Immediately after the execution of the beloved master, an occurrence he could not prevent, he, in the company of other Socratics, left Athens and for a time took up his residence in Megara. Soon thereafter he undertook extensive travels, which seem to have been interrupted by lengthy sojourns in his native city, and it seems highly probable that he fought with the Athenian forces in the first years of the Corinthian wars (395, 394). On his journeys he very probably went to Egypt and remained there for some time (he went to Egypt at the earliest about 395 and stayed there until the outbreak of the Corinthian wars). It is also highly probable that he visited Crete and Cyrene. From the very beginning, the journey to Southern Italy and Sicily (about 389) was of greater importance for Plato and of greater significance for his future career. About this journey to Sicily

and the subsequent ones which grew out of it, we are more definitely informed.

One of the incidents of this visit was Plato's acquaintance with the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy, among whom was the learned scholar and statesman, Archytus, to whom Plato became attached in true friendship. Another incident was of even greater importance and entailed more serious consequences. While in Syracuse he met Dion, the brother-in-law of the tyrant Dionysius I. Dion was a talented and high-minded youth and became attached to Plato with the sincerest devotion and enthusiasm. The immediate consequence of this meeting was that a discussion on politics took place between the tyrant, who was about the same age as Plato, and Plato (Dionysius was 43, Plato was 40, Dion was 20). During the conversation the two men clashed and the philosopher was sent home in scorn and disgrace. On his homeward journey, either as a consequence of chance or the sinister conniving of the tyrant,¹ Plato fell into the hands of pirates. In the market-place of the island Aegina, which was at this time at war with Athens, Plato was sold into slavery. Fortunately Anniceris, a wealthy man of Cyrene, happened to be there. He bought Plato, gave him his freedom and sent him home to Athens. We can definitely say that this event took place in the late summer of 388; in fact, it is practically the only event in Plato's life which can be definitely dated. Since Anniceris refused to be reimbursed the amount which he paid for Plato—he considered it an honour to serve him in this manner²—Plato took that amount of money and within the confines of the Academy³

¹ In his life of Dion, in which he follows good sources, Plutarch reports that Dionysius instructed the leader of a Spartan delegation, who was at this time also at his court, to get possession of Plato and either dispose of him somehow or sell him into slavery. In doing so, no injustice would be done Plato; for Plato asserted that even in slavery he could enjoy the happiness which justice assured him in all circumstances.

² It is evident that Plato was already known through his writings.

³ The region was named after a certain hero Akademos (Hekademos).

bought a plot of ground, which he set aside as the location for the school of philosophy which he had decided to found.¹ For more than twenty years he lived here in voluntary retirement from public life and public discussion of scientific and philosophic problems. During this period, in fellowship with kindred spirits, he contemplated the meaning of life. At the same time he taught an ever-increasing group of young men, who were attracted to him by his powerful and amiable personality and by his reputation for learning.

In the year 367, immediately after the sudden death of Dionysius I, Dion² advised the new ruler, Dionysius II (son of Dionysius I), now in his late twenties, to extend a solemn invitation to Plato to come without delay to the court of Syracuse to help to organize the state in accordance with philosophical principles. Although Plato had little faith in the enterprise, he felt that he should not turn a deaf ear to the pleading of his friends, especially to that of Dion, and he therefore decided to undertake the journey. Upon his arrival in Syracuse, he was given a splendid reception and at first everything seemed to go well. But the foundation on which Plato was to build was undermined with jealousy, suspicion, and slander. The reactionaries in the court soon succeeded in supplanting Dion. He was accused of traitorous activity and was banished; Plato was suspected of secretly being party to the plans. Thereupon, he tried in vain to obtain permission to return home. Dionysius would not let him depart, because he feared the general derision which would follow the sudden break between himself and the man through whose friendship and reputation he was going to secure for himself in the eyes of the whole world the title of philosopher-king. Finally, when war broke out, Plato succeeded in gaining permission to return

¹ This garden was gradually provided with living quarters and buildings for instruction and remained the home of the Platonic school until Justinian expelled the last members from his kingdom (529). (They went to Persia.) It is the same year in which Benedict of Nursia founded his monastery on Monte Casino.

² Dion was uncle and brother-in-law of Dionysius II.

to Athens, but only on the condition that he return to Syracuse as soon as the war was over. At the conclusion of peace, Dion was also to be allowed to return home.

Because of this agreement, Plato was obliged at the end of five years once more "to undertake the journey through dangerous Charybdis."¹ This time his failure was much greater and became apparent much sooner. The honest and straightforward efforts of his guest in favour of Dion filled the spoiled tyrant with uncontrollable jealousy. By repeatedly trying to have Dionysius carry out his promise to let Dion return, Plato ran the risk of paying with his own life for the loyalty to his friend. For the permission to return home unharmed, Plato was indebted to the tactful efforts of Archytus and his colleagues. The return took place in 360, again as it seems in late summer.

This concluded Plato's Sicilian adventures, the outcome of which corroborated his original apprehensions. The banished Dion was helpless while he saw himself robbed of his large possessions and while his wife (sister to the wife of the tyrant) was forced to marry another. Even this action of the tyrant could not move Dion to give up the rights which had been denied him. Instead, he gathered an army and marched (357) against the kingdom of his unprincipled nephew and brother-in-law. He drove him from Syracuse; but the struggle for power, which ensued between him and the deposed and exiled tyrant, gave ambitious adventurers an opportunity to interfere, and a few years later he lost his life by assassination. Plato felt this to be the severest blow that fate had dealt him. He mourned the loss of Dion as if he had been his only son and heir. He felt this blow more keenly than the death of Socrates; the latter had attained the goal of his life; whereas the former perished when he was preparing to attain the

¹ Thus it is expressed in the *Seventh Letter*, which is without doubt genuine in its historical content. Only the philosophical section (341b-345c), in style like the *Epinomis*, cannot be from the pen of Plato. Cf. below, p. 28.

greatest things. Plato felt that had Dion remained in power, the dream of his life, the ideal which he outlined in the *Republic*, would have been realized, i.e., the philosopher-king would have achieved this ideal state without persecution and the bloody shambles which usually accompany a political revolution; he would have brought true happiness to a large kingdom, and this would have served as an excellent example for others and, without doubt, would have found imitators elsewhere.

Five years after Dion's assassination, Plato died (347 or 348) at the ripe old age of eighty or over. To the end of his life¹ he was mentally alert and active and enjoyed the honour and respect conferred upon him by his circle of disciples.

2. We are better able to pass judgment on Plato as philosopher than we are on all other Greek philosophers. The numerous writings in which he gave expression to his thoughts have, without exception, been preserved *in toto* and that in excellent manuscript form,² so that there are only a few unimportant passages in which the meaning is doubtful.

There has been much useless argument about the genuineness, as well as the order of appearance, of the different dialogues. It was not until a careful study was made of the difference in language and expression of the dialogues that an indubitable means of determining their genuineness, as well as the approximate date of their appearance, was arrived at. If this means is combined with the thought of the dialogues, the following dialogues may with certainty be set down as genuine: I. *Lesser Hippias*, *Laches*, *Protagoras*, *Charmides*; II. *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, *Gorgias*; III. *Major Hippias*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, *Meno*, *Menexenus*; IV. *Lysis*, *Symposium*, *Phaedo*; V. *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*; VI. *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Timaeus*, as well as *Critias*, *Philebus*, and

¹ Cicero does not imply more in his saying: *scribens mortuus est*.

² This exactness is perhaps explicable by the fact that the Academy existed in Athens for such a long period.

the *Laws*. Of the *Letters*, the *Third* and *Eighth* appear to be genuine, as well as the main narrative part of the long, rich in content *Seventh Letter*. Everything else accredited to Plato is most certainly not genuine.¹

The order of appearance of the dialogues is also fairly certain. The order here given probably differs only slightly from that chosen by Plato himself. The Roman numerals I—VI are to be understood in the sense that definite lines of demarcation are indicated by them and that any deviation from this classification seems unwise.²

Definite dates cannot be given for any of Plato's writings. Yet we may with great certainty place the *Theaetetus* in the year 369 or 368 (i.e., one to two years before Plato was called to the court of Syracuse). Since this dialogue indicates an important turning-point, much is gained by this date. The striking difference in language between it and its continuation, the *Sophist*, is only explicable by a long and doubtless unforeseen interruption. This unfortunate interruption could only have been caused by the journey to Sicily. The change in language is most readily explained by this journey and its consequences. As for the *Parmenides*, I believe that I have made it sufficiently plausible that it was written during the uncomfortable and aimless stay at the court of Dionysius after Dion's exile (367 or 366).³ It is unthinkable that the *Lesser Hippias* could have been written after the distressing accusations against Socrates.⁴ This should also make it apparent to

¹ Evidence for this position is given in various places in my two-volume work on Plato (consult index), as well as in my *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon*, pp. 329 ff. Compare also *Philol. Wochenschr.*, 1929, Nos. 16 and 44; also *Untersuchungen*, 1888, pp. 81 ff.

² Only with reference to the *Major Hippias* do I feel very uncertain. This dialogue ought, perhaps, to be placed at the end of group I. In groups I—VI, the *Lysis*, the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedo* could interchange positions; also the *Euthydemus* and the *Cratylus*; as well as the *Laches*, the *Protagoras* and the *Charmides*; and finally the *Timaeus*, the *Critias* and the *Philebus*. The *Menexenus* could also be moved one place forward or backward.

³ *Platon*, I, 127 f., 265 ff.

⁴ See note, p. 39 below.

every critical reader that the *Apology* could not have been Plato's first work. In spite of recent objections, it is still highly probable that the *Symposium* was written shortly after 385.

In the *Phaedrus*, Plato characterizes the literary product of an able man, and thereby his own, as something of secondary and subordinate nature. Here the written word only means innocent play for him and is chiefly to be considered as a means for the pleasant recall of lively conversations; but it is not to take the place of verbal discourse. This is not true, however, in the same degree of all of Plato's writings; but it is true of the earlier ones, as well as of those dialogues which were written before Plato reached late middle age, the age at which he wrote the *Phaedrus* (about 375). Students of Plato often speak of a Socratic period and place within it those dialogues in which the author (supposedly) is completely under the influence of Socrates and has as his purpose the portrayal of the real Socrates for the Athenian reading public. Good examples of this group are the *Laches* and the *Protagoras*. Such dialogues are really the result of the serene playfulness of the poet's imagination following his inner urge to embody his observations and experiences in artistic creations; primarily they serve the purpose of recalling pleasant memories. Their philosophical content, with which he is not chiefly concerned, is difficult to grasp because of the Socratic irony which is imitated. It is otherwise with Plato's later writings. Already in the *Cratylus* and the *Meno* more positive teachings are to be found, and no one doubts that with these doctrines Plato goes beyond Socrates' convictions. This is true in even a greater degree of the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus*. The *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides* are, indeed, mainly critical, but their analytical criticism forms the necessary preparation for extraordinarily important conclusions which are foreign to Socratic thought. These are already in the critic's mind as the end to be attained, but their positive development is not given until we reach the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus*. The *Timaeus* and the *Laws* are didactic in nature. The artistic,

free play of thoughts has more and more given way to their strictly logical unfolding. The lectures which the aged Plato delivered in the Academy may be thought of as being of a similar nature to these writings of his old age. Even if he now writes as he taught, the literary product has a different purpose; at least it is given more serious import.

Much effort has been spent in distinguishing between the purely Socratic and purely Platonic thought in the dialogues of Plato's youth; therefore careful attention has been given to the expressions which deal with the relation of the concepts to the particular things. From of old the philosophy of Plato has been looked upon as having the characteristic of taking the concepts and hypostatizing them or making substances¹ of them, i.e., of making things of them which exist in and by themselves and which are looked upon as the true reality of everything that exists; whereas the individual object was considered as real only in so far as it participated in the universal, either by imitation or in some other mysterious way. The terminology applied to these independently existing or real objects is also considered to be peculiarly Platonic. The term used to designate them is *Idea*. In Plato's writings two words are used, viz., ἰδέα and εἶδος, the latter being used more frequently.² This conception of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, which has been most frequently accepted as the essence of Platonism, is clearly expressed in several passages of Aristotle, in whom, as the greatest pupil of Plato, absolute confidence was placed more or less universally until recent times. Aristotle says that "From his youth, Plato was acquainted with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines that all sensible things are in constant flux and that no knowledge is possible of them. These views he held even in later years. At the same time, however, he adopted Socrates' philosophy, which was concerned with ques-

¹ Substance is the Latin translation of ὑπόστασις, a term used by Aristotle.

² εἶδος, ἰδέα and similar words, I have discussed fully in my *Neue Untersuchungen*, pp. 228-326. München, 1910.

tions of morality (and excluded the general questions of natural science). In these ethical questions he was interested in the universal and turned first of all to definition. Thus Plato arrived at the conclusion that this type of reasoning referred to something else than the objects of sensation. He believed it impossible that a universal definition could have for its object a sensible thing, since sensible things are constantly changing. This type of being he called Ideas (*ιδέας*). The sensible things, he maintained, existed apart from the Ideas and are named after them; for the multitude of things which bear the same name as the Ideas are as they are through participation in the Ideas (*τοῖς ἐῖδεσιν*).” Aristotle adds: “Besides, the latter is only a changed expression for the Pythagorean doctrine that things are imitations of numbers.” Even earlier, Aristotle had remarked that “Plato’s investigations agreed in most points with those of the Pythagoreans.”¹

Gradually, however, the faith in the absolute dependability of Aristotle’s interpretation was severely shaken. It was found that very frequently he misinterpreted his predecessors, because of his own preconceived notions; nor is he altogether free from hair-splitting disputations. At times he simplifies by schematizing, and constructs means for establishing simple connections between propositions which he is comparing. In this manner he misinterprets the Pythagoreans several times and also grossly misunderstands several passages in the *Republic* and the *Laws*. This means that we must be on our guard when we read Aristotle, especially in regard to his interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas.

Since Plato expressed his thoughts in writing up to the time of his death, the contention that the latest form which Plato gave to his thoughts was handed on by word of mouth is nothing but fiction. For the same reason we may say that Aristotle cannot materially supplement the thoughts expressed in Plato’s dialogues by what he heard in Plato’s lectures.

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I, 6. See Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 2⁵, p. 654.

Therefore, when Aristotle's interpretation does not agree with what we ourselves can find expressed in Plato's dialogues, we can only say that it must be attributed to Aristotle's incorrect hearing or misunderstanding rather than to anything else. Our interpretation of Plato must at all times start from and be guided by the Platonic dialogues.

It is, indeed, difficult to draw a sharp distinction between Socrates' thoughts and those of Plato in those dialogues in which Socrates plays the leading rôle. For this reason the two English scholars, Burnet and Taylor, wish to regard everything that Plato makes Socrates say about the Ideas (as e.g., in the *Phaedrus*) as being Socratic and to derive it from Socrates' association with certain Pythagoreans. This interpretation has been refuted by others;¹ I too cannot agree with it. I am, nevertheless, convinced that at least the ethical principles of the older Platonic dialogues are entirely Socratic—for many of these dialogues the ethical ideas form the chief content. Besides, it would be inconceivable how Plato could produce a long series of writings, covering at least three decades of his life, in which everything worth while is expressed through Socrates without at the same time reaffirming anew that he (Plato) owed the best and profoundest thoughts of his philosophy—i.e., its ethical content—to the unforgettable master.

Beginning with the *Sophist*, the person of Socrates suddenly recedes far into the background.² Now we no longer have a Socratic philosophy. We have already said that the purpose of Plato's literary activity had changed. In reality Plato turned away from Socrates in the *Theaetetus*.³ The task which Plato set for himself here and which he pursued more undeviatingly—viz., What is Knowledge?—is different from that of the early dialogues; it indicates a new departure, a turn to purely theoretical considerations, whereas the early dialogues were

¹ See A. M. Adam, *Sokrates "quantum mutatus ab illo,"* *Classic Quarterly*, 1918 (12), 121 ff.

² We shall see later that the *Philebus* is only an apparent exception.

³ Compare below, Chapter II, 13.

concerned with explaining and defining practical concepts, such as the good, courage, temperance, justice. Then, too, the investigation of the epistemological concept knowledge already implies the indispensable supplement, that of defining the ontological concept reality or Being. In developing this concept in the *Sophist*, which is a continuation of the *Theaetetus*, Plato's artistic sense, or if one prefers, his good taste and simple sense for truth, rebelled against giving the leading rôle in this dialogue to Socrates.¹

We may then say that beginning with the *Theaetetus* we have Plato's own thoughts. Up to the *Theaetetus* the content of the dialogues is predominantly of an ethical and practical nature. We may assume their basic content to be Socratic convictions. Only the development of the ideas and the conclusions drawn from them are no longer Socratic; this is particularly true when Plato applies these ideas to individual, practical ends such as the organization of an ideal state as that is given in the *Republic*. These conclusions are the result of Plato's independent thought. In a similar manner, we shall have to accept as Platonic the logical, psychological, and epistemological investigations on which the ethical propositions are based and by means of which they are unified. This also applies to the doctrine of Ideas.

A remarkable fact seems to favour the Socratic origin and nature of the doctrine of Ideas. This has not escaped the keen observation of Burnet and Taylor. In the effort to define and to determine the concept reality, Being (*ὄν, οὐσία*), the *Sophist* begins with the examination of a materialistic theory and with the diametrically opposed teachings of the "friends of the Ideas."² This second position is characterized in words which strikingly resemble the description of the Ideas in the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, and the *Republic*. But since Plato refutes this

¹ It would have been ridiculous to let Socrates discourse on Being and Non-Being or on the two ways of measuring, as the leader of the conversation, a stranger from Elea, does in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. Cf. p. 168 f. below.

² Compare Part II, Chapter I, 2.

exposition of the doctrine of Ideas almost as decidedly as he refutes the materialistic hypothesis, and seeks instead to reconcile the two positions, the whole position would seem to clear up if the following simple formula were applied: In the *Republic* and in the *Phaedrus*, which soon followed it, Plato was still essentially a Socratic and pursued the Socratic trend of thought. But henceforward, he elaborates his own thoughts independently. However, I believe that the matter is not as simple as this. Definite proof cannot be given here. Only probability can be the goal aimed at. The degree of probability and the convincing clearness with which the nature and the development of Plato's philosophy are set forth must decide as to the correctness of every interpretation. This also applies to my presentation when compared with those of others.

After these introductory remarks, I shall give as best I can an exposition of Plato's philosophy.

3. I think it expedient to analyse the vast material in such a manner that I shall first consider the ethical principles which I can gather from the writings up to the *Theaetetus*, temporarily ignoring the pedagogical and political conclusions found in the *Republic*. Then I shall give an exposition of the other ideas found in these dialogues. Finally, I shall take the dialogues of Plato's old age (from the *Parmenides* on) and give an exposition of his mature philosophy as expressed in these dialogues. The exposition will comprise the following chapters: Epistemology and ontology; the philosophy of nature (cosmology, physics, anthropology); ethics and the philosophy of the state; and, finally, aesthetics and religion.

PART ONE

THE DIALOGUES

OF

PLATO'S YOUTH AND EARLY MANHOOD

TO THE

SECOND SICILIAN JOURNEY

(367)

CHAPTER I

THE ETHICAL CONTENT OF THE EARLY DIALOGUES

I. First of all, we wish to discuss the ethical content of the early writings. We shall begin with the *Lesser Hippias*. The purpose of this peculiar dialogue is not easy to understand. In contrast to the other early dialogues which display Socrates' ignorance and permit his every effort to determine the clear meaning of such practical and commonly used words as courage, piety, virtue, to fail, he makes very definite assertions here, which he obstinately defends to the end. But as these propositions are doubtful, it is not easy to know to what extent we are to take them and their defence seriously. They run as follows: Whoever is praised for being truthful, can also tell the biggest lies. Whoever deceives consciously and intentionally is a better man than he who falls unintentionally into error and falsehood. Voluntary and intentional activity is always better than involuntary activity, even if harm and wrong are done thereby. The average reader will, no doubt, agree with Hippias when he says: "It would be most unfortunate if those who do wrong voluntarily were better than those who do wrong involuntarily." However, Hippias is not in a position to refute the arguments advanced in favour of this proposition. He has to admit that a runner or a fighter who lets himself be beaten voluntarily by his competitor is a better runner or fighter than he who is defeated in spite of his efforts. An instrument with which I intentionally do a piece of work badly is better than one with which I could not execute it, even though I exerted my best effort. From this the questionable conclusion seems to follow that "He who voluntarily fails and voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things¹ is the good man." Again the average reader will side with Hippias when he says, "No,

¹ Socrates adds, "If there be such a one."

with that I cannot agree." Whereupon Socrates also remarks, "Nor can I agree with it myself; and yet this conclusion necessarily follows from our assumptions."

We ask, What are these assumptions?

In this dialogue, Socrates shares the conviction¹ of the Sophists (and Plato agrees to this) that education makes a person good. This is only another way of saying that virtue consists in knowledge and that it can be taught. He is more certain of the thesis that education makes a person good than are those who are not so certain about the consequences of virtue. But since he gives more depth and inwardness to the concept of the good and the concept of virtue than do the Sophists, he understands something quite different by education, which is the condition of virtue, and by its corresponding knowledge. He is convinced that education does not consist in acquiring any kind of knowledge and skill, such as Hippias and other Sophists offered for sale, but rather that from the very beginning it has to be directed toward the goal of moral perfection. As soon as education is related to this goal of virtue, especially as virtue is understood by Socrates and Plato, the objection must disappear which, through a superficial understanding, the sound moral consciousness must bring against the proposition: the more educated a man is or becomes, the better and more virtuous he will be. If a mis-step and a crime are considered in the customary manner as being a deviation

¹ It may be debatable whether this conviction is to be termed intellectualistic or not. One might apply it to the Sophists' conception of education; but it hardly applies when moral perfection is regarded as the goal and standard of education and when education is defined in terms of the good, as Plato defines it in the later dialogues. Xenophon throws light on this when he says, "Socrates did not separate wisdom and temperance (σωφροσύνην); instead he considered that individual wise and temperate who used his knowledge of the beautiful and the good and the objectionable to do the former and to avoid the latter." And to the further question whether he considered those wise and temperate who knew what they ought to do but did the opposite, he replied, "No, most certainly not. They are rather unwise and intemperate." To this the quotation in note 1, p. 41 below is joined.

Apomn., 3, 9, 4.

from what custom has set up as the norm, the possibility naturally arises that there can be a purposive deviation from this established norm and the following proposition is true: Whoever deviates purposely from the standard set is also able, if he so wills, to live in accordance with the standard; as a matter of fact he is able to fulfil all precepts better and more perfectly than he who vacillates uncertainly and only now and then haphazardly hits the mark. If, after a careful and independent examination, this prescribed norm proves to be wrong, then the breaking of the norm must be judged in a similar manner as Jesus judges (according to *Cod. Cantabr.*, Luke vi. 4) the man whom He saw working on the Sabbath: "Oh man, if you know what you are doing, you are blessed; but if you do not know, you are accursed and guilty of the transgression of the laws." On the contrary, no one would voluntarily deviate from the highest norm of action which has been set for him by education and insight, since no one harms himself voluntarily. Thus, it is impossible that the fully educated, the wise man, should do wrong voluntarily.

It is amusing to see how helpless Hippias seems and how, in spite of the fact that it was his greatest delight to harangue against the crushing force of custom and tradition and to praise the right of nature, he cannot defend himself against the uncanny conclusions which Socrates forces him to draw except by appealing to custom. Says he, "It is customary to forgive those who do wrong in ignorance. The laws also are known to be much more severe on voluntary wrongdoers and liars than on those who do wrong involuntarily." However, it cannot be said that the main purpose of this dialogue is to make the vain Sophist appear ludicrous, although Plato with his youthful daring comes dangerously close to making him appear so. But the thoughtful reader¹ will find a serious purpose behind his

¹ I say the thoughtful reader! But is such deep reflection to be expected from even the best of his fellow citizens? Must not the honest, average citizen feel deeply hurt by Socrates' arguments? Must he not consider Socrates the worst pettifogger and twister of words, the worst of all Sophist babblers? Apelt makes a tempting

extravagant raillery. He is to realize that it is necessary to arrive independently at fundamental principles of morality, that in times of upheaval it is no longer sufficient to appeal to customary morality as an adequate standard for holding old values, that even the new ideals couched in beautiful language and advocated by the Sophists are inadequate, since they entirely lack careful deliberation and confirmation.

2. In the *Laches* the question is asked, What is courage? It soon becomes evident that the definition that courage is endurance in battle is insufficient. The discussion leads to the more general concept of endurance; yet not all endurance is courageous. One might say that courage is reasonable endurance. But this definition needs further limitation; for after some examples are given, it again seems as if unreasonable endurance were courageous rather than endurance based on sound insight. (E.g., the untrained fighter needs more courage to enter a combat than does the trained one; and whoever has not learned how to dive must have more courage to dive into the water than the trained diver.) From another point of view, it might be said that courage consists in a sort of wisdom or knowledge, or, to be more exact, in the knowledge of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared. This definition is also inadequate, since what is to be feared falls under the suggestion when he says that the *Greater Hippias*, which was written later, is to be regarded "as an explanatory and pacifying supplement" to the *Lesser Hippias* (Platon. *Untersuchungen*, pp. 222 ff.); thus the *Greater Hippias* would stand in the same relation to the *Lesser Hippias* as the second speech of Socrates in the *Phaedrus* stands to the first. Personally, I regard the following conclusions as most certain: Plato could not have written the *Lesser Hippias* after Socrates was accused of being a perverter of youth. Every time I read the *Parmenides* I have to marvel at the fluency with which Zeno assures us that he did not wish to make public the polemic treatise which he had written in a youthful mood and directed against those who contradicted his master. This can hardly be true, since he could scarcely have been brought to trial for it in Athens. The only explanation I can offer for this statement is that by it Plato wanted to excuse himself for an indiscretion. If this be true, this apology can only refer to the *Lesser Hippias*.

general concept of the bad and what is not to be feared under that of the good. These general concepts must be included in the definition. Yet as soon as courage is defined as knowledge of good and evil, it becomes evident that all difference is removed between courage and such other virtues as temperance, justice, piety.

Plato leaves us in uncertainty, but not without hints as to how we may find our way out. If we make use of these hints, we arrive at the conclusion that every virtue consists in the certain knowledge of that which is good or bad for us. This proposition can only be true if we make the two assumptions which Plato makes in the Socratic sense. The first maintains that there is no action except that which is directed toward an end, the attainment of which appears to man as the best and the most conducive to his well-being.¹ The second affirms that the greatest happiness of man consists in his God-likeness² and in his moral communion with men. From this it naturally follows that whoever clearly understands "what makes for his peace of mind" can do no other than his duties toward God and his neighbour. With this the lines of demarcation which separate the different virtues disappear—or, at least, they lose their significance. Each virtue shows itself only in reasonable actions which are in accordance with man's profound insight as to what is good and bad for him; these actions must be carried through against the temptation to act otherwise. In this sense each virtue is really reasonable endurance.

And yet with all this, the nature of virtue has not been fully explained. In the background are questions which must yet be answered, to wit, IN WHAT must one endure? WHAT is really the good? WHAT is the bad? WHAT makes for man's peace and salvation so that it may become the unconditioned goal of his striving? What leads away from this goal?

¹ Xenophon expresses this concisely as follows: "I believe that all men choose among the different, possible courses of action that action from which they expect the greatest good." *Apomn.* 3, 9, 4.

² ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ as the goal of human effort first appears in the *Theaetetus* (176b).

3. In the *Protagoras* the question is asked as to the meaning and content of the term "good," and this means nothing less than the attempt, forced upon us by the difficulties into which the *Hippias* brought us, to give an independent and scientific basis of morality. Socrates at first advances the proposition that the good is that which is useful to man. The Sophist is not entirely satisfied with this answer; he wants to do away with limiting himself to man. Later, Socrates declares that the good is the pleasant, or that which gives pleasure; the bad is the unpleasant, the painful. The Sophist now wishes to limit the definition as follows: Only that pleasure is good which has a worthy and honourable motive or object. Socrates replies that this limitation only obscures matters. In so far as something pleasant is joined to something disagreeable, it is neither praiseworthy nor good; but the experience of pleasure in and by itself is, nevertheless, good. Any indulgence not regarded as respectable but as disgraceful is criticized not because it arouses pleasure, but because the experience of pleasure is accompanied by disease, loss of wealth, or some other misfortune. These unpleasant or painful consequences or by-products are the sole reason for criticism. Conversely, experiences of pain (e.g., an operation) are considered as good and are recommended because pleasant and beneficial consequences follow upon them. By nature, the striving of each man is directed to the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, or, as it is put later, "it is humanly impossible that anyone should strive to do that which he knows to be evil, instead of striving to do the good, and if anyone is obliged to choose between two evils, he will never choose the greater instead of the lesser evil."¹ It is ludicrous to assert that frequently a man, led astray by the enticement of pleasures, chooses the bad, even though he clearly knows that it is bad

¹ The proposition that no one chooses the bad receives further confirmation by the following conclusion: If fear is nothing but the anticipation of evil, it is impossible that any man should pursue that which he fears. The courageous man is not afraid of danger; that is why he overcomes it.

and that he could have avoided it; or that a man does not want to do the good which he recognizes, but instead is seduced by pleasure to act otherwise. The nonsense and the contradiction are readily recognized if the term "good" is replaced by the synonymous terms "pleasant," "gratifying," and if the term "bad" is replaced by "unpleasant," "painful," or if instead of "pleasant" we use the term "good" and instead of "unpleasant," "bad." One of the doubtful conditions could then be described as follows: A man does the bad which he recognizes as such, because he is overpowered by the good which stimulates him to action. Or again, he does the unpleasant and painful which he recognizes as such because he is overpowered by the stimulus of the pleasant. It is clear that if this is to designate a perverse action, the mistake could only be due to the fact that he who acts in this manner misjudged the quantity and quality of the conflicting, yet fundamentally the same, stimuli. This mistake is similar to that of comparing the size of a near object with that of a distant one. Because of an illusion, the wrong choice is made. Just as we need a measuring rod to avoid error in comparing size, so we need a standard of measurement for the comparison of the values which accompany the different actions open to us. And because men are not familiar with this standard of measurement, they fail through ignorance to make the right choice between that which produces pleasure and pain or between the good and the bad. What is commonly called the weakness of yielding to the enticements of pleasure is nothing but ignorance of the most fundamental question of life.¹

We can readily see that Socrates desires to make pleasure the criterion and standard of the good. Yet pleasure, or that which gives pleasure, i.e., the pleasant (ἡδύ), is not without modification to be put on the same plane with the good. On the contrary, the opinion of the expert is needed to weigh and determine the positive and negative aspects of pleasure and pain and to determine when the pleasures outbalance the pain

¹ ἀμαθία ἡ μείλιση.

and when they do not. Only the excess of pleasure is then to be regarded as good. *belief in pleasure as such*.

One is in doubt whether this hedonistic doctrine¹ gives the true position of Plato. In other dialogues, e.g., the *Gorgias*, Plato vigorously attacks and decidedly rejects hedonism. Since there is not the faintest indication of another definition of the good, we cannot easily reject the conclusion that these answers of Socrates are in agreement with Plato's conception of the good at the time he wrote the *Protagoras*, they do not, however, give a complete account of Plato's view, and consequently do not arrive at the real basis of the matter.

Later I shall show that Plato did not change his position materially even in his later years; he merely became more careful with his terminology. With reference to the pleasures and pains which follow upon a pleasure experience, I shall limit myself for the present to the statement that the pleasant or pleasure, as a positive excess, is raised above that conception of pleasure which is subject to the fluctuation of the constantly changing sensations and which must end in nihilism.² I think that when pleasure is thus defined, its meaning becomes identical with that concept which refers to the future and which defines the pleasant as "the useful for men," so that the two Socratic definitions in the *Protagoras* really mean the same thing, or rather that the second definition, whose content is supplied by our own sense experience, gives definite meaning to the first one, which was essentially formal.

At the very beginning of the dialogue, Socrates also raised the question whether virtue can be taught, since this seemed to be the assumption on which the whole activity of the Sophists was based. We do not arrive at a conclusion on this point.

¹ Only recently A. E. Taylor stated that the assumption that fundamentally the *Protagoras* taught the same hedonistic doctrine as did Bentham was a misconception which "makes the right understanding of its purpose wholly impossible" (*Plato*, London, 1929, p. 235). On page 260 the reason for this statement is given.

² As Theodorus logically developed it from the hedonism of Aristippus.

Protagoras does not want to admit that virtue consists in knowledge and that as such it must be teachable. At any rate, courage, which is so different from the other virtues, does not seem to depend on knowledge. Socrates, however, doubts whether virtue can be taught and in doing so he removes from his own definition the basis which he desired to give to it.

But in spite of this Socrates thinks that he can prove that courage also consists in knowledge. The courageous man differs from the coward in that he shows no fear, and from the "dare-devil," on the other hand, in that he shows no daring intrepidity (dare-deviltry). The reason for such fear or lack of daring is always ignorance. Therefore, the nature of fear is ignorance of what is to be feared and what is not to be feared; the nature of courage is correct knowledge of these things.¹

4. The *Charmides* also assumes as self-evident that a virtue—the virtue here considered is temperance (σωφροσύνη)—must be useful to the person who possesses it. Furthermore, we are told that this is only possible if virtue gives man knowledge of what is good and what is bad. From the discussions of the dialogue we also learn that good actions are the result of a knowledge of the good. I believe that by carefully considering some of the conclusions of the *Charmides* we arrive at the result that we are not to judge the external consequence of an action as moral, but rather the will alone. To be sure, only a hint of this insight is here given; its development is left to the reader.

In this dialogue the epistemological (psychological) and logical investigations far outweigh the ethical. Nevertheless, much is gained thereby for the moral-practical concept temperance, as well as for every other virtue. They enable us to conclude that virtue, since its essence consists in knowledge,

¹ Compare with this definition Socrates' behaviour during the trial. He knows that the sentence of the judges and the death which follows upon that sentence have no misfortune, no evil for him. This knowledge makes him courageous.

must have a sound epistemological basis. If then we wish to state clearly what virtue is, it is necessary that descriptive ethics be completed by and based upon epistemology and psychology.

5. We continue with the *Euthyphro*. Here, too, the discussion centres around a practical, a moral concept, viz., piety, or the correct behaviour toward the gods. The point of contention is whether a command of piety arises from the fact that the gods prescribe it, or whether the command of piety springs from and describes the inner nature of piety, which even the gods must approve and call good. In the discussion Socrates calls attention to the close relationship between justice and piety. The good behaviour of man toward man, which is pleasing to the gods, is also essential to piety. The duties which bind us to our fellow men can never be set aside by religious commands. Even religious traditions must be subjected to the critique of reason before they can become binding and valid for us. For the purpose of clarifying the concept of piety, we not only have the conversation between Socrates and Euthyphro but also the excellent contrast between the two personalities. Socrates and Euthyphro meet in the porch of the hall of justice in which the cases which relate to religion and the cultus are tried. Euthyphro, the augur, has come to prosecute his father, who through negligence caused the death of a slave; Socrates has come to defend himself against the charges of impiety which Meletus has brought against him. In a talkative manner and with an air of importance, proud of his knowledge of the most extraordinary secrets of the gods, secrets which repel the finest human sentiments, Euthyphro informs Socrates of his purpose. Socrates, thereupon, asks him whether he is absolutely certain that he is not committing an outrage against the divine order of things. In an excellent discussion, G. Schneider has compared the two characters of the dialogue with the patriarch and the monk in Lessing's *Nathan der Weise*. This dialogue, like Lessing's drama, forcefully contrasts the two personalities and their attitude toward religion. The one is a genuinely pious

and simple man, who in his pure piety cannot be hard and brusque toward his fellow men; the other is a zealous and blind fanatic who, with all his ritual correctness and readiness to repeat dogmas offensive to reason and the most refined emotions, atrociously violates the yet unwritten laws of morality. There can scarcely be any doubt in the reader's mind as to which of the two men is truly pious and pleasing to the gods.

6. In the *Apology* Plato makes Socrates give utterance to the following ethical principles: A righteous man is not afraid of death, but only asks whether what he does is right or wrong. "Whatever post a man takes either voluntarily, because he considers it best, or in obedience to the command of his superior, there he must remain and face danger, without thinking of death or anything else, except disgrace." Were I to fear death, I would give proof thereby that I do not believe in the gods. Men are afraid of death because they imagine that it is the greatest evil. I do not pretend to know anything definite about the conditions in Hades, "but I do know that wrongdoing and disobedience to superiors, whether they be gods or men, is base and a disgrace." I shall always fear and avoid this; but I am not afraid of the unknown. I am determined to carry on my work even though I should have to suffer death many times. If you put me to death, you will not harm me but yourselves. "For I believe that the world is so constituted that the good man can suffer no harm from the bad one." Death, exile, the taking away of civic rights is no real evil; but an unjust sentence is an evil. If I were to attempt to appeal to your emotions and thus cause you to forget your oath, I would thereby teach you to deny the gods and would thus justify the accusation that I do not believe in them. Since I do not wish to harm anyone, I cannot wrong myself. It is impossible for me to live otherwise than I have lived. To do so would be disobedience to God and the abandonment of the real content and meaning of my life. That I do not defend myself any better is due not to a lack of oratorical ability, but

rather to a lack of shamelessness and flattering self-debasement which you demand as the customary tribute. However, I do not regret my action. I would rather die with a clear conscience than live with a bad one. "It is not difficult to run away from death; it is more difficult to run away from evil, for it runs faster than death." "No evil can befall a good man, either in life or in death; nor will the gods forsake him."¹

7. The *Crito* has the following contribution to make to our present subject matter: We are not to consult the unenlightened mass of humanity as to what is just or unjust, what is good and beautiful or their opposites, but rather the few enlightened experts. The mass of humanity is incapable of deciding between the good and the bad, and it can make an individual neither prudent nor imprudent. From all the deliberations which Socrates carried on with his friends during his long life, the following conviction became evident to them: To do wrong, or what is the same, to harm another is never good nor praiseworthy. Under all circumstances, therefore, a man is to refrain from wrongdoing regardless of the external consequences of his actions; and under no conditions is a suffered wrong to be retaliated. Socrates very well knows that on this point the opinion of the many is the exact opposite. He also knows that those who differ on this matter cannot understand each other and can never achieve anything in common. "They must of necessity look with contempt on each others' beliefs." A citizen owes respect and obedience to his state as a mark of gratitude for the immeasurable benefits which he has received from the very beginning of his life, because law and order prevailed. One's country is more sacred than one's parents; rebellion against its ordinances is worse than disobedience to one's father and mother. Just as, in the crisis of war, each individual must give his life for the existence of his country, so each must bear what the state imposes upon him by its laws

¹ This unshakable optimism throws its transfiguring light over all ethical principles thus far advanced.

and its courts. For whoever interferes with the execution of the laws by escaping their penalty undermines the existence of the state itself. Citizens are allowed peacefully to approve or to object to undesirable measures and to keep them from becoming laws or to have the laws changed; but at no time may they manifest overt insubordination. He who does this is guilty of disloyalty. By remaining in the state in which he grew up and from which he could have migrated at any time, the individual citizen silently pledges his loyalty to the state and acknowledges the duties which the state imposes on its citizens.

8. The dialogue *Gorgias*, in length equal to two or three of those already considered, is almost wholly ethical in content. It is in order at this point, therefore, to sketch the entire development of its arguments.

The logomachy which at the beginning takes place between Socrates and Gorgias arises from the question about the meaning and purpose of the art of rhetoric of which Gorgias claims to be a master. He assures us that rhetoric is concerned with the most important matters of life. Its purpose is persuasion and particularly persuasion as to what is just and unjust. It is sufficient for the orator that his audience believe his words. Knowledge is not demanded; it is not even necessary for the speaker. If the orator wished, he could even without such knowledge outwit those among the mass who really know and are experts in their field. But that would not be justifiable. Wherever such an abuse occurs, rhetoric is not to be blamed for it.

Socrates replies: Can it be that the orator has no need of a knowledge of what is good and just, etc.? Can it be that the teacher of rhetoric will not consider it his duty to give instruction about what is good and just to base and unjust individuals who come to him? Will he simply teach them the skill of exercising his art and so arouse the belief among the common people that the orators know their subject? Gorgias replies that this is not

true; that in matters of rhetoric the orator must have real knowledge.

Socrates answers that the orator must then be a just man. And the possibility of the misuse of the art of which Gorgias spoke would be an impossibility.

At this point, Polus, the pupil of Gorgias, takes up the argument. He expects to dispose very quickly of the individual who makes such assertions and who can hardly entertain them seriously. Consequently, he demands further explanations from Socrates. First of all, so as to be on a firm basis, he wants Socrates to admit that rhetoric gives its adherents the greatest power, since they can have their opponents exiled, killed, or their property confiscated. To his surprise, Socrates contradicts him immediately. If the advantage means the mere possession of power and if this is supposedly a good, then the assertion is fundamentally wrong. No doubt, the skilled orator will attain such results and thus accomplish what he considers to be good (for himself); but what is really good (for him) he does not achieve at all. Yet this is the real end of his desire; but the very thing which he really desires he does not attain. By the use of his art he does not achieve happiness but unhappiness.

Socrates continues that fundamentally this is the general conception, although influential individuals and the crowd contradict it. To do wrong is generally considered to be more disgraceful and hideous than to suffer wrong—even Polus agrees to this. If one inquires into the real meaning of the words “disgraceful” or “evil,” one finds that they mean whatever causes pain or does harm; whereas the beautiful, approved by popular opinion, is something which brings either gain or joy, i.e., produces pleasure, or both. In comparing two things, the one which brings more pleasure or gain is considered more beautiful, the one which produces more pain or does more harm or evil is considered uglier. If wrongdoing is more disgraceful or more evil than the suffering of wrong, it must also do more harm. (Certainly pain is more apt to be connected with the suffering of wrong.) Thus the doing of wrong would

not only be more disgraceful, but since it is more harmful, it would also be more evil. If a man has committed a wrong, no better thing can befall him than that he also suffer punishment for this wrong. Whenever we call a punishment just, we approve it. The reason for this approval must again be that the punishment is pleasant—which no one would affirm—or that it is beneficial, salutary. To suffer a deserved punishment if it is properly administered means deliverance from the greatest evil. If rhetoric keeps him who has done wrong from being punished, it brings him only harm.

With that Polus is disposed of. But Callicles, a clearer thinker and a more dangerous opponent, takes up the argument with Socrates. He honestly reveals the deep-seated causes of Polus' secretly cherished convictions. In the argument, two conflicting philosophies of life are dramatically defended. The one is that of the ordinary, practical politician trained in the art of rhetoric; the other is that of the theoretical man, lost in philosophic studies, who would like to reconstruct the world according to his theories but who meets only the greatest mistrust and almost complete rejection. Callicles argues: It should never have been admitted that the doing of wrong is more disgraceful than the suffering of wrong. It is true that this is the traditional position and that on it are based the accepted standards of right and wrong. However, by nature, the suffering of wrong is not only bad but disgraceful; it is slave-like and is unworthy of an honest man. Natural right (that "might makes right") is the right of the strong. His law is that the stronger shall rule over the weaker; the more able is to be preferred to the less able. Whoever enforces this law is a courageous man. Socrates objects that if the weak were to combine and by their combined strength impose their will on the strong man, this too would be in accordance with nature, and custom would thereby be set aside. Callicles refutes this objection by saying that he is really concerned with the rule of the intellectually superior, that these are the born rulers and are to be preferred to the others. Socrates replies that these would really be experts. If

we may conclude from the experts of any manual art, it follows that they themselves do not ask any special privilege at the expense of others; they only ask what really belongs to them. To this Callicles once more emphatically replies that the rule over the weaker, for which rhetoric trains the politician, is really in accordance with nature and is therefore, in spite of the cowardly admonition not to use force, the right and just goal toward which every able man should strive. If philosophy teaches the contrary, it teaches a slave morality which is of no use to the born ruler.

Unexpectedly Socrates now asks the question: Is it within the very order of, and demanded by, nature that those privileged individuals who are destined to rule over others must also rule themselves? Scornfully Callicles replies: For the strong and able man there is nothing more disgraceful and evil than self-control or temperance and justice, which are praised so highly by the weak and by hypocrites. No, to revel in unrestrained and unchecked freedom is true virtue and happiness. "Everything else is a mere bauble, customs of man contrary to nature, nonsensical talk without any value whatever."

Socrates begins anew; this time from another angle. Pleasure is to be identified with the good. We notice, however, that pleasure and the good stand in different relations to their opposites, pain and evil. Pleasure arises from the satisfaction of a desire born of pain. It lasts only as long as the pain. Thus pleasure and pain exist together. The good, on the contrary, cannot exist with the evil, nor well-being with non-well-being; in short, they exclude each other. Furthermore, if good were identical with pleasant, bad identical with unpleasant, then the greater the pleasure is which a man experiences, the better he would be; the greater his grief and displeasure, the worse he would be. The courageous man, whom Callicles himself considers to be better than the coward, without doubt, experiences displeasure when the expected battle does not materialize; whereas the coward rejoices over it.

Even Callicles cannot refute the force of this illustration. He now declares: Certainly one has to distinguish between the better and the worse pleasures, and when he spoke of pleasures he always meant the better pleasures. However, he makes the same admission which Polus had to make, namely, that it is not the pleasure in itself which is of value, but rather that everything is to be judged from the point of view of the useful or the good. One can be mistaken in this evaluation; this is not a matter for the second-best individual but for the expert. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance to possess correct knowledge of the good; because of its importance for the whole conduct of life, the meaning of the words "good" and "bad" requires the most serious reflection. On the contrary, there is no value in knowing what is merely pleasant, since it is only an imitation of the good. Philosophy tries to attain correct knowledge of the good; rhetoric takes the merely pleasant as its guiding principle.

The good is the end of action; whereas the pleasant is a mere means for the attainment of the good, not vice versa. Every art, including that of ruling, i.e., statecraft, must ask the question whether it aims at the good and produces it or aims at illusory pleasures. Examples from the trades show that a man can best show his skill and fulfil his task if he has a definite end in view and if this end guides his whole activity. Whatever an individual achieves in this realm by his art is good and useful in that it receives a unified, harmonious form and order which correspond to this purpose. Order, then, constitutes goodness; whereas the lack of it, or disorder, constitutes badness. Wherever the natural order of things is disturbed, it must, whenever possible, be restored.

Just as a thing is good in proportion to the order which essentially belongs to it, so the human soul is good; the ordered soul is better than the disordered one. It is at one and the same time wise, temperate, just, pious, and courageous; that is to say, it is perfectly good; and because of this, it is happy. The opposite is true of the unwise, undisciplined, bad soul.

Therefore, whoever wishes to be happy must strive for temperate prudence and while practising it must control himself. Should he ever fall into license and realize that he needs corrective discipline, he must bring it about for himself; he must do the same for his household and for his country. The undisciplined man is friendless and in his badness is forsaken by the gods. If it is true that justice and temperate prudence constitute happiness and that their opposites constitute unhappiness, then it follows that all the other contentions are true which were advanced above and which Callicles thought must be rescinded, especially the proposition that the doing of wrong is worse than the suffering of wrong.

Striving for political power brings with it the temptation to do wrong. This could only be justified in accordance with Callicles' proposal if the mere possession of life were the highest human good. Then also rhetoric, which may be used as a means to stave off the judgment of death in the courtroom, would have great value, although it would be of less value than the art of the engineer who, by his machinery of defence, can save the population of entire cities.

Once more the two conflicting philosophies of life are characterized. For one group pleasure is the guiding principle in life; for the other group it is the good which can only be attained by fighting pleasure. Socrates believes that he must hold to the latter position. If Callicles wishes to convert him to the other viewpoint by admonishing him to pursue a political career in accordance with his (Callicles') tastes, then Callicles must show himself an expert in this field. He is to tell from what famous master he learned his art and is to show that by practising it he has made some Athenian better, i.e., morally better and more prudent. That is the real task of the politician. The men whom Callicles holds up as great politicians in Athenian history would, indeed, when measured by this standard, appear very small; for they all neglected the most important task of the statesman. They flattered the populace and acted in accordance with its whims instead of restraining

them; they did not improve the people but only spoiled them. When the consequences of their actions were turned upon them by the conduct of the people, they had no reason to complain of ingratitude. Most assuredly, he who practises true politics, as perhaps Socrates alone is now doing, may expect persecution and death as his reward. But this is not important. Only the fool and the coward fear death and Hades; but it is the greatest and most terrible of all misfortunes if the soul laden with great guilt has to enter Hades.

The dialogue ends with a solemn, sermon-like discourse, the greater part of which is taken up with the mythical description of the last judgment and of future retribution.

From the deep emotional tone which pervades the whole dialogue and which in parts reaches the height of passion, we can see how greatly the author is personally interested in the ideas which his characters discuss. We do not have merely a dramatic account of the ethical position of the deceased master; it is rather a personal confession of the mature philosopher who, in a critical moment—I am tempted to say at the crossroads of his life—is forced to make grave decisions, fully conscious of his responsibility for them. The question is, Shall he accept the proposals of the party-politicians who promise him power and influence and who recommend the use of the deceptive art of rhetoric as a means to this power, or shall he remain loyal to his old teacher, Socrates? He chooses the latter at all costs.

It is difficult to determine definitely the time during which the *Gorgias* was written. I should like to place it in the year 390,¹ but there are some striking characteristics which favour the conclusion that the dialogue could not have received its final form until after Plato's Italian-Sicilian journey. The *Seventh Letter* informs us that even before this journey the almost forty-year-old Plato, who since his youth had had the desire to be faithful to the family tradition to be active in the politics of his city, had now become more and more indifferent to politics.

¹ Cf. *Platon*, I, p. 95.

Finally, the observation of the gradual deterioration of the conditions in the entire Hellenic world determined him to renounce politics completely. "When I considered the political events and the men who shaped them, as well as the laws and the moral conditions, it seemed to me that the older I grew and the keener my insight became, the more difficult it appeared that I could ever achieve success as a practical politician." He continues: After having waited in vain for a long time for a favourable opportunity to participate personally in politics, "I arrived at the conviction concerning all present states that they are in a sad plight. Their laws are almost unimprovably bad and only a miracle could bring about their betterment." In this mood Plato undertook his first journey to Italy and Sicily. This is also the mood in which the *Gorgias* was written. If, in this connection, we remember that evidently the old acquaintances and the good friends of Plato tried to win the talented young aristocrat for their plans and zealously encouraged him, much as Callicles did Socrates in this dialogue, then there can be no doubt that the *Gorgias* is Plato's solemn refusal to them. It says: I cannot go with you. It is impossible for us to work together profitably. Our ideals are too different. I have examined my way of life and have found it to be the right one; it is the one shown me by God. I shall not forsake it. Now it is your duty to examine your way and its goal. I can scarcely hope that you will do it seriously, but if you should, you would have to say: "The life which we lead is totally perverted."¹

But we must not be detained too long with personal matters. How is it with the ethical principles? How are they related to the ethical ideas developed in the earlier dialogues, which we regarded as being essentially Socratic?

We must now discuss the relationship of these ideas to the

¹ Callicles characterizes the impression which the argument between Socrates and Polus made on him by these words: "If Socrates is right, then the life which we lead is totally perverted." Socrates replies, "So it really is."

Protagoras. One might say that Callicles' doctrine of pleasure, which Socrates most decidedly rejected, is after all no different from the position which Socrates advances in the *Protagoras*. However, a more careful examination does not substantiate this.¹ What Socrates here without exception decidedly rejects is merely the position which places the good on the same plane with pleasure. After Callicles himself has changed his definition so as to call only the higher pleasures good, Socrates raises no objection but adds that only the expert can distinguish between good and bad pleasures. The useful or the harmful which accompanies the pleasure experience is set up as the criterion for this distinction. Thus it seems that the useful is again identified with the good, an identification which Socrates attempted in the *Protagoras*. The appeal to the expert has perhaps the same meaning as the declaration in the *Protagoras* that conflicting sensations of pleasure and pain, which may accompany each other or which may only be related through a common cause, must be measured by an adequate standard according to which the excess of pleasure is considered good and the excess of pain, bad. Whether this is also the position of the *Gorgias* will be determined in our discussion of the ethical problems of the later dialogues.

It is at all times well to observe that ethics can be treated from three different points of view: as the doctrine of duties, as the doctrine of virtue, and as the doctrine of goods. The man in simple cultural conditions will at various times make use of the three points of view as standards of morality without any serious conflict. He who, in his relationship to his fellow men and the gods, observes the existing customs is praised, respected, and honoured and is considered good; whereas he who does not observe but breaks them is despised, disciplined, and considered bad. In such a condition the individual member of

¹ Therefore, all conclusions based on this assumption are false and I need no longer be concerned with them. Only Aristippus' doctrine of pleasure seems to agree with that of Callicles. (Cf. above, p. 44, note 2, and p. 62).

society observes that obedience to law brings him gain; whereas the transgression of customs and law brings him harm. The individual who obeys customs and law is happy and contented. In this narrow, cultural condition where the individual is still subordinated to the group, and where there seems to be an indissoluble union between what custom prescribes and religion sanctions, i.e., between what is externally useful and what satisfies our innermost longing, the three concepts of what is in accordance with custom, of what is useful, and of what is strictly moral are interchangeable concepts—at any rate, they are concerned with the same thing. This was also true of Athens up to the time of the Persian wars. From then on the contact with other towns and peoples, which was more frequent, more intimate, and more varied, and the revolutionizing of the economic life brought forth that spiritual ferment which we call sophistry. Now scepticism and individualistic theories separate what custom prescribes in the name of the group from what the individual desires. On this level of human development, the doctrine of duties prescribes for an individual something totally different from the enticements which the doctrine of goods sets up, or from what the individual, after rational reflection, considers to be good. Socrates and Plato exert every effort to close the breach which has appeared between the conception of duty and that of virtue and the striving for happiness. They are convinced that virtue and happiness coincide, and from this standpoint they again give virtue and happiness the close relationship which they originally had in the popular mind, but which was gradually shaken by the individual losing his group-consciousness and by the questioning of sceptical philosophic reflection. We may go beyond the admission of Polus that whoever acts justly (i.e., virtuously) deserves praise, whereas the opposite action is blameworthy, and we may say that virtue is its own reward. The divided opinion about the good is once more unified; for, what benefits, what is useful to me (the hedonistic good) is moral (or morally good). If that is the case, then no one can refute our duty to

do the good. For the duties of morally good actions imposed on men have no other purpose than that they give them the greatest satisfaction and assure their happiness. If anyone has the selfish desire to go contrary to such a command, it may be allayed by the thought that only irrationality and narrowness of mind are responsible for it. The individual who has clear and distinct knowledge no longer considers a duty as an externally imposed demand. As an expert, he is at all times prepared in advance to do whatever duty imposes. For him who allows himself to be guided¹ willingly by Pepromene because he "has made God's will his will," there is no moral heteronomy but only moral autonomy. But he may also regard that as "duty" which has to be imposed on unwilling, obstreperous individuals, so that it may be universally fulfilled. Between the dialogues *Protagoras* and *Gorgias* there is a great difference in expression and in the use of words. In the *Protagoras* the words "pleasant" and "pleasure-giving"² included everything which in any way furthered human existence; they included everything which we designate as "valuable," especially the purely spiritual; in short, they included everything which calls forth aesthetic and moral judgments in him who passes judgment. In the *Gorgias* these words are limited to the popularly accepted usage and have a double meaning—they signify the strongest and therefore the most desired sense stimuli; they also signify the desire for honour and power. In thus limiting the meaning of these words it follows that pleasure must be wholly condemned. This type of hedonism is the exact opposite of the moral conviction and purpose of Plato, as well as of Socrates. However, if we observe that Plato abandoned this arbitrary restriction in later dialogues, such as the *Republic* and the *Philebus*, we must inquire why he makes an exception and accepts this limitation in the *Gorgias*. The reason for this I take to be that he must have noticed that the ethical principles which he made Socrates express in the *Protagoras* had been greatly misunderstood. In fact, the manner

¹ *Cleanthes frg.*, 527, Arnim.

² ἡδύ, ἡδονή.

in which he had characterized his master was little suited to correct the wrong notions which the mass of his Athenian readers had formed as to the dangerousness of this man.¹ The *Gorgias* attempts to correct these notions most emphatically by sketching Socrates' whole conception of life and contrasting it with that of the ordinary men of affairs, the conscienceless babblers and political aspirants.² In order to bring out this contrast clearly, he makes use of the ordinary mode of expression.

Thus I believe I have proved that the supposed contradiction does not exist in the ethical doctrines of the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*, the latter dialogue did not appear until Plato had passed through more than ten years of rich and varied experience. But we must not overlook the fact that certain things which are peculiar to the *Gorgias* are lacking in the *Protagoras*. I refer to the expositions about the definite nature and the inner order which a thing must have to be good; I also refer to the application of the ethical principles to politics.

Briefly, the following may be said on these points: If a thing, which has been produced by a human being, is good because it was produced in accordance with a purpose and that therefore its composition (i.e., the relationship of its parts) is in full accord with this purpose, then this definition is not in agreement with pleasure and pain, nor with the pleasant and the painful; one is more apt to find it related to the concept of the useful. For whatever can serve as a means to an end is for that reason useful, and whatever interferes with this end is harmful. However, the purpose by which the useful and the harmful are determined stands (as a good) above the useful and is not to be identified with it. Therefore, one can say that we have here a determining of the concept of the good; this definition

¹ Because of this the *Protagoras* must have been written at the same time as the *Lesser Hippias* (cf. note 1, p. 39) when no one, as yet, thought of bringing a serious charge against Socrates.

² This can readily be brought into harmony with the main purpose of the dialogue: Plato's personal pledge to the faith and ideals of Socrates and the rejection of the proposals of his ambitious friends.

ascribes a peculiar value to the good, makes it independent of pleasure and raises it above the useful. But we must remember that "purpose" has no meaning except as a purpose of a willing being who makes it the end of his action. Such purposes may contradict each other. For example, one individual's purpose is to dam up water, another's purpose is to make the water flow more rapidly. Callicles sets before himself the purpose of satisfying the constantly changing pleasures, while Socrates has a totally different purpose. If we make purpose the standard for determining the good, we are also threatened by the danger of relativism and nihilism unless there is a highest purpose which is valid for all mankind, in the pursuit and attainment of which individuals do not hinder but aid each other. Should we succeed in finding such a purpose, we should once more have to ask how pleasure and pain are related to it. For the present, since the *Gorgias* gives us no hint on this point, we shall be satisfied with the knowledge that we have indicated a difficult problem.

We shall defer our discussion of the political ideas of these dialogues until we can consider them in a larger context. And so we shall at last proceed to discuss other dialogues. ✓

9. The *Greater Hippias*, which investigates the concept of the beautiful, the pleasing (*καλόν*), also makes a not insignificant contribution toward the solution of the fundamental, ethical problem. Socrates wants to put the beautiful on the same plane with the useful; however, he immediately raises the objection that the concept of the useful or beneficial is always directed toward an end outside itself, and that this end cannot be anything else but the good.¹ Thus the good and the beautiful would not be identical but separate, just as end and means are separate; however, this is a false conception of their relation-

¹ This position does not contradict that of Protagoras. It is merely to remind us, as was done in the *Protagoras*, *Laches*, and *Charmides*, that a highest standard is essential for making a judgment about anything.

ship. But even this hint does not give us a complete explanation of the matter.¹

10. In the *Euthydemus* Socrates shows that it is the way a thing is used which determines whether it is good or bad for us; even spiritual merits, such as courage and inherent stability of being, can become evil through misuse. The only unconditioned good is the insight into what is beneficial for us, since it guides us in the right use of our abilities and assures us of our possessions. The only evil is incorrigible, vain conceit, and intellectual indolence. The same thought is once more expressed in the *Meno*, which repeats the proposition that every man desires the good. In a casual remark, the *Cratylus* infers from the sceptical and subjective propositions of the Sophists that no normative ethics can exist side by side with them, and that we are not justified in making a distinction between good and bad men. This is only the negatively critical reverse of a doctrine which must be supplemented by the *Protagoras* and the *Greater Hippias*, viz., that the good which we seek must be real,² i.e., its concept does not originate merely in subjective fantasy. If the theories of the Sophists are true, it has no objective reality. Every effort to discover a tangible and logical concept of the good would be useless—or, as the Sophists contend, it would merely be an idiosyncrasy which constrains individuals to differentiate between truth and error. They are no more justified in making this differentiation than are those who do not recognize it. The only guide left us for determining what is good are the ever-changing sensations of pleasure, which produce a good which appears different from moment to moment.

11. From the *Menexenus*, which is essentially a parody but

¹ I cannot, at this point, go into greater detail about this dialogue, whose genuineness I, together with other critics, doubted for a long time. A complete understanding of the *Greater Hippias* has been given us in an article by Apelt, to whom I referred on p. 39, note 1.

² The *Protagoras* expresses it by *πράγμα τι* (330c); the *Hippias* by *ὅν τι* (287c); cf. p. 100 f.

which also contains a serious section, we may cull a few beautiful moral maxims. "Without virtue every possession and pursuit are disgraceful and bad. All knowledge which renounces justice and all other virtues is clever trickery (cunning¹) and not wisdom." Be assured that "to a man who has any self-respect nothing is more disgraceful than to be honoured, not for his own sake but on account of the reputation of his ancestors. The honour inherited from one's parents is a beautiful and precious treasure; but it is dishonourable and unmanly to use up an inheritance, whether that be of possessions or of honour, instead of bequeathing it to one's posterity. That man who has within himself all, or almost all, conditions for his happiness and who does not depend on others, so that he is not moved by the vicissitudes of their fortune, is best equipped for life. He is the temperate, the courageous, and the wise man. When his riches come and go, when his children are given and taken away, he will show no excess, either in joy or in grief, because he is self-reliant."

12. The *Lysis* leads us far into the difficulties of determining the good, which Socrates is constantly trying to understand. I shall, therefore, give the complete development of its thought.

Expert knowledge alone entitles one to dispose of a matter. Even strangers subordinate themselves to the knowledge of the expert, because they believe they benefit by it. Friendship and love are rooted in the expectation of deriving profit from the friend or the beloved. But this does not yet explain the relationship which exists between friends. If one wishes to understand it completely and if one considers the language employed and examines one's own experience, one can see that friendship cannot come into being through a one-sided behaviour, either active or passive, of an individual who might be thought of as being the friend of another. Nor can friendship spring from a similarity of natures. The closer the bad man comes to another bad man, the more enmity will arise between

¹ *πανουργία*, cf. p. 311, note 1.

them, since the one fears evil from the other. It is true that the evil man does not remain like himself and cannot therefore resemble another. We may then venture the proposition that the good are friends of the good. But against this contention it must be said that the good man is self-sufficient, and therefore does not need completion through another. Rather it would seem that opposites supplement each other. Yet friend and foe, the just and the unjust, the good and the bad cannot be friends and find completion in each other. And if the good cannot be friend of the good and the bad cannot be friend of the bad, a third type which lies between these two and which is neither good nor bad must be considered. This intermediate type is friend of the good because of the evil which clings to it externally and from which it wants to be freed. Thus a man loves medicine because of his illness; the ignorant man strives for knowledge because he is conscious of his ignorance. From this we see that the lover has an end in view, the realization of which means for him the attainment of a denied good. Whatever he loves, e.g., medical art or learning, is therefore a means to an end. But the purpose itself is only loved and sought for a higher purpose. Health and expert knowledge are not unconditioned, highest ends. There must be a highest purpose, a first and unconditioned thing worthy of love¹ on account of which all other things which we love are dear to us, because they seem to image this highest purpose. Here again an objection may be raised: This highest good is of no value since it does not serve as a means to another purpose. In and by itself, it seems to be useless. It also seems that those who were threatened by or suffered from evil pursued the good merely because they were suffering from evil. And so the highest good, the highest purpose, would again be conditioned by its opposite, evil. Yet the following reflection will perhaps remove the difficulty: Whatever is dear to us is an object of our desires. The satisfaction of our desires can be either beneficial or harmful, or neither. If one imagines that the

¹ *πρῶτον φίλον.*

harmful, the bad, is no longer present, desire still remains and this desire, which is neither good nor bad, is directed on an object which is dear to it. Thus it is not the evil which is the cause of love, but desire. But we shall always desire whatever we need, whatever we are momentarily in want and deprived of, but which really belongs to us and is akin to us.¹ At least so it seems. But in the end new doubts find expression. It will be difficult to differentiate the related and the similar, and thus to escape the old difficulties which arose from trying to explain love as being the attraction of like to like. Or if we successfully escape this danger, we are again led to the position that only the good is friend of the good and loved by it. But this position also could not be maintained.

What is said here about friendship may be briefly summarized as follows: Friendship is a concept of a relation; the word designates a reciprocal relationship. At its basis there is on both sides a need which leads one friend to another. Men are indeed disposed toward the good, but they are nevertheless subject to errors, privations, and imperfections from which they desire to be free if their good predisposition has not been entirely destroyed by these defects. To this end any man can be of service to other men, provided that his virtue is based on expert knowledge and is superior to theirs. In such a person they will see their natural friend and he will gladly help them, since he as man also needs completion through others and in turn finds in them much that he lacks. So they approach each other, being alike in their striving for perfection, and unlike in that each one looks for and finds what he lacks in the other. About the good, we learn that it is the object of man's natural desires. It is the highest purpose which cannot be subordinated as a means to another end; but in itself it has an unconditioned value.² Everything which we ordinarily call good, and which we desire to possess as a good, derives its charm from it. In

¹ *Tὸ οἰκεῖον.*

² If one may use an expression from the *Symposium*, one may say *ἱκανόν.*

this purpose our being attains its end, the state of perfection, which as such includes the highest happiness attainable by us.

13. The striving for completion or for the attainment of the perfection of one's own being, which was made the basis of friendship in the *Lysis*, is also the fundamental thought of the *Symposium*. The speeches are made in honour of Eros or love as that affects the disposition and attitude of the human soul.

Diotima's speech reveals the nature of love to us; whoever loves, seeks the beautiful. But this is only one form and a special type under which human beings desire and seek the good. The desire for the good or for happiness, which brings with it the possession of the good, is ingrained as a fundamental impulse in the very nature of all men and is taken as a matter of course. If we define love with Aristophanes as a desire for the lost half of our own being, this definition can only be accepted on the assumption that we regard the good as natural, the bad as foreign to our natures. However, love is not mere desire for the possession of the good, but rather the desire for its everlasting possession. It is the desire for immortality in which the individual completely and heroically subordinates and sacrifices his own being, so that something new may come into Being. In procreation he transmits his very nature through the germ plasm to the offspring; in spiritual creation he places his stamp or character on whatever he produces. However, physical reproduction is only possible through the union of two individuals who are suited to each other and attracted to each other by their beauty. Physical beauty is immediately understood by all. Whoever is inspired by it follows a path which gradually leads him to higher and higher levels. As he advances, he recognizes that spiritual beauty is of greater worth than physical beauty and that the spiritual creations of love bring greater happiness than do the physical. On the highest level which human beings may attain in the common philosophic reflection of things he sees beauty absolute, formless, eternal, unchangeable, perfect in every respect; this beauty imparts its

beauty to all individual beautiful things. This vision of beauty absolute in its perfect purity gives to life the greatest content and the greatest value; the satisfaction which it brings is infinitely deeper and more lasting than that which a lower impulse of love or desire for immortality can give; it inspires to the highest and most fruitful achievements accompanied by divine blessing.

This characterizes the nature and goal of life which should logically be called "Platonic love." Its very essence is enthusiasm for the highest ideals and self-sacrificing devotion for their realization. But in the description of the different levels to which he who has been inspired by beauty absolute gradually rises, the conviction grows that beyond every attained end is still another, and that the ultimate and highest end is not attainable by human beings; it can only be intuited by devout premonition. But something more belongs to Platonic love. It is the consciousness that even the soul which is inspired by love and which in contemplation is carried into the highest realm of Being and beauty can at no time completely separate itself from the physical realm. It is always conscious of the fact that man is not spirit alone and that as a being constituted of soul and body he is subject to limits. These limits he wishes to overcome so that he may find satisfaction in creative activity. He cannot achieve this satisfaction by an action which confines itself to one individual, but by a creative activity which springs from co-operating with others and which is inspired by working with them.

I merely wish to make a few additional remarks. If happiness, which all men seek, can only be enjoyed by those who are still in this earthly existence, and if love is the impulse to sacrifice this life, we are justified in drawing the following conclusion: He who follows the impulse of love must derive such great and positive satisfaction from the consciousness that his influence continues to live on in others, who are indebted to him for part of the best that is in them, that the years sacrificed to such a service are fully compensated for by the brief hours

which have been elevated and transfigured by anticipating the happiness which would come to these individuals. The thought that in the future worthy individuals will appreciate the fruits of his labours and will bless his memory¹ raises him beyond the bounds of his personal existence. Only in this sense can one understand the determined sacrifice of one's life for the physical offspring, or the defence of one's spiritual creations and the vindication of one's teachings and principles. However, the knowledge that man is not self-sufficient, that he cannot be happy in complete isolation, is expanded by these reflections into the thought of the intimate relationship of all individuals, including future generations. Such knowledge is the main pillar of every sound ethics. Later writings will give us the opportunity to investigate more carefully the relation of the beautiful to the good.

The speech of the inebriated Alcibiades in honour of Socrates follows almost immediately upon that of Diotima. Its purpose, after all the other speeches have been made in honour of Eros, is to present Socrates as a concrete example of the best human embodiments of Eros. In the *Gorgias* he was portrayed as the only true politician. Fundamentally, the two are not different. Ardent desire for moral ideals is the love that fills Socrates' whole being, a love which he kindles in the hearts of his friends by his spiritually creative work. The man who devotes himself to public welfare needs this love above all else. It alone enables him to be a blessing in the service of the common good.

14. In the *Phaedo* Socrates repeats and emphasizes his former convictions that life and possessions are of little value; in so doing he clearly indicates the religious basis on which these convictions rest. This dialogue contains no new ethical principles. Yet I must discuss a certain section, so that it will not be interpreted as if it and the *Gorgias* gave definite proof that Plato energetically rejected every hedonistic foundation of moral principles. It is here stated: Whoever considers death

¹ Compare the last words of Goethe's *Faust*.

an evil and only suffers it with the intention of escaping another, greater evil, and whoever denies himself certain pleasures because they would spoil for him other more enticing ones does not show true virtue, but only an absurd sham virtue. For "the true way to purchase virtue is not by exchanging pleasure for pleasure, pain for pain, fear for fear just as one exchanges larger coins for smaller ones. There is only one true coin for which all else ought to be sacrificed, i.e., wisdom. Wherever anything is bought with or sold for it, there in truth will be virtue, courage, temperance, justice; in fact, there every virtue will be present, and it matters little whether pleasure or care or anything else of this nature is present or absent. But wherever such values are severed from wisdom and are then exchanged, there only a shadow of virtue will exist which (in reality) is unworthy of a free man and which contains nothing true nor healthy. In truth, temperance, justice, and courage consist in the purgation from these sense stimuli, and wisdom itself is a purgation."

Wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is here praised as the pearl of great price is praised in the Gospels, for whose possession the wise merchant gladly offers everything that he has. The possession of wisdom alone makes true virtue possible. Without it whatever one praises as virtue is only hypocrisy and vanity. Thus these propositions are briefly summarized. However, we may state their essential meaning still more concisely by Socrates' well-known maxim: Virtue is knowledge. It is knowledge of the true good; it is knowledge about that which satisfies the deepest longing of mankind and brings about the desired happiness. The art of measuring and comparing an absolute value with lesser, merely relative values is not superfluous at this point.¹ No one is able to practise this art except the man who has expert knowledge; to him Socrates appeals in the *Protagoras*. From the time that Socrates identified virtue with knowledge, his conviction seems to be that there is only ONE

¹ In Jesus' parable also, the crowd does not know how to recognize the value of the pearl of great price.

value which is absolute, and that all other values depend on it and are conditioned by it.

I can find nothing here which would refute the contention which I have developed above (p. 57).¹

It may seem that the epistemological considerations (these we shall discuss later) of the *Phaedo* call in question whether we can know absolute value or the true good in our earthly existence, which is so greatly obscured by sense impressions and perturbed by the many temptations resulting from them, and whether we can apprehend this good in all its reality; or whether we must remain satisfied with a mere premonition or a foreboding faith of it.

It must not be overlooked that in the *Phaedo*, as in the closing myth of the *Gorgias*, there appear Orphic or Pythagorean ideas of a future life of the soul, which has been purged by the mysteries of the imperfections of this earthly existence. We are told that the highest desire of the soul is to be free from "the aimlessness and irrationality, the fears and fierce passions and all the other evils of human existence," and to dwell with the gods in a realm akin to it and at their side to enjoy pure happiness. To attain this goal those who truly strive for wisdom refrain from all bodily pleasures. For this reason, and not because they have petty mercenary ambitions, they are just, courageous, and virtuous, renouncing the body more and more, despising the vanity of fame and concerning themselves solely with the well-being of their souls. While this is no longer Socratic philosophy, we must ask, Is it Platonism? Shall we really accept the following statement as Plato's ethical confession? That virtue is a true (philosophic) virtue which is practised because we wish to enjoy heaven (and because we

¹ That the hedonistic doctrine of ethics in particular is not to be abandoned is evident from the answer which Socrates gives to the faithful Crito at the end of the dialogue, when he asks whether Socrates does not have a special request to make of his friends concerning his children. He knows none other than the oft-expressed one: They are to take care of themselves as best they can. This includes everything which others could possibly expect of them for themselves.

fear the torments of hell, as the *Gorgias* described them). Further investigation will show us something different.

15. We turn to the *Republic*. Here the task is to define justice. In the effort to determine what justice is, Plato also considers its relation to happiness, the natural end of all human striving. To begin with, we should know in what justice consists. The usual position that justice consists in doing good to one's friends and evil to one's enemies places expert knowledge at the basis of justice. But what is good and bad in any individual instance? Who is a friend and who is an enemy? Moreover this definition is wrong. For to do evil to a person or to harm him is the same as making him worse; to do good to a person is identical with making him better. Justice is at all events an attribute of a good man. Its task can never be to make a man worse. Only the unjust man will harm another. Thrasymachus begins to define. Justice, he says, is whatever is advantageous to the stronger or to the superior. As ruler of the state, he determines what justice is by the laws which he makes for his own benefit. Socrates reminds Thrasymachus that the ruler who makes these laws may be mistaken as to what is for his advantage; and Thrasymachus replies that such a ruler is really not superior, and that he does not understand the art of governing. It is to be presupposed that the superior individual has correct knowledge of what is to his advantage. Socrates reminds him that this implies expert knowledge, which lies at the basis of every practical art. The task of this expert knowledge is to discover what is beneficial for certain conditions, and then to carry it through. But such a knowledge is not concerned with benefiting him who possesses it and who because of it deserves to rule over others; it, like the art of the doctor and the herdsman, is rather concerned with benefiting him who is the object of the art and who is subject to the master of this art. Thrasymachus replies in the same vein in which Callicles replied in the *Gorgias* that this is not justice but stupidity; and that its opposite, or what is commonly

called injustice, is more rational and more honourable. He maintains that the tyrant, who by injustice subjects simple "just" men, is an object of universal envy and admiration.

Social organization and the happiness or unhappiness of the individual depend on the decision as to which of the two conflicting positions is true. At the centre of the conflict stands the proposition of Thrasymachus that the unjust man is an able, expert, as well as shrewd man, and that he is happy in the unjust life which has given him his position of power; whereas the opposite is true of the just man. This proposition, however, does not withstand criticism. The sagacity of the expert in any field consists in not asking favours for himself at the expense of others; only fools do that. Co-operation with others, which gives strength, is impossible when complete injustice rules. Not even a band of robbers or thieves can exist if its members do not practise justice toward each other.

In order to investigate the problem of happiness, it is necessary to observe that everything in the universe has its peculiar station and task (*ἔργον*), its particular purpose which can best be accomplished by it. Virtue is the right state or condition which enables each thing to do its own task best. As the function of the eye is to see, of the ear to hear; so the function of the soul is to rule, to contemplate, to live. It attains this end when justice rules, not when injustice is supreme. From this it follows that the righteous soul lives a better and happier life than the unrighteous one.

Thrasymachus can no longer advance rational objections. But the more serious listeners to this controversy between him and Socrates are not entirely satisfied. Glaucon observes that it has not yet been demonstrated that the doing of right in all circumstances is better than the doing of wrong. He distinguishes between three types of goods: (1) Those which are chosen solely for their own sake; (2) those which are chosen for their own sake and for their consequences; (3) those which are chosen solely for their consequences. The usually accepted

view is that justice belongs to the third class. It is looked upon merely as a makeshift for him who cannot attain the best: to do violence and injustice without punishment. No one would carry out the demands of justice if he were in possession of Gyges' ring, which makes its wearer invisible and frees him from the fear of punishment. If one looks upon the consequences of action, the righteous man is misunderstood and maligned and is worse off than the unrighteous man who knows how to keep up good appearances and outward decency; the lot of the one is persecution, disgrace, and martyrdom; the other has power and honour and brings the most splendid sacrifices to the gods.

Adeimantus adds: The usual exhortations to do justice seem as if they were not concerned with justice itself, but merely with the appearance and with the advantages to be gained thereby. Much is made of the divine blessing which comes as a reward to the righteous man; whereas he who practises injustice is warned against the terrible punishments of Hades; yet one also hears that these may be averted by elaborate expiatory sacrifices. If Socrates is to prove his point against Thrasymachus' contentions, he must show that justice is its own sufficient reward in that it makes men happy no matter what befalls them; that injustice is of itself perverted since it destroys man's inner happiness, the destruction of which is the greatest evil that can befall the soul.

In continuing the investigation of justice, Plato unfolds the constitution of the ideal state in which all virtues are realized. The organic structure of this state consists of three classes (the workmen, the soldiers, the rulers) which have their natural basis in the respective abilities and aspirations of the individuals constituting the state. The human soul is composed of three parts: The appetitive, which desires the things of sense; the spirited, which strives for honour and power; the rational, which is in need of higher intellectual activity. The greater mass of humanity is most strongly inclined to matters of sense. This mass of human beings is adapted for material production

and constitutes the tillers of the soil and the artisans. This class forms the basis for the life of all citizens. A small number of human beings is inclined toward the spirited and courageous, and in them the striving for honour is stronger. These are the individuals best fitted to be soldiers and guardians, and in time of crisis they must be able to defend the state against the attacks from without and from within. The small minority in whom the intellectual interests predominate—one may call these philosophers—are to be singled out from the soldiers and are to be entrusted with the affairs of the state. The wisdom of the state consists in the fact that the ruling class know what is required for the welfare of the whole state. The courage of the state consists in having the soldiers know what is to be feared and what is not to be feared; they must hold to this conviction against all temptations which may arise from pain and pleasure or fear and desire. The temperance of the state consists in having all citizens agree as to who is to rule in the state. The justice of the state consists in having all its citizens (women included) occupy their respective positions and there perform their duties and tasks, not meddling with the affairs of others. Such conduct makes the other virtues of the state possible and maintains them. There can be no doubt that the state thus ordered is happy, whereas the opposite behaviour will end in harm and in the destruction of the whole state.

This constitution of the state and the virtues proposed for it correspond to the ordered nature of the human soul and its virtues. In man, justice consists in having each of the three parts of the soul fulfil its particular function. The wisdom of the soul consists in having reason (the smallest part of the soul) rule, guided by the knowledge of what is best for the whole soul as well as for its parts. The temperance of the soul consists in the unanimous agreement of the parts and in the understanding as to which among them is to have the leadership, etc. Again there can be no doubt that the soul which is in such a state is healthy, beautiful, and happy. One need not inquire at length whether it is advantageous for the soul to be just and to

act justly or to be unjust; this latter action would result in meddlesomeness, disorder, and confusion.

There are four types of defective constitutions. Since the peculiarity of the constitution of a state depends upon what side of human nature manifests itself in it, it follows that there are types of human character which correspond to each of these constitutions of the state. The kingly man corresponds to the ideal state. Next in order is the timocracy in which the striving for honour is the most powerful impulse. A considerable distance lower is the oligarchy where the rich rule. The man who corresponds to this form of the state has subordinated his spiritual powers to the amassing of wealth and has made mammon his god. Still lower is the democracy with its unbounded freedom, and the theoretical equalizing of all rights and claims of its citizens who differ greatly among themselves. The individual who corresponds to this constitution is entirely without principle and character. And finally, farthest removed from the ideal state is tyranny, which is the outgrowth of democracy; in it there is the arbitrary rule of the individual, a rule which respects neither law nor freedom; it is built up on hirelings and slaves and crushes the opposition of the good and able citizens. Similarly the tyrannical man despises every law and is filled with shamelessness and licentiousness, slavishly serving the lowest passions and refraining from no crime in his effort to satisfy his lust.

The question is whether a man of such absolute badness should not also be considered as altogether unhappy. The argument up to this point leads by analogy to the conclusion that individuals, as far as their virtue and well-being are concerned, act in the same way as the states whose constitutions resemble theirs. It is self-evident that a state which is governed by a king is better than one in which the arbitrary will of a tyrant holds sway. No one who has a penetrating and all-comprehending vision and who is not blinded by the ostentatious display of the ruler and his immediate surroundings can fail to observe that the former state is the happiest and the

latter the unhappiest. He who wishes to compare the corresponding individuals with each other must likewise penetrate their innermost thoughts, fathom the hidden conditions, and reveal the sorrows and emotions of their lives. He will observe that just as the tyrannical state is in unworthy and wretched slavery, so the soul of the tyrannical person is miserably enslaved because the highest nature is ruled by his lowest and wildest nature; just as this state can do nothing that it should like to do, so it is impossible for this soul to have its own way (cf. p. 50); instead it is forced to do otherwise and as a consequence is constantly filled with agitation, confusion, and remorse. In addition such a soul is in spiritual poverty and is always filled with unquenched desire, fear, misery, and pain. To give such a man the unlimited power of a tyrant only increases the misery in which he already finds himself.

But as we are here concerned with "the most important thing—a good life," a more detailed consideration must be given. We must follow it, even though it takes us into psychological and ontological problems, which, according to our plan, we were not going to touch until later. If we imagine a wealthy slave owner who, with his entire horde of slaves and possessions and with his wife and children, has been transported to an isolated region where no one can help him and where the inhabitants hate him and show enmity toward him, then we have the counterpart of the position of the tyrant. What will be the natural outcome? On all sides he sees himself and his own threatened by danger. He must condescend to unworthy flattery and favouritism; he will spend his whole life in miserable fear; like a woman he will confine himself to the house and deny himself the most enticing pleasures which he enviously sees others enjoy. That is the lot of the real tyrant who is placed in the position of ruling others while he does not know how to rule himself. (This would be like encouraging an invalid to play the rôle of a prize fighter.) Certainly he is even worse off than the man who has the nature of a tyrant but who lives the life of a private citizen. Already "jealous, faithless,

unjust, friendless, and impious, capable and guilty of every vice," he is therefore a curse unto himself and to those depending upon him. From day to day this condition becomes worse through the pressure of his environment and "in truth, even though people do not detect it in him, he is a slave of the meanest and lowest kind, a flatterer of the vilest of mankind. He does not find the least satisfaction for his desires. Whoever could look into the depths of his soul would see that he is poor and that most of the time his desires are not satisfied. All his life long he is beset with fear and is tormented by his conscience and the fear of death."

The final decision will not be difficult: Human beings stand in the same relation to their happiness as they do to their virtue. The kingly man takes first place; then follow the timocratic, the oligarchical, the democratical, and the tyrannical. The happiest of all is the best and most just; the unhappiest is the worst and most unjust, and it matters little whether men or gods know of his justice and injustice or not.

A further proof may be given when one begins from the division of the human soul into three parts and their corresponding impulses and desires. Human beings were divided into three classes in accordance with whatever impulses or desires predominated (cf. p. 73 f.). If one asks the individuals of the three different classes what way of living is the most pleasing, each one naturally will praise his own and will recommend the pleasures of that part of the soul which dominates his life, and he will disparage the other pleasures. Only one of these individuals can be right in his judgment. This judgment depends on experience, rational meaning, and logical thinking. The philosopher has a richer experience than the other two classes. He knows the bodily needs and their satisfaction as well as he who makes them his only pleasure; for everyone from childhood up has had to satisfy the needs of his body. Besides, the philosopher also knows the joy of the timocratic man, since honour is bestowed on him as it is on anyone who accomplishes anything; honour is even shown him who does

no more than amass great wealth. However, the philosopher alone knows the true joy which springs from the possession of knowledge and from the contemplation of ultimate reality. Further, he unites reason and experience; besides, only he is really familiar with the use of logic (λόγοι) or the art by means of which decisions are made. That pleasure which he considers the highest must, therefore, in reality be the highest. The pleasures of the warrior and the timocratic man are placed second in rank while those of the lover of money and of the man of the world rank last.

A final and really decisive proof lies in the fact that only the pleasure of the rational man is completely true and pure; all others are only theatrical sham. Between the contradictory stimuli of pleasure and pain there is a quiet, neutral, intermediate state of the soul. This state is not induced by sensation and (contrary to what it really is) is experienced as highly pleasant and conversely as highly painful, depending on whether the state follows and is contrasted with a pleasant or painful experience. Most of the physically conditioned and strongest pleasures are a result of the transition from the painful experience to this intermediate state, i.e., they arise from the subsiding of the pain experience. But the decrease of pain and its absence in that quiet, intermediate state are not a real pleasure but only a make-believe one. Besides, the material, which is subject to change and decay, is less real than the spiritual. If the pleasant consists only in the fulfilment of a need with which nature has endowed us, then the agreeableness of the pleasure must be by so much more real and true as the need is real and its satisfaction is true.

The intermediate state between the opposites can easily be mistaken for one of the opposites. This error may be illustrated by a road leading from a valley to the mountain-top. The traveller who has climbed half-way and who does not see the summit mistakes the half-way point for the summit and begins to descend. This may truly be called a descent from his point of view, but he knows nothing of climbing the rest of the way

nor does he know the summit. Or we may compare it to the optical illusion which makes grey beside black appear white. Individuals who, without reason and virtue, care for their bodies only and so do not attain real satisfaction may be compared to those who have never reached the top of the mountain but who at the most have only reached the half-way point. Or they remind us of the Trojans and Achaeans who, according to Stesichorus, fought for life and death about the phantom of Helen, while the real Helen had been spirited away. Similarly such men enjoy only phantoms of true happiness, since their every pleasure is mingled with pain. Those who are irrationally seeking to satisfy their thirst for honour and who persist in their stubbornness and their every whim may be compared to the sensual natures (third class). The impulses of those parts of the soul which desire possessions and victory can only find their highest, truest, and most corresponding satisfaction if they willingly follow the rational or philosophic part of the soul. On the contrary, if the right relation does not exist between the different parts of the soul, and if instead the lower impulses are in control, then these impulses cannot attain the corresponding satisfaction, nor will they permit satisfaction to the other parts of the soul. Least of all is that part of the soul which is farthest removed from reason and which is given to passionate love and to arbitrary tyranny capable of such satisfaction. From this it follows that the tyrant gets the least happiness out of his life while the kingly man, whose soul is well-ordered, obtains the most.

The difference between the true and complete happiness of the one individual and the sham happiness of the other can scarcely be described. The life of the former possesses infinitely more decorum, beauty, and virtue than that of the latter.

Without assistance most people cannot attain the properly balanced soul which is the sole presupposition and condition of true happiness. Only the "kingly" or "philosophic" natures, whose noblest part of the soul is strong enough to keep the other two in subjection, can attain the well-balanced soul. All

other human beings can only find their salvation if they choose a man with a well-balanced soul as their leader and confidently submit to his guidance. He who has been selected as such a leader is not interested in exploiting his subordinates as Thrasymachus thought he naturally would be; instead he aims at the realization of a universal rule of reason which is to make all men more or less alike and friends of one another.

It became evident in the *Charmides* that the meaning of the good could not be ascertained with certainty without previous philosophic and ontological investigations. These are chiefly undertaken in the *Republic*, and they are so developed that, if one takes into consideration the hints which have in the meantime been given in other dialogues, there can hardly be any doubt as to the close relationship between happiness and what is morally good.

If we consider the outline and the trend of thought in the *Republic*, it immediately becomes apparent that Plato, following the hints of his master, put forth every effort to give ethics an eudemonistic basis. We cannot help noticing that Plato made such an attempt in the *Protagoras*. However, it does not seem entirely impossible that the conclusions there reached did not represent Plato's own convictions; and we have seen that some scholars think that these views are corrected and refuted in the *Gorgias*. But the *Gorgias* also advocated moral principles which sounded extremely eudemonistic. We shall have to consider very carefully before we set the issue aside as secondary, since it is in perfect agreement with what has just been emphasized in the *Republic*. Upon comparison of the main ideas of these two dialogues, a striking similarity is apparent; and in many places of the *Republic* one can recognize a deliberate and emphatic confirmation of the affirmations of the *Gorgias*. Further, the *Menexenus* in its characterization of the virtuous man, who embodies all conditions for happiness, and the *Symposium* in Diotima's lucid discourse,¹ where it is main-

¹ Some ideas of the *Republic* can be readily harmonized with the profoundest thoughts of Diotima's speech. The necessity of the

tained that the striving for happiness is ineradicably ingrained in all human beings (see p. 66 f.), give us definite evidence that Plato seriously considered eudemonism (or, if one wishes, hedonism).

And yet it would seem as if Plato were not entirely satisfied with his subtle eudemonistic-deterministic theory, which appears to give a satisfactory solution. Just as in one section of the *Gorgias* we had an unusual explanation of the good which did not easily fit into this theory,¹ so we have a similar thing happen in the *Republic*. It deals with the question concerning the ultimate aim of the education which the prospective leaders of the state are to receive for their preparation. Here the contention is made that the choicest objects of knowledge may be found in justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom. Yet above these is a higher good about whose knowledge man should be most deeply concerned, namely, "the Idea of the good to whose co-operation it is to be attributed that the just, etc., is useful and advantageous." It is unfortunate that we cannot have exact knowledge of this highest Idea, as such a knowledge would give validity to all other knowledge, just as the unconscious, unreflective possession of the good makes every other possession valuable. The multitude, Plato continues, identifies the good with pleasure; the more enlightened, however, identify the good with insight (*φρόνησις*).² If they wish to ridicule us for our ignorance, their reasoning is circular; and they make themselves ridiculous in that one group in its further explanation identifies the good with the knowledge

state is implied (cf. p. 67 f.) in the conception of love as presented in this speech. Similarity in nature or what belongs to our natures (*οikeῖον*) is nothing other than that which completes and perfects the one-sidedness and insufficiency of the individual. The good each one longs for is this supplementary perfection, which is impossible without personal surrender and productive co-operation. The state is the organization which assumes the responsibility that those individuals who are similar in nature come together.

¹ Compare pp. 53, 60.

² Compare p. 69.

of the "good"; whereas the other group excludes the bad pleasures which, according to its definition, are really a "bad" good. Yet all agree that the good is that which every creature should unconditionally strive for, and that no one is to be satisfied with a semblance of good but only with its reality. Only an illustration can in some measure make clear the nature of the Idea of the highest good. As the sun, the giver of light, without which there can be no sight, is related to our eye to which it gives the power to see and by means of this power the sun, like other objects, becomes visible to the eye; so in the realm of thought the Idea of the good is related to the knowing subject. In the first place, the Idea of the good makes the knowing faculty effective and, in the second place, it gives the objects of knowledge their true Being. As the sun in the sky rules in the realm of the visible and gives the objects in the visible world not only their visibility but also their Becoming and growth, while it itself has no Becoming; so the good is the mediating cause not only of the knowability of all objects of knowledge but also of their growth and Being, excelling even essential Being (*οὐσία*) in nobility and power.

This exposition is difficult to understand and Plato knows it. He makes Socrates give definite expression to it and his keen, attentive companions in the conversation, Adeimantus and Glaucon, declare that they were not able to follow very well. The difficulty lies not merely in the fact that here metaphysical concepts appear, whose full meaning can only be explained by another thought—the concept of the IDEA combined with the sharp contrast of Being and Becoming. For the present it is sufficient to say that the "Idea" (*ἰδέα*) of the good is interchangeably used with "essence" (*ἐξίς*) of the good, and that we are not to understand anything else by these expressions but the exhortation: The thought which we associate with the word "good" is not to be a mere fancy but is to have independent reality. In other words, that which we think to be good is not posited by this thinking but is presupposed by it. Or to express it in another way, that the world or reality is really such that

we have good reason to designate it as good, that the good may be regarded as ruling in it.¹

The real difficulty, however, lies rather in the fact that such a good which holds and supports the world, i.e., the ruling of a rational, divine power in cosmic Being and Becoming, cannot be rationally proved; therefore this thought remains a postulate.² Only by analogy can we support our faith in it. If we assume the postulate, and if we accept it as true, then with its validity we have gained a concept of the good which, if it does not refute eudemonism entirely, at least takes away much of its force.

We have often heard that every creature strives for pleasure or for happiness. In the *Symposium* the striving for the good is presented as being so self-evident that there is no reason to look for a deeper basis. If in addition it was said that every creature necessarily strives for the possession of the good, the good appears to be identical with happiness and both words are synonymous and interchangeable. There can also be no objection to substituting happiness for the good in the following oft-repeated propositions: Whoever is deceived as to the content of the good will in his error be led to the wrong striving; or absolute, scientific knowledge of the good in its true reality is not obtainable (from which is to be inferred that spotless virtue and perfectly unerring correct striving are also impossible). However, we are also told that the good gives all things their Being. It is the source and basis of all reality as well as of all knowledge of reality. If in these propositions we interchange the terms which seemed so unobjectionable a while

¹ Or: the Idea of the good is to be understood as the objective basis for our correctly formed idea of the good. The existence and comprehension of this Idea are the ground and guarantee that the content of our idea is true. Conversely, as long as we do not apprehend the Idea of the good, our idea of the good cannot be true.

² I contend that in my opinion this thought constitutes the fundamental postulate of all (Socratic) Platonic philosophizing, and that Plato was conscious not merely of its epistemological implications, but also of its religious significance. We shall meet this thought again when we discuss Plato's religious conceptions.

ago, i.e., if we make happiness instead of the good the subject of our propositions, they will take on a nonsensical and almost frivolous meaning. Plato expresses this by letting Glaucon, who is astonished by the characterization of the loftiness and the transcendency of the Idea of the good, make the doubting remark that pleasure can hardly be meant by this. Socrates denies the identification by giving the argument a new turn, such as is customary when one warns against the sin of disturbing a religious devotional attitude.¹

In the *Gorgias* the question was raised whether there can possibly be a single purpose which is valid in the same degree for all men, and whether this purpose can be safely set up as the norm for passing judgment on the relation of the good to the status of happiness. With Plato's meaning, I believe that we can answer this question affirmatively by propositions which can be derived from our considerations up to this point; but these propositions need further development and additional proof, which will be advanced later.

According to the *Lysis* (see p. 64 f.), the highest purpose valid for all men is to attain that condition in which they achieve perfection. According to the *Republic*, this highest purpose is attained when the soul is in that state of Being which can also be called justice (or virtue in general) and consists in having reason rule the passions and the sensuous desires. We may then say that wisdom shows itself when reason is the undisputed ruler; courage shows itself when the passions take the hints of reason and suppress all stimuli of irrational desires; temperance shows itself when there is a willing subordination of the striving powers to the ruling power. This is a condition which is repeated on a larger scale when individuals unite for mutual perfection in an ordered state. A standard, but not a cause, for the correctness of the constitution of the individual, as well as for that of the community, is to be found in the degree and the intensity of the pleasures which proceed from it, so that

¹ *Εὐφήμει*, 509a.

the good is most certainly indicated by happiness but is not determined by it.

We cannot know the ultimate reason why the highest and purest pleasure is bound up with the voluntary activity of reflection.¹ Only because everything was so arranged from the very beginning and because human nature was placed under this natural law, can the moral world with its beauty and dignity persist. Moral attributes, such as justice and temperance, are really valuable and good² only because the "Idea of the good" and a good rational cosmic power rule in the world (cf. p. 82). Ethics is here connected with theology, and with it rests upon the belief in a God who embodies all spiritual perfection. The notion of man's relationship to God, a relationship which we shall consider later, is also of significance for Plato's ethics.

For the present we shall merely say the following: Love is implanted in every human breast and is the desire for perfection. In its development it serves as a mediator between God and man. Eros is thus described by Diotima in the *Symposium*, and the *Phaedrus* (which is later than the *Republic*) characterizes Eros in the same manner. Here it is also said: Love is God-inspired or divine madness which makes our soul wing its way in ethereal flight, and in the enraptured vision of the beautiful it produces in us a greater state of happiness than could ever be attained by the minute and careful reasoning of exact science. The *Greater Hippias* has already told us of the absoluteness of beauty and its unconditioned value. Even if beauty is not identified with the good, it nevertheless seems to be mysteriously and inseparably connected with truth and the good; it is like an outer shell in which truth and the good are enclosed and which reveals them to us. If beauty is really

¹ In which the rational moral activity is always thought of as being necessarily included. (Cf. what was said about Eros on p. 66 f.)

² Hints were even given in the *Gorgias* that with the cosmic order the laws for man's rational activity (as a condition for his happiness) were given. 507ef.

absolute and of unconditioned value, then the hidden or invisible good, which is intuitively revealed to us, cannot be relative or conditioned. However, it would be relative if it derived its value from the emotional experience which indicates its presence—i.e., from the experience of pleasure which an individual may have.

CHAPTER II

ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE EARLIER DIALOGUES (TO 367)

1. The survey of Plato's ethical teachings has brought us to the dividing line which separates the *Phaedrus* from the *Theaetetus*. We turn now to the earlier dialogues to consider the other philosophical ideas. First of all, we enter the realms of Being and knowledge. Here the so-called doctrine of Ideas claims our attention.

In the *Phaedo* this doctrine arises in a most striking manner. In order to obtain the proper understanding of the theory of Ideas from the very beginning, we wish to pursue the whole trend of the argument of this dialogue. On the last day of his life, Socrates discusses the meaning of death with his friends. He shows that death has no terrors for the philosopher. For since death separates the soul from the body, it brings to full realization what he who strives for true knowledge has practised all his life—by thought to grasp Being itself, the very essence of things. This Being cannot be apprehended by the sense organs; just as the sense organs cannot grasp magnitude, health, or power in themselves, so they cannot grasp the just, the beautiful, and the good in themselves. Knowledge of these objects is best attained by him “who approaches them by thought (*διανοία*) alone, making use neither of sight nor of any other sense in this thought process but rather, with the aid of absolute and pure thought, he must attempt to comprehend purely and absolutely each one of the real objects, in that he sets himself free as far as possible from eyes and ears and in short from the whole body, convinced that these only confuse him and hinder the soul from attaining truth and wisdom (*φρόνησιν*).” To the objection raised, that the soul would be destroyed by its separation from the body, Socrates replies with the argument that all Becoming and

passing out of Being can only be understood as proceeding from its opposite state and can only take place in a cycle. As waking corresponds to sleeping, so life corresponds to death. Everywhere we observe the passing from death to life.—That our souls have pre-existed is also substantiated by the learning process, which can only be characterized as logical and without contradiction if it is thought of as a reminiscence of what was known in a previous existence. The psychological analysis of ordinary memory based on earlier sense impressions also bears testimony to pre-existence. For example, the similarity which we always observe in such an act of memory, we become conscious of through a comparative activity in which we use the concept of the equal as a standard. This standard does not have its origin in our sense perceptions; for all the objects of sense which we experience to be equal are not perfectly and absolutely equal. They are only equal in the sense that what appears equal to me now appears unequal to another person as well as unequal to me from another point of view; whereas the equal in itself must appear equal to all men at all times and without deviation, and the unequal in itself must appear as unequal. Consequently no one can confuse (conceptual) equality with inequality. What is true of the concept of the equal is naturally also true of the concept of the greater and the less, as well as of the beautiful, the good, the just, and the holy in themselves; in fact, it is true of everything of which we predicate Being by means of our questions and answers. We must have obtained knowledge of all these things before our birth. Socrates continues: The pre-existence of the soul is as certain as is the objective reality of the concepts with which philosophic investigation is constantly concerned—the concept of the good, the beautiful, etc. It is to this reality that we refer the definiteness of our sense stimuli, as to something which was present in us before the sense experience and which serves us as a standard for it. Besides, it is clear that only the composite can suffer dissolution, never the simple. Only those things are composite which act differently under

different circumstances; whereas that which remains always the same is of a simple nature. Thus the conceptual or "Being in itself (*αὐτῇ ἡ οὐσία*) of whose existence we give account with our questions and answers" is simple. Every concept, as for example the equal, the beautiful, in fact every essential Being, is in and by itself simple and unchanging. But the objects of sense are compound and subject to change, and we give the same name to them that we give to the conceptual realities disclosed to us only in thought. Thus two types of reality are differentiated: the visible and the invisible. The body, without doubt, belongs to the first type, the soul to the second.

Then Socrates relates the development of his own philosophical thinking concerning this question. While absorbed in the theories of the old physical philosophers as to the causes of coming into and passing out of Being, he discovered contradictions everywhere and rejected their conclusions and haphazardly proposed a theory of his own. Setting out from Anaxagoras' position that an ordering mind brought the world into Being, he would have liked to give a teleological explanation; but in this he did not succeed. So as not to remain at a complete loss, he arrived at his own solution. It consists in seeking the truth of things in their concepts (or in the determining of the concepts: *ἐν τοῖς λόγοις*). In the course of a closer characterization of his procedure Socrates says: "I return to the oft-discussed things and begin with them in that I assume an absolute beauty, an absolute goodness, and an absolute greatness, etc." Proceeding from this assumption he maintains that the reason why individual objects show definite peculiarities or characteristics is because they participate in their corresponding concept or Idea—e.g., a thing is beautiful because it partakes of absolute beauty. On the contrary, he would not dare to say that something is beautiful because it has a beautiful colour or a beautiful form. He must leave the predication of such more definite causes to wiser men. His own explanation may perhaps seem simple and foolish, but

he must confine himself to it. He cannot even say anything about the manner of the communication of the sensible object with its Idea—whether it is present in it or whether both have something in common or whether they must be thought of as being related in some other conceivable way. In order not to become involved in contradictions one may merely say that a thing is greater than another because of its size, and a thing is smaller than another because of its smallness; one may not say that a man is greater than another by his head and because of it; afterwards it might become necessary to admit that he is smaller than a third man by the measure of the head. The reason that a thing has become two is not to be sought, if one proceeds carefully, in the addition of one to one or the division of one; but if we use the never-failing, fundamental assumption in both cases, it must be said that participation in duality is the sought-for cause. Nothing becomes what it becomes, nor does it receive a characteristic in any other way, except through its participation in the peculiar essence of this characteristic. From these propositions, which seem almost absurd because of their tautology, the discussion proceeds as follows:

It is evident that the general concepts or the Ideas ($\epsilon\iota\delta\eta$)¹ have objective reality, and that the concrete objects depend upon them. This dependence is such that the different characteristics of the objects are due to the different Ideas which are present in them. These characteristics bear the names of their corresponding Ideas. If, therefore, we make contradictory statements about an object, it is because that object participates in contradictory Ideas. Thus, e.g., Simmias is taller or shorter according to whether he is compared with Socrates or with Phaedo. His tallness is always tallness and can never be nor become short, just as little as size in itself can change. His shortness always remains short like shortness itself. If a person who was small becomes tall, he retains his nature, but shortness is no longer present in him; for it either takes to flight or

¹ This word suddenly appears here in 102b.

it is destroyed. Conversely, the same is true if a tall person becomes short. In fact, this is true of all things when they lose one of their characteristics and take on an opposite one.

Plato then proceeds to show that not only do the contents of opposite concepts absolutely exclude each other, but also that no concept admits an attribute which is opposed to any of its permanent characteristics or to any element which determines its form (*μορφή*). Snow always has the characteristic of being cold; fire always that of being warm. If heat approaches snow, then snow cannot absorb heat (i.e., become warm) and still remain snow; it must give way or be annihilated. The same is true of fire if cold were to unite with it. While the concept of the number three is not exactly the opposite of the even, it, nevertheless, necessarily has the form of the odd which is opposed to the even. For this reason, it can never have the characteristics of an even number; on the contrary, it is odd.

At this point it is well to pause a moment to consider certain details more closely. In this connection the word "Idea" (*εἶδος* in 102b) evidently designates not just a concept which is merely subjective, but a concept whose reality transcends the subjective realm. If the Idea is to be the cause of the attributes of concrete objects, which partake of its essence, it possesses independent and objective reality. It is at least as independent and original as all subjective reality or as every psychic experience.—To use Plato's expression: every soul or every part of the soul (later spoken of as every psychic faculty, e.g., reason) and its manifestations and productions (as for example an experienced pleasure, a conceived concept).

Previously it was said that certain concepts, such as the equal, the greater and smaller, the beautiful, the good, the just, are innate; or that our soul brings them into this earthly existence as definite standards, according to which we judge and order life's experiences partially in their external appearance and partially in their spiritual significance. It was also said that these concepts have objective reality. A neuter term

was used when speaking of them as the equal, the good, etc., and in order to make the meaning clearer the expression "itself" or "in and by itself," or the abstract nouns "equality," "inequality," "largeness," "duality," "unity," were used. The statement that our knowledge of these concepts was innate meant the same as what we to-day¹ mean by the *a priori*. But the term "Idea" was not yet applied. However, innate knowledge of size or of aesthetic norms and moral attributes consists in nothing else but what was elsewhere called knowledge of the Ideas.

A still sharper distinction must be drawn. It is not the conception of the equal, the good, etc., which is innate, but merely the capacity to call forth or arouse these conceptions. These conceptions then appear as being definitely related to something objective, which, if we may express it thus, constitutes their content. Yet, with all these expressions, we are in danger of being misunderstood. The words "conception" and "concept," which are common in epistemology and logic, have a decidedly subjective connotation; nor do we definitely escape the realm of subjectivity with the expression "content of conception" (*Vorstellungsinhalt*) or "content of concept" (*Begriffsinhalt*), as logic defines this content as being constituted of certain characteristics. Yet in the whole discussion with which our argument has been concerned, Plato wished to escape this subjectivity. Whenever he used the expression reality—whether that of the concept or of the Idea—he meant this objective independent reality. In this connection he thought that knowledge—including mistaken knowledge as well as imaginings—is an achievement or a condition of our reason, of our faculty to think and to conceive. But the peculiar feature of this achievement or condition, which differentiates it from all others, is that it attains truth and that it permits no uncertain conjecture nor error. Either this distinction between truth and error is valid or all of Plato's philosophizing has no meaning. Plato believes that this difference is rigid and in-

¹ With Kant.

effaceable. He postulates it and chooses the word *Idea* (εἶδος)¹ as the adequate term which enables him to pass from the logical content and the implications of a concept to its pre-supposed objective basis. The term *idea* taken in and by itself means the external form and appearance of a thing as well as its inner nature. For a long time it had also been used in the logical sense of designating the type or the species. Plato himself uses this term in all of these meanings. The word "Idea" in and by itself is of no great importance. What is meant by the expression "each Idea" at the point where we started to digress is the same as what was meant by the previous expression "everything of which we predicated Being." The same was also meant by "Being in itself of whose existence we give account with our questions and answers," and later by "essential Being." Previously Plato had also expressed this by "the essential Being of all things," "the pure Being in and by itself of each real thing," or more concisely "everything in its absoluteness" and "the things in themselves."² The examples given in what precedes the passage where the word "Idea" suddenly appears are "the just in itself, the beautiful in itself, the good in itself"; and again "the essence (οὐσία) of size, of health, of power," "the equal itself" or "the essentially equal"³ or "equality" with its opposite concept of "inequality"; and again "the larger, the smaller," "the beautiful in and by itself and the good and the large"; then "largeness," "smallness," "multitude," and further "duality," "unity."⁴

These examples make clear that the expression used to designate the matter under consideration (that is the objective reality of the generic characteristics which we conceive in

¹ In the *Phaedo* *idéa* is the characteristic or the definite form of a concept for which (cf. p. 91) *μορφή* was substituted once. Otherwise the terms *εἶδος* and *idéa* are interchangeably used and that with different meanings. This is explained more fully in the chapter "εἶδος, *idéa* und verwandte Wörter in den Schriften Platons" (*Neue Untersuchungen*, pp. 276 ff.).

² *Phaedo*, 65d, 65e, 66e.

³ *Phaedo*, 65d. In 75c this is expanded by "and the holy (ἅγιον)."

⁴ *Phaedo*, 74d, 100b, 101bc.

thought and to which our words refer) is really not developed into a definite technical term. The substantives, such as largeness, smallness, equality, have the same meaning as the neuter adjective used as a substantive. Where no misunderstanding is to be cleared up, Plato unhesitatingly omits such added expressions as ITSELF or ESSENTIAL (ὁ ἑστί) or both, or IN AND BY ITSELF used to emphasize the contrast between generic reality and the individual appearances which have its characteristics. It is also clear that as a substitute for the substantive SIZE the positive form of the adjective LARGE is used once; at another time the comparative LARGER is used.¹ Just as the expression "every Idea" suddenly appeared in 102b and replaced the expressions, which include all the individual characteristics of the species, "to which we ascribe Being" or "each essential Being in itself," etc.; so the word "Idea" could have been used for each example given of the objectivity of the generic characteristics. The "Idea" of the equal, the beautiful, the small could have been used instead of the essentially equal, the beautiful itself, smallness; or the "Idea" of size and health could have been used instead of their "essence." As a matter of fact, the possibility of the interchange was not made use of; instead up to this point, the term εἶδος, in the narrow and peculiar sense which we had to determine, is confined to a single passage; whereas all other possible descriptions of the subject under consideration are much more frequent.

Once the term Idea is introduced, it asserts itself and occurs again. It is true that of the three passages in which it is used in the further discussion,² two are not altogether clear. I have already made use of these passages and in doing so have spoken not of the Ideas, but of the content of concepts and of concepts. Not only do opposite concepts absolutely

¹ It is especially instructive to follow all the changes of this expression in the section which deals with equality, i.e., 74a-78b. Cf. *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 277.

² In this enumeration, I omit the passages where εἶδος, in accordance with common usage, means the external form and species. In the *Phaedo* there are five or six such passages.

exclude each other, but no concept tolerates a characteristic which is opposed to its nature. The concept snow does not permit the attribute warm; that of fire does not permit the attribute cold. However, the "Idea of life" is unambiguous in the proposition which refutes the proofs advanced for personal immortality as given in the dialogue. Here it is stated, "God, at least, and the Idea of life and whatever else may be immortal, as every one will admit, can never cease to exist." It is apparent that here the concept of life is not meant, but rather ultimate reality from which all life springs.

Let us return once more to the passage where Socrates describes his own method of the philosophic deliberation of things. He informs us that since he despaired of human inquiry which was limited to sense experience, and since he was not able to find a teleological explanation of the world, he took refuge in concepts (*λόγοι*). He continues, "and since I proceed in each case from the assumption which I consider to be the strongest, I accept as true whatever seems to be in harmony with it, and as false whatever does not agree with it." And immediately following, "There is nothing new in what I am saying; it is only what I have repeatedly said at other times as well as in our discourse of a moment ago." Soon thereafter follows the explanation,¹ "This brings me again to what we have so often spoken of," etc. If Plato makes Socrates assure us that he has "at other times repeatedly" spoken of the things here treated, we may expect to find evidence of this in earlier dialogues. We do not have to search long for it. Two of the dialogues, the *Symposium* and the *Cratylus*, not far removed in time from the *Phaedo*, contain related thoughts.

2. In the *Symposium* we heard of the various levels² which the lover climbs until at last he reaches the goal where he sees absolute beauty. This most felicitous object of vision is nothing other than the essential beauty of the *Phaedo*. Therefore, we may without hesitation take everything which Diotima

¹ See p. 89.

² See p. 66.

asserts about it as a supplement to that which we learned in the *Phaedo* about the supersensual realities, or Ideas. Above I sketched its content only in a general way and I shall, therefore, quote the main passage in full.

"Suddenly he who has allowed himself to be guided thus far sees a most wonderful beauty, even that on which all his former efforts were directed; a beauty which is everlasting, and is neither becoming nor decaying, neither waxing nor waning. It is a beauty which is not fair in one respect and ugly in another, beautiful at one moment and not at another, or beautiful when compared with one thing and ugly when compared with another, or beautiful in one place and ugly in another, or beautiful for one individual and ugly for another. Nor will he see this beauty in any phenomenon, whether it be that of a face or of hands or of anything else in which the body participates, neither in words of any kind nor in science, nor is it to be seen in any other body whether that be of a living thing or of the earth or of heaven or of anything else; it is rather beauty in and by itself, beauty absolute, unchangeable, always the same and always ONE; whereas all beautiful objects share in this absolute beauty in such a way that while they come into being and disappear, beauty absolute suffers no increase nor decrease, nor any other change. The true way to see beauty is to begin with the beautiful appearances here on earth and to use them as different levels or stages in the ascent to absolute beauty; to pass from one beautiful form to two and from two to all beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies to beautiful practices, and from beautiful practices to beautiful sciences until one arrives (with the aid of the particular sciences) at that science which has only absolute beauty for its object of knowledge and so attains the essence of beauty.¹ . . . Let us imagine it possible for a man to see absolute beauty pure, clear, and unalloyed, not weighted down with flesh and blood and colours and the vain show of mortality, i.e., to see divine beauty itself in its simple form.

¹ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστι καλόν.

Do you think that life is meaningless for the man who looks in this direction and with his spiritual eye beholds absolute beauty and holds converse with it? Do you not realize that life can only have meaning for him who sees absolute beauty and not its shadow; and since he beholds truth, he will produce true virtue and not its shadow?"

In this whole discussion the word *IDEA* is not used.

3. In the *Cratylus* the question centres on the origin of words used to name the thing spoken of and the correctness of this naming. Hermogenes maintained that the meaning of words in any language is arbitrarily determined and agreed upon. Whatever name anyone may give to a thing is, therefore, the correct name for that thing. Thereupon Socrates asks whether, according to this opinion, it is not only the name but also the essence (*οὐσία*) of things or of realities (*ὄντα*) which is subjectively conditioned, and whether Protagoras was right when he said that man is the measure of all things, and whether these things, therefore, are as they appear to each individual, or whether he believes that there is an unchangeable objective reality of things. In that case it would be true "that the things themselves have their own proper and permanent essence, that they are not distorted in their relation to us nor through our imagination in this or that direction; but rather that in and by themselves and in accordance with their own nature they are and behave as it was prescribed for them by nature."¹ This is not only true of what one ordinarily understands by "things" but also of their actions,² which constitute a type of reality as much as the things themselves.³ The fact is, Socrates maintains, that an action, e.g., weaving, can only be correctly executed when its own natural being as well as the object on which the action is directed and the means by which it is accomplished are taken into consideration. Speaking also is an action, and its purpose and being are the exchange of thought

¹ Apelt's translation.

² *ἀι πράξεις αὐτῶν.*

³ *ἐν τι εἶδος τῶν ὀντων εἶσιν.*

or mutual understanding. Whoever wishes to speak correctly must heed the peculiar nature of things and the conditions of which he is speaking as well as the means at his command. Just as the weaver uses the shuttle as his instrument so the speaker makes use of words. As the shuttle, which was made by a different art, that of the carpenter, is given to the weaver who is an expert in his art and to whom the use of the shuttle rightly belongs; so the use of words, which were formed by another, rightly belongs to him who understands the art of teaching. The skilled artisan who makes instruments regards nothing but the purpose which they are to serve. The carpenter forms the shuttle while "looking at what it is naturally best adapted to weave."¹ "Suppose a shuttle breaks; he will not, while making another, look at the broken shuttle; but rather to the Idea² which guided him while making it." This may be called the "essential (ideal) shuttle."³ The former of words, the creator of a language, proceeds in a similar manner. When making a thing, the tradesman takes into consideration special types of his ideal; e.g., in making shuttles, he will make different shuttles for fine weaving and for coarse weaving, and in doing so he will not be guided by his own whims,⁴ but rather by what best suits the needs of his purpose; yet he will do this in such a manner, so that each individual thing must represent the Idea or the fundamental characteristic of a shuttle⁵ or of an awl. Similarly the creator of words must "know how to express in sounds and in syllables the proper name of each thing and to determine and to give all names with a view toward the essential name."⁶ In passing judgment on an instrument, the question is always whether its maker has expressed its fundamental characteristic (τὴν αὐτὴν ἰδέαν). Thus the accomplishments of a Hellenic and a barbaric creator

¹ *Cratylus*, 389a.

² Or the form, the shape? *εἰκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος*.

³ αὐτὸ δ' ἔστι κερκίς, 389b.

⁴ E.g., τὴν φύσει κερκίδα ἐκάστω πεφυκυῖαν (as is fitting for ἐκάστω εὔδει ὑφάσματος) εἰς τὸ ξύλον or τὸ φύσει ἐκάστω τρύπαιον πεφυκὸς εἰς τὸ σίδηρον τιθεῖς—οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουληθῇ, ἀλλ οἷον πέφυκε, 389c.

⁵ τὸ τῆς κερκίδος εἶδος.

⁶ αὐτὸ εἰκεῖνο δ' ἔστιν ὄνομα.

of words are of equal value, "provided both express in words, in whatever syllables they please, the fundamental characteristic of a particular object."¹

The comment is also made that only the expert who uses a tool, and not the one who produces it, is capable of passing judgment as to its worth. Accordingly the final judgment on the shuttle must be pronounced by the weaver, on the product of the shipbuilder by the helmsman, on the words of a language by him who knows how to converse with them intelligently, how to use them in asking questions and in teaching, in short by the dialectician. Contrary to the original proposition, it seems to follow, "that the names of things are natural to them and that not every man is capable of naming things, but only he who looks at the name which each thing has by nature and who is able to express the true forms (*εἶδος*) of things in letters and syllables."

Then follow long expositions of questions which do not concern us here. The final chapter, however, is relevant. In it we are told that something is to be said for the contention that the artificers of words were followers of the doctrine of Heraclitus.² But this position is not tenable. For when we speak of a beautiful in itself or a good in itself or of anything real in itself, we mean thereby an unchangeable reality. And if it is not to be an error to characterize a thing as having such and such qualities, then the thing may not change while we are speaking of it, i.e., it cannot be in flux; it must rather retain its definite form (*ιδέα*). Knowledge of the objective characteristic of a thing is possible only after this fashion. Also knowledge or knowing itself as an activity of the subject must, while it is taking place, retain its nature and charac-

¹ ἔως ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῶ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἐν ὁποιασοῦν συλλαβαῖς, 390a. Similarly it is said later, εἰ ἐν ἑτέραις συλλαβαῖς . . . τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα . . ., ἔως ἂν ἐγκρατὴς ᾖ ἢ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος δηλουμένη ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι, 394d.—οὐσία, which I translated by *Hauptbestimmtheit*, is nothing but purpose.

² This evidently was the meaning of Heracliteus Cratylus, whom the young Plato is supposed to have had for his teacher.

teristic (it must maintain itself in its εἶδος). "If the knowing subject and the object known exist, and further, if the beautiful, the good, and every other object exist, then the things of which we were speaking evidently do not resemble a stream or a flux."

I have no doubt that in the *Phaedo* Plato wanted to refer back to these sections of the *Symposium* and the *Cratylus*, partly to substantiate them, and partly to enlarge upon them. They touch on what was there developed. The question arises: Do we have here what is ordinarily called Plato's theory of Ideas? I shall not venture a definite answer until the related passages from the other dialogues which precede the *Phaedo* have been compared. In this further discussion, let us start at the very beginning.

4. In the *Laches* someone wanted to define courage as remaining at one's post in the rank and file, but then had to admit that courage shows itself also in other ways and in other circumstances. This gives rise to the problem "of indicating the common quality in this behaviour—this common quality constitutes courage"; or of showing "what power it is which produces the same effect and which we designate by that name."

In the *Protagoras* the contention is advanced that words such as "justice" and "piety" used to designate the individual virtues stand for something real,¹ and that it is immaterial whether one uses the nouns or the adjectives "just" and "pious" in designating them.

In the *Euthyphro* Socrates asks for information as to what piety and impiety are. In order to make clear that he seeks a general definition, he adds that the pious (the correct religious attitude or behaviour), as well as its opposite, is identical with itself in all the individual actions in which it appears, and that it has a unitary conceptual form.² Euthyphro's answer, in

¹ πρᾶγμα τι., 330c, 331.

² A unitary characteristic μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν.

which he justifies his present action as pious, does not satisfy Socrates. He replies, "I did not ask you to give one or two examples of the many pious actions, but rather the essential form of piety¹ in virtue of which everything pious is pious. You said that one Idea (*μὴ ἰδέα*) made the impious impious and another Idea made the pious pious. Teach me, therefore, to know this Idea, so that I may look upon it as the standard by which I may judge as pious those actions of yours and of others which are pious and those which are of a different nature as impious."

In the *Greater Hippias*, Socrates makes the following statement to the Sophist, whom he asks to define the concept "beautiful": "Evidently the beautiful must have reality² from which all beautiful objects derive their beauty; just as those men who are wise are wise through their wisdom, which is something real; and as those who are just are just through their justice; and as everything which is good is good through the good."

In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates warns us not to jest about serious and beautiful things. And the Sophist asks him whether he has ever seen a beautiful thing. Certainly, he replies; in fact, many. Were they different from the beautiful or were they identical with it? Greatly perplexed as to what to answer, Socrates replies that he had made the statement that they are different from the beautiful itself, yet that each of them has a certain beauty in it.³

¹ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος.

² ὅν τι, 287cf.

³ *πάρεστι* ἡέντοι ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν κάλλος τι, 301a. Certain people cling to *πάρεστι* to prove by it that the author of the *Euthydemus* had already given the doctrine of Ideas the form which it has in the *Phaedo* and in the *Symposium*, and that *παρεῖναι* and *παραγίγνεσθαι* on the one hand, and *μετέχειν* on the other, are recognized designations for the relation of the Idea to the individual thing, and vice versa. If that were so, the indefinite *κάλλος τι* should not be here. It would have to read *πάρεστι μέντοι τοῦτο ἁμῶς γέ πως ἐκάστῳ αὐτῶν*. The only correct thing in this contention is that the difficulty of which the *Phaedo* makes so much, viz., the relationship of the universal to the particular, is already noticed here.

5. The *Meno* returns to the question of the *Protagoras* as to whether virtue can be taught. Again Socrates says that in order to answer this question, one must first know what virtue is. Meno begins by differentiating between the virtues of men and women, those of old and young, and those of freemen and slaves. Thereupon Socrates asks for the common nature¹ of virtue from which they derive their name. E.g., every figure is included in the comprehensive definition of figure as the limit of body. Since Meno does not succeed, in accordance with the example given, to give a usable definition of virtue, he encumbers the investigation with the proposition advanced by the eristics that there is no sense in looking for something which one does not already know. To weaken this argument Socrates uses a doctrine originating from another source, viz., the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. As soon as one accepts this, it becomes evident that the soul brings knowledge with it from a former existence. This knowledge it had lost in the meantime; but if we seek, we shall find it again and shall recognize it as knowledge with which we were once familiar. The fact that the search after unknown truth is successful and has a rational justification is shown to Meno's surprise in the solution of a geometrical problem (the determining of the length of the sides of a square from the double area of a given square).

The *Meno* reminds us not only of the *Protagoras*, but also of the *Euthyphro*; for like the *Euthyphro* it rejects the attempt to arrive at a general definition through an enumeration of instances which come under a concept. It is also particularly close to the *Phaedo*. The immortality of the soul is taken up in both dialogues and in both cases it is used to prove the possibility of absolute knowledge of truth. All knowledge is recollection of earlier experiences. In the *Meno*, Socrates deduces this from the religious tradition of certain priests and priestesses regarding the nature and the destiny of the soul. In the *Phaedo*, one of the friends introduces it as a well-

¹ ἐν τι εἶδος ταῦτόν.

known doctrine of Socrates.¹ As proof for the correctness of this position, he advances the explanation that by proper questioning, individuals may be led to discover a fact; "yet they would be incapable of doing this, unless they had knowledge and right reason within them to draw out. That this is so is most clearly shown when we are confronted with geometrical figures and the like." This remark in the *Phaedo* we may regard as a reference to the *Meno*.

Let us make a careful comparison of what is said in the two dialogues. The *Meno* shows that the same answers to the questions about the relation of the sides and the areas of drawn squares are given with absolute certainty by different persons who intuit them. This shows an objective, universally valid fact, the comprehension of which constitutes knowledge of truth. At once we become aware that the feeling of absolute certainty or evidence may be bound up with the comprehension of an objective fact. Thus the search for truth becomes meaningful, and we are encouraged in the search for it. For Meno's trend of thought, this knowledge serves only as a justification of the attempt to determine the concept of virtue. Because of the difficulties involved, this attempt is abandoned and is replaced by the familiar contention, known to us from the *Protagoras*, that if virtue can be taught (certain observations seem to testify to the contrary), it must consist in knowledge.

With reference to determining a concept, the claim is also made that a concept, in order to be useful, must include all individual cases or forms and must, therefore, give their fundamental characteristic (*εἶδος*). If we compare this with the directions given in the *Euthyphro* for determining a concept, we find that they are synonymous.² The question here seems to be concerned with a purely logical relationship.

But in the *Phaedo* we have more. Even the basis is more

¹ 72c.

² Only in expression do they show greater liberties in that the conceptual characteristics are designated by the words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*; evidently these words are regarded as of equal value.

certain, because here the doctrine about the *a priori* element of knowledge in the soul is not treated as a mere hypothetical thought, but as a fact which is to warrant the conclusion about the imperishability of the soul.

Yet the most striking peculiarity of the *Phaedo*—it matters little whether it is in agreement with its inner content or not—is that the independent existence of this *a priori* element is emphasized, and that it is considered as the cause not merely of properly naming the phenomena observed by us, the knowing subjects, but also of their objective characteristics or that which essentially belongs to them. But the uncertainty still remains whether this independence is already assumed in the earlier dialogues. I should like to believe this and in this sense understand the saying of the *Protagoras* that the words justice and piety, if rightly understood, mean “something real.” This statement recurs in the *Hippias* with reference to the beautiful. The *Laches* seems to betray the same view even more where it is asked that it be shown what power it is which, in its uniform activity, produces that in the individual instance which we call courage.¹ At any rate, the independent existence of the content of the concept is not emphasized much in the earlier dialogues. And it is certainly no accident that such expressions as “size or power in itself, the just, the good itself, the equal itself, Being itself, essential Being” or “that which essentially is, the essence of beauty itself, divine beauty, true virtue” are almost completely absent in the earlier dialogues. We may say that, while at first it is the logical need of clarifying the concept (which aims at uncontradictory and comprehensive definition) which gives direction to the philosophical investigation, this is later overbalanced by an ontological and metaphysical interest. Or to put it perhaps a little more correctly: the epistemological and ontological side, which belongs to every sound, logical exposition, comes more and more to the fore. Logic would be childish play if it did not constantly seek to apply its laws to an actually experienced reality or to

¹ Cf. above, pp. 32, 33.

one capable of being experienced. To make oneself understood by means of language is only possible when what we say is not subjectively arbitrary but has an objective basis. No doubt, this is the conception of every person who has not been confused and confounded by eristics and subtle hyper-criticism. It seems to me that, aside from the doctrine of innate knowledge, which has to be valued in and by itself, all Platonic propositions which caused us some difficulty intended essentially to express and to prove this very thing.

Bonitz is not necessarily wrong when he characterizes the Platonic theory of Ideas as: "that the WHAT of the logical concept as such has objective reality." One can at least associate an unquestionable meaning with these words. Yet it would be clearer to say that according to Plato's teaching only an idea whose content is based on objective reality (i.e., its WHAT has objective reality) may be used as a logical concept. As long as an idea has not been given an objective basis, it has not yet been refined into a concept. In other words, I can conceive the Platonic Idea as the expression of the simple principle that every properly formed idea has a firm basis in objective reality. This doctrine followed almost of itself with logical necessity from the postulate which Plato took over from Socrates, to wit, that there must be an ineffaceable difference between good and bad, between true and false.

I am convinced that all relevant propositions which have appeared in the dialogues up to the *Phaedo*, and which I have carefully brought together here and reviewed, find their explanation most naturally in this conception. Let us see whether this also holds for the later dialogues.

6. The first attempt is to be made with the *Republic*.

In another connection (p. 81) our attention was called to the discussion of the Idea of the good as that was given in the *Republic*. At that time we confined ourselves to a few preliminary remarks about the meaning of this discussion and we must, therefore, return to it once more. It was said that

the highest object of knowledge which the education of a prospective statesman (ruler) must strive for is the Idea of the good. When Socrates is called upon to explain this highest good more precisely, he says that the task is too difficult. When he is pressed, he reminds¹ his hearers "of what he had said in the preceding discussion, as well as frequently elsewhere." To wit, "we affirm that there is multiplicity of things beautiful, of things good, in fact, of everything, and these many things we describe and define. . . . And there is an essential beauty and an essential good; similarly we assume of all things, which we regarded as many, a fundamental unity (or Idea) which exists as a single entity; consequently we speak of the essential Being of each thing."² This is, in fact, the oft-mentioned teaching of the *Symposium*, the *Cratylus*, and the *Phaedo*. The content of the passage which precedes this passage in the *Republic*, and to which Plato refers, is essentially the following: The true philosopher, without exception, seeks to know each thing. In his search for truth he is not limited to this or to that thing. He seeks to know the real, simple nature of things, and does not confine himself to the varied external accidents of a phenomenon. For example, he seeks to see beauty in its essence³ or to see the uniform Idea of the beautiful which he differentiates from beautiful tones, or colours, or bodily form, all of which only participate in absolute beauty; consequently, because of its relation to external things or actions or to other Ideas,⁴ absolute beauty appears manifold. The same is true of the good itself, the just itself, the hideous, the bad, the unjust, etc. In all this the philosopher is interested in knowledge, a knowledge⁵ that springs from a clear and an alert consciousness. The multitude, on the other hand, or the common people who cannot free themselves from the multiplicity of appearances and who,

¹ It is a reference similar to one we had in the *Phaedo*. Cf. pp. 89, 94f.

² ἰδέαν μίαν ἐκάστου ὡς μιᾷς οὐσίας τιθέντες ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον προσαγορευόμεν, 507b.

³ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ τὴν φύσιν.

⁴ τῇ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωματίων καὶ ἀλλήλων (sc. τῶν εἰδῶν) κοινωνίᾳ.

⁵ γνώμη, or 477a γνώσις.

like those in a dream, mistake the copy for the original, always guess or conjecture and their conception of things may be called opinion ($\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$). If they claim knowledge, we must remind them that all knowledge has Being, reality, for its object. Non-Being ($\mu\eta\ \acute{o}\nu$) cannot be an object of knowledge. Whatever does not exist is altogether unknowable, just as perfect Being is completely knowable.¹ If at one and the same time a thing existed and did not exist and so occupied an intermediate position between pure Being and nothing, there would also have to be a corresponding knowledge which occupies an intermediate position between ignorance and knowledge. In fact, we not merely set absolute knowledge over against not-knowing or ignorance ($\acute{\alpha}\gamma\nu\omicron\iota\alpha$), which is without an object; but also opinion, which is subject to error, and we thereby ascribe to it a special meaning or power. On this is based the assumption that opinion must have a different sphere or object other than knowledge, to which we must ascribe the power or faculty of knowing. We cannot distinguish one power from another (i.e., one faculty from another) by any other characteristics except those of its object and its consequences.² The object of knowledge is Being; and the purpose of knowledge is to know Being in its true nature. The object of opinion must, therefore, be different from Being. Yet it cannot be identified with Non-Being ($\mu\eta\ \acute{o}\nu$), which is the correlative concept of not-knowing (or ignorance). Therefore, the object of opinion occupies an intermediate position between Being and Non-Being. What was previously assumed as hypothetical, as sharing in Being and Non-Being, now appears before us as real, and this special object of opinion gives opinion its special meaning and determines its position between not-knowing and knowing.

However, we must consider this object of opinion still further. Those good people who do not wish to hear anything of the unchangeable Idea ($\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\alpha$ —form) of beauty and who cannot bear being told of one beauty, one piety, one justice,

¹ 477a.

² Or purpose.

because they always look at the many appearances of the Idea, can nevertheless inform us whether all these individual appearances do not contradict each other. They cannot deny that a beautiful form, which is pleasing to the eye, a beautiful colour or a voice, may be ugly in some other way; what appears just to them may at the same time appear as unjust; what is supposed to be double may also be considered as half that amount; and what is supposed to be heavy may be considered as light, etc. In short, all the appearances and actions of which they speak may just as well be considered to be the opposite of that which they are designated to be and are, therefore, neither. They are intermediate between Being and Non-Being. He who only knows and recognizes such things and who directs his striving toward them has opinion only, not knowledge, and he is a friend of opinion and appearances;¹ whereas he who loves and sees the unchangeable realities themselves has knowledge, and is a friend of wisdom and of truth.²

Some of these propositions probably need further explanation; but we shall leave them for the present, so as not to push into the background other passages of the *Republic* in which the Ideas are spoken of as objective realities.

They are found in the last book and in the following connection: In order to have a firm basis for judging the production of the arts and crafts, we must investigate the nature of imitation. In doing so we "may take our departure from our usual method. In every case we have assumed one Idea³ for all the particular things to which we apply the same name . . . e.g., there are many beds and many tables, but only two Ideas⁴ of these household articles, one of the bed and one of the table. . . . We have also said that the producer of each of these articles looks at the Idea while he makes the individual bed or table for our use . . . since no craftsman produces the Idea."⁵ And immediately following, "The master carpenter, as we have just found, does not construct the Idea,⁶ which

¹ φιλόδοξος.

⁴ ἰδέαι.

² φιλόσοφος.

⁵ 596ab.

³ εἶδος τι ἔν.

⁶ εἶδος.

we consider to be the essential bed,¹ but only a particular bed. And if he does not produce the Idea, then that which he produces is not real.”² And again, “Whether God did not wish to make, or whether necessity prevented him from making, more than one bed in nature,³ the fact is that he made only one essential bed. Under no conditions will God permit two or more such beds to come into being. For if God were to make only two beds, a single bed would have to make its appearance whose essential characteristic (εἶδος) or form the other two beds would have to share; and this one bed would be the essential bed.”⁴

7. Let us proceed to the *Phaedrus*. In a beautiful picture, which is to present before our eyes the enigmatical many-sidedness of the human soul and its dual striving, Plato gives a poetical characterization of the world of Ideas. The charioteer of the soul with difficulty drives the unequal horses; he has to give battle constantly to the wild sensuality of the one horse; and while heeding the call of love (Eros), he directs his desires and the flight of his soul towards the highest celestial realm where the gods dwell and pursue their course, happy in their beatific vision. Only falteringly can a human tongue describe what is to be seen and what transpires here.

“Colourless, formless, intangible Being⁵ is visible only to reason, the pilot of the soul; around this Being and in this place dwells true knowledge. Here dwell divine reason, which is nourished by intelligence and pure knowledge, and the reason of every soul, which is privileged to receive its due inheritance when, after a long period of separation, it sees pure Being once more; here reason finds its satisfaction, nourishment, and joy in the vision of truth.” Here it sees “absolute justice, absolute temperance, and absolute knowledge; not that which comes into Being, nor that which is different when it has for its object one of those things which

¹ ὁ ἔστι κλίνη.

² οὐ τὸ ὄν.

³ ἐν τῇ φύσει.

⁴ 597c.

⁵ ἡ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφής οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα, 247c.

we now consider as real; but rather real knowledge whose object is real Being;¹ the same is true of the other real Beings.² . . . That soul which follows a god best and resembles him most closely raises the head of its charioteer into the outer region of space and accompanies the gods in their journey about the cosmos; but because it is encumbered by its horses, it contemplates Being with great difficulty; while another soul rises and sinks and, because the horses have their way, it observes some things but not others. The rest of the souls also long after the upper world and follow the procession; but as their energy is inadequate, they are carried around below the surface; and in their effort to be first, they trample one another and interfere with each other. . . . A soul which has never seen the truth cannot enter a human body; for it is necessary that man have knowledge of concepts and universals which subsume many particular objects of sense and bind them into conceptual unity.³ This knowledge is recollection of those things which our soul once saw when it followed its god, and when it raised itself above what we now call reality into the realm of pure Being and contemplated it." "Not all souls easily remember the things above by the aid of the things here below, as some may have seen them but a short time; whereas others may have forgotten the holy things which they once contemplated; because in their fall to earth, they had the misfortune of getting into evil company and turned to the practice of injustice. Few, indeed, are those who retain an adequate memory of them. When they see an image of the things above, they are seized by an incomprehensible wonder and, because they lack clear knowledge, they do not know what affects them. Justice and temperance and whatever else is of value for the soul have their earthly copies, which appear but dimly; and it is but seldom and with great difficulty that, with the aid of the dull senses with which we approach

¹ τὴν ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἔστιν ὃν ὄντως ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν, 247e.

² τὰ ὄντα ὄντως.

³ δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον, 249b.

the copies, a few recognize the real nature of their original. Beauty once spread its bright rays upon us when we followed the band of Zeus or that of other gods; then we saw and contemplated blissful spectacles and were initiated into the mysteries which may be called most blessed, so as to celebrate them in a state of perfection, still untainted by all the evil which awaited us at a later time. We approached perfect, pure, unchangeable, and happy visions which we beheld shining in pure light. Then we were still pure and untainted by what we call our body, in which we are now imprisoned like the oyster in its shell."

8. Let us again pause to make certain comparisons. I believe that what is set forth in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* is in agreement with the proposition which I advanced above (p. 105); viz., that the Platonic Idea means nothing other than that each correctly formed concept is grounded in objective reality. All that needs to be added is that each Idea has as its content a universal relation and not the individual appearance. If anyone believes that fantasies have anything to do with the doctrine of Ideas, it will be found that he has uncritically accepted Aristotle's objections to the Ideas. As can be shown, these objections are based in important points on a perverted interpretation of the Platonic Ideas.¹ Such an individual has committed the common and gross error of certain expositors of Plato, an error against which we cannot warn sufficiently, viz., to consider the fantastic pictures of the Platonic myths and the closely related poetic pictures of the *Symposium*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus* to be on the same level with the methodically attained results of scientific investigation.

To make my position clearer, I shall give a fuller account of the theory of Ideas. When Plato first responded to his artistic impulse and began his literary activity, his purpose was probably none other than to sketch vivid scenes of Socrates'

¹ Compare, e.g., the final chapter, *Die Aristotelische Kritik der Ideenlehre*, of Natorp's *Platos Ideenlehre*.

stimulating art of instruction; these portrayals were to arouse the attention and interest of others in this remarkable man. While Socrates was engaged in conversation with impressionable youths, with mature men who prided themselves on their philosophy of life, and with bloated sophists, questions concerning the value of traditional morality took first place. Socrates was chiefly interested in the right understanding of these questions. At the same time, Plato sketched Socrates' usual method of taking simple analogies from everyday life and of comparing individual cases, so as to determine their common characteristic and to bring them together in a definition. Epistemological problems, which seem to have been far from Socrates' thought, appear in Plato's thought as early as the *Charmides*; they do not receive his serious attention, however, until we come to the *Euthydemus*, the *Cratylus*, and the *Meno*. The occasion for introducing them is the appearance of controversialists ("eristics" or "anti-logicians") who satisfy their vanity by pledging themselves to refute every assertion advanced by another. Setting out from Protagoras' saying that man is the measure of all things and from the doctrine of Heraclitus that all things are in constant flux, restlessly passing from one state into its opposite, they concluded that every view is as correct as the contradictory one. In opposition to this contention, Plato passionately and emphatically maintains that there is a truth which transcends every personal opinion and whim, and which excludes all objections and all subjective arbitrariness; and he makes it his sacred duty to show how this objective truth may be attained. Everyone understands the word "true" as expressing a definite relation of our ideas and assertions to reality. That thing is true which is as we conceive and predicate it. As Plato weighs the objections which were destroying this conception of truth, he finds that the Heracliteans are right as far as the physical objects, the things perceived by our senses, are concerned. The concepts and terms which we employ when predicating something permanently retain the meanings attributed to them and are,

therefore, only adapted to designate the permanent characteristics or the essences determined by them. From this Plato concludes—and I believe with irrefutable logic—IF THERE ARE TRUE PREDICATIONS AND A CORRECT NAMING OF THINGS, THIS TRUTH AND CORRECTNESS CAN ONLY BE GROUNDED IN A REALITY WHICH IS ALSO IMMUTABLE. OUR THOUGHTS AND WORDS MUST REFER TO THIS REALITY. In fact, in our predications concerning any individual object, we refer to something universal which that object has in common with many other individual things. The word used when designating these things subsumes them or their characteristics under a general concept. The characteristics of this general concept must be objectively based in nature if our ideas are correctly formed. This, it seems to me, is the basic thought of the doctrine of Ideas, which is very explicitly expressed in the *Cratylus* without even using the words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in the decisive passages. The same view is expressed in the *Phaedo*. It is also at the basis of the exposition of 102b where *εἶδη* is used to designate the objectively real species. I AM CONVINCED THAT ALL THESE PROPOSITIONS OF PLATO ARE ABSOLUTELY CORRECT, and every one has to admit as much, unless he is willing to be engulfed by Protagorean subjectivism which, as Plato shows in the *Theaetetus*, permits no difference between truth and falsehood. This subjectivism would preclude all understanding or rational interchange of thought and only idle babbling would remain.¹

¹ As I have shown in Chapter 10, Vol. 2 of my work, *Platon* (cf. also p. 124), Meinong's *Gegenstandsphilosophie* and Husserl's *Phänomenalismus* gradually lead us away from the twisted and stilted subtilizing of the Neo-Kantians and back to the rational position of the ancients, especially to the Platonic viewpoint which K. Chr. Planck of contemporary thinkers has always maintained. The view often attributed to Plato by Aristotle that Plato believed he had solved the riddle by introducing the term *Idea*, in which objective reality exists and by means of which we can grasp and describe it, is a complete misunderstanding of Plato's position, as one can see from the *Republic* 596a (and other passages) where the doctrine of Ideas is described as the beginning and the "customary method" of investigation. He who characterizes the doctrine of Ideas in this manner cannot see the final result in it.

The question arises whether Plato did not go beyond these propositions, and so fall into error; whether certain of his contentions about the independent existence of the Ideas and their relation to the individual objects did not take him into the realm of idle fancy. To clarify this point, we must consider more closely certain passages of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*.

We have noticed that Plato is very hesitant to say anything definite as to how the individual object is determined by the general characteristic of the species.¹ Nor does he cease to show that our conceptual definitions have their basis in sense-perception.² Yet the *Phaedo* contains a few remarkable assertions. We read in 76de: As certainly as the concept of the good, the beautiful, etc., has objective reality, and as certainly as it is this reality to which we refer the characteristics of our sense-stimuli as something present in us before the perceptions, so certain is the pre-existence of the human soul. The one assumption stands and falls with the other. And again, the immaterial realities are to be seen or felt by our mind. Even though this expression may only be taken figuratively—since we are here dealing with the immaterial—nevertheless we are led by this picture to think of the knowing process after the analogy of sense-perception (sight and touch). And if we follow Socrates' exposition in the *Phaedo* and think of our souls as existing in and by themselves, stripped of all sensibility, freed from the bondage of the body and yet³ endowed with certain spiritual powers and abilities, then it is also in order that the objects with which the soul is supposed to be able to come in contact and to which it is related—a fact which Plato stresses—must also be divested of everything which binds them to the things of sense, the objects of our perception. That would indeed be fantastic. To become fully conscious of the fantastic aspect of such a teaching, it is necessary to ask: What is the relation of the invisible realities (Ideas) to the things of sense, if the things of sense derive their names from and are supposed to have their Being and essence in the

¹ *Phaedo*, 100c.

² *Phaedo*, 75a.

³ *Phaedo*, 70b.

Ideas? Where shall we say that these invisible realities exist? These are the questions which Aristotle raises in his criticism of Plato's theory of Ideas.

But perhaps it is only a misunderstanding of Plato's language which leads him to this criticism. Those individuals who are accustomed to look at Plato's philosophy through Aristotle's spectacles partly excuse the shortcomings which they find in his philosophy on the ground that Plato was trapped in his thought by certain ambiguities of the Greek language. I, on the contrary, believe that these individuals have not sufficiently observed the ambiguity inherent in every language, an ambiguity which must be sought in the fact that words refer primarily to the sense realm, and that it is only secondarily by figurative use that some of them refer to spiritual things. The less a language has been used to express abstract thoughts, the more is he who speaks of invisible things subject to grave misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings, therefore, can only be excluded from the discussion of deep, philosophical problems when the listener pays close attention and makes a genuine effort to understand the arguments. Besides, discussions of this kind are always under great limitations; for in presenting their subject matter, they scarcely ever have accessible means to express their thought, and, therefore, can only hint at, rather than demonstrate, their point. With little effort we could cite numerous passages in which modern writers, while expounding ontological questions, use words very much in the same way as Plato makes use of them in the *Phaedo*; yet no one has attributed to them the naïve meanings which Aristotle has attributed to those of Plato, and which certain modern interpreters accept on good faith. I regard it as profitable to give a selection of such passages at this point.

9. Goethe, in his *Versuch einer Witterungslehre* of the year 1825, writes: "The true, which is identical with the divine, can never be known directly by us. We see it only in its

reflection, in the example, the symbol, in isolated and related phenomena; we experience it as imperceptible life, and yet we cannot suppress the desire to apprehend it. This is true of all phenomena of the sensible world." And again: "Be it noted that there is a great difference among the phenomena. The primeval phenomenon, the purest of all, never contradicts itself in its eternal simplicity; whatever is derived from it suffers condensation, friction, and gives us only obscurities." On his Italian journey he wrote in his diary for April 17, 1787: "In the face of so many new and renewed forms, the old notion came to me again whether I could not discover among these forms the primeval plant. There must be such a plant, else how could I know that this or that form is a plant unless all are fashioned after the same pattern? I endeavoured to investigate in what particulars the many deviating forms differed from each other. I always found them more alike than different. If I wanted to use my botanical terminology, I could do so, but it was of no avail; this disquieted me without helping me." In his *Erkenntnistheoretische Logik*, p. 107, Schuppe writes, "If we are fortunate enough to know the thought-process as such in its real nature and in all its forms, the result is the same for the thought-process in all fields as it is for the specialized fields if we are fortunate enough to grasp in all species and individuals the essential nature of the concept animal, as comprising certain simple events which, according to material and environmental circumstances, produce well-known and varied, curious forms according to a necessary law now evident to us; or if we should succeed in defining the concept justice in such a way, so that all possible instances of justice could be conceived as following from its distinct, fundamental nature." After Chamberlain has made it clear in his *Grundlagen des 19. Jahrhunderts* how races are formed, how they become solidified and perfected, and how on the other hand they pass away, he writes, I, p. 311 f., "What is this race if it is not a collective concept (idea) for a series of individual bodies? The individuals are bound together by an

invisible, yet real power, which is grounded in objective facts. It is true that the race consists of individuals; yet the individual can only attain the complete and the noblest development of its powers (*Anlage*) within certain conditions which are subsumed under the term 'race' . . ." "This is as much a fact of nature as any other. The only difference is that here, as with all phenomena of life, we are far from being able to analyse and explain them." And again on p. 294, ". . . Since race is not merely a word, but an organic living thing, it follows that it is not stationary."

As these quotations from present-day scholars are expressed, they are no less ambiguous and, if you please, no less fantastic than what Plato has at any time said about the Ideas of natural objects.¹ Yet these words have a rational meaning. For Goethe's primeval plant can be substituted the concept plant in the same sense as Schuppe speaks of the discoverable concept animal, the definition of which, he thinks, will be of great value to scientific zoology. We might substitute for this the principle of form or the law of form (*Bildungsgesetz*) of plants and of animals. The primeval phenomenon is never explicitly given; it is not visible and is not tangible; it is never specifically and purely realized, but is always accompanied by distorting or at least confusing admixtures. And yet, as Chamberlain says of the concept race, it is "not an arbitrary concept." As Goethe observes, it is only by comparison that we are able "to know that this or that form" belongs to a definite group, and is to be designated by the name expressly applied to the individual phenomena of this group. Every such classification and division has as its purpose, while it synthesizes and analyses, to make possible analogical conclusions and thus to simplify and to facilitate the knowing process. It is always based on the thought that there must be a natural bond which unites the many characteristics. If some characteristics of different phenomenal complexes are related in a similar fashion,

¹ We shall not encounter these Ideas until we come to the later dialogues.

it is to be expected that these complexes are alike in other respects—and that, therefore, from other characteristics of one thing we may infer similar characteristics of another thing. The fact that one system of classification seems to be better than another, even though both¹ include all the material (in their fields), can only be explained on the ground that classification is not merely subjective, but that it has an objective basis. In my opinion, this objective basis of a concept is the Platonic Idea; and it matters little where the objective basis is found, or whether the concept be that of the genus or of the species. Chamberlain does not go far enough when he says of the relation of the individual and race, “the individual can only attain the fullest and noblest development of his powers within certain conditions included in the term ‘race.’” In fact, if mankind is divided into races, the individual cannot exist without belonging to a race (unless he is a hybrid of different races). A living being (*animal*, ζῷον) cannot exist unless it is a mammal, a bird, a fish, an insect, a worm, or some other form of life. And yet the mere possession of the characteristics of its class does not enable it to exist; it must have such other characteristics as constitute the genus, the species, and the sub-species if it is to receive and maintain its life at a definite place in space and for a definite time.

It is indisputable that the existence of the individual as phenomenon is different from that of the concept genus and species. It is also true that the concepts, when compared, have different degrees of existence depending on their logical order—e.g., the concept life is different from the concept man or the concept Hellene. But of an entirely different nature from all of these is the concept of minotaurs, harpies, centaurs, or the concept of a being half man and half animal (*Tiermensch*), which logically subsumes them. For the former, to speak with Plato's *Parmenides*, the prototypes exist in nature;² for the latter they do not—at least not as a combination of charac-

¹ As examples we may take the two botanical systems: the “natural” and the “artificial” of Linné.

² *Parmenides*, 132d, ἐν τῇ φύσει.

teristics which we ascribe to them; they are rather a new whole chimerically constructed by the imagination from separate elements of experience. I should hesitate to say of a generic concept what Chamberlain says of the concept "race," that it is "an organic living thing," for I know from Plato's critics that everything clear and good which can be predicated of an object does not save it from the reproach of being fantastic, a reproach which may be due to a single, carelessly used expression. Yet no one will question the fact that the concept race has an objective basis which is bound up with perception or, to express it more concretely, with the common blood, as well as with climatic influences. Because of climatic differences, races which were originally closely related have very likely become differentiated. The objectivity of this concept can be demonstrated *ad oculus* by the form of the skull, the skeleton, facial features, skin, and hair. These objective facts make the assertion that an individual belongs to this or that race true or false. No one will deny this statement.

Aristotle also criticized the words which Plato used to express the relationship of the individuals to the Idea, i.e., that the Idea is in the things, etc. He who considers carefully the passages which speak of this relation will find that they will give the honest and unprejudiced observer little cause for reproach, and that they express no fantasy. The greatest temptation to consider the object of thought as separated from the object of sense—as Aristotle interpreted Plato's position—is due to the fact that this doctrine is closely related to that of immortality and to the theory that learning is only recollection of a knowledge which we bring from a previous existence. If one thinks of the personal pre-existence of the individual man and attempts to picture this pre-earthly condition, one necessarily falls into all kinds of fantasies. I must admit that for Plato personal immortality was a serious problem, and that his whole exposition, and especially the trend of his argument in the *Phaedo*, urges us to accept it. For him, immortality includes the pre-existence of the individual. In trying to make

this thought clear to himself and to us, he creates in his imagination an invisible realm, separate from the earthly existence, as the place of incorporeal souls. Since these souls must be active, he must provide for them, as knowing subjects, a world of immaterial objects. However, I am of the opinion that Plato was conscious of this fact, and in this whole discussion he gives the impression that he does not attain scientific truth in these expositions.¹ If there is no definite position in the *Phaedo* about the doctrine of immortality, but only hesitation and deliberation, I believe it to be equally true that the *Phaedo* contains no fixed dogma about the doctrine of the other-worldliness of the Ideas.✓

10. The question still remains, how is it with the doctrine of learning as RECOLLECTION? It seems to me that the passage in the *Phaedo* on which Plato puts the greatest emphasis is the one in which the cause of coming into and passing out of Being is explained. Its meaning for all purely scientific investigation is essentially methodological. The whole discussion assumes² the existence of objective, immutable realities. And we are told that this assumption might be questioned. To make sure that it is tenable, one would first of all have to examine all conclusions which can be deduced from it. If they contradict each other, then the assumption on which they were based is evidently untenable. If the conclusions do not contradict each other, the assumption is still not established. To make sure that the assumption is correct, one would have to infer it from a higher, more universal assumption (which would be more certain than the less universal assumptions),³ and finally it would have to be inferred mediately from a proposition which would be immediately intuited, i.e., from a *ἰκανόν*, an axiom. To clarify this matter, we shall attempt to support the assumption of these immutable realities. They are

¹ They were based on widespread, popular conceptions.

² *ὑπόθεσις*.

³ *ιοιδ*, ἀλλήν αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνεται.

to explain the individual happenings in this world. For example, to the question why did one thing by division become two, the answer is because the thing in question participated in the form or Idea of duality. To the question, Why did the stone get hot? we can answer, because fire brought it in relation with the Idea of warmth. But this answer will only satisfy him who assumes with us the existence of unchangeable realities of definite content.¹ If this assumption is questioned, then we must try to discover on what firmer basis it rests. This basis I believe to be the simple proposition that true and false ideas are by nature fundamentally different. Plato regards this as incontestable, as an axiom. He himself is not only convinced of this, but he opines that every human being believes in this difference, even though the Sophists (eristics) at times pretend not to understand it or not to regard it as self-evident.

Is such a regress from one hypothesis to another really recollection?² Or does the certainty of such a proposition rest on recollection in the same way that yes and no exclude each other, and if the affirmation is true, the negation must be false? I do not believe that such was ever Plato's meaning. In the *Meno*, which introduces the thought that learning could consist in recollection, the explanation is given in the remarkable statement, "Since all of nature is akin and our soul has learned to know everything, nothing stands in man's way (in this learning process) to discover everything for himself if he is reminded of a single fact; provided he is courageous and does not faint in his search."³ Here we must ask: Why does one need recollection as a starting-point in such a "kinship of all nature"—in such a dependence of one thing on another, in such universal, causal relationship? It would seem that any and every experience taken from our own observation would suffice. Already in the *Gorgias*, we have the fine psychological observation that in our search for an understanding with others we have to set out from the facts with which every individual is familiar through his own experience. "If human beings, in

¹ Ἀνὰ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν.

² ἀνάμνησις.

³ 81c.

spite of all their individual differences, did not have fundamentally the same experiences, moreover, if an individual experienced everything as different from what others experience it, it would not be easy to communicate our own experience to someone else." He who has not experienced the incompatibility of an affirmation with a negation as fundamental, and who would appeal to his own experience for evidence to the contrary, would be an idiot with whom it would be impossible to come to an understanding. If the hypothesis about the existence of immutable realities is based on the more fundamental assumption of the incompatibility of an affirmation and a negation, it is so well grounded by merely referring the former hypothesis to the latter that a rational individual can no longer question it. Every other attempt which might be made to give it an objective basis is superfluous. A mythological basis taken from priests, priestesses, and wise men of old can have no greater value than the mythological element in Plato's writings.

It will not be superfluous to make a few comments. In the second book of the *Republic*, Plato has given us definite hints as to how he approves the practice of beginning children's education by telling them fairy tales which are fictitious or false, but which nevertheless contain a certain amount of truth. Under certain conditions he finds it even justifiable to tell similar lies or inventions to adults; for example, stories about pre-historic times, relating events which cannot be accurately known by anyone. The reason for using such fictions is pedagogical. It cannot be expected that the listeners can follow a scientific explanation and grasp the naked truth. It is hoped that in this way they will receive the proper conviction rather than a clear knowledge of things, and that false opinions will thus be eliminated. At times even another reason enters, viz., that the listener or reader is to be made, by the use of rhetorical and mythological decorations, more receptive for a more difficult scientific investigation, or that his intellectual appetite is to be stimulated, so that he will set out from the assumptions

and in accordance with the hints of the myth will search for the truth. However, without exception it is true of the myths, of the stories, and of the teachings of wise men and women which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, as well as of the parables, that only the kernel is true; that the shell, or cloak, is not to be taken literally.

If we apply this fundamental proposition to the doctrine of recollection in our knowledge of the Idea of a phenomenon or of a single psychic experience, it seems to mean nothing else but what we to-day express in the Kantian terminology somewhat as follows: In every knowing process there is an *a priori* element which must not be forgotten if one wishes to enumerate the indispensable conditions of possible experience. It is often said, and rightly, that this is one of the greatest achievements of Plato, that he was the first to see this *a priori* element and to describe it.

II. We shall also have to discuss certain statements of the *Republic*. The one which strikes us as most strange and contradictory is that perfect Being is completely knowable, whereas Non-Being is not knowable; what is conceived as semi-correct and semi-false lies between Being and Non-Being. We may be told that this contains the fundamental error of rationalism—as if every thing real had to show itself to our understanding as being real. There are truths which can only be experienced but not conceived, facts which make themselves known only to the emotions, e.g., the religious emotions, or to the will.

On the other hand, the principle which gives greatest offence is that whatever becomes, i.e., whatever develops in time and space, and Becoming itself, are only half real; on the contrary, changeless, immutable Being alone is to be entirely real.

Many see in this a definite confirmation of Aristotle's criticism of the transcendence and separate existence of the realm of Ideas, a criticism brought against it by many Plato critics since then.

Here also I find that the reproaches and the objections do

not touch the essence of the Platonic propositions. He who rejects the rationalistic position that all reality is justifiable before our reason abolishes human thinking. Plato is right when he says (*Phaedo* 79b) that if we distinguish between the visible and invisible, i.e., between the tangible and intangible, between the material and immaterial, we mean that which is perceptible with human eyes (human sense organs), naturally making use of all possible means to whet them. I believe that whatever human reason can fathom is also thinkable. In the *Parmenides*¹ it is shown that a god who knew the independently existing Ideas would not know anything of the many concrete things and individual events of the world—the meaninglessness of this view brands it immediately as a bit of worthless fantasy.

I share Plato's opinion that everything which is made known to man—consequently also everything which he experiences in his emotions and in his will—only becomes a conscious experience² when it is subjected to the laws of logic or to the understanding; but an experience thus considered loses as little of its peculiarity as a phenomenon which we observe and investigate with the understanding loses or changes its peculiarity.³ Something which we have experienced but not understood is indisputably real only as a subjective experience.⁴ As such it is indeed incontestable. Modern Christians very often say the same of their "experiences." But it must not be forgotten that this experience is no more real than the subjective experience of an insane person, who imagines when someone speaks to him that he is speaking either to God or the devil. The same is true of the hypnotized person who drinks a nauseous broth thinking it refreshing water or spark-

¹ I have to refer to it in advance; likewise I must almost immediately refer to the *Theaetetus*.

² Thus it is something about which he can speak to himself and to others.

³ This is the correct meaning of the *Gegenstandsphilosophie* or *Phänomenalismus* of our day. Cf. note on p. 113.

⁴ As *παρὸν πάλος*, to speak with Socrates in the *Theaetetus*. See note 1 on p. 138.

ling wine. No rational person argues about such experiences. But men do dispute, and with good reason, about the kind of objective fact that they demonstrate.

And now for the other objections, viz., the misconception about that which develops in space and time, the concrete and, according to common opinion, most real phenomenon. Plato denies, and rightly, that Becoming, or the concrete object such as we perceive it, has reality. He does not, however, deny it all reality. It is recognized to be real in so far as our ideas of the individual object are objective, and in so far as we can describe them by words—the only means by which we can give that description; every word expresses universal and not particular traits. In three dialogues, the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Statesman*, which follow next in time, we shall learn of more careful investigations about this perplexing matter. We shall postpone our criticism until then.

Yet what shall we say of the contention that opinion, even when it is not wrong but surmises correctly, has a different object for its knowledge than does real knowledge or science?

Let us confine ourselves to the mathematical example given by Plato in the *Meno* (cf. p. 102 f.). Since a square whose area is four feet is two feet long, the slave, whom Socrates asks about the length of the sides of the square of double this area, surmises that it would be 2×2 or 4 feet. When he is shown that this is wrong, he surmises that the sides are three feet long. Both answers were false guesses or opinions. The object which was here conceived was distinctly different from that which knowledge of the correct ratio has for its object; for this knowledge conceives a square whose sides are as long as the diagonal of the first square. If the slave had guessed further and had affirmed that a new square was to be erected upon this diagonal, he would have guessed correctly. But as long as he could not give a clear account of the reasons for his new assertions, he had no knowledge. Now it seems that, as far as its content is concerned, the geometrical proposition does not change when we give reasons and proof for it. And

it would also seem that the object of our thought, which at first was only a correct guess, does not become another when the guess becomes knowledge. And yet we may affirm this to be the case. Knowledge of a certain truth consists essentially in a knowledge of reasons which enable us to relate the content of the correct conception to the content of other conceptions (as, e.g., when we refer one hypothesis to another hypothesis of a higher order). A proposition which is understood has complete knowledge of the deductions which follow from it and which constitute its proof. These deductions dissipate into mere equations. It is this very conceptual relation of identity, expressed by these equations and transmitted from one member to another, which constitutes the content of our knowledge. (The conjecture that the square erected on the diagonal will be double the area of the first square simmers down to a question whether there is not a relation of identity between half of the new square and the whole area of the original square. We are merely in search of the mutuality of relations on which this identity visibly rests. We apprehend it by intuiting the inevitability of the two sides of the final equation whose members are held together by the intermediate terms.)

I firmly believe that after a similar fashion Plato would have known how to defend his proposition that the OBJECTS OF OPINION AND THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE ARE DIFFERENT. However, he seems to have thought of the relation of the scanty means of mathematical demonstration to the perfect, ideal construct of the doctrine of space and number of which we shall speak later. But I should not like to affirm that this proposition was the result of such considerations. We must rather seek the more fundamental basis for his conviction about such a difference in the expositions of the earlier dialogues, and from those passages of the *Republic* which restate what was said in those dialogues. The essence of the matter is that the conceptions which we form do not change their content, whereas the objects of sensation change; besides, the content

of our conceptions has generic universality, whereas what is given in sensation is singular, particular, and different from all other individual impressions. It follows, therefore, that sensation deceives us about the things to which it refers in that it causes us to make assertions about becoming and changing things, assertions whose content claims to be permanent in character. Yet Plato does not conceal the fact that perception gives us something more than mere deception. In the *Symposium* he said that we are to use sensations as points of departure, as levels from which to ascend to a knowledge of the unchangeable objects.¹ In the *Phaedo* he maintained that the objects of sensation which cause us to say that they are equal or beautiful do so, because they remind us of equality in itself or of beauty in itself. The predication that they are beautiful or equal is, of course, inexact—one may say false—for the objects are not equal or beautiful in a perfect and unlimited sense. Yet the statement contains some truth; for they are equal or beautiful in a higher degree than other things.² The correct predication naturally would be that the characteristics of the objects of sensation resemble essential equality and essential beauty (equality itself, beauty itself), etc., and that they imitate them in their phenomenal appearance.³ This is what is meant when Plato at times says that things partake of the generic characteristics or of the Ideas.

All this does not entitle us to speak of a third class of realities or Ideas, different from generic characteristics and the individual phenomena. Very likely the notion of a third class arose as soon as the question, which was later discussed in the

¹ Here the contemplation of beautiful forms and colours is characterized as the necessary point of departure for a knowledge of the beauty of spiritual productions and characteristics, and as a prerequisite for a vision of the Idea of beauty absolute.

² Poetically this thought is also expressed by the proposition that the individual objects about which we predicate something (e.g., that they are equal) wish to correspond to the concept which this predication indicates, but with which there can be no complete correspondence.

³ In the *Timaeus* this is regarded as the correct statement of the matter.

Timaeus, was raised, viz., what is that which constitutes the peculiar nature of the objects of sensation which are supposed to participate in the generic characteristics? In what is their mutability and variability grounded? Likewise if we ask: Why is it that the objects of sensation are not perfectly knowable in their mutability? These two questions are not raised in the *Republic*, and yet Plato probably had them in mind, and the deliberations which he might have given them probably caused him (influenced by the Eleatics) to make the pronouncements about the non-existing objects of not-knowing (ignorance). As a matter of fact, he should not have spoken of such objects. That he speaks of them as he does betrays a certain ambiguity which he had not overcome at this time.¹ I do not doubt that certain propositions of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* are to be contested; that all this time Plato could not give a clear account of the nature of Becoming and of the changing objects of sensation; that he was merely searching² how, in spite of all experience, he might defend the fundamental propositions which he had advanced. The mythological cloak which he so frequently gives to his deepest thoughts, as, e.g., in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus*, testifies to this.³ In all these cases, as well as in the beautifully conceived parables of the *Republic*—e.g., the sun as image of the Idea of the good (cf. p. 82), those who are chained in the cave

¹ Later it is made clear in the *Sophist* that if Non-Being, nothing, is an object of false predication, then whatever is said about this object is, in spite of what may be said to the contrary, no true predication by which something could be thought, but is only idle babbling. But the fact is that a false predication is as clear in meaning as is the true one. Thus its content has a certain amount of reality.

² Once more I remind the reader that in the *Phaedo* Socrates expressly declares (100d) that he would not venture a definite statement about the relation of the Idea to the phenomena. In the *Republic* he affirms that very likely he would arouse only laughter if he attempted to give a scientific basis for the Idea of the good (506d). And when Glaucon later, by his expression of astonishment about the transcendence of this incomprehensible exposition, interrupts the discussion, Socrates reaffirms the inadequacy of his effort to explain this difficult matter (509c).

³ Cf. *Platon*, I, p. 528; II, pp. 59, 80, 784.

and who by the dim light of a fire in their rear see only shadow pictures on the wall of their dark prison, and who would be blinded by the brightness of the sunlight and the objects on which it shines if they were suddenly led out of their cave—presentiments, suppositions, a certain conviction are expressed, but no scientific knowledge can be guaranteed by them (as Plato well knows).

12. Another point must be investigated at this stage. What meaning is there in the fact that in the *Republic* the IDEA OF THE GOOD is selected from all others and is in a certain sense placed at the head of the whole realm of the invisible world? Why did he not select the Idea of Being or reality, since the peculiarity of Ideas is supposed to be in their complete reality? How is the concept of the good related to that of Being? How is it related to that of beauty or to beauty itself which, according to the description of the priestess Diotima in the *Symposium*, is the highest object of beatific vision?

These questions are partly answered by never losing sight of the task which the *Republic* sets for itself. Since the discussion, as in so many of the earlier dialogues, starts from a concept of practical conduct—the concept of justice, as elsewhere the concept of temperance, courage, etc.—it is natural that, as the discussion proceeds, the problem of fathoming what, in a most general way, is practically right, or what is good, again arises. We were told in the *Protagoras* that a sought-for concept of virtue, e.g., that of justice or that of piety, must have reality. And above (p. 81 f.) it was affirmed that the Idea of the good means nothing else but the good in its reality, in its real nature or the objective basis, the cause of the good.

Yet this does not explain the all-transcending meaning which is ascribed to the Idea of the good. It is said of it that it sheds light on and gives clarity to every form of knowledge, and not merely the knowledge of practical concepts. This introduces us to a trend of thought which is familiar to us

from the *Phaedo*. There Plato gives us to understand that he regarded a teleological explanation of things as the really satisfactory one. Unfortunately, however, he could not find any of the older philosophers who maintained it, nor could he successfully defend it. The teleological explanation of a fact would consist in showing that it is better to have it be as it is than if it were changed in some way. In the meantime it has become evident that every conceivable change in an individual characteristic is not only of significance for the thing in which it takes place, but for all other things to which it stands in relation; consequently what may seem improvement of its condition, may at the same time prove to be a deterioration of the condition of other things. Since causality pervades all of reality,¹ it follows that the attempt to give a teleological explanation suffers from all the defects of the causal explanation (this was already hinted at in the *Phaedo*), and that it can only find an adequate basis in a comprehensive world view.

All Ideas, if my interpretation is correct, are merely postulated by Plato as the basis for true conceptions. Similarly, we must understand the Idea of the good as the necessary postulate for our conceptions of the good. Without using the expression, the "Idea of the good" is set up as a postulate in the *Phaedo* by declaring the teleological explanation as the only satisfactory one. For the teleological explanation of the world is mere fantasy, a mere subjective idea, if no rational, purposive power rules in the universe and determines and orders it in all its details. If this rational power which harmonizes everything is objectively real, it could be nothing else but the good in itself, the good in its true nature. As has been shown, this is identical with the Idea of the good. Even in the *Republic*, where the Idea of the good is praised with such high, transcendent words, it is not raised above the level of a postulate.²

¹ This the *Meno* emphasizes (cf. p. 121).

² It is a question whether it is possible to explain scientifically its reality or that of any Idea. We shall speak of this later. Empirically

Concerning the relation of the Idea of Being to that of the good, I should like to say the following: Everything which we correctly designate as "Idea" has Being.¹ Briefly expressed: Idea is known reality. Therefore, the good as Idea would have Being, would belong to the realm of reality. Evidently there can be no Idea of the content of our false ideas. If one inquires about the reality of an Idea (or the reality of the Idea in general), rationally the inquiry could mean only: how Being as something actual, as something objective is to be understood in contrast to the mere imaginary. The Idea of Being or of reality would be that which forms the basis of all Being, makes it objective, actual. Both concepts, the "Being of the Idea" and the "Idea of Being," can scarcely be kept apart,² and we cannot investigate them without directing our attention on the totality of Being, on all reality. These Ideas are related to the Idea of the good in the same way that the concept of the world is related to the concept of God. (The Idea of Being is the cause of the objective world; the Idea of the good is the cause of the world's being so ordered that feeling beings intuit, know, and enjoy it.) We may say that the good is the significance of Being; and that Being is the actuality or the endurance of the good. Only the good is real. All Being—and in this Plato agrees with Heraclitus—is good and persists because it is good. The limited human understanding does not know this. It could only be known by the perfect knowledge of an all-inclusive spirit. Man can only have presentiments about it, and he can only convey these presentiments to others through parables and myths.

We shall see that the *Timaeus* and the *Laws* are pervaded by the same fundamental conviction. And if Plato here audaciously and freely casts his eye over the whole expanse

the Idea of the good, or in other words the actuality of the good ruling in the world, cannot be proved, because the world in its totality cannot be empirically experienced.

¹ εἶδος, ἰδέα and ὁ ἔστι are of equal value (i.e., mean the same thing).

² It is pretty much the same whether I say the "Being of known reality" or the "known reality of Being."

of the universe and penetrates all its depths, the height from which he has chosen to contemplate everything in the light of the highest purpose does not keep him from realizing how much the complete picture which presents itself to his view is lacking in detail, and how vague certain individual features of it remain. For example, he does not fail to recognize that the teleological explanation must be supplemented by the aetiological explanation; and that, between the individual high points on which the former sheds light and the expanses which are accessible to the latter, there still are immense gaps which as yet completely escape his view.

Another point is to be considered. The transcendent words with which the loftiness of the Idea of the good is praised seem to remove it from all contact with the earthly, the human. It is supposed to dwell "beyond the world of Being," "beyond reality."¹ Yet it is also to be the source from which springs the knowledge of all truth. For that reason Plato requires that the guardians of the state must have seen the Idea of the good, and that all education must be so directed that all talented individuals from early youth will be guided toward this goal. Either all these efforts to attain this goal are in vain, or the goal is not to be conceived as altogether other-worldly or as strictly transcendent. Here, as in the *Phaedo*, we notice a degree of uncertainty. Yet the decision in Plato's sense must have inclined more and more toward the second possibility. This resulted as much from theoretical considerations as from practical effort. He never doubted the knowability of certain positive truths. He even considered it his highest duty to discover them. The more successfully he carried on this philosophic investigation in the service of this duty, the more deeply and the more certainly the conviction must have taken hold of him that reality has positively knowable features. Thus every step of progress in investigation reduces and narrows the gulf between the objects of sense and of Becoming with which man is bound up in his earthly existence, on the

¹ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.

one hand, and the immaterial realm of Ideas, on the other. Nowhere is this gap as pronounced as in the *Phaedo*; yet even here we are not altogether without attempts at mediation. Besides, it is quite evident for the Idea of the good that it cannot be conceived as being in no relation whatever. The word "good" would lose its meaning if we did not ascribe to it the power of attraction which it exerts on a sensitive being.

13. After having traced the doctrine about the good and the theory of Ideas in the dialogues up to the *Phaedrus*, there still remains for us, if we wish to make a clean sweep, a number of other philosophical problems. However, for the sake of clearness, the bulk of these problems (the politico-pedagogical considerations about the constitution of the ideal state) we shall reserve for a later chapter, which will be devoted entirely to practical philosophy. We have already considered some¹ of the logical, epistemological, and psychological propositions made sporadically here and there; others we shall discuss later in their proper context.

Schleiermacher considered the *Phaedrus* as announcing the programme with which Plato opened his career as a teacher in the Academy and as an author. This was an error into which he was led, without knowing and admitting it, mainly through the reports of careless authorities of old. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher was right in maintaining that the *Phaedrus* was written in an elevated mood, and that it has an important position in the series of Platonic dialogues. Only it is impossible that a youth could have written it. It reveals the rich experience of a master. Here, from the height of gratifying and scientific research and teaching in which he has found his vocation, the author looks to a bright future. Borne up by the inspiring power of Eros, which leads him to dare the highest flight of thought, and conscious of the similarity of their goals with those of co-striving youths with whom he is intimately united, he feels himself much superior to the vain babblers of his

¹ E.g., pp. 43, 52, 60, 63 f., 66 f.

day. With pleasure he also thinks of his own writings; yet compared with the fructifying teachings of verbal discourse, he considers them as a simple accomplishment—an accomplishment, to be sure, of which he need not be ashamed when compared with the literary products of other writers, e.g., the stiff artificialities of Lysias, admired by so many, or the pedantic wisdom of the authors of textbooks on rhetoric. However, he gives a friendly and an encouraging side-glance at the ever-worthy effort of Isocrates. The dialogue breathes a quiet and pleasant self-reliance. One might think that the man who writes thus would now rest for a long time in the secure feeling of his mastery. To say the least, the reader of the *Phaedrus* will hardly expect that its author will soon undertake the writing of other dialogues, which will set new problems which the author will earnestly strive to solve. And yet the style, which is similar to that of the *Theaetetus* and the *Parmenides*, on the one hand, and to that of the *Republic*, on the other, and which clearly distinguishes this whole group of dialogues from the earlier ones, as well as from the mature style of the *Sophist* and the dialogues which follow it, shows that only a short interval of time could have elapsed between the writing of the *Theaetetus*¹ (369 or 368) and the *Phaedrus*.² We also know—this I have emphasized more than once—that there were many uncertain points in the basic outline of the philosophy which Plato sketched for himself and that he was conscious of these imperfections. The Idea of the good was to give a firm basis to this philosophy. But the brightness of the light which radiates from it cannot be beheld by the bare eye without first dimming the light. It is only in the form of a parable that Plato speaks of its relation to other Ideas and to the phenomena. Other problems were still awaiting solution. In the myth of the *Phaedrus* and in the speech of Diotima in

¹ Cf. p. 27, 28.

² I think the *Phaedrus* was written shortly before 370. The *Republic*, except the first book which still shows signs of the earlier style, was probably written in the years 375–372.

the *Symposium*, we have Plato's confession that he has not yet succeeded in giving a rational and purely scientific explanation of ultimate questions. However, the *Phaedrus* shows that this did not discourage him.

14. In the *Theaetetus* Plato firmly and resolutely pursues a new course, which is to lead him to the solution of the deferred problems. In his psychological and epistemological investigations he now makes use of the best scientific means.

Practically the whole dialogue is concerned with the question which he raises in the beginning and considers as extremely difficult: What is knowledge?

Certain individuals wished to identify knowledge with sense-perception. Plato contends that this position is not even adequate for our knowledge of the sensible objects; although in this realm there is considerable justification for it. He shows how a complete, sensualistic theory of knowledge—that everything perceptible is constantly changing from one state of being to another—may be developed from the Heraclitean doctrine of the constant flux of things (this doctrine is incontestably true of all sensible things) and from the epistemological work of Protagoras. The objects which we perceive through our senses become perceptible through their motion. Even the perceiving subject in the act of perception produces motion. These motions, which come from opposite sources, meet and influence each other reciprocally; and, in accordance with the dual nature of causes, the perceiving subject becomes conscious of the effects of this clashing of motions; on the objective side, he experiences it as a sense quality; and on the subjective side, he experiences it as a perception of this quality. Thus, e.g., arises the perception of a white colour or a sweet taste. In reality, however, white colour and sweetness, as well as the sensation of sight and taste, do not arise—they do not exist as something unrelated (separate) in and by itself; on the contrary, the individual object, which is constantly changing and which coincides with the perpetual change in the subject,

becomes white or sweet in the momentary perception of the knowing subject. When the two motions meet, the subject does not have sight in general, but he sees white in particular. There is no absolute whiteness; nor is whiteness attached to the observed object which some individuals, who give it their attention, would like to see either as white or as some other colour; whereas others could not see it at all. Nor is there any perception which perceives an object always in the same unchanging manner, regardless of what that object may be. Under these conditions it is clear that two different individuals can never experience the same qualities in an object; nor does a person have two successive, identically the same perceptions of an object.

The very clever disposal of certain objections, which might be raised, shows the theory in an even more glaring light. It is said that one would like to object that with this conception as the basis there would be no sense in speaking of dreams and chimeras (delusions) nor of false perceptions or illusions of any kind. On the contrary, it is stated that it is not easy to distinguish clearly between a dream experience or a waking experience and to designate the conditions which give rise to false perceptions. But if waking and sleeping, health and sickness are different states, then the sensations or motions which an individual experiences during these various states are naturally different; consequently the results of the encounter of these subjective motions with the motions coming from a perceptible object must be different. The dream experience is real for the person who dreams; but when he awakes, it is no longer real. If the same wine is sweet for the tongue of the healthy person but bitter for the tongue of the sick person, then sweetness was produced in the first case but bitterness in the second—naturally not as something absolute, since these attributes do not exist absolutely, but as something in relation to the perceiving subjects. Being coincides with appearances—or if one prefers: Becoming is identical with appearances—this is, in fact, more correct. In the strict sense of the word there

is no "Being." And my sense perception is always correct and true; for what it attests has its complete reality in this sense-perception and belongs to the Being (*οὐσία*) of the perceiving subject.

Another objection is as follows: If sense-perception and knowledge are to be identical, one would have to say of a person who looks at an object with one eye while he has the other closed that he knows the object and does not know it. On the contrary, one could always say that the subject, who had these conflicting states of consciousness, was not simple; besides, a person changes with every impression which he experiences and with every change in his thought-content. Even though the advocate of this sensualistic theory recognizes no difference between human opinions as to truth, there is no contradiction if he speaks of wisdom and folly; for from a rational point of view that which one calls "wise" or "sagacious" one may also call "healthy." This healthy condition of an individual enables him to have or to produce phenomena which suit him, or which suit him better than others, just as the sensation of the sweetness of wine is better than the sensation of bitterness. The physician is able to change the unpleasant taste into a pleasant one, and he is wise in so far as his knowledge is related to bodily things. Similarly, in another relation that speaker is wise who knows how to persuade a city to declare useful things right and not the harmful ones. The same is true of a teacher who influences his pupils in a similar manner.

Skilfully as the refutation of the doubts advanced is carried out, it nevertheless contains various weak points which Plato, in the person of Socrates, attacks as follows: The weakness of the last statement is most apparent. By means of this statement, the antithesis of wisdom and folly is traced to the existing or insufficient knowledge of the useful. For the moment there may be difference of opinion whether a thing is really useful or harmful; later, however, the question is unanimously decided by the consequences which have appeared in the

meantime. The person who advises the adoption of a thing, say a certain law, because he regards it as useful, expects certain consequences in the future. These will either come about or they will not come about. In the first instance, his advice proves to be wise; in the second instance, it proves to be foolish. Thus it finally comes to light that what is right (true) and wise is in agreement with an objective fact; whereas the foolish and the false (or untrue) is non-agreement with objective reality.

At any rate, it is generally agreed that he is wise who can foresee and foretell what will take place later, not only with reference to judgments of utility but with reference to all judgments referring to the future. Conversely, he who cannot predict what will happen is foolish. Socrates comments that it would be a hopeless solution if one were to affirm that such a person could judge correctly for himself and only wrongly for all others who consider him to be a fool.

Protagoras' assertion that every opinion is correct is similar to this last comment and refutes itself as soon as one contradicts it. For the judgment which affirms that this proposition is false is itself supposed to be true.

If it cannot be denied with reference to sensation or perception that the present stimulus of which I am aware,¹ and which I describe by predicating something about it (as for example in the judgment "this draught is bitter"), is for me just as real as is the stimulus which is caused by the same object but which another person perceives and describes quite differently (as, e.g., when he says "this draught is sweet"), it follows that when we ask which of these predications are correct or true and which false, something entirely different must be meant from the description of the momentary stimulus.² Moreover, Plato calls attention to the fact that in sense-perception it is not only the perceiving organ (as a bodily capacity) which is active in us, but rather that it is guided by a ruling spiritual power which combines the impressions of the different

¹ As *παρὸν πάθος*.

² That this is the case will be shown later.

sense-organs and passes judgment upon those which have no sensuous meaning. To these judgments belong not merely the predications about good and bad (judgments of utility) but also the predication about what is real and unreal and that about the mutual differences of the impressions.

This discussion clearly shows that the identification of knowledge with sense-perception is untenable. It would seem, therefore, that we should look for knowledge in the realm of opinion, i.e., in those judgments or predications which we make on the basis of sense-perception. Perhaps knowledge is nothing but right opinion.

Against this position the objection (this is similar to the eristic objection of the *Meno*, cf. p. 102 f.) is brought that no clear distinction of true and false can be unconditionally made. For what one conceives is a conception in consciousness and cannot be mistaken for what is not conceived. Plato replies with two illustrations¹ from the psychic process, which are intended to make clear that all conjecture (as an attempt to learn and to acquire new knowledge) establishes associations between conceptions, associations which were disrupted in consciousness and which may now be made according to clear logical possibility either as they were originally or in an absurd manner. Both illustrations indicate that the question is always one of associating ideas of different orders which are related

¹ One illustration represents memory as a tablet (an illustration frequently used by philosophers since Plato) on which the sense stimuli, as well as all results of the comparative and reflective consideration of these stimuli, are registered. Another illustration is that of a bird-cage in which all our ideas are caged. If the impressions on the tablet were not clear, or if they gradually become effaced, while new impressions are constantly being recorded at their side or over them, which give occasion for comparing them with the old ones, it is possible to mistake them or to read them wrongly. The caged birds do not remain quietly in their places but fly hither and thither. If one wishes to catch one for renewed consideration, then one may by mistake catch a wood-pigeon instead of a rock-pigeon (191c). To give us a concrete picture of the origin of error, the *Theaetetus* even uses a third illustration (193c), that of a man who mistakes the left shoe for the right one.

in much the same way as cause and effect are related; e.g., the relations between an idea in memory and a momentary stimulus of our sense organs, or the relation between the recalling of a stimulus and the idea which was produced by it.

Furthermore, it can be shown by a simple example that knowledge differs from mere opinion, even if the latter is correct. He who has merely heard the report of an eye-witness about an occurrence, as, e.g., at a trial, may have a correct opinion of it but he most certainly does not have knowledge of it.

This seems reasonable. And so to the question: What is knowledge? we must look for another answer. The right conception lacked something and this must definitely be added. What it lacked was the "logos." The explanation that knowledge is to be found wherever and whenever reason unites with correct opinion has actually been advanced. But it too is of no use. It is utterly impossible to see how the word *λόγος* with its many meanings is to be understood so that it will raise the right conception, which previously was not knowledge, to the level of knowledge. The only valid meaning which could possibly be found in the word would be "intuition." And with this meaning we would arrive at a circular definition.

15. Thus the investigation of the *Theaetetus*, like so many of the earlier dialogues, apparently ends in complete indecision. We receive no definition of knowledge which we can safely take home with us. But we did receive certain hints which it will perhaps be worth while to pursue further. The subjective aspect of knowledge, about which we wanted information, has for its content an objective reality. "Knowledge," it is stated in the *Theaetetus*, "is knowledge of what is (what is real)." And definite views have also been expressed in the dialogue about objective reality. From these suggestions, conclusions can be drawn about knowledge, which is concerned with reality.

From the explanation and criticism of Protagoras, it becomes clear that reality is not to be thought of as static Being, as the

Eleatics thought of it, but rather as moving, as changing, such as Heraclitus described its essence. Perfect rigidity of Being would exclude all action as well as passion; and with this, knowledge of reality and every rational predication concerning it would be excluded. The characteristic which we perceive and predicate of an object comes into Being through a dual movement, coming partly from the object and partly from the subject. This movement is both active and passive. And sense-perception itself, which as perception is an event, a psychic event, also belongs to the reality of the perceiving subject. On the other hand it is shown that there is something permanent in these events and movements; this unchanging element alone enables us to name the event, to compare it with others and to know that it actually transpires. It is stated¹ that there are two types of motion or change, viz., movement in space and change in quality² (the change in characteristics of the object which to external appearances remains the same). Both types of motion must belong to an object of which the predication that it moves or changes is to be unconditionally and unreservedly true. If the perception of a definite, sensible attribute is to arise from the meeting of the motion coming from a sense organ and that which comes from a perceptible object, and if at the moment of their meeting both the organ and the object of its perception undergo qualitative changes, then it is clear that the attribute which I predicate of the object and the activity which I predicate of my sense organ belongs to them and does not belong to them (both changed their natures at the moment of perception). With this all possibility of knowledge would cease, and one could not ascribe any characteristics to an object without denying it in the same breath. Therefore Being or reality cannot be thought of as mere motion, but a certain constancy, a permanency, must in some way be perceptible in the motion.³

¹ In Chapters 27 and 28.

² *φωρά* and *ἀλλοίωσις*.

³ We may say, a law which enables us to know and to designate motion as motion of a definite kind.

For every Being, for every reality of which we may speak, the contradictory characteristics of motion and permanency are valid, especially for the psychic or spiritual reality. Strictly speaking, in this realm also there is constant uniform development or Becoming, and not a state of rigid, unchanging knowing or not-knowing to which the eristic logicians wish to attach their proofs against the possibility of error.¹

"Every Being, every reality of which we may speak." Has this not the same meaning as the statement of the *Phaedo*: "Everything on which we place the imprint of reality?" And have we not decided that this expression was identical with what in the *Phaedo* is later called the Idea, and with what we found under the same name in the *Republic*? Most certainly. We may say with assurance that the *Theaetetus* in its epistemological investigation is concerned with a knowledge of Ideas, since understanding and knowledge cannot be comprehended in any other way except as referring to an objective content which may be called the Idea of the individual, correctly formed concepts. If it were possible to determine by a psychological investigation (as is done in the *Theaetetus*) how definite knowledge comes into Being, one would thereby have shown how objective Being or the Idea is apprehended.

Apparently the attempt failed. And yet, though the repeated efforts lead to no positive results, the impression is made on the attentive reader of the dialogue that Plato firmly held to the hope that by continuing his investigation he would attain his goal. He holds out as a promise that he will supplement his present explanation of the doctrine of the flux of all things by examining the opposite position, i.e., the Eleatic doctrine of unchanging, eternal Being. This examination is undertaken in the dialogues *Parmenides* and *Sophist*. But even in the *Theaetetus* he inserted a chapter in the middle of the sceptically restraining expositions of the knowability and definability of real events, a chapter which opens for us a vista of a sphere of reality where complete truth and absolute knowledge are

¹ The investigation of the *Cratylus* led to a similar result (p. 99 f.).

attainable. It is here stated¹ that many will regard the moral value-judgments as uncertain and as vacillating as they regard the predications about the objects of sensation. They will make what is praiseworthy, just, and pious depend on the arbitrary character of the individual state, and will affirm that "there is no essential, objective content of these concepts."² This is also the accepted opinion of the average citizens, who are accustomed to quarrel in court about their own and their opponents' right and wrong, and are highly concerned whether the judge will punish or acquit them. They despise the philosopher because he does not know how to behave in petty law-suits. He is not concerned with the single question: "In what way do I transgress your legal rights and in what way do you transgress mine?" On the contrary, his spirit is concerned with fathoming questions "about the nature of man and the task and duty which spring from it for each individual."³ He is in search of "justice and injustice in their peculiar and contrary nature,"⁴ and instead of joining in the praise of the next best king or of the rich man, he raises the question: "How is it with the government? How is it with the happiness and misery of human beings? What is their basis and why does man naturally seek the one and avoid the other?" Shrewd men of affairs are not aware of the divine cosmic order. "While two patterns are given us in the world of reality, one of the godlike person who is perfectly happy and the other of the godless person who is most unhappy, people in their folly and in extreme irrationality cannot see that these two patterns exist. Similarly, they do not observe how by their unjust actions they become more like the godless and less like the godlike person."⁵

¹ 172ab.

² ὥς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει αὐτῶν οὐδέν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον.

³ 174b.

⁴ 175c.

⁵ Apelt translates: "Although there are two patterns (*Vorbilder*) in the world of true Being, one for the divine as the happiest, the other for the godless and as the unhappiest." Natorp translates: "Patterns (*Musterbilder*) which are represented in that which is." The Greek is: παραδειγμάτων ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστώτων, τοῦ μὲν θεοῦ εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθεοῦ ἀθλιωτάτου. 176e.

"The essence of man" and "justice in its essential nature" are surely nothing else but the Idea of man and the Idea of justice. We may even speak of the Idea of government, of the Idea of human happiness, and of misery without changing the meaning of the above propositions. And the "two patterns (*Musterbilder*) which are given in reality" are also Ideas. The just or unjust individuals are the concrete, individual instances or examples which participate in these Ideas. The fact that the word Idea does not appear here, just as it was missing in the epistemological section of the *Theaetetus*, strikes us as strange. This is all the more noticeable because in the *Parmenides*, which is next to the *Theaetetus* in the order of time, and which is internally and externally closely related to the *Theaetetus*, the two words εἶδος and ἰδέα are more frequently used to designate the independent realities than they are in all the other Platonic dialogues¹ taken together.

¹ The *Parmenides* uses εἶδος 50 (or 51) times out of a total number of 81 (to 84) for all dialogues; the word ἰδέα is used 5 (or 7) times out of a total of 28 (to 30); besides, the use of this term is strictly confined to the first nine chapters. For details see *Neue Untersuchungen*, εἶδος, ἰδέα, etc. See pp. 313-317 in addition to the attached table.

PART TWO

THE DIALOGUES
OF LATER YEARS

FROM

THE SECOND
SICILIAN JOURNEY ON
(AFTER 367)

CHAPTER I

EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF THE LATER DIALOGUES

A. THE *PARMENIDES*

1. The trend of thought of the first chapters is the following: Socrates, represented as a very young man, is engaged in a conversation with the Eleatics, Parmenides and Zeno. The argument starts from Zeno's famous work on the antinomies and determines its main thought to be the following: If one were to assume that Being is many, then one would have to think it as being like as well as unlike. But the like cannot be unlike and the unlike cannot be like. Thus the proposed hypothesis appears to be impossible. Socrates then raises the question whether Zeno does not think that there is an independently existing species or "Idea"¹ of the like, as well as of the unlike, and that the individual objects, which are spoken of as the many of Being, participate in the unitary Ideas; and, in as much as this is the case, they are like or unlike, or they are both at one and the same time. Socrates declares that he can see nothing strange or marvellous in the fact that sensible things participate in opposite Ideas, and that consequently they have the opposite attributes of likeness or unlikeness, as well as of unity and plurality. On the contrary, he would be greatly astonished if anyone were to discover and prove that the antinomies about the individual things to which Zeno called attention in his work also applied to the invisible Ideas, and that the essence of unity itself² is many or that the essence of plurality is one, or that likeness and unlikeness, rest and motion are a mixture.

The two Eleatics hear these comments with perceptible

¹ εἶδος. Perhaps we had better use *Formbestimmtheit*, *Wesensbestimmtheit*. At any rate, what is meant is the objective basis of the idea of such a *Formbestimmtheit*.

² ὁ ἑστὶ ἐν, 129b.

pleasure, and Parmenides praises the philosophic enthusiasm of the young man. Then he has Socrates confirm his position once more, to wit, that we must differentiate between the forms (*Formbestimmtheit*) or Ideas, and the things which participate in the Ideas, and consequently there is, in addition to the likeness of the things, likeness itself; similarly there are unity itself and plurality itself aside from their phenomena; the same is true of all the concepts of which Zeno made use in his proofs. Parmenides inquires further whether Socrates also assumes an independent Idea of the just, the beautiful, the good, etc.¹ Socrates answers in the affirmative; yet he admits that he is in doubt whether he is also to affirm a separate and an independent form of man, of fire, etc. He is inclined to reject the thought that worthless and despicable objects, such as hair, mud, dirt, have Ideas which are real, aside from their phenomena; in fact their reality appears to him to be exhausted by the phenomena. He adds, however, that at times he was tempted to ascribe Ideas to all things. But his thoughts reel at the consequences to which such an admission would lead; consequently he confines himself to a consideration of the Ideas about whose reality he is not in doubt.² In this inconsequential hesitation of Socrates, Parmenides sees a sign

¹ εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

² The question whether there are Ideas of these things is identical with the question whether there is a full and complete knowledge of them. According to the *Phaedo*, this might seem to be excluded. Ideas of concrete objects cannot belong to the innate equipment of the soul, as was proved in the *Phaedo* as well as in the *Meno*; and even if these ideas could be considered as objectively based, the mathematical proofs of the latter dialogue could not overcome the objection that, since they were accidentally discovered by our understanding, they could not be attributed to it as something familiar, and so could not give the certainty, the evidence which is essential to knowledge. This opinion might also seem to be substantiated by the *Sophist* (p. 233 f.) when it puts before us only thought-forms or categories as the highest Ideas of independent reality. But the definition that Being is power (active and passive) and the hint that the mental and non-mental belong together may be advanced against limiting the Ideas to the merely formal, and the *Parmenides* makes unmistakable assertions that even those Ideas which are doubtful have a legitimate claim.

that Socrates is still too much concerned with the prevailing opinion of the many and admonishes him not to underestimate the most insignificant things. Only then will he attain philosophic mastery.

Whereupon Parmenides asks how Socrates conceives the participation of the individual objects in the Idea after which they supposedly are named. There are only two possibilities: They would either have to participate in the whole Idea or only in part of it. Socrates admits the dilemma. But Parmenides finds that each of the suppositions is contradictory. In the first case, the whole Idea would have to be present in every individual object; and from this it would follow that the whole Idea, which is one, would at one and the same time be in different places, would be separated from itself, and would differ in itself. Socrates does not wish to admit this conclusion as necessarily valid, and wishes to compare the reality of the unity and the difference of the species with that of the day which is present as the same day in many places and yet is not separated from nor "outside" itself. Parmenides sees in this comparison only a confirmation of his assertion about the dissimilarity of what is spatially different. This will become more evident when we take another illustration, that of a large canvas which is stretched over many different persons. Somewhat hesitatingly Socrates admits that each individual is covered by only a part of the tent. "Therefore," Parmenides concludes, "the Ideas themselves are divisible; whatever participates in them, participates in a part of them only, and the Ideas are not present as a whole in the individual thing." Yet this second assumption immediately proves itself untenable, and from it the greatest inconsistencies follow in the individual instances. For the individual object, of which we predicate size, is large not in virtue of a portion of greatness which is less than absolute greatness; nor is one object equal to another object in virtue of a mere portion of equality; if this were so, then the small itself would become great in that it would have to be compared with a mere part of itself, and all relations of

size would become meaningless. Neither in this manner nor in any other does the participation of things in Ideas seem conceivable. Socrates admits that he, too, finds it hard to discover a solution for the difficulty.

Parmenides continues: The reason for Socrates' accepting a single Idea beside the many individual things subsumed under it should necessarily force him to assume many Ideas. For just as there is an Idea of size for the individual objects which we observe and which appear large to us, so one would have to find another Idea which would subsume the Idea of size and the things subsumed under it—and so on *ad infinitum*.

Socrates wishes to escape this conclusion by the problematic assumption that the Ideas are thoughts only in the minds of thinking beings. Parmenides, however, reminds Socrates that this thought is supposed to be an idea of something that really exists. And by this thought we think of the single Idea of the individual objects as really existing (these are distinguishable from the Idea itself which has them for its content). The attempt to think of the Idea as a mere thought would lead to the position that the individual things, which are supposed to participate in the Idea, would be composed of thoughts only.

To this Socrates replies that the right relationship between the Ideas and the objects of sense would probably be as follows: The Ideas indicate the points of departure, as well as the direction, in the real world, and the participation of the individual things in the Ideas consists in having the objects resemble the forms. Or more literally: the Ideas are fixed as patterns in nature; whereas the individual objects resemble them and are patterned after them. The fact that they resemble the Idea constitutes their participation in it. Parmenides replies that inasmuch as such a participation can exist, the Idea must be like the individual thing which is patterned after it. But whatever is alike is subsumed under the same Idea. This would lead us again to assume for this likeness another Idea which would subsume the first Idea and the

individual objects embraced by it, and would hurl us into the infinite regress which we previously rejected. Therefore, the participation of the individual things in the Idea cannot consist in resemblance. Apparently another explanation must be sought.

It has become evident that great difficulties are involved in Socrates' attempt to put the Ideas into a realm by itself. These difficulties increase and become more pronounced when one assumes an Idea for every concrete object. The greatest difficulty is to refute the objection that these Ideas are not knowable in their peculiarities. At any rate they lie outside the realms of perceptual experience.¹ In so far as they are related, they can only be related to Ideas and not to the sensible things of human experience which are named after them. Thus an individual as master or as slave is not related to the absolute Idea of mastership or the absolute Idea of slavery, but to an individual man whose servant or master he is. Similarly the absolute Idea of mastership is related to the absolute Idea of slavery, but not to the individual slave. In like manner absolute knowledge is related to absolute reality, and the absolute individual sciences are related to absolute individual realities. Human knowledge in all its aspects, on the contrary, is only concerned with the realities of our human world. If the forms or Ideas exist apart from our world, then we must also lack the Idea of knowledge, i.e., that knowledge by which we know the nature of the forms or the Ideas and which is related to them. Thus we remain completely ignorant of the Ideas themselves which we have assumed (as, e.g., the beautiful itself, the good itself, etc.). But if anyone is supposed to possess such absolute knowledge, which would be much more exact than our human knowledge, we would have to ascribe it to a god. However, this would be followed by a much worse conclusion, viz., this god with all his knowledge of the Ideas could not know anything about us and about the things which we human beings know, since absolute knowledge has no relation to the realities

¹ ἐν ἡμῖν, 133e.

of the human world, just as the absolute rule which God exercises has no relation to the individual man. Or conversely, our knowledge and our authority do not extend to the absolute, divine essences. "Surely," replies Socrates, "it would be a most astonishing conclusion to deny that God has knowledge."

Parmenides summarizes his position once more as follows: These difficulties are implied in assuming a realm of absolute Ideas. It is not easy for one who hears about them to believe in their objective reality; and if he does believe in them, he will regard them as knowable. Only a highly endowed individual can follow their expositions; but even more is needed if an individual is to find a clear solution of these difficulties independently. And yet it is only by clinging to the distinction of such absolute Ideas that we can save philosophic thinking from complete shipwreck.¹

Socrates admits that for the present he is perplexed. Parmenides replies that Socrates' mistake is in trying to reach his goal too quickly; consequently without the necessary preliminary investigation he introduces the Ideas of the beautiful, the just, the good, and the like. It would be well for him if he were to follow Zeno's manner of analysis, and adhere to his own particular problem, the invisible forms or Ideas which we apprehend by thought alone, and make them the object of his investigation. Parmenides expressly approves of the renewed assurance of Socrates that the difficulties which Zeno could not solve can be solved by distinguishing between the Ideas and the visible things. Besides, Zeno's method of proof can be improved upon as follows: After the consequences of an hypothesis have been considered, the logical conclusions of the contrary hypothesis should also be considered. Therefore, Zeno should not have been satisfied with developing the assumed thesis that the many are real; he should also have developed its antithesis which denies the reality of the many. Similarly, the examination of the propositions: there is likeness

¹ εἰ γέ τις δὴ . . . αὐτὸ μὴ εἰσέει εἰδὴ τῶν ὄντων εἶναι . . . , τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασιν διαφθερεῖ. 135bc.

or unlikeness, there are motion and rest, there are generation and destruction, etc., implies a similar development which, for the sake of comparison, always takes into consideration the opposite.

At Socrates' request, Parmenides is ready to make his exhortation clear by an illustration.

Thus we are lead to the second and much larger part of the dialogue, the detail of which need not concern us. From the Eleatic proposition that "Being is one" or "the one is, i.e., exists" a whole series of contradictory conclusions are drawn by the dialectical method, so that in reality every conclusion is denied by its contradictory, and in this manner the fundamental assumption is apparently carried to absurdities.

2. Even though this antilogical development constitutes the greatest part of the dialogue, the content of the chapters which precede it is no less significant. There can be no doubt that in them we have one of the main passages about the Platonic theory of Ideas, and this time not in mythical form, but in a highly communicable exposition.¹ The two Eleatics consider the theory of Ideas, as here presented, as an earnest attempt to solve the problems of knowledge and of Being. But the objections which Parmenides raises remain unrefuted. Yet it is clearly indicated that these objections must be refuted, and that a suitable explanation must be given of the relation of the Ideas to the sensible objects. Parmenides himself, who plays the most important rôle in the dialogue, says that, in spite of all the difficulties indicated, it remains certain that only the holding fast to the distinction between the individual, changing phenomena and the absolute, unchanging Ideas can save philosophic thinking from complete failure. More literally his statement is that he who does not hold to this distinction "will completely destroy the power of reasoning² which tries to

¹ For further information look under *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, and related words in Plato's writings, *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 315, in addition to the table. Cf. also Preface to English edition, p. 10.

² *τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν*.

arrive at an understanding of things." But this would remove the distinction between truth and falsehood; for, without recognizing such a distinction, there can be no valid difference in opinion and no understanding about deviating opinions.

In short, the REAL MEANING OF PLATO seems to me to be well expressed in the words: The Ideas are fixed in nature like patterns or (what I consider to be the same) the Ideas (*Gattungseinheiten*—generic unities) give us a firm hold and points of direction in the real world; whereas the individual sensible objects are patterned after these Ideas, and therefore partake in the universal characteristics of the forms. This explains the statement in the *Phaedo* that the individual objects with definite characteristics strive to be, but are not entirely, what the Idea is really and perfectly. The expression "fixed in nature,"¹ it seems to me, designates the permanent nature of the Idea which is free from all change and from all vacillating subjective perceptions;² but we should be entirely wrong if by this we understood a spatial characteristic. Rightly Socrates protests against the assertion of Parmenides: If the whole form were in each individual object which partakes of it, then we would have to think of the unitary Being, which is identical with itself, as being in different places; this would ascribe differences and division to the Idea. If the Idea is in the individual objects, it must not for this reason be thought of as being in space. Socrates' analogy of daylight, which is simultaneously present in many places, yet remains one, does not confuse the issue. One can see that the objection which Plato puts into the mouth of Parmenides gives him (Plato) great concern.³ In the *Timaeus*⁴ he simply calls it an error to

¹ ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει.

² It is in direct opposition to what is in the world of changing experience (ἐν ῥήμιν).

³ Nevertheless, daylight is not composed of many rays (particles) of light which fall upon the individual objects. Each ray of light is an effect, like all the others, of a uniform cause; but this uniform cause remains untouched by the refraction of the light which is its effect.

⁴ *Timaeus*, 52b.

consider as unreal whatever cannot be thought of as being in space.

Later Aristotle frequently and emphatically renewed the objection that the recognition of the Ideas as a special kind of reality, as Plato characterized them, would lead to an infinite regress. This statement of Aristotle indicates a lack of thoroughness, as well as of profound insight. That which the Ideas and the sensible objects subsumed under them have in common is (similar to a visible model and its image) a conceptual content, consisting of one or more related characteristics which cannot be conceptually differentiated in our thinking; consequently they do not represent a multitude for which a unifying concept must be sought. However, the distinction which separates the Idea from its appearances, in that it regards it as the invisible cause of the visible things, can be made only as a distinction, and cannot, therefore, be represented as something which the two have in common (this a more inclusive Idea would have to be). There is, therefore, not the slightest reason for attempting to subsume the Idea and its appearance (or the prototype and its images) under a higher, more universal concept. Besides, the notion of a general Idea is based on the epistemological position that there is an objective cause or basis for the content of every conception, and of all predications in so far as they may be regarded as true or correct. Since our conceptions, as well as the propositions in which they are expressed, are universal in meaning and never designate an individual phenomenon, but many similar things, their objective basis must be a universal characteristic which comprises many individual things and which is their uniform cause. A concept would be fantastic without a basis which conditions and produces similar phenomena. Should an attempt ever be made to look for an Idea of a higher order which subsumes an Idea of a lower order and its many effects (as, e.g., the Idea of man and the many different individuals who appear and disappear in history, or the Idea of the beautiful and the many beautiful phenomena), the attempt, to be in agreement with

Plato's purpose, could rationally be only an inquiry into the objective cause why a universal should be active and produce generic likeness in the individuals which bear its characteristic, so that we can speak of the coming into Being or the passing out of Being of men or of beautiful things. This would not lead us to a squaring and a further involution of the Idea of man and that of beauty and to an endless regress: instead, it would lead us to an entirely different solution. To inquire about the Idea of a characteristic of sensible things or of a sensible object means that we are to give the objective basis for the subjective aspect of our perceptions and conceptions.¹ To explain this, Plato sometimes makes use of the relation between an image and its original. In the *Timaues*,² we are told that the nature of an image is to be an image of an original and so to be dependent on it. No rational being would think of saying that the reason for the similarity between an image and its original (say a portrait and the man whom it represents) was due to the fact that both resembled an original of the original, and that this similarity was based on the fact that this original of the original expressed the essential features of still another, higher and more original, etc. We should rather inform a person who inquires about these things that the similarity was due to the fact that an object can be imitated and that this is in turn based on physical conditions; in part these conditions are active without our help, as, e.g., a reflection in a mirror,³ and in part they are purposely used by artists as a means of imitative representation.⁴ One of the most familiar

¹ It can readily be seen that the notion that the Ideas are the cause of the becoming and the development of objects is also important for the question as to the location (place) of the Ideas and the manner of their participation in the objects.

² *Timaues*, 52c.

³ The *Sophist* appeals to the reality of such reflected images over against the logical objections of the eristics who doubt their possibility, 239de.

⁴ It is true that in Bk. X of the *Republic* Plato says that the painter who paints the picture of a piece of furniture is three degrees removed from the Idea of the object, say of a bed or of a table; whereas God

criticisms which Aristotle brings against Plato's doctrine of Ideas is that they are absolutely independent of and are set over against the finite things. Plato himself here indicates with the greatest care the absurd conclusions to which this would lead. According to this criticism, the Ideas would remain unknowable; but according to the illustration of the sun in the *Republic* the Ideas are not only the cause of the essence of things, but also of their knowability.¹

Some of the later expositors have looked upon the Ideas as mere thought-constructs. Even though Plato opposes and rejects this position, we may ask whether it is not to be accepted and defended. From the early dialogues, which apparently came to no definite conclusion, we could, nevertheless, become convinced that the negation of a proposed question, even when evidence was advanced for it, gives us no definite assurance that what Plato denied in so many words was to be given up entirely. The refutation of the thesis and its antithesis in Part II of the *Parmenides* shows us that we must be on our guard, and that we must not trust every refutation nor every proof. Here too it is a question of an ambiguity inherent in the word "Idea." As the identification of the Idea with the in-and-by-itselfness or the essence of things already indicates, the Idea (in spite of its definite relations to the objects of our experience) is supposed to be something independently real. I have called this the objective basis for our conceptions of the objects, which gives these conceptions their validity and truth. However, as soon as we speak, or even think, about this independent reality, we make it in a certain sense dependent on our verbal designation and our manner of thinking. In its absolute independence it would not be related to us in any

produced the Idea, the artisan who makes the piece of furniture has given us an imitation of the Idea. But in this exposition, which has meaning only for Plato's criticism of the creative arts (and will therefore be discussed in a later section of this book), the regress from the image to the original reaches its end with the third step.

¹ What is there said of the Idea of the good alone, may also be said mediately of the other Ideas.

way and would therefore be truly unknowable. This is the nature of the case, and the difficulty is similar to that of the Kantian "thing in itself" which loses its "in itselfness" as soon as we wish to think about it and to describe it. The obscurities of the *Parmenides* follow, in part at least, from this difficult relationship which is subject to ambiguities. The idea as a thought-basis for our conceptions would be a thought-construct (νόημα). But if it were admitted that the whole reality of the Idea consisted in its being so conceived, its objectivity which is claimed to be the opposite of mere subjective existence would be lost. Therefore Plato's rejection of this conception must be regarded as his sincere and irrefutable opinion.¹

From the consideration of the difficulties which the *Parmenides* presents, it becomes necessary, as is clearly shown later (in the *Sophist*), that we must attribute an objective as well as a subjective element to the concept of reality, the understanding of which is supposed to be made clear by the term "Idea." From the very beginning my statement that the Idea was the objective basis for our correct ideas included these two elements and their definite relation.

3. We also wish to give some consideration to the ILLUSTRATIONS of the IDEAS which appear in the conversation between Parmenides and Socrates. They can be divided into three classes. The first is formed of logical categories and is based on a comparison of the concepts of magnitude; the second is constituted of concepts of moral and aesthetic values; the third consists of concepts of concrete objects. It is clear that the objective basis of a judgment predicating that of the relation of size or likeness or unlikeness between two things, as well as of the judgment about a thing that it is beautiful, that it is good, differs from the objective basis of the judgment:

¹ However, the possibility of looking upon the Ideas as thoughts in the divine mind still remains. The Neo-Platonists regarded them in this manner. We shall investigate the correctness of this position later.

this is a man, or this is a horse. Similarly such simple ideas as large, larger, smaller, beautiful, good, on the one hand, and man, horse, on the other hand, have a different objective basis.

The sensible objects, the characteristics and relations, are supposed to be images of Ideas. We are not only unable to pass from the original to its imitations, but conversely we cannot go from the imitation to the original. We arrange the sensible things into classes; each class includes like things. And again we join these classes in various ways by such resemblances as we discover in them. Thus we bring concrete objects together and classify them into the organic and inorganic with their subdivisions. From these we distinguish invisible realities which can be classified with greater difficulty and with less certainty. We must, if and in so far as its concepts are true, be able to apply the whole scheme of this ancient classification, which existed in its main features long before Plato, to the realm of Ideas. It can readily be seen from the account which this dialogue gives that Plato, from the time he began to transcend the individual experiences and to seek to ground them in universal concepts, did not at first dare to demand originals for the concrete objects. He began with the concepts of form and of value;¹ these above all appeared to him to be incontestably rightly formed, and the dispute about the content of the concepts of moral values was to him, as a disciple of Socrates, of the greatest importance and its clarification the most pressing need.

If Plato had wanted to explain in what the objective basis of a concept such as the "beautiful" or the "just" consisted, he would have had to describe the nature of the human soul. We recall chapters from the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Republic* in which it is shown that the longing for beauty and justice lies deep in the soul of every man. It is difficult to prove from experience that this is true without exception, and it is for that reason that Plato makes such frequent use of

¹ This is true of the adjectives which appear as predicates in a sentence; it is not true of nouns which form the subject of a predicatio

mythology. If the imagery of mythology through the presentiment which it arouses essentially supplements the world view derived from experience, then we may say that a divine power rules in the world. The reign of this divine power assures man of a reward for all his actions (this reward makes right actions the condition of happiness), implants a sensitiveness for beauty in his soul, and provides an objective basis for the concepts of justice and beauty in their innermost essence.

There should also be corresponding evidence which would show the objective basis of the concept of equality or likeness, or the concept of any relation of size. These concepts receive their content only through a mutual comparison of different objects (or conceptions), and this mutual comparison is totally indifferent, purely external, to the objects compared. Their result changes with every change in position of the knowing subject without in the least changing the inner nature of the objects which have entered into other relations. I should like to contend that the objective basis of all predications of comparison is given with the organization of the human mind, which has the ability not only to receive sense-perceptions, but also independently to make use of them. Against this the objection could be raised that if I were right in my contention, then the psychic activity of comparing and of determining relations—an activity described and considered in the *Theaetetus* as the essence of the soul (the mind)—or the ability for such an activity, would have to be identified with the Ideas of equality, greatness, smallness, likeness, etc. This would, indeed, be incompatible with many Platonic pronouncements about the Ideas. But the objection would be based on a misunderstanding of my position. My statement that the organization of the human soul was disposed and determined to make comparisons was to indicate only one-half of the conditions for establishing the truth and the correctness of a concept of relation; the other supplementing half lies in the fact that in the objects, to which the comparing activity refers, there must be recognizable certain objective facts which justify judgments of comparison.

As justice, of which we speak, is objectively based in the appetitive nature of the human soul, so, it seems to me, equality, likeness, and every other relation of size which may be advanced are objectively based in the nature of the understanding of the human soul. However, neither in the latter nor in the former case is the psychic nature of man alone adequate for a complete explanation. We must, rather, at all times take into consideration what for us is the world of concrete and external objects; finally, we must also consider the unity of the whole world of reality or the power which produces this unity, and which pervades the whole and brings our soul in contact with the objective world which stimulates the desires and fills the understanding of the soul. Just because the appetitive nature alone is inadequate to explain just actions, the Idea of justice is not to be sought in it, at least not in it alone. Similarly, since the ideational activity of the soul is inadequate to explain the appearance of quantitatively and qualitatively like or unlike features of phenomena, it cannot be put on the same plane with the Idea of any comparative concept, nor with all of them together.

4. Only a few more remarks about Part II of this dialogue. There are many things in the *Parmenides* to which we could object, but into these I shall not now enter. And yet some of the very propositions, which may give the greatest offence, because they appear entirely sophistical, can be explained in such a way that they will have a good and tenable meaning.

Because of the lack of adequate definition and because of the ambiguous terms used, now in one way and then again by an immediate transition in a wholly different sense, one frequently does not know where one stands. At no time have I been engaged with a critical piece of work which made me so distrustful and weary as did the confused chain of reasoning of this section. With increasing uneasiness and anxiety one follows the development of all these propositions which succeed each other in breathless haste, without any interrup-

tions by the lively digressions which adorn the earlier Platonic dialogues so gracefully. Yet I do not doubt that Plato did this on purpose. The reader is to be brought into difficulties and despair by the propositions offered him on the authority of others. While these statements seem trustworthy, they all contradict each other. This is done so that the reader may compose himself and seek to become independent in his thinking. He will then discover for himself the rules impressed on the reader by the *Phaedrus*, that at no time may one undertake serious investigations without first laying a firm foundation with clearly defined concepts and psychological considerations. Whereas the Megaric school employed eristics partly for vain artistic display and partly for self-destruction (destruction of each other's arguments), Plato wished to use the doubt aroused as an incentive for more careful attention and independent reflection. He who, as a consequence of this incentive, seriously gathers his thoughts will not only discover errors here and there in the antilogical arguments presented, but he will also glean permanent results from the chaos of the conclusions.

To attain these results, if possible, I shall attempt to give as concise a review as possible of the content of the whole of Part II. The question is whether the reality of the ONE may be affirmed or denied. The answer to this question is derived from the conclusions which follow from each of the two opposite assumptions. The arguments reveal that:

I. Through their inherent contradictions, a number of connected conclusions refute the positive as well as the negative aspect of the fundamental (Eleatic) assumption. Both assumptions are untenable if the meaning is correct which follows from assuming the Eleatic concept of the absolutely unrelated ONE, determined only by its unity. It matters little whether the ONE is or is not (exists or does not exist); for nothing follows from it either for itself or for other things or for concepts to which it is not related.

II. Other conclusions remain intact. Their main propositions are:

(a) If we affirm the reality of the one, the one must stand in relation to something else from which it differs, when logically considered, but which it also resembles, and by which it is spatially and temporally included. It must also include logically determinable differences, as well as spatial and temporal parts. But the other things, from which the one differs by nature, are also determined by characteristics. They have a unity which is essentially the same as that observed in the one.

Inasmuch as the unity of the one is emphasized (a unity which is inseparably bound up with manifoldness and difference, and only because of them is real unity), we may emphasize the separateness and the difference of the nature of the other things by abstracting from the togetherness of the moments which are always and inseparably united in reality. (Everything is one through the Idea which subsumes its characteristics. But unity in itself is only logical, never real. Reality requires spatial-temporal existence. The spatial-temporal is unquestionably manifold, but it can only be apprehended as a unity.)

(b) If the reality of the one is denied in such a way that the denial constitutes a meaningful judgment, the statement means no more than that the one does not have its determinateness in itself nor from itself, but that it is to be considered from the point of view of other things, and that it is to be defined by exclusion and by contrast. Since the one remained the same, approximately the same logical predicates are attributed to it by the negative definition as were attributed to it by the positive one. If the one and the many are in intimate relationship, and if the one is defined first and then the other things are defined by means of it, by determining the logical relationship existing between them, then the observer of this relationship has merely changed his position, but the result of this observation must remain the same.

By the negation of the reality of the one (which as previously is thought of as being the opposite of other things), one expects

a further series of conclusions in which the one would not be thought of; instead the others (i.e., the objects of nature) would be considered in and by themselves. This series is lacking; instead a different series follows.

III. The non-existence of the one is posited in such a way that the indefinite, in themselves not clearly definable nor predicable many, are the only reality. For the other things abstracted from the many, all kinds of predicates thereupon follow; in the other series these predicates were ascribed to the one or its opposite, the others—but only apparently. There would be no real unity; and, therefore, no knowledge, no science, no truth.

5. I believe that the greatest profit to be derived from this discussion is the realization that the Eleatic conception of Being as undifferentiated and unitary, and as unrelated to the many (Non-Being), is involved in contradictions; that the one or simple Being is a contentless hypothesis which only has a definite meaning in its substantive form, but does not differ from nothing or Non-Being, which has a similar form. This conclusion, as we shall see, is clearly expressed by the thorough critique of the Eleatic doctrine as given in the *Sophist*.

Further, the following should also be borne in mind: The unity which I posit in thought contains the possibility of developing the whole system of numbers, the possibility of constructing, by continuous addition or subtraction and division, series which have no definite limit, and which are in this respect not only many but infinite. Even the necessity for such development is inherent in this possibility. Unity in itself has no meaning; to have meaning it must be differentiated from other unities. If each unity contains within itself the many (and infinity) whose parts stand in the same relation to it as the parts do to the whole, then unity, many, the whole, parts are related concepts, each one of which requires the other three.

To this logical development, against which I can raise no objections,¹ the remarkable proposition is joined that Being is always accompanied by unity and unity by Being. In this manner Being and unity are also represented as mutually supplementing each other; and we may, therefore, infer still further that Being, each being, is not merely unity, but also multiplicity, a whole with parts (relatively a part of a whole).

The question arises: How are these concepts, the one, the other (other things), the whole, and the parts, related to the Ideas whose essence and whose relation to the sensible things Socrates discussed in the introductory chapters? I believe that what is here said of the one is true of every Idea since it is unitary and determined. But this is also true of each individual object, in so far as it is one, or is thought of as one. We may say that each Idea as a definite Idea differs from other definite Ideas and stands in a definite relation to them.² For that reason the Idea may be apprehended and described not only through its own characteristics, but also from the point of view of other Ideas, i.e., by the similarities and differences in their characteristics. The same is true of the individual object of sense-perception. It stands in relation to and is in contact with other sensible objects which may be viewed from opposite points of view—now in this, now in that manner.

But with all this nothing has yet been determined as to the question raised in the introductory chapters about the relation of the Idea to the objects of sensation. And yet in the anti-logical development of Part II, at least, we expect the indication of an answer. I believe that there is such an answer, and its meaning I should express as follows: "You find special difficulties in my doctrine and do not want to understand what I have said in explanation of it. I ask that you reflect whether

¹ The eristic will indeed always say: The one is not many. But he also says, if there is an Idea of things, then there must also be an Idea of the Idea.

² The *Sophist* will show that it is this relation which constitutes the being of the Idea.

such explanations, which are difficult to understand, do not appear in every investigation which seeks to get at the bottom of things. Do you understand the contradictory predicate which, as the Eleatics, Parmenides and Zeno, have shown, follow for everything definitely thought which is one in concept and yet includes many? The same is true for every spatial and temporal existence. Whoever is able to detect paralogisms during his investigations and to know them as such, and to ferret out whatever is earnest and tenable in them, will see how the above objections to my doctrine can be solved. At any rate, he alone will also understand where and to what extent these objections make it necessary to restate my position, and to what extent it need not be done. For the decision of this question the critic (whoever he may be) must be thoroughly prepared by the precise art of dialectics; I realize that I, too, am in need of further practice just as, according to Parmenides, the youthful Socrates must still practise the art before he can know all the individual Ideas and define them adequately. Let us once more investigate the matter thoroughly."

According to the pattern which is here given with the explanation of the concept of Being, the investigation would have to take the following course: To begin with, if the Ideas exist and do not exist as independent entities; or in the second place, if they stand or do not stand in relation with others—What follows (1) for the Ideas themselves? (2) for the objects? This investigation has already been made in part by the introductory conversation between Socrates and Parmenides. The conclusion arrived at is that if the Ideas (see page 162, I) are thought of as separate, unrelated entities, they remain unknowable. So neither from the assumption of their existence nor from the assumption of their non-existence does anything follow either for the Ideas themselves or for the objects. Besides, it has become evident (this corresponds to p. 164, III) that if one wishes to think of the Ideas differently, i.e., in such a way that we should have to affirm their standing in relation to the sensible objects, yet deny their reality, then there are

no knowledge and no truth.¹ For him who wishes to determine the conditions of possible knowledge² there still remains the following problem for investigation (this corresponds to II above): If the Ideas exist, not unrelated but related to the things of sense, how must their Being, their true reality be conceived, and in what does this relation between them and the objects exist?

It seems to me that Plato's main purpose in the *Parmenides* is to urge the readers to consider seriously to what extent they wish to hold to the doctrine of Ideas, or to the entities existing in and by themselves, offered them in a mythological cloak in the earlier dialogues, and to what extent they find the doctrine in need of correction and completion. At any rate, it is especially noticeable that in all the later Platonic dialogues with their many profound and careful investigations devoted to essential Being, the old theory of Ideas scarcely ever occurs. Only in one place of the *Timaeus* shall we encounter expositions which remind us of the Ideas as set forth in the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic*, etc.✓

B. THE *SOPHIST*

I. The *Sophist* continues the discussion of the *Theaetetus* and supplements the results attained there. By investigating the concepts, it throws light on the relation between knowledge and Being, not from the point of view of the subject of knowledge through psychological explanations, but from the point of view of the object of knowledge—of reality, of Being. This investigation begins with an historical, critical review. Plato asks: What did other philosophers say about the concept of Being?

Two points of view are considered: (1) whether Being is one or many (i.e., the number of the elements); (2) the nature of Being. When considered from each of these viewpoints, the earlier philosophers can be divided into two groups. As far

¹ The *Theaetetus* determined that truth arises from relating a sense-impression to an Idea. ² Kant would say: "Possible experience."

as the number of the elements is concerned, most of them affirm an original plurality, e.g., duality of Being. Others, e.g., the Eleatics, affirm the reality of the one, indivisible and undifferentiated. Upon careful examination, one sees that the assumption of two kinds of Being quickly leads to that of three, that of three to four, that of four to five, that of five to six, and so *ad infinitum*, since we cannot stop with any definite number.¹ For example, if we take the dry and the moist, the warm and the cold, the light and the dark, or any one of the pairs which were placed at the beginning of things and recognize them as first principles, then upon the first predication which we make about them, if it is really to have meaning and validity, we must posit a third type of Being. For example, in the predication that reality is two and that each of the two is one, duality and unity are assumed as existing. If these are compared with each other and the so-called first principles, other predicates follow which (if they are to be correct) must have an objective basis in the existing relations of Being. With our predications, we are on the direct, never-ending path which leads from duality to infinity. But we find ourselves on the same path when we consider the so-called simple and indivisible, in itself undifferentiated Being of the Eleatics. All adjectival predications which we make of it, as well as the characterization of it as a unity which the Eleatics attribute to it, the very act of naming Being, posits differences—at least the last posits the difference of the thing itself from its name. Thus we pass from unity to duality. How we proceed from duality, we already know. If we wish to avoid every differentiation, we are not only forbidden to designate Being by a word and to exclude every predication about it, but the very thought of the concept of Being is destroyed. The so-called one Being, of which we may predicate or think neither unity nor Being, becomes identical with Non-Being. The something becomes empty nothing.

¹ Cf. the origin of the concepts of number according to the *Parmenides*, p. 164 above.

Similar difficulties confront us if one investigates the historical answers to the question about the inner nature of Being. The opposing views are those of materialism and spiritualism.

The materialists identify Being with the material, i.e., with that against which we bump in space and which we can touch with our hands.¹ The others, we are told, affirm immaterial Ideas which form the content of thought and constitute true reality.² Everything bodily they explain, on the contrary, as mere Becoming. Of Being they affirm still further that it exists in and by itself in reverent holiness, unmoved, without action, and without passion. The leader of the conversation—it is not Socrates, but an unnamed Eleatic, who is brought in by Socrates, and who is induced to carry on the argument—finds both definitions inadequate, since neither does justice to the reality of the psychic life. One could not seriously affirm that not only is the soul demonstrable, but also its movements or activity and its good and bad attributes are demonstrable. With this materialism is readily refuted. The refutation of the other one-sided position is more complicated and not so simple. It is the position which is—strangely—attributed to the friends of the Ideas.³ But Plato says: If they admit that our souls enter into a knowing relation with the so-called unchangeable reality of Being, then knowledge cannot be understood in any other way than as an action or passion of the soul; correspondingly on the part of the known object there must also be an adequate passion and action. (There is no action without a corresponding passion, and no passion without a corresponding action.) Whether one regards the behaviour of the soul in the knowing process as active rather than passive, or perhaps at one and the same time as active and passive, at any rate, the relation between it, as the subject of thinking, and Being, reality, as the object of knowledge, is a relation which may be

¹ Their definition is: οὐσία = σῶμα or οὐσία = δ παρέχει παραβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα.

² νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσία εἶναι, 246b.

³ They are called οἱ τῶν εἰδῶν φίλοι, 248a.

described by the correlative concept action-passion.¹ This excludes the perfect rigidity and immobility of Being as object of thought. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten² that if knowledge is to arise, there must be a certain amount of stability in the relation of the object to the subject; a certain permanence is necessary for both. It follows, therefore, that nothing else remains except to think of Being at one and the same time as in motion and as not in motion.

When the peculiar doctrine of the "friends of the Ideas" has proved itself untenable, the Eleatic proposes another definition which is contrary to those of the opponents, and which may not be wholly adequate; but it is a definition to which they can for the moment agree, since it is better than their own. It runs as follows: "Anything has real existence when it in any way has inherent in it the power to affect another thing or to be affected, even if only for a single moment and in the slightest degree, by something else, no matter how insignificant that thing may be. Therefore I propose the following definition of BEING: BEING IS NOTHING BUT POWER,"³ or BEING IS POWER.

2. This has brought us to a declaration which is the greatest stumbling-block and the most cogent objection to the traditional conception of the doctrine of Ideas. It will be necessary to devote a little more space to it. Yet I do not wish to introduce an exposition which will interrupt our argument before we have considered the epistemological explanations of the *Sophist*, which involve a further explanation of the concept of reality. We had reached the conclusion: Being must at one and the same time be thought of as in motion and not in motion.

¹ ποιεῖν-πάσχειν.

² The proof for this was already given in the *Theaetetus* and earlier in the *Cratylus*. The proposition is here given anew.

³ 247de. This is restated in 248c as follows: "We have determined as an adequate definition of real things: If a thing has inherent in it the power of being affected or of affecting others, no matter how small the thing."

To this, logic raises its objection: How is that possible? The contradiction—so the Eleatic leader of the conversation declares—is as pronounced as if one wished to speak of Not-Being. It is evident, however, that the Eleatic prohibition, not to speak of Non-Being, must lead to the denial of every predication, of every judgment. And yet all our thinking takes place in the form of judgments. By advancing hypotheses, the Eleatics contradict themselves. The very assertion that one may not predicate anything of Being except that it is, and that one may not speak of Non-Being, is a judgment. He who wishes to hold to the Eleatic prohibition would have to refrain from thinking and speaking. One has to remember that the judgment, as it at all times is formulated, is a fundamental fact and is the incontestable assumption of all logic and of all disputes.¹ In its simplest form, the judgment (this is true of every judgment) consists of a noun (*ὄνομα* in the narrower sense), which is the subject of the predication, and of a verb (*ῥήμα*), which, in conjunction with the noun, expresses an action or passion of the subject, or it expresses a relation of the subject to something else and thereby indicates a positive or negative characteristic. A single noun or a series of nouns gives us no predication. "Lion, deer, horse," is no judgment. Nor does the judgment arise by positing a verb or a series of verbs, e.g., "walks, runs, sleeps." Whereas "man learns," "the lion walks," or "man is good," "real things are in motion" or "at rest" constitute judgments.² He who makes such a judgment differentiates between two things in the concepts of the subject and the predicate; yet at the same time he assumes in the different things real relations which he wishes to characterize by the predication. The Being which is expressed in such judgments as "a man is good," "real things are at rest," i.e., are immobile, immutable, means nothing else but such a

¹ Compare the more detailed exposition in my *Neue Untersuchungen*, pp. 54 ff.

² The examples are found in 262c, 251b, 252a. Also compare *Theaetetus*, 206d and *Cratylus*, 425a, 431c.

relation between the concept of the subject and that of the predicate, a determining of the subject by the attributes of the predicate; it is the relation of the one being influenced by the other.¹ Or the nature of the subject is as the predicate indicates it. (The ambiguity which still clings to the predication of Being and which needs more careful explanation is made univocal by the relation which the judgment expresses. But it is only a question of a relation, and it is altogether false if one thinks that the judgment "S is P"² affirms the identity between S and P.) This being of such and such a nature, which excludes other characteristics, may also be negatively expressed as not-of-a-different nature.³ For that reason, the Being which is expressed in the judgment is in a certain sense identical with Not-Being. Conversely we may say that Not-Being—in spite of the objections of the Eleatics—exists (is real). It is real in the sense that it is other or different (*ἕτερον*). Not-Being is inconceivable in any other sense (in fact, as Parmenides expresses it, "unthinkable and inexpressible"). Therefore, as soon as one speaks of Not-Being (speaking is only to be recognized as an uttering of sounds which have meaning), one means Not-Being in this sense. To pronounce on the correctness of a judgment, one has to decide which definite relations between the concept of the subject and that of the predicate are valid and which are not valid. In this connection, Plato returns once more to the eristic objection that false judgments or predications are impossible, since they would have to speak of Not-Being; this would be contradictory. By comparing two propositions "Theaetetus sits" and "Theaetetus flies," which have the same subject for their predications, he shows that no one can fail to recognize the difference between the true and the false judgment. He im-

¹ In 252b the relation between them is expressed as a *κοινωνία παθήματος*.

² Plato does not yet know of the use of these simple letters. This belongs to later logic.

³ So that both Being and Not-Being are only differentiated through a subjective consideration which uses this or that view-point.

proves the vague and controvertible definition of the false judgment, "which affirms Not-Being as Being or Being as Not-Being," by saying that it truly predicates Being of an object (even flying has Being, i.e., it is an activity derived from experience), but it is a Being which does not belong to it;¹ that is to say, it affirms of the subject a relation to something else which does not take place, or it denies a relation to something which actually takes place. At any rate, Being belongs to everything which is thought and investigated; but only in the sense of being determined in a certain manner. It is still doubtful how this "certain manner" is to be conceived or in what its definiteness consists. Similarly Not-Being, as well as to-be-identical-with-itself and to-be-different-from-something, is true of everything which is thought. Further (in accordance with the general definition that Being is power), motion and not-motion, i.e., permanence or rest, may also be predicated of it. (Otherwise what is in motion would be unknowable and not predicable.)

The pronouncement here made about the meaning of predication or of the judgment supplements the position of the *Theaetetus* as to the origin of the judgment, and forms the basis for a theory (about the judgment) which shows scarcely any loopholes and which can hardly be improved. That this theory was satisfactory to Plato is evidenced by the fact that at a much later time it is briefly set forth in the *Philebus*. But it is closely connected with a definition of reality or the concept of Being which we could gather from the *Theaetetus*, and which is definitely expressed in the *Sophist*. In the judgment, the predication of Being has different meanings.² These depend on the subject about which the predications are made and on the relations into which the subject is brought by the predication. Inasmuch as the judgment is true and correct, these relations are not ascribed from without to Being through the

¹ ὄντων ὄντα ἕτερα, 263b. Cf. also Preface to English edition, p. 10.

² There is no Being which is not in relation with something else and whose relation could not be described by a judgment.

arbitrariness of a judging understanding; they have rather an objective existence. Objectively, relations can only exist as causal relations when they produce or when they suffer change. This corresponds to the definition: Being is power to act or to be acted upon; Being is action and passion. This definition was the result of the investigation which was expressly undertaken for the purpose of determining the concept of Being; this investigation makes use of all the efforts of the earlier philosophers to define this concept. As we have seen (p. 169), the definition was introduced with the greatest emphasis—the words used are, “I propose the following definition in order to determine the concept of reality”—and later it is once more stated in an abbreviated form.

3. It is true that some doubt is indicated whether the newly proposed definition is altogether satisfactory. For the present, at least, we are told, the opponents may perhaps agree to it.¹ However, this may only be a change in modesty out of deference for the opinions of others; yet we may have to attribute greater meaning to this limitation. In fact, there is a passage in the *Sophist* which seems to demand that the concept of Being be supplemented at a later time. To weaken the objection which the “friends of the Ideas” may have against the position that a spiritual relation between the knowing subject and its immaterial object of knowledge is that of action and passion, the question is immediately put: “Shall we, in fact, be easily persuaded that motion, life, soul, and reason do not belong to Being (reality)² in its full sense, that Being does not live nor think, but that it dwells without mind³ in an unchanging majestic holiness?”⁴ This seems inconceivable. At any rate, mind must be attributed to it. Then too it must have life. And it can only have life if it has a soul;⁵ and again as a Being with a soul it cannot be without motion.

¹ “It is possible that something else will recommend itself to us and to them at a later time,” 248e.

² τῷ παντελῶς ὄντι.

³ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον.

⁴ 248e.

⁵ ἐμψυχον.

Is it not possible that the conclusion is pressed upon us that the real is to be defined as having a soul? I find it of importance for an understanding of this much disputed passage that in what follows the expression, Being (reality), is frequently replaced by an expression which designates the whole of cosmic reality.¹ In this I should like to see the indication that we cannot understand and that we cannot satisfactorily (exhaustively) define the real without directing our attention to the whole of reality which is known to us in two ways: as the physical or material and the non-physical or immaterial to which spiritual Being belongs. At any rate, the exposition in the *Timaeus* is in agreement with this interpretation.

4. Before leaving the *Sophist*, we must investigate who the "friends of the Ideas" are whose propositions are here overthrown, as are those of their opponents, the materialists. We are told that they are the Megarics. They may be included in this classification, but at no time must we think of them alone. He who bears in mind the discussion of the Ideas of the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, and the first chapters of the *Parmenides* must also (most certainly) include the Platonic Socrates among the "friends of the Ideas." And if he is the most important one in the group of whom the reader, without doubt, will have thought rather than of anyone else—then what does the criticism brought against the contentions of the "friends of the Ideas" mean?

Of this two explanations are possible. Either Plato wishes to correct his own views, which he formerly held, or he wishes to protest against a misunderstanding to which the manner of presenting his views gave rise. To me the second alternative seems the probable one. I conjecture that greater significance was attached to the proofs for immortality, as given in the *Phaedo*, by the followers of Plato (in the Academy) than Plato wished to attribute to them. From this misunderstandings

¹ τὸ πᾶν, 249d and 252a where τὰ ὄντα appears as the equivalent.

necessarily arose as to the meaning of the Ideas.¹ Thus it seems to me that the "friends of the Ideas," spoken of by the *Sophist*, are Platonists who enthusiastically followed the hints of the Platonic myths in the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, and those expositions of the *Phaedo* which are more rhetorical than philosophical, and who were inclined to take them literally.

Of course, we do not wish to deny that Plato had reason to improve certain points of his own presentation. E.g., some views which he left undecided or ambiguous at an earlier time had to be formulated and defined more carefully. With the *Theaetetus* this energetic effort begins. With an unmistakable deliberate abandonment of all charm, of all poetical decorations of presentation, this effort is continued in those dialogues which are externally a continuation of the *Theaetetus*; in short, the argument proceeds by carefully avoiding all flowery expressions. The Plato of the years after 369 is no longer the same, and he ceases to give Socrates the leading rôle. The only question is whether there is a break in the development of his thoughts; whether he consciously abandoned the old conception of essential Being and its relation to knowledge. It seems to me that this is not the case.

C. THE STATESMAN

1. The *Statesman* may be regarded as PART II of the *Sophist*. In addition to supplementing and confirming the epistemological doctrines of the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, it brings us something altogether new. Plato emphasizes this new element so much that one cannot help noticing that he considers it a discovery of the greatest importance. It is the distinction between two kinds and two standards of measurement or—if we translate more freely—two ways of determining comparative attributes (characteristics). We are told that the one standard of measurement is relative and leads to predica-

¹ According to the *Phaedo*, the disembodied soul is supposed to be able to come in contact with the Ideas.

tions which are expressed by the comparative forms of the adjective.—To the larger and smaller of the text we may add stronger and weaker, more or less, and still retain the meaning of the text; whereas the other standard of measurement is absolute. It measures,¹ as Plato expresses it, “Every production with reference to a necessary and absolute essence.” That is to say, it relates everything to an absolute standard, and regards as false the “too” or “all too” which modify the adjectives describing the object and which do not agree with this standard.

We are also told that the two kinds of measurement determine two divisions of all the arts (τέχναι) or sciences. One division includes all the sciences which “measure number, length, depth, breadth in relation to their opposites”; the other division includes the sciences which measure “with reference to the mean, the appropriate, the opportune, the mora necessary; in short, with reference to a standard which is determined once for all and which lies between two possible extremes.”—We may call this the ideal mean.—A further description of the two branches reveals that the first includes the sciences which are concerned with what is purely conceptual or abstract; the other includes the sciences which pass judgment upon the conditions of the real world, and which determine the temporal and spatial status of the concrete objects in this world, or which wish to mould them in accordance with a standard. Pure mathematics is a good example of the first class. For it, there is only a more or less, a larger or smaller. For it, there is no “all-too-intense,” “all-too-much,” or “all-too-little”; neither is there a distinction between values. On the contrary, for it every number and every magnitude is, abstractly considered, of equal value with any other, and from a different point of view it seeks the mutual relationship of the one to the other. What it determines either has “Being,”²

¹ Or “according to the standard of the nature” (the given essence of nature) “necessary for all production.” *Κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκάων οὐσίαν*, 283d.

² ὄν.

abiding reality, and is scientifically valid (i.e., in agreement with all other knowledge in its field), or it does not have Being (i.e., it is "Non-Being"¹), and as such is scientifically impossible and, because of its contradictions, it is rejected; in short, it is not in harmony with existing reality, and is, therefore, once for all excluded from it. On the other hand, the achievements of the artist and the tradesman are difficult² because they are subject to an ideal which the artist and tradesman may or may not attain. That is to say, in the one (mathematics), the question concerns existing and non-existing relations; in the other, it is a task which demands effort and at best can only be solved by such an effort.

Plato lets the Eleatic leader of the conversation give the illustration of pure mathematics. The careful reader, who is led on by hints to pursue the proposed path when the others hesitate, must ask and search what other sciences are included in the first art of measurement. He will see that closely related to the science about the relations of numbers or pure mathematics is the science of the relation of concepts, regardless of their contents. This includes formal logic, as well as ontology or metaphysics. Further, we must include in this art of measurement every pure theory not concerned with purpose. Mathematics even extends to the other division and forms its essence, since it, too, is concerned with measurement. Even the practical arts are to be based on the art of measurement.³ When mathematics does not limit itself to theory, but sets for itself practical tasks for the solution of which it employs its knowledge of the relation of numbers and magnitudes, then it must take into consideration the peculiarities of the actual conditions, i.e., the peculiarity of the material which is to be formed according to a purpose, or it has to take into consideration "the essential nature necessary for all becoming";

¹ οὐκ ὄν.

² ὅν χαλεπόν, 284a.

³ In the *Philebus*, Plato returns to the distinction here made and says (55e) that practical arts have real science and knowledge only in so far as they contain the art of number, of measuring, and of weighing.

as such this essential nature is independent of man's free will. At any rate it is true that everything which comes into Being is subject to the art of measurement.¹ Protagoras, however, must abandon his position that man is "the measure of all things,"² and he must admit that the individual, sensible objects have within them the measure of their form, or that this measure consists in an objective law of development.³ Very likely this is the new thing which is to be taught by the distinction between the two arts of measurement. It is the knowledge that when we measure and compare we are bound to and necessitated by something which is independent of us and which we must recognize as a fact.

To begin with, we recognize in the activity known as thinking, distinguishing, counting, and comparing measurement our own subjective arbitrariness. Counting and distinguishing proceed from one to two and three and beyond into the infinite (cf. pp. 167 f.). Every characteristic of Being which we perceive, we may compare with an endless number of other characteristics, and we shall always find that it is not what they are.⁴ Everything which we perceive as large, we can perceive as small by changing our point of view, and vice versa.

¹ 285a. μετρήσεως μὲν γὰρ δὴ τινα τρόπον πάνθ' ὅποσα ἔντεχνα πετέλληφεν.

² On the contrary, it is affirmed in the *Laws* (716c) that God is the measure of all things.

³ "Law of development." This best gives the meaning of the Greek expression which I translated (p. 177) as "the necessary and absolute essence for production." I was frequently tempted to use this expression when I was striving to elucidate the meaning of the term "Idea," but I purposely refused to do so. Only in a note (p. 141, note 3) did I use it where I expatiated on the statement that something permanent would have to be recognizable in motion. We may say a law which enables us to know and to designate motion as motion of a definite kind. Above (p. 154) we made clear that the Idea, as the objective basis of a judgment, because the words joined into a proposition do not designate anything individual but a whole class of similar things, must comprise many individuals and must be their common cause. The expression, law of form (*Bildungsgesetz*) or law of development, was readily thought of as the cause of this generic similarity. But compare pp. 181, 183 below.

⁴ ἀπειρον πλήθει τὸ μὴ ὄν, *Sophist*, 256c.

In all these illustrations, one of which now and then appeared in the earlier dialogues, we have the confirmation for the validity of the famous saying of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things. Over against this, in the *Theaetetus* Socrates already demanded, as a condition for the validity of the difference between truth and falsehood, that a realm must be discovered to which our subjective arbitrariness does not apply. He hinted that no one really believes in the boundless omnipotence of this arbitrariness, and he ardently gave expression to his personal conviction that morality belongs to this sought-for realm to which this arbitrariness does not apply; and that this provides us with a necessary and universal standard by which we judge human actions and with which the morally good is in agreement. The whole ramification of this realm could not yet be given in the *Theaetetus*. This is done in the *Statesman*. The contraposition of two types of "art" clearly indicates that the arbitrariness of looking at things ceases as soon as they are considered from the point of view of a purpose which guides every practical activity of art. That which constitutes the superiority of the expert over the layman is not the thought of a universal purpose—even the dabbler holds to that—but the knowledge of the means for attaining this purpose, a familiarity with the manner of operation, or with the characteristics of the material which must be formed in accordance with a purpose.

The *Theaetetus* still left us in doubt whether there could be objectively true predications, or, in other words, whether there could also be real knowledge of sensible things.¹ This doubt is solved here—at least for all those who hold that in the realm of the human arts the distinction between the expert, the dabbler, and the layman is valid. Of course, this is as yet no strictly scientific proof which would give us accurate knowledge; but it is high probability. The absolute proof—which

¹ According to the earlier investigations, one might think that real knowledge is only possible of the unchanging, of the universal, of the abstract. See p. 181 f.

is here abandoned as too round-about—could only be given if it were shown in detail how every art, practised and recognized by men as such, attains its goal only by a very definite procedure which regularly produces the same effects with the material on which it labours.

2. The new element, therefore, which the *Statesman* introduces with this double art of measurement is merely an expansion and a generalization of a hint already given in the *Theaetetus*. This gives it greater substantiation. If it was asserted in the *Theaetetus* (cf. p. 137) that no one, by his changing and arbitrary evaluation, could mistake the useful for the harmful, and that the previous difference of opinion whether something would be advantageous or disadvantageous could have no effect on the later judgment about the real consequences, it is shown in the *Statesman* that whenever human beings prepare the empirically given material for their sensuous, spiritual needs and enjoyments, there is the belief that there is regularity of production or an objective law which is in the objects, and at the basis of the definite material¹ and the instruments for working that material. This regularity is constantly manifesting itself. This conclusion was already hinted at in the *Gorgias*, and in the *Cratylus* it was rather extensively developed² by certain examples.

In the *Theaetetus* it was shown that the vacillating uncertainty of judgments about sensible objects could only be overcome if a normal, i.e., healthy, condition could be found for those who pass judgment. But if one of the two motions, which when they meet give rise to the attributes, originates in the subject or in the one who passes the judgment, and if the other motion arises in the object of the judgment, then a normal condition must also be required for the object. In the *Statesman*, this normal condition is set up as the standard, and

¹ We must not only think of such examples as the *ναυπηγία* of the *Philebus*, but also of those of *ἐηγορικὴ* of the *Phaedrus*.

² Cf. *Platon*, I, pp. 464 ff. and *Neue Untersuchungen*, pp. 259, 262 ff.

what is in agreement with it is valid, what is not in agreement with it is invalid. With this we have found a practicable means for uniting the conflicting opinions about the concrete or the changing. If we may assume a normal course of development for the concrete objects, then the individual and continuous forms or levels¹ will appear for a limited time as the expression of the law of development, and they will therefore be regarded as typical. All things can be compared with these typical forms, and by determining the deviation from the type, we clearly determine them. In this manner knowledge of things coming into Being is possible. It can be acquired as we acquire knowledge of abstract Being. The results of the *Theaetetus* seem to me to be maintained throughout the *Statesman*. From this I conclude further that what Plato says about the art of measuring refers not merely to the relation of magnitudes, but also to the predications about colour, temperature, etc.; these are combined with the predications of the *Theaetetus* about magnitudes. Accordingly Plato's position is: He who predicates

¹ It is self-evident that whatever remains the same during a process of development cannot be represented in a single, spatially limited form. For the nature of development, as was already shown in the *Phaedo*, is that Non-Being is constantly springing from Being, or that what is not yet definitely determined proceeds from what is definitely determined (and conversely, Being is derived from Non-Being; what has one definite form from something which has another form). The unchanging which unites them can only be represented in a series of external forms. In this process every individual form will appear as inadequate and yet as full of content, and its meaning and value are the same as those of any other form. For from the beginning to the end of the development, they are necessary forms, determined by the law of development.—E.g., the process of development to which an organism is subject during its life implies that the expression which the law takes from one moment to another should be different. But there is a normal behaviour for this unfolding of causally linked conditions, viz., that of health, and an abnormal behaviour which deviates from it in many forms of disease. That which lies at the basis as the objective condition of this process could be called the power which expresses itself in its effects (and can be described only by its effects). Thus one may speak of a power of life (*Lebenskraft*). In Platonic terminology this would be the "Idea of the life process" or of life.

anything of sensible characteristics means by such a predication, when it is carefully considered, a certain degree of this characteristic; this degree is the result of comparing it with something else which was previously perceived. And if the meaning of these characteristics is to be very accurately expressed, they would have to be thought of comparatively and the point of comparison indicated with reference to which they arose. This is also true of the relations of magnitudes.

The verbal expression with which the second art of measuring is characterized in the *Statesman* substantiates my position. It takes into consideration, we are told, "the strictly necessary nature of Becoming," or the "coming into Being of that which is in accordance with measure." From the earlier dialogues, as, e.g., the *Phaedo*, we were accustomed to consider essential Being and Becoming as irreconcilable opposites.¹ According to this position, Becoming could have no truth and could not be the object nor the content of knowledge; whereas here we are told of Becoming which "really" becomes.² The subjective concept of TRUTH also has corresponding objective reality. All reality becomes known in the true judgment, and every

¹ Even the "friends of the Ideas" of the *Sophist* (p. 169) place the two over against each other.

² From my contributions to the explanation of the *Sophist* (*Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 83 f), I should like to append the following: "The expression . . . οὐσία γενέσεως . . . and ὄντως γιγνόμενον . . . I explain as follows: With this distinction Plato purposely wishes to destroy the notion that he only regards the ὄντως ὄν in contrast to γιγνόμενον as real. Existence, the real, is, as is shown in the *Sophist*, not an unchanging ὄν, but a changing γιγνόμενον. As a consequence of these expositions, one may place an ὄντως ὄν as the mere conceptual—for even the conceptual is in a certain sense, ὄντως, as soon as it is taken up in our thought, and, let us say, made the subject of the proposition—over against what really exists, not merely what is thought. The addition of ὄντως would, therefore, have only the value of reminding us that εἶναι in its most general meaning belongs to both types of Being, the ὄν and the γιγνόμενον, or it is intended to introduce the more exact characterization of the form of εἶναι, so that it could be translated: Precisely expressed, carefully considered." Cf. *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 87.

true judgment is founded on reality. Whatever really becomes must also be knowable.

This may also be inferred from the necessity or the rigid conditionality which is here ascribed to Becoming. It can mean nothing else but that in the process of Becoming there is something permanent, something which does not change, that a law pervades it and that Becoming, therefore, has the characteristics which the *Sophist* (and in a veiled manner already the *Theaetetus*) considers to be the fundamental features of reality. Art or applied science observes this necessity, or that which remains the same in the changing states, i.e., the law of change or development (or if one prefers, the manifestation of its effects); the existence¹ of art depends on this law. For only the permanent, the unchanging can be apprehended, never the changing which disappears the moment it comes into Being. And in so far as we apprehend the unchanging within the change and make it the basis for a true conception, it appears as an Idea.

Thus we again arrive at the conclusion that the Idea is the form-giving law of Becoming or of what develops. Be it noted, however, that this is only true of the realm of Becoming, of the concrete, the perceptible. The abstract, to which Plato never thought of denying reality, is to be clearly distinguished from the concrete. So it finally becomes evident—other considerations already indicated this—that there are Ideas differing in kind as well as in degree, that there is a REALM OF IDEAS² which is organized just as the reality, which depends upon and is determined by it, is organized.

3. In spite of this, he who says with Aristotle that the Ideas are a duplication of the things of sense is greatly in error. First of all, there are Ideas, as we have again shown, not

¹ Because of this knowledge and observation of the law of development the knowledge of the expert differs from the groping uncertainty of the layman. In accordance with this, the ideal or the ought for any realm is determined.

² Cf. also Preface to English edition, p. 10.

merely of the objects of sense and their characteristics—we must not forget the Ideas of the beautiful, the just, the equal, etc., of which the *Phaedo* spoke so frequently; but there is also an Idea of number, of Being, as well as of mathematics, and of ontology. In fact, there is an Idea of every theoretical science in addition to the Ideas of all the perceptible and imperceptible objects and relations which these sciences recognize as existing. Second, the Idea is related to the objects of sense much as it is related to the imperceptible things. With the one as with the other, the term “Idea,” or a similar expression designating essential Being or what exists in and by itself, serves to indicate the basis of its reality. If all this were thought of as happening in such a way that the mere word “Idea” gave us an adequate explanation, we would have useless duplication which would lead to inconsistency. However, for Plato the word “Idea” is from the very beginning only a sign for a problem, which is still to be solved by setting out from definite facts and following causal relations or by causal explanation. The real purpose and meaning of advancing the Ideas are that we do not merely wish to accept, but to understand the given; we want an explanation of actual Being, an explanation which is to separate Being from the phenomena. As was shown in the *Theaetetus*, the sensationalist, if he is consistent, falls into complete subjectivism, and for him there is therefore no sense in asking for a standard to distinguish between true and well-grounded phenomena. THE IDEA IS WHAT IS RIGHTLY APPREHENDED IN AN OBJECT, WHETHER THAT OBJECT BE MATERIAL OR IMMATERIAL. It is the PERCEIVABLE AND CONCEIVABLE OBJECT IN ITS ESSENTIAL BEING, freed from the accretions and additions attributed to it by an inept understanding having predicated false relationships of it.

In the “dialectical” or logical investigation which is introduced¹ in the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus*, Plato discovers the means for separating the Idea from its deceptive cloak. The more the logical investigation proceeds in co-

¹ Later we shall investigate this in greater detail.

operation with the epistemological investigations, the more definite becomes the meaning of the Idea.¹

I do not doubt that Plato assumes a special reason for the existence of the visible and invisible (abstract) objects between which he clearly distinguishes, and each of which he subjects to a special art of measurement. With this distinction he wishes to designate two main types of Ideas; each of these is still further divided. In so far as we succeed in following these ramifications with our logic, we shall find that such classifications as we make are not subjectively arbitrary. To use the expression of the *Statesman* (262a), they are not mere parts, but Ideas.

The arbitrary divisions may be regarded as artificial and contrary to nature, because they disregard and go contrary to

¹ We may say that the word "Idea," which at first merely designated the position of a necessary unknown, an *X*, has received several meanings by solving the equations which expressed the value of the unknown magnitude. Especially the investigations in the *Sophist* about the concept of Being have very clearly indicated this ambiguity. The fact that this ambiguity gradually made itself more noticeable might be one of the chief reasons why the word "Idea," used in the *Phaedo* and for some time after to designate the essential Being in the phenomena, is from now on openly and expressly avoided. (This particular meaning of this word we shall meet only once more in the *Timaeus*. From now on the terms *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* appear more frequently in their purely logical sense of designating the concept of the genus and of the species or of the characteristics. Cf. *Neue Untersuchungen*, *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα*, etc.). The characteristics deducible from the definition of the concept of Being seem to contradict the characteristic of immobility and that of existing in and by itself, which were previously emphasized as especially belonging to the postulated and independent Being. Even if more careful investigation should prove it possible to unite Becoming and the active and passive relation with permanence and existence in itself, since what can be expressed by a formula ("law of development") remains the same in the development which we know and which we can describe, it is nevertheless understandable that Plato was no longer satisfied with the words whose meaning was constantly associated with eternal immutability and absolute separateness. The scornful polemic of certain critics (cf. *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 394, and *Platon*, I, p. 453 f.) as well as the misunderstandings which well-meaning friends had of them may have been partly responsible for this.

the order of Ideas. They group what should not be associated; they unite complexes of similar characteristics which have no common cause; they separate what should be combined. Aristotle asserts that Plato did not recognize¹ Ideas for the objects of art, and this is ordinarily understood to mean that he denied Ideas for the productions of human handicraft and artistic activity. But since Plato often speaks in the *Cratylus* of this and that product and especially the weaver's shuttle, and since in the *Republic* he considers² the Idea of the table and of the bed and their relation to the tables and beds made by the carpenter, and since in the *Timaeus* the condition for beautiful forms is the looking toward an eternal prototype (this eternal prototype can be nothing else but the Idea), the explanation is resorted to—an explanation which removes³ many confused statements of Aristotle about Platonic doctrines—that Aristotle's references are to the oral discourses of Plato's late old age.⁴ This is altogether beside the point. These statements of Aristotle are to be explained from the expositions of the *Statesman*, and they show a misunderstanding of them. It is evident that there is and can be no Idea, in the same sense of the word as there are Ideas for the objectively conditioned types or classes, for that which is conceived in our imagination as belonging to the same group and as having a common name. And yet, even those arbitrary, or if one pleases, wrongly formed classifications have their peculiar reality, since psychically they are adequately based, exactly as are the false judgments about sense qualities which are made in an abnormal condition by those who dream, or are sick

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, 3, 1070a, 13 ff.; I, 9, 990b, 8 ff., 99b 6, etc., compiled by Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 1¹, p. 703, note 3. As examples of such products of art, Aristotle mentions the house and the ring.

² See p. 108. If the purpose of the pruning-hook is spoken of, Plato assumes thereby that an Idea lies at its basis, according to which it is formed (*Republic*, 353a).

³ This puts us on very uncertain ground, since Plato, as Cicero says, "*scribens mortuus est*." Cf. p. 27, note 1.

⁴ So Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 703.

or mentally unbalanced. Thus the fact that they come into Being is also based on an Idea, as I tried to show above—only this would be an Idea of another order. Whoever wishes to justify Aristotle may affirm that he must have known that Plato had his misgivings about considering as Idea¹ the objectively known basis of false judgments.

If Plato separates the Ideas of Being from the Ideas of Becoming, this seems to correspond to our division of reality into Being and the OUGHT; and we are not so far wrong when we identify the Idea of Becoming with the ideal. In describing the second art of measurement (p. 176 f.), which makes possible the practical application of knowledge to the concrete material, it is said that it takes as its standard the appropriate, the purposeful, the ought. Each art strives to form the material in accordance with this ideal standard. He who succeeds in this shows himself a skilful master. But before man ever approaches the material with his teleological activity, nature—or God, as we may always say—has put its law of development into it.² The correct unfolding of this law gives the material its most perfect, its “typical” form.³ The impression which this form makes on the observer is an impression of the beautiful. On the contrary, wherever the material is so formed that the sight of it does not completely satisfy, we shall probably say that it does not entirely express the norm and that we regard this lack as a violation of the law of its development.

But when we set Being over against the ought, we do not

¹ Aristotle even affirms, according to the passages referred to by Zeller, that Plato would not grant Ideas for the concepts of relation nor for those of negation. We can readily understand this; for the strictly negative is that which in thought is rejected as unreal; and as far as the concept of relation (of magnitude and number) is concerned, we can observe a certain indecision in Plato.

² God himself is (cf. p. 108) the creator of the Idea of the table and of that of the bed.

³ The law itself is different from the type. It is, as we have said, the law of development. We shall see later that this development may be thought of as God's purpose. The expression *ἀναγκαιὰ οὐσία γενέσεως* refers to the type and not to the law.

mean the ought prescribed by this law. Rather we mean thereby the demand which is addressed to us as acting human beings. Even for these demands there must be an Idea which is identical with that of human perfection.¹ Whenever a man develops in such a way that at every moment of his life he clearly expresses the Idea of humanity, he will be perfect, absolutely good.² Yet only that which really is in the Idea of humanity can be realized by a man, and only that can rationally be demanded of a man which he is capable of realizing. Every demand which exceeds this would be wrong, since it is based on a falsely assumed Idea.

More light will be shed on all these explanations when we consider the logical conclusions of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. For the present, I have put and I am putting them aside, in order to consider first of all the doctrine of Being in the remaining dialogues of Plato's old age.

D. THE *PHILEBUS*

1. Several passages of the *Philebus* are very closely related to the doctrines of the *Sophist* and of the *Statesman* just discussed. All reality, we are told, may be divided into four classes:³ The infinite or unlimited (*ἄπειρον*), the finite or the limited (*πέρας*), the mixed (*μικτόν*), and the cause (of the mixing). The characteristic of the first class is that it permits every possible comparison; it is the class which permits the more and the less. As a rule, the examples which Plato gives appear in the form of pairs of comparative adjectives of opposite meaning⁴—as warmer and colder, higher and lower, drier and moister. By this is meant the variable temperature, the indefinite pitch of a tone, the yet-to-be-determined degree of

¹ This Idea of human perfection is the *παράδειγμα ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστός* (cf. p. 143) of *θεῖος ἄνθρωπος* who as such is at the same time *εὐδαιμονέστατος*.

² On the contrary, he who in any way lacks in this expression is morally censured, because he has not fulfilled what is demanded of him by the "you ought" of this law.

³ *εἶδη* or *γένη*.

⁴ Compare pp. 175, 184 f.

humidity. The characteristic of the second class is numerical limitation or definiteness. To it belongs the equal, the double; in short, whatever is quantitatively determined by number or measure.¹ The third class comes into Being whenever the definite, the limited, unites with the quantitatively unlimited and determinable and forms it. This class may, therefore, be called the union² or derivative class of the first two. It is set over against these two classes—from which, as we are told, everything springs³—as a mixed and generated reality. The examples given are: health; harmony—which evidently has come into Being through the mastery and the arrangement according to definite standards of the fluctuating tones (higher-lower) which in and by themselves present indefinite, indistinct intervals or contrasts; good weather which corresponds to the regular change of the seasons and avoids all extremes and harmful variations; beauty, physical strength, mental excellence. It is expressly stated, however, that only that which is well mixed, only that which came into Being through a proper union of the limited and the unlimited, is to be included in this class. Therefore sickness, vice, a succession or confusion of inharmonious tones, monsters do not belong to it. Such phenomena Plato puts into the class of the infinite or unlimited.

But this reveals a confusing ambiguity in this word. In our discussion hitherto, the infinite appeared as the basis of every careful determination of number and of relation—somewhat similar to the concept of the qualitative—differing perceptibly either extensively (extension in space) or intensively (intensity of perception). Of these differences, there are and can be an infinite number of magnitudes and degrees. The infinite or unlimited is the boundless determinability (of a spatially-perceptible stuff or of a mental capacity) which as such is at

¹ τὸ ποσόν, τὸ μέτρον; or perhaps more correctly that which contains number and measure; for it is said of it that it sets limits and bounds to the fluctuations between the opposites so characteristic of the first class.

² Κοινὸ γένος.

³ 27d. ἐξ ὧν γίγνεται πάντα.

the same time complete indeterminability. As an example we may take either the perception of light, in which the intensity of the stimulus in every instance is determined by the degree of brightness, or the sensation of pleasure and pain whose vehemence may have an infinite number of degrees. Thus the unlimited is something abstract and is never something which exists in and by itself without definite relations. The limited was the other abstract constituent which analytical thinking derived from the "mixed," which we experience as real. According to this conception one might consider the unlimited as the material and the limited as the form of the composite (mixed). But we must also consider as unlimited the concrete or that which manifests itself in the mental realm (as perception, thought, striving) which is not subject to measure and does not correspond to any clear relation. It is always something which is composite (mixed) and possesses form, but is not "correctly" formed. Although it is said to be something unlimited, when considered as material, we can gather from it what we gather from the "mixed," which is related to it. For example, we may derive the concept higher-lower from discords as well as from harmonious chords, and the general concept of temperature (warmer-colder) from the slushy, thawing, and freezing weather of early spring as from good weather. Only we can find no standard in it which would determine the form. And so our conception of it also remains in impenetrable confusion.¹

The fourth class is the cause which, in accordance with its nature, is concerned with the Becoming and the change of

¹ Every *μετρητική* (art of measurement) (cf. p. 176 f.) is concerned with a material which, until it has been given form, is *ἄπειρον*. In this it may proceed arbitrarily, always changing its position—this is the *μετρητική* of the first type. As *μετρητική* of the second type, it takes a definite stand and in doing so finds one right and in accordance with a standard (according to type), viz., the *μικτόν*, and the other as not right, as not being in accordance with a standard (deviating from the type in the direction of too much or too little); this may again be called *ἄπειρον*.

its material. As is expressly shown, cause and effect and change are concepts supplementing each other. And since the effect of the cause is supposed to consist in uniting the limited and the unlimited into the "mixed," we see from this explanation that from the very beginning the "mixed" thus determined is an individual phenomenon which shows pure and distinct relations. In order to avoid misunderstanding, we should have to change the above illustrations somewhat and instead of saying health, we should say a healthy body or the correct mixture of the fluids in a body; instead of saying spiritual excellence, we should say the correct disposition and constitution of the soul of the individual man. (The fact that all this comes into Being only gradually and changes is no real objection to it.) ✓

Concerning these explanations, let us ask: How are the four classes related to what was ascertained in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* about the concept of Being? But primarily let us ask: Can the definition that Being or reality is "the power to affect and to be affected" also be applied to the four classes of reality which the *Philebus* mentions?

For generated reality this is self-evident. It has experienced the influence of the cause and has thereby become what it is. And in turn the cause in its formative activity has shown itself as power. With the infinite (unlimited) and the finite (limited) the matter is not as simple. If we remember that sickness and ugliness belong to the unlimited, it would seem that the unlimited, as the material, by its very nature had withstood the efforts of the cause which tended to form it according to measure, and that in this opposition it showed its own power. If we take the unlimited to mean infinite determinability in all its types, e.g., extension in space or the sensation of pleasure, the question arises whether we may affirm that Plato wished to ascribe Becoming and action to this element, which can only be differentiated from experiential reality by abstraction. The same objection is also to be made to the corresponding other abstraction which is concerned with the number and

the nature of the limit determined in the object of experience. Yet in spite of this, both are to be considered as parts of reality (i.e., as *ὄντα*). If we compare several types of the unlimited, e.g., temperature and moisture or speech and song (to retain the examples used in the *Philebus*), we shall see in each of these indefinite, general ideas a fundamental characteristic which it does not share with any other. We have a feeling that we cannot arbitrarily change this characteristic and in that way destroy the boundaries between the concepts and have them pass into each other. Therefore even the abstract ideas of that which still lacks bounds and measure, in so far as they are abstracted from what has really been experienced and in so far as they are correctly formed, have the power to affect. The same is true of the other abstraction, viz., that of limitation or of that which sets limits. We observe that in different realms different determinations of number prevail, so that the conditions which determine the harmonious tones do not apply to the articulation of speech (or to illustrate from modern science, that the form of a crystal is different from the form of a cell of an organism, that there are different forms of crystals for different minerals). In the *Statesman* it was shown that not one and the same law applies to the development of all things, and that consequently the standard for judgment must be derived from the peculiar natures which appear as totally different for different species. In accordance with its concept, we must ascribe constraining force to this law. The limitation of the *Philebus* is at least closely related to a law of development.

We thought that we had already found a hint in the *Sophist* that Being can only be understood with reference to the whole of reality and with special regard for the spiritual powers in it. This conception is substantiated by the arguments of the *Philebus*, which, no doubt, remind every careful reader of the particular passage in the *Sophist*. The question¹ is raised whether the world came into Being through blind chance.

¹ 28d.

This idea is emphatically rejected as altogether untenable. Not only the beauty of the starry heavens and the wonderful order of motion observable in it, but also the existence of rational beings testify to the contrary. Just as the body of man is made of elements taken from the world, so the human mind must have its origin in it. And the creative cause, which has united body and soul in man, must itself be spiritual. Accordingly we may, in our description of the fourth class of reality, i.e., the cause of all Becoming, predicate another characteristic: It must be thought of as rational, as acting with deliberation. This agrees with the proposition made in another connection¹ that all Becoming is for the sake of some Being or essence, and that the whole of Becoming is for the sake of the whole of Being. This is the reason why the action of the cause is purposive. But purpose only has meaning when we recognize a purposive rational Being.²

2. We must discuss another section of the *Philebus*. The content of chapter v is as follows: The question arose whether every pleasure was good and worth striving for, or whether a pleasure can possibly be objectionable or bad. To investigate this, we are told that we must divide the general concept of pleasure into subtypes. But some declare such a division of

¹ 54c.

² Besides, the rationality of the "cause" is to be inferred from what was said about the "mixed," in so far as it has come into Being through its activity. If by this we mean only the well mixed, in other words the perfect phenomenon, what is in accordance with measure or is true to the type, then the appearance of what is misformed, defective, cannot be attributed to this rationality, even though it is spoken of as "the cause of all Becoming." Assuredly, the generation of the defective is not to be denied and its existence from the very beginning of things affirmed. The defective is merely to be considered as irrational and as inconceivable either in its nature or in its Becoming. Recalling what was previously determined about the relation between knowledge and reality, one might say that this relation does not appear as Being nor as Becoming, nor as Not-Being and Not-Becoming. The difficulty of the concept of an enigmatically veiled Being which opposes all rationalization will confront us again in the *Timaeus*.

the concept not to be permissible. Thus it appears necessary to give a preliminary explanation, which is concerned with the relation of conceptual unity to conceptual plurality. "E.g.," says Socrates, "if we attempt to posit man as one, an ox as one, the beautiful as one, the good as one, then the liveliest controversy arises about the zeal to bring these and similar unities (henads) into relation with their parts." The controversial questions are: "In the first place, whether one may consider such unities (monads) as actually existing; and then how one may assume, if each individual unity is always the same" (i.e., identical with itself) "and incapable of generation and destruction, that it nevertheless is determined in this or that manner" (i.e., that it has this its special characteristic); "and again we are to conceive its existence in a world of Becoming and of infinite objects as follows: It has been dispersed and multiplied or it is still entire but separated from itself—this would seem most impossible—existing as one and the same reality in the one and in the many" (i.e., it is identical in its conceptual unity and in its empirical multiplicity). There is no doubt that the henads or monads of these propositions are identical with the Ideas of the earlier dialogues. In meaning these questions unmistakably coincide with the question of the *Parmenides* with which Zeno's hoary master caused the young Socrates great difficulties.

The *Parmenides* did not give us an irrefutably clear answer to these disturbing questions. But I believe that in the meantime the expressed objections have been dispelled by the *Sophist*. And if Plato here really succeeded in making clear that the logical difficulties can be overcome, then not only is the relation of the concepts to each other made understandable, but also every objection to the activity of the Ideas in perceptible objects is removed. The statement in the *Sophist* is that without differentiations and relations there can be no reality, and that unity itself, on whose account differentiations and relations are forbidden, cannot exist without at the same time being many, a plurality which is determined by number

and measure. The division of the one is a fundamental fact and is the irrefutable assumption on which all thought and judgment are based. The *Philebus* merely repeats this answer of the *Sophist* in that it too appeals to the actuality of the judgment and puts the attained result in the comprehensive statement: There are unity and plurality¹ at one and the same time in everything. This much could already be inferred from the contradictions of the *Parmenides*. Only the psychological basis for it was still lacking. Beginning with the *Sophist*, this is given.

Under these circumstances it is especially noteworthy that the traditional exposition of Plato is brought into great difficulties, not merely by the critique which the *Sophist* directs against "the friends of the Ideas," but also by the conclusions of the *Philebus* concerning the monads and the four classes of reality. What has the old conception of the Idea to do with them? If all of reality is divided into these four classes, and if in accordance with the earlier dialogues, the reality of Being consists in the Ideas, then they must be classifiable into the four classes of the infinite (unlimited), the finite (limited), the "mixed," and the cause. And even if through further investigation it should be established that, as e.g., Zeller believes he can prove, the Idea is not identical either with the unlimited or with that which sets limits, it must nevertheless be maintained that there is an Idea of the one as much as of the other (and also of its various sub-types). Otherwise both these Ideas (together with the Idea of the "mixed" and that of the cause) would be wrong, incorrectly formed abstractions. Therefore, there must not only be an Idea of the cause but also of what is caused (or the mixed), i.e., that which through Becoming has attained final form of Being. The *Philebus* offers as first example of the "monads" those of man. No doubt in giving this example, Plato means to indicate that which constitutes or conditions the relatedness of man into a unitary concept.

¹ Therefore, every reality also has parts and we may indicate of each thing its *ἄπειρον* and its *πέρας*.

The next example of the monads is that of the ox. Both are most assuredly sub-types of the living creation and this in turn is a type of the mixed.¹ And if we accept the identification of the Ideas with the "monads," then we may accept the explanation which the *Philebus* offers—and which agrees with the *Sophist*—for the relation of one Idea to another and to the many perceptible things whose conceptual characteristics are identical with those of the Idea (cf. above p. 153). This relationship remains enigmatical and inconceivable only as long as the Idea is thought of as something unrelated, as existing in and by itself. However, this conception of the Idea is not only erroneous, but contradictory, and therefore actually impossible. With every serious attempt to think of the Idea as unrelated, we discover that we completely lose the thought-content. Every conception, every ideational act of thought is a mixture of unity and plurality; so we may say that to be absorbed in and bound up with another thought-content is also essential for the Idea, which is the basis for every true conception in that the latter apprehends the former. As we could already clearly see from the *Parmenides*, there is not just one Idea, but a plurality of Ideas, and if we wish to comprehend this manifoldness, we must classify the Ideas. In doing so we shall obtain different groups, depending on the point of view from which we consider them. This grouping is made possible only if we carefully observe the actual conditions given in our experience. The reality of the unlimited consists only in the fact that it serves as the material for the forming activity of the limited; the reality of the limited consists in the fact that it imposes form on the formless or unlimited; the reality of the mixed consists in the fact that these two classes which may be separated by abstraction have been intimately united and are given in the mixed; the reality of the cause consists in the fact that the process of development, through which this alone could and can happen, is not merely known as a

¹ As it is expressed in the *Philebus*, 32b, τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμψυχον γεγονός εἶδος.

logical cause of an event, but is initiated by an impact, the actuality of which is put outside the whole action of causally connected events at which we can arrive by a mere logical procedure and by tracing back the whole process.

Similarly the reality of Being which the *Sophist* differentiates from Non-Being, from the identical and the different, from the permanent and the changing, is in closest and inseparable relation with these. The law of development, which the *Statesman* demands, can only be shown to exist in productive relations. The setting up of the highest concepts and the comparing of them does not complete the knowing enterprise. Each of these concepts subsumes other concepts and when we classify them, the unique nature of their content must be taken into consideration. This has become more and more evident. Yet it cannot be denied that even the author of the *Philebus* is still lacking in clarity; this can be attained only by a careful and complete examination of the human soul. After having exhibited in the *Meno* the *a priori* nature of some aspects of our mental constitution, Plato's contribution, from the *Theaetetus* on, toward a clarifying of matters is great, but it is not altogether adequate.

E. THE *TIMAEUS*

1. The validity of the conception of the Idea which has been presented in the preceding pages must still be tested by two comprehensive works, the *Timaeus* and the *Laws*. We pass to the *Timaeus*. The fifth chapter begins with the proposed task of explaining the structure of the universe. Its content is as follows: To begin with, we have to distinguish between what abides and is unchanging and what is constantly changing, always coming into and passing out of Being. The one is apprehended by concepts in thought, the other is only perceptible by our senses and has to be characterized by vague suppositions. Everything Becoming has the necessary cause for its Becoming and being in something outside itself. All

Becoming or change, i.e., the world, by its beauty with which it delights the heart of the spectator, shows it was fashioned according to a unitary plan by a rational creator. The creation cannot be described in detail. For the content and object of every predication give it its character. One may expect that the propositions about the permanent and unchanging with which thinking man is concerned are without contradiction and always the same; whereas what appears as a mere image of the eternal essences and mirrors their relations in only a glimmering light does not permit absolute certainty of description, but only a greater or lesser approximation. The former (knowledge of the eternal) alone give us truth, the latter (knowledge of sensation) only gives probability. Thereupon we are told how the demiurge completed his work. To give a definite and beautiful form to the chaotic stuff which he found, he began by giving it a soul, by dividing this stuff (in accordance with harmonious ratios) into four fundamental elements, by forming the luminous celestial bodies, by producing an invisible structure of spheres and globes, extending from a centre in every direction (so that the extremes are equidistant from the centre). By giving it this form the creator gave the motions of the celestial bodies their direction and basis. Urged on by the life-impulse which radiated from the cosmic soul and which pervaded the parts, forms and organizations came into Being everywhere; the creation of man especially came into Being from the earth through the co-operation of God. Repeatedly Plato emphasizes that in describing these events, we can only arrive at probability, never at absolute certainty. And in explaining the origin of individual things, he advances physical, mechanical causes, as well as divine purposes, and informs us that neither the one nor the other are to be ignored. Formative reason and absolute necessity participate in the creation of the world. Most of those, he says, who attempted to give an explanation of the world believed that the description of mere mechanical causation explains the whole process of nature. In this they confuse auxiliary causes which God employs to

realize his purpose, viz., to produce the best, with the ultimate or the real cause. If we wish to attain a true scientific explanation which satisfies human reason, we must be primarily concerned with the discovering of this cause, which lies outside of and beyond material and inanimate nature in the realm of the spiritual. In addition, however, special consideration must be given to the mechanical causes, which would only give an accidental and orderless succession when considered alone.

2. After this twofold, i.e., TELEOLOGICAL AND AETIOLOGICAL, CONSIDERATION has been applied to give an explanation of the sense organs and their activity, a new beginning is made with chapters xvii, xviii. So far four elements were presupposed. But in this connection we are told that we are not to be satisfied with this presupposition. Even though there is no hope of completely understanding truth, the pursuit of probability must go beyond this assumption. The division of reality into two kinds was found to be inadequate; for in addition to the OBJECT OF THOUGHT which is always the same and the ever changing OBJECT OF PERCEPTION—the former is conceived as the prototype of the latter and the latter is conceived as the imitation of the former—we must from the very beginning assume a third type of Being. Careful observation will show that it is an enigmatical Being which is difficult to define. Its nature may most easily be characterized as the protecting receptacle and mother of all Becoming. It may be more explicitly understood if we characterize its relation to the elements already mentioned. More careful observation will show that these elements completely change their characteristic forms (*ιδέαν*) and pass into each other. Thus the changing of an element in opposite directions forms a complete cycle. E.g., when water freezes it becomes stone, i.e., earth, and when it evaporates it becomes air. On the one hand, air when inflamed becomes fire and, on the other hand, it condenses into mist and clouds and is finally turned back into water. No single thing can be correctly described in the form

in which it appears. To be on the safe side, we may only say that some fire or water or earth, etc., has the characteristics just observed. For fire, water, etc., in fact everything which becomes, including such sense qualities as warm or hot or their opposites, in short everything of this sort escapes the "this" and the "here," as well as every predication which wishes to attach something definite to it. Nevertheless, the characteristics "this" and "here" belong to that which underlies the changing forms of the phenomena and from which they spring and then disappear. An illustration will make this even clearer. Let us say a goldsmith finds pleasure in constantly producing only the new, and therefore takes the objects which he has made from gold and immediately transmutes them into other forms. If anyone asks him what any one of the objects may be, he can only say with certainty, "it is gold;" on the other hand, every statement about the form of the metal is incorrect if it ascribes to such a form a permanent character by saying "it is this, it is thus." At the most, we could accept the statement "as long as it appears thus, it is this and that (what appears thus and so is this)." The material basis of the universe is like the gold (when considered as matter) and its indefinite form, which may constantly be given a different form. This formless stuff or matter of the universe is to be designated as something permanent which retains its manner of action (*δύναμις*); although its form and qualities are impressed on it, its nature is in no way influenced. Thus we have three kinds of reality: Being, which is eternally the same; Becoming, which is marvellously patterned after Being and which appears as definite sensible objects; and that in which Becoming takes place. The third type of Being, therefore, showed itself to be invisible and formless, but capable of taking on any form of definiteness and in a mysterious and incomprehensible manner to be related¹ to the intelligible. If we wish to describe its nature still further, we may say that

¹ 51b. *ἀνόρατον εἶδος τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές, μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσλαωτότατον.*

alternately it appears in the form of the four elements, depending on whether it has taken the form of the one or the other (i.e., of fire in itself, water in itself, etc.) into its all-inclusive receptacle.¹

We immediately notice that the conclusions of the fifth and eighteenth chapters when taken together are closely related to the twelfth chapter of the *Philebus*, and expositors have always referred from the one to the other. The demiurge evidently corresponds to that cause which, as we were told, was wisdom and spirit. One would like to identify permanent Being with what sets limits (the limited); the substratum of sensible reality with the unlimited; and the sensible objects with the "mixed." However, before we make this identification, we must examine carefully another section of the *Timaeus*, which seems to throw doubt on such an identification. Closely connected with a concrete picture of that enigmatical element, the question is once more raised concerning strict proof for the necessity of differentiating between the three main classes. The passage reads as follows:² "Let us consider this matter more carefully. Is there really a fire in itself? Do all those things which we designate as self-existing and independent beings exist? Or do reality and corresponding truth belong only to those things which we see or perceive with our other bodily sense organs, whereas there is nothing whatever real besides them? Is it all idle talk whenever we say that we

¹ I refer in this connection to Kuno Fischer's explanation of MATTER: "Matter as such cannot represent an Idea. It is only causality; its Being is pure activity. We also find that it is the common substratum for all individual appearances of Ideas; consequently it is the connecting link between the Idea and the appearance or the individual object. . . . Plato was, therefore, right in setting up matter as a third Being which is different from and which exists in addition to the Ideas and their appearances; the latter two include everything in the universe. . . . Matter has no other attributes, except Being itself, stripped of all other more careful determinations. Every empirically given bit of matter, on the other hand, i.e., the stuff . . . has already taken on form and manifests itself through the qualities and accidents of these forms. Therefore, pure matter is an object of thought alone, not of intuition" (*Kant*, I, 4, p. 251, and II, p. 51). ² 51b ff.

apprehend the Idea of a thing by thought? Is the name 'Idea' only a hollow sound? We may not leave the important questions proposed unsettled nor unexamined by simply saying that such is the case, nor may we affirm that no decision is possible; neither may we interrupt our long discourse by another investigation equally long. On the contrary, if an important characteristic, which may be described in a few words, presents itself to us, then that would seem to be most opportune. Therefore, I submit the following as my view: If reason (*νοῦς*) and correct opinion are different, then there necessarily are self-existing essences, i.e., Ideas,¹ unperceived by our senses and apprehended only by our reason. If, however, as some maintain, true opinion does not differ from reason, then the things which we perceive with our bodily sense organs must be regarded as being most real and certain. But reason and opinion are distinct and differ both in origin and in nature. The one is implanted in us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one is always accompanied by insight into the true reasons for things,² the other does without reason;³ the one cannot be overthrown by persuasion, the other is easily persuaded. Finally, although it may be said that every man shares in true opinion, rational knowledge belongs to the gods and only in a very limited degree does it belong to mankind. That being the case, we must acknowledge that there are three types of Being: The one is that Being which is unchanging,⁴ uncreated and indestructible. It receives nothing into itself from without nor does it go out into anything. It is invisible and imperceptible by the senses and its contemplation belongs to thought alone.⁵ The second type of Being bears the same name as the first and is similar to it. It is perceived by the senses and is generated; it is in constant and varied motion; it appears in one place and then disappears; it is apprehended

¹ Or: "Then the Ideas which we do not perceive with our senses but only apprehend with our reason necessarily exist as real and independent realities." *παντάπασιν εἶναι καθ' αὐτά ταῦτα, ἀνάσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἶδη, νοούμενα μόνον.*

² *μετ' ἀληθοῦς λόγον.*

³ *ἄλογον.*

⁴ *κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχον.*

⁵ *ὁ δὲ νόησις εἰληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν.*

by opinion and sense-perception. The third type of Being is space.¹ It is not subject to change and decay, but provides a place for all things which come into Being. In itself it can only be apprehended without the aid of the senses by an illegitimate inference and scarcely deserves our faith;² it deceives us variously. We become aware of it as if in a dream and we imagine that every real thing must necessarily be somewhere in a place and that it occupies space; whereas that which is neither on earth nor in heaven has no reality. All this and whatever is related to it we ascribe in dreamlike fashion to the waking and true reality of nature. We are unable to cast off our dreams and consider nature³ with a wide-awake mind and establish the correct difference between them, saying that it is an image and that an image is not even independent⁴ in what it is to accomplish, but that at all times it is a mere appearance (image) of something else and must, therefore, have its origin and Being in something else, in order that it may lay some claim to Being—otherwise it would be nothing—; whereas true Being is accompanied by the proposition: As long as two objects are different, and the one object is this and the other that, then one of them can never have its origin in the other and so at one and the same time be one and two.”

3. Certain details of this section need further explanation and more careful examination.⁵ To begin with, however, we shall concentrate our whole attention on the proof of the reality of invisible essences. The essence of this proof is to be found in the distinction between true opinion and reason. How can this distinction have any decisive meaning? Only by introducing presuppositions which are not expressed in the *Timaeus*. Plato could reticently ignore these presuppositions

¹ τρίτον δὲ ὃν γένος τὸ τῆς χώρας αἶν, 52a.

² μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτόν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν.

³ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν.

⁴ Susemihl: “Does not even have in itself the purpose for which it was brought into Being.” ἐπεὶ περ οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ἐφ' ᾧ γέγονεν, ἐαυτῆς ἐστίν.

⁵ We shall return to this later.

only if he had considered them in earlier dialogues. We shall attempt to discover them in these dialogues.

The very question whether knowledge is identical with correct opinion was considered in the *Theaetetus*; and their identity was denied there (cf. p. 139) as it is denied in the *Timaeus*. For this refutation, it was sufficient to recall that those judges who in their convictions were persuaded by an accused person do not possess profound knowledge even if their convictions are right. From the fact that the identification of correct opinion with knowledge is rejected, the independent existence of the invisible objects conceived by the understanding is easily inferred. The careful and excellently worked out epistemology of the *Theaetetus* has shown us that in the controversy about the attributes, which we predicated of an object perceived by our senses and which contradict the observations of another, we are not concerned with what is immediately perceived from one point of view or from another (cf. p. 138); but rather with something more general which consists in a comparison of present perceptions with what had come into Being earlier and which, in so far as it was correctly formed, has something objective for its basis; but this objectivity is not perceptible by the senses. It remained doubtful where the correct criterion for differentiation between right and wrong in this conflict lay. But in spite of all doubt, the fundamental conviction remained that there must be such a criterion, and that this is the invisible Being which escapes the subjective differences and variations of opinion and arbitrariness; the apprehension of this invisible Being gives certainty and truth to our ideas. Incidentally, at least, a very definite hint was advanced that in the moral concepts there was given an object of knowledge which was the same for all and which could be known with certainty. If we reject this fundamental conviction, the position of the *Theaetetus* ends in scepticism.¹ Thus the proof of this chapter in the *Timaeus* may be regarded as

¹ Plato, as well as Socrates, considers it his moral duty to fight this scepticism.

again introducing the position of the *Theaetetus*, and if the careful reader keeps this in mind, the proof should be sufficiently intelligible to him. Then, too, the conclusion that there are independent, invisible realities contains nothing else but that the ideas, which we form on the basis of what is given in sensation and which transcend the realm of phenomena, refer to something which constitutes the objective basis of these ideas. (E.g., this takes place in all our judgments about the independence or lack of independence and conditionality of the objects, about their permanence and their change, their size, vividness, and the intensity of an impression of an object of sensation).

It is also noteworthy that the question of the *Timaeus*, whether there is a fire in itself in addition to the fire given in sensation, and whether there are other supersensual realities, has in a way the same meaning as the question of the *Philebus*¹ that there really are monads. Commentators refer us from this passage in the *Philebus* to that section of the *Parmenides* where the Eleatic questions Socrates about the independence of the Ideas and their relation to the individual objects. In this connection the *Parmenides* refers—among other examples of the questionable Ideas—to the example of the *Timaeus*, i.e., to fire in itself; before this, however, the just in itself, the good in itself, the beautiful in itself, and (as was done in the *Philebus*) humanity in itself had been spoken of. The answer to this question, which concerns all three dialogues, was given by the *Parmenides* as follows: Without assuming the existence of such unchangeable realities, no intelligent communication is possible between human beings; i.e., unless the unchangeable realities existed and formed the basis for our correctly formed ideas, every distinction between true and false would disappear. It would seem that with this we had given an unshakeable basis (ἰκανόν) to that which was for the *Phaedo* still a mere hypothesis, viz., that there are unchangeable objective essences

¹ As far as the time of their appearance is concerned, the *Timaeus* and the *Philebus* follow closely upon each other.

which form the basis for our subjective, unchanging ideas.¹ For his practical conduct, no one can doubt the difference between the true and the false.² However, the difficulty still remained that one could not demonstrate how the Ideas could be present in the objects named after them. In asking the question about the reality of the Ideas or the monads, the *Philebus* again indicated this difficulty. Following the *Sophist*, the *Philebus* found the solution in a psychological analysis of what actually takes place in every clearly expressed thought, judgment, or occasion. By showing how at all times thought can only come into Being by combining abstract invisible thought-contents with one another and by relating them to each other, the *Philebus* presented the logical objections against such combinations as ridiculous. If when considered in this light it proved to be essential also for the reality of the abstract, the invisible, that it stand in relation to and affect something else, then the conception that it stands in relation to and acts upon sensible objects can no longer be considered as contradictory (cf. p. 195 above).³ ✓

4. Of course, certain difficulties arise in comparing the *Timaeus* with the *Philebus*. Let us consider still more carefully the third type of Being of the *Timaeus* and ask: Can we really identify it with the unlimited of the *Philebus*, as we attempted to do? Or in what other relation does it stand to the unlimited? In

¹ Cf. *Platon*, I, 574 f.

² For further explanation, it may be added: The thought that for every Being there must be a reason for its existence (i.e., for every reality there must be a real basis) is not hypothetical, but is something which logic predicates as self-evident. But the hypothesis was advanced that this basis lies in an invisible realm. This hypothesis was substantiated by every new investigation, in that the difficulties connected with it were more and more removed.

³ The author of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* (cf. pp. 127 f., 134) had not yet arrived at the clarity of thought which the *Timaeus*, in the meantime, had attained by means of the epistemological and logical investigations undertaken in the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* and brought to a conclusion in the *Philebus*.

what relation does it stand to the Ideas? Is it not also an Idea?

We have seen that the unlimited is an abstraction derived from concrete ("well mixed") objects. It is in these objects as the element which is still in need of being determined, or as their qualitative attributes which cannot be further defined (these are designated by such words as temperature, pitch of tone, weight, the sensation of pain and pleasure). Its infinity or its indefiniteness consists in the fact that in and by itself it is capable of taking an infinite number of degrees or levels. By contrasting the other two, the third type of Being of the *Timaeus* also became known, and the certainty of its existence arose from the necessity of positing an invisible, permanent reality as a special type of Being in addition to that which appears in sensation and that which is constantly changing. In the realm of sense this is united with the third type of Being, just as the unlimited and the limited are united in the "mixed" of the *Philebus*. But the identification of this third type of Being with the unlimited is not altogether successful. The unlimited of the *Philebus* is characterized by more or less, whereas the third type of Being in the *Timaeus* is characterized by spatiality or corporeality. These characteristics cannot be interchanged nor taken together. If the unlimited were also considered to be spatial, the scope set for it in the *Philebus* would be greatly narrowed. The most we can say is that this enigmatic third type of Being is a subtype of the unlimited.

Plato does not leave us in doubt why he introduces this third type of Being. But first he directs his attention to permanent Being; to that which develops and becomes; and to God who initiates the development. Then the third type of Being is introduced, in order to explain the irrational in the process of Becoming.

The irrational here under consideration is the isolated, the individual object which makes itself known to the senses by an unmistakable stimulus, but which in its individuality cannot be classified with anything else and, therefore, cannot be

described by a meaningful word. What we designate as understandable for others in the individual object or event are the specific characteristics which the object has in common with other objects or events, i.e., the Ideas in which it participates. But even these Ideas contain something irrational, viz., their qualitative character which must be unreservedly accepted. This is the irrationality which the *Philebus* has in mind, viz., the permanent characteristics of all Being which, by a careful logical consideration, can be classified under the general concept and which may thus be divested of their irrationality more and more; but there is something in them which always resists rational explanation. The viewpoint from which the various facts of reality are classified is not the same in the two dialogues. It is true that both dialogues set over against what is only abstractly thought that which is realized in the form of a concrete object, and they show that there must be a sufficient cause for this realization. Both dialogues agree that the ultimate cause of all finite existence is a rational, spiritual power. The *Philebus* is satisfied with this answer, in order to devote its attention to other questions. But the *Timaueus*, which wants us to pursue¹ the structure of the world of concrete objects in detail, cannot overlook the many inconsistencies which arise—whenever we blindly accept the different qualitative attributes—as soon as all reality is to be teleologically explained. It is in search of a general principle of explanation for these inconsistencies and it finds it in the resistance of matter to the purpose and the efforts of this formative rational power. Space appears as the essence of matter. Thus space becomes the cause of the irrational in the individual appearances.

At this stage the application of the old point of view which led to the acceptance of the Ideas as invisible realities results in considerable difficulty. If I predicate spatial quality of all material things, I can do so only on the ground that there

¹ In this the *Timaueus* is concerned with the question about the cause of the irrational in the process of Becoming; whereas the *Philebus* limits itself to logical considerations.

is an Idea of space in which all these things participate. But is this Idea of space anything else but the third type of Being of the *Timaeus*? As soon as we accept this Idea as valid, we not only consider it as the essence of all appearances to which we ascribe the spatial characteristics in our predications, but we also consider it as the cause of our knowledge of this attribute. As Idea, it must be completely knowable, completely rational. FOR EACH IDEA INDICATES THE ESSENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL APPEARANCES IN SO FAR AS THAT IS KNOWABLE. The analogy to other Ideas forces us to determine the nature of space; compared with these determinations, the fundamental characteristic which we wished to ascribe to space while pursuing other trends of thought is "scarcely believable." And the conclusion which was to assure us of this characteristic appears as an "illegitimate conclusion." The peculiar enigmatic nature of space constitutes a harsh contrast to all other essences which we recognize to be part of reality and which we regarded as the basis for the general concepts; it even constitutes a harsh contrast to the unlimited of the *Philebus*. In a somewhat changed, abstract way this renews the old contradiction (which had in the meantime been overcome) between motionless Being—supposedly the only knowable reality—which was set in motion by introducing the concept of power for the explanation of reality, and Becoming which is supposedly inaccessible to knowledge. Both Being and Becoming (whatever develops) are still set over against each other, but they are, nevertheless, related in so far as both retain the character of the genus. Both can be thought as existing in an infinite number of finite forms, and all these finite forms are held together by the unity of a concept which, when rightly constructed, must have an objective basis and cause. However, whatever appears as extended is in space (the various positions in space are all different) and as such an object appears only once, as something individual. Space, to use Locke's expression, is the *principium individuationis* and as such is the cause of something incomprehensible which is of a different nature

from what is meant by *ἀπειρία* (the undetermined) in the *Philebus*.

5. From this it becomes evident that the point of view of the theory of Ideas, if it goes beyond a certain limit, is no longer helpful but is a hindrance. It no longer appears as important to the aged author of the *Philebus* that while distinguishing between the concepts of the types one should also differentiate the "Ideas" lying at their basis. For whatever is predicated in propositions about the unitary concept and the many types and subtypes into which it is analysable, or about the abstract elements of a thing which belongs to the "mixed" class, is similarly true of the Ideas in which the conceptual relations are based. The notion of the Idea adds nothing more than that the formation of our concepts, as we formed them, is conditioned by a certain necessity (not merely psychological, but logical and universally valid) and that it is therefore to be regarded as correct.

The important point to be borne in mind is that there are Ideas, that is to say, that our subjective thoughts (whose content is always something universal and permanent and not something individual or particular which, since it belongs to the transitoriness of the moment, cannot be fully known) have a corresponding objective reality; therefore all dispute about truth and error has for its purpose the determining whether this objective invisible Being is apprehended. The *Timaeus* once more briefly considers and determines this matter. If the right conceptions coincide with knowledge (such is the case when he who opines accidentally guesses correctly what at the moment happens to be objectively realized), then the perceivable objects alone are real, since these are the objects of our conceptions. The statement in the *Republic*¹ that capacities—including the spiritual ones—differ only in that they have different objects and produce different effects may be reversed. Sensible reality is the object of sense perception

and whatever may be predicated of it is opinion; under favourable conditions these opinions are true and may, therefore, be taken to describe correctly the perceptible relations (just as a concrete triangle may prove to have the sum of its angles equal to two right angles), but of this we can never be absolutely certain. Absolute truth can only be attained with reference to unchanging, permanent objects.

As already indicated, while the old doctrine of Ideas has gradually receded into the background, we may nevertheless affirm that not one of its propositions has been formally retracted or silently rejected. Knowledge clearly differs from error and opinion. It consists in the fact that our ideas have clearly grasped something real and found a basis in this reality. It also remains true that whatever is completely real is also completely knowable. Naturally it is also true that whatever is completely and in every way unreal is also completely unknowable, and we cannot even have a conception of it. At the same time it is true that there is an intermediate Being between these two; uncertain opinion has this Being for its object. In the meantime, as a result of the progress of the investigation since the appearance of the *Theaetetus* and in addition to the old propositions, new insight was gained, viz., that reality does not stand over against Becoming but that there is also reality in Becoming. Gradually and with ever growing clarity, it became evident that reality is not of a simple type (i.e., describable by a single characteristic), but that we must distinguish in every bit of reality two aspects, since in addition to active relations, which are essential to reality, we must introduce that aspect of reality which falls between the knowing subject and the known object. Not only do the sense qualities of a physical object have a double cause, i.e., originate from two different sources, but this is also true of those characteristics which are made accessible to us by thought alone and which are not given in sensation, e.g., the equal, the many, size, difference, unity or simplicity. Inasmuch as they are apprehended in thought, they act on the thinking

soul; but it can scarcely be denied that at the same time they in turn are acted upon by the soul.¹

6. Repeatedly I have called attention to the fact that we must distinguish between different types or orders of Ideas. The question now arises whether, by making use of the hints here and there given, we can give a balanced, comprehensive view of the whole realm of Ideas and of their classification. My answer to this question is: ALL IDEAS are the same in that they form THE OBJECTIVE BASIS FOR CORRECT CONCEPTIONS. That which causes them to be different is identical with that which causes our rightly formed conceptions to be different. These conceptions are readily divided into large, strikingly different groups, e.g., the abstract and the concrete, or the immaterial or spiritual and the material. The spiritual may be divided into understanding, feeling, and will. The material may be divided into the organic and the inorganic, etc. All these classifications or divisions must also have meaning for the Ideas; for, as we have already observed (p. 158 f.), "this whole scheme of this ancient classification, which existed in its main features long before Plato, must, if and in so far as its concepts are true, be applied with meaning to the realm of Ideas." It can readily be noticed that these customary classifications, however practical they may be for certain purposes, cannot without hesitation be united, since they do not follow any uniform point of view. For that reason we need not be surprised to discover the same shortcoming in Plato's efforts to distinguish between different types of Ideas.

At this point I wish to raise the question: How, according to Plato, must we think of this objective basis for the main types of objects which he differentiated, or what are the various meanings of the Ideas which form the basis for this classification? I attempted to answer these questions when I was discussing the *Parmenides*. In recalling once more what was

¹ As objects which are not thought of, they do not come into consideration for our thinking and reflection.

said there, I shall attempt to conclude what I set out to accomplish. I desired to present clearly the Idea of justice, beauty, size, equality by saying—I do not wish to repeat verbatim what I said, but merely to express my thoughts in another way, so that, if possible, I may present them more clearly—that the objective basis which gives validity to our notions of the concepts of the just, the beautiful, or any other concept of comparison (such as the large, the small, the equal) must be sought in the very nature of the human soul, which finds in this divinely ordered world the desired happiness in justice,¹ which focuses the isolated parts of individual appearances and enjoys them with aesthetic satisfaction, and which compares whatever impressions it has with each other or with some fixed standard. To this I wish to add at this stage that the objective basis for a conception of a concrete object and that which gives it validity is the fact (1) that in accordance with our psychic constitution, we mould into unity the various sense impressions or images given us under certain conditions; (2) that the fragments of objective reality, which cause the impressions which we, the perceiving subjects, mould into unity, are also held together by an inner unity. Thus considered they are for our ideas “the prototypes which exist in nature.”² The Idea of such concrete things and the Idea of individual attributes which we unite into a concrete object, or which we recognize to be parts of and clinging to a concrete object (as e.g., colour), clearly revealed, according to the investigation about sense-perception in the *Theaetetus* (cf. p. 135 f.), a double aspect, conditioned at one and the same time by our nature and by the concrete objects. Even the Idea of equality, beauty, justice, etc., cannot be described by a single attribute, (neither by one which is purely subjective nor purely objective).

The objective basis, which is shown by setting the unlimited over against the limited, by dividing an object given in expe-

¹ For that reason that behaviour which produces human happiness is taken as the standard for judging all actions.

² *Parmenides*, 132d, cf. pp. 149, 152 f.

rience into two logical components, as well as by the similar attempt of the *Timaeus* to divide experiential reality into its parts, is again given on the subjective side in our psychic constitution and on the objective side in the corresponding relations. I need not expatiate on this any further. If we still wish to speak of Ideas, although Plato himself avoids this word later, then we should put side by side IDEAS OF A SUBJECTIVE NATURE AND IDEAS OF AN OBJECTIVE NATURE which are without exception related to each other. The subjective ideas (those which belong to the constitution of the perceiving subject), as well as the objective Ideas, differ among themselves in nature as well as in rank (cf. pp. 118, 184, 187, 212 f.). It is the most general characteristics of the material which we may consider as the objective counterpart of the subjective idea in our perception. Seeing, hearing, touch, etc., each has¹ a special quality in the sensible object; sense-perception in general has for its object sensibility or the materiality of the object in general. Similarly,² thinking has for its object the imperceptible reality of an object; and the individual forms, which enable us to apprehend and to understand, always have their peculiar form, their particular class of invisible objective reality. On the objective side, as we have seen, an unusual significance was attached to the Idea of the irrational, whereas on the subjective side the comparing activity of the soul appeared especially important; and it is on this comparing activity that our judgments are based.

In the *Republic* the relation of the Ideas to the individual things of experience was compared to that of an object and its image and was at times described as the relation of the original to its copy. In the *Timaeus*, the divine demiurge forms the world after a pattern; to reproduce this pattern becomes his ideal. This is similar to what we are told elsewhere:—that the man who wishes to make a weaver's shuttle or a table looks at the invisible prototype or the Idea of these objects

¹ According to *Theaetetus*, 156d ff.

² According to *Timaeus*, 52a ff.

and fashions his material after this pattern. The prototype of the world is characterized as the original type of organism, or the original form of animate existence as the "perfect" or the "absolute organism." Perhaps it will be more intelligible to say the essence of every germ of life.¹ We may also substitute "Idea" of animate existence.² It is said of it that it contains within itself different types of living beings, e.g., the water animals and the land animals. They in turn constitute the pattern after which God, in his creative activity, made the world; hence they may be considered as Ideas which are subsumed under the highest Idea. It is difficult to differentiate between these Ideas and the images which have been brought into Being by divine creation. At any rate the relationship indicated is not a relationship with which we are familiar from earlier descriptions and representations of the Idea. Elsewhere we were told that the Idea merely existed as something which is simple, invisible, and which is not duplicable; but its imitations are innumerable and because of their individual traits they differ from each other widely. Here, on the contrary, it is maintained that the concept of the universe includes everything real; therefore God's imitation of the Idea of the world can only exist as a unitary, all-inclusive reality.³ The imitations of the Ideas included in the Idea of the world (e.g., the Idea of animal, of land animal) exist on our earth only as unitary genera. I should like to designate these types and their subtypes such as mammal, predatory animal, lion, as Ideas. For what we said of the relation of the Idea to the individual

¹ Or, following Goethe, I should like to translate: Original phenomenon of the organic. The Greek expressions used to describe the process are: (ζῶον) οὗ ἐστι τὰλλα ζῶα καθ' ἑν κατὰ γένη μόρια—τὰ . . . νοητὰ ζῶα πάντα ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὼν ἔχει, *Timaeus*, 30c.—τὸ τῶν νοουμένων κάλλιστον καὶ κατὰ πάντα τέλειον (ζῶον), 30d—ζῶον αἰδιον—ἡ τοῦ ζῶου φύσις . . . οὐσα αἰώνιος, 37d—ἡ διαιωνία φύσις, 38b (τὸ . . . πάντα αἰῶνα ὄν, c)—τὸ δ' ἐστι ζῶον, in this the νοῦς sees included the ἰδέας of all other ζῶα (as ἐνούσας), 39e.

² Already the expressions οὗ ἐστι ζῶον and ἡ τοῦ ζῶου φύσις justify this.

³ The thought that there may be innumerable repetitions of the Idea of the world is bluntly rejected.

phenomena is true of the relation of these types to the individual examples given us in sense-perception.

The simplest solution of this difficulty would be to dispense with the distinction between divine purpose and its realization, since it attributes human relations which are limited by space and time to the absolute, the infinite, the divine. But what seems so strange in this whole consideration will probably be somewhat toned down if we observe that similar conclusions are found in Goethe, whose "primeval phenomenon" I introduced above (p. 115 f.) to clarify the meaning of the "Idea." Siebeck¹ explains it as follows: "In his sketch of a morphology which engaged him for some time, he intended, first of all, to describe the nature of the organic, in order to show (while setting out from a central point of view) how organic being (the type) developed in one direction into the manifoldness of the plant realm and in another direction into the multitude of animal types, and how the peculiar forms of worms, insects, higher animals, and crowning them all the form of man,² may be deduced from the general primeval type."

In any event, what we have said about the Ideas holds even in the light of the conclusion of the *Timaeus*. Our ideas originate from sensible, individual phenomena. We compare them and form the concept of a dog, a horse, an ox, a chicken, etc.; then, when we group several of these concepts under still higher concepts, we obtain the higher and more inclusive concepts of beast of prey, or of ruminants, etc., and through still further generalization, the concept of animal and of organism which combines animals and plants. The objective basis for the correct formation of these concepts is to be sought in the fact that when the world was ordered, the powers were arranged so that they constantly maintain a fixed, or a gradually and according to law changing, relationship of co-operation, which by constant repetition produces the fundamental types

¹ *Goethe als Denker*, 3 ed., p. 105, cf. p. 110.

² I take it to be like ἐνοῦσαι ἰδέαι τῶν δ' ἔστι ζῶον.

which may be called by these words. THE REALITY OF THIS COSMIC STRUCTURE, which includes the laws of action and a union of the forces, provides a basis for our ideas of it; we may therefore describe this reality by the term "IDEA."¹ The reference to it is an explanation. Yet not everyone will be satisfied with it. One may still inquire about the reason for reality; and here different answers are possible. One such answer affirms that chance produced the existing order. Over against this answer we have Plato's conviction that a ruling mind formed it in accordance with a purpose. If this is true, then there is an Idea of God's co-operation in the process. And if it is true that God thinks of purposes first as human beings do and then proceeds with their realization, then the existence of such purposes would have to be distinguished from the reality of their actualization, and we could differentiate between original Ideas (*Urideen*) which God follows and other Ideas to which God gives reality by producing a world. Moreover, this consideration confirms the proposition previously advanced that Ideas differ in rank and character.

7. I have spoken of the arrangement of the powers in the universe or of the union of their effect by the activity of the demiurge, and by this I did not wish to designate anything other than what might be called the Idea of the genera and of the concrete individual objects in the world. The question now arises WHERE ARE THESE IDEAS? Do they exist as separate entities in addition to the individual objects? The answer of the *Timaeus* to this question is: With reference to the peculiar nature of the third type of Being "we imagine, as if in a dream, that all reality must of necessity be in a definite place and occupy a space, whereas that which is neither on earth nor in heaven has no existence." This dreamlike experience, it is thought, destroys the knowledge of our waking hours that there is an immaterial reality which is independent of space as well as of time. But in spite of the admonition that we are

¹ Cf. also Preface to English edition, p. 10.

not to ask about the WHERE when we are speaking of the invisible,¹ we cannot easily refrain from doing so. Even Plato himself observed here and there in the earlier dialogues, and even once in the *Theaetetus* and in the *Parmenides*, that the inquiry about the WHERE was not to be set aside. In the *Theaetetus* (cf. p. 143) we came across the remarkable words: "Even though patterns are set up for us in reality, e.g., on the one hand, the godlike person who is perfectly happy and, on the other hand, the godless person who is utterly miserable appear in reality as patterns, the average person in his simplicity and utter folly does not see that such is the case; for that reason he does not observe that by his unjust deeds he becomes like the one and unlike the other." The corresponding passage in the *Parmenides* (cf. pp. 150, 153) reads: "It rather seems to me that the relation is the following: These Ideas exist in nature as prototypes, whereas the other things resemble them and are patterned after them."² Similarly it is said in the *Republic* of the Idea of the bed which the carpenter has in mind when making a bed that it exists in nature. But this is not assigning it a place "in reality" or "in nature." Where could the godlike happy man or the god-forsaken unhappy man (comparable to the Christian devil) be? For the individual person, he is like a prototype³ and corresponds more or less to the concept just as the triangle, the sum of whose angles equals two right angles, or the real right-angled triangle or the perfect square are prototypes for drawn figures with such names. Where is the ideal triangle or the ideal square itself? Or let us use the example from the context of this passage in the *Timaeus*: that of fire. Even though a burning piece of unlimited matter does

¹ The soul belongs in this realm.

² It is true that this conception proposed by Socrates is rejected by Parmenides, the leader of the discussion in the dialogue. But whether we, the readers, wish to reject it is, according to Plato, left to our judgment. I believe that it is not only supported by the corresponding passage of the *Theaetetus* and the passage of the *Republic*, to which I shall refer in a moment, but it is also corroborated by the *Timaeus*.

³ παράδειγμα.

not exactly correspond to the stereometrical form and the physical characteristics which, according to the description which the *Timaeus* gives of the elements, constitute the essence of fire, we must ask where could the fire be after which the burning piece of matter is named? Or again what are the material atoms like? Where do we find them exactly in the form of icosahedra of a definite size as they are supposed to constitute the characteristics of water? Where are they given in their real nature, unmixed with anything else? While substituting for the definition of the *Timaeus* a definition of modern science, I should like to ask OUR scientists: Where is chemically perfect, pure water (H_2O) of a certain normal temperature and of a given normal volume? I believe that their answer to this question must be in agreement with that of Plato, viz., that it cannot be proved to exist anywhere and that it cannot be produced in its perfect, its ideal purity. Yet the concept which we have formed of it is not mere fantasy, and "when anything has this or that characteristic" (*Timaeus*, 49 d, 51 b) "it is (pure) water."

It would then seem relevant to regard the pure forms, e.g., the mathematical forms, in each individual case as being nothing but concepts in a thinking mind. If that were so, then that which the *Timaeus* is intended to refute would be true of them, viz., they would be mere thought-constructs¹ and would not exist as prototypes "in nature." I repeat a remark which I made once before. E.g., the linguistic sounds cannot be classified in the same manner as we classify the intervals of tones; nor can the forms of crystals be applied to zoology. Evidently we are not left to human arbitrariness as to how the system of spatial relations in geometry is to be conceived; rather we are bound to something objective. Nor can we, according to Plato, speak of the arbitrariness of God, who orders everything.

In an extremity it would seem to be in order to think of powers which act in various parts of space and within definite

¹ οὐδὲν πλὴν λόγος.

limits as being confined to these limits. E.g., one would like to maintain that the organization of forces, observable in the transmission of the characteristics of one living being to its offspring, is spatially present in all living beings which are capable of reproduction or which will become so with maturity. For if all these beings were destroyed, this organization of forces would no longer exist. The reality of this organization does not depend, however, on the existence of the individual beings; on the contrary it is their cause. If it ceased to exist, it would be a consequence of or identical with the fact that the conditions of life under which the individual beings lived were nullified, as this has taken place in a limited way on our earth in the extinction of certain types of living beings and as it will take place again.¹ And again these conditions of life are not limited to isolated empirical facts, present in a definite number; on the contrary, if one attempts to determine them spatially, one has to take into consideration the whole expanse of the universe. One could therefore say that as long as they exist they are everywhere; just as when we inquire about the when of their existence, we may say that they exist always. On the other hand, since they are not subject to spatial limitations, the possibility of limiting them spatially no longer exists, and one would therefore like to say that they are

¹ Certain of the threads of life are then, as it were, destroyed; these threads served the purpose of binding together and of separating the various lines along which the inexhaustible life of the universe unfolds, so that a picturesque pattern may result from it. Because of this the manifoldness of the pattern has been here and there simplified. If we keep to our picture, we can accurately describe spatially the threads of the fabric, no matter how many times they cross and recross. But one would hesitate to say that active powers are there spatially present where their effect makes itself perceptibly noticeable. The appearance and disappearance of these powers are so frequent that their spatial division is at no moment the same and cannot therefore be definitely stated. Apparently what the *Parmenides* maintains is true: Whatever is or becomes active in many places and in types which comprise many individuals existing in almost an infinite number of places, cannot be present in any one of these places in its complete reality.

nowhere; for to be anywhere means to be in space. And in accordance with its nature, only the concrete, the individual, the particularized is spatial, but not the universal, as e.g., the organism or the life impulse or the principle of life¹—neither is the universal man, predatory animal, dog, cat, nor weasel spatially limited—and yet the combinations of powers which constitute the essence of these universals (or let us say with Plato the Ideas) are real. Even gravitation or any definite force of which our physicists speak cannot as such be localized. One cannot describe them as being limited to a definite space (and a definite time).

Whenever Plato speaks of the supersensuous realm, the realm of Ideas, as a place, inaccessible to us through our senses, in which the Ideas dwell,² he does not think of this place as having spatial characteristics nor does he wish to give that impression. This becomes evident from a passage in the *Republic* which inquires into the existence of the ideal state. This can probably be found nowhere on earth; “but there is perhaps a pattern of it in heaven for him who wishes to behold it.”³ What Plato relates about the demiurge, viz., that he made the world after the eternal pattern of the perfect organism which he constantly beheld, is true of himself when he was sketching the constitution of his state; he too looked at the pattern of the perfect state. In so far as he succeeded in doing this, he does justice to the real needs of human nature and the actual conditions of the world in which these needs have to be satisfied. Thus the Idea of this state is not “perhaps” but really existing—and it matters little whether we say existing in reality or in nature or in heaven. There it dwells as indestructible and unchangeable Being; here too exist the prototypes of the perfectly just man, the complete villain, the bed, the shuttle, and of many other things and conditions patterned

¹ Cf. τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος of the *Phaedo* and τέλειον or τὸ ὅ ἐστι ζῶον of the *Timaeus*.

² Cf., e.g., *Republic*, 508c, 509b, 517b; *Phaedrus*, 254b.

³ *Republic*, 592a.

after a purpose, as well as those of land animals, water animals, man. Even though we cannot demonstrate their spatial existence, these Ideas depend on the physical and psychical powers which exist in the universe.

8. The logical investigations of the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus* are so intimately connected, and in many ways the epistemological investigations of the *Theaetetus*, as well as certain suggestions of the *Parmenides*, are so closely related to them, that we may conclude that the philosophical convictions of the author during the period in which these dialogues were written did not change materially; at the most we need only reckon with an expansion or with minor corrections of the fundamental position. But the *Timaeus* is also closely related to this whole group of dialogues; and only when it is torn out of this setting is it possible to understand certain propositions as being in conflict with the doctrine of Being of any one of the dialogues in this group. I am, however, willing to admit that the strict and clear formulation in which the *Timaeus* expresses the independent existence of the invisible essences which he once more designates by the old, almost forgotten term "Ideas"¹ may represent a final synthesis. This may, therefore, be taken as evidence with reference to Plato's earlier writings that he was not conscious of a change in his conception of these essences.

9. The *Laws*, which still await our consideration, are throughout concerned with political and ethical matters. For that reason they will form the natural centre of our discussion in a later chapter. But they make no direct contribution to Plato's teaching about true and essential Being, which we tried to understand and sketch in the preceding pages. Thus we may finally bring the present long drawn-out chapter to a close. Later we shall, of course, have more than one occasion to make slight additions here and there. This will be especially

¹ Cf. p. 202 f. above.

true when we discuss Plato's conception of the universe and of God.

In this exposition of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, we found nothing which implied anything fantastic or crudely unnatural. How fortunate Plato's interpretation of nature by means of the Ideas was will become even more evident if I can show that present-day philosophic thought is again seeking a solution to the questions under consideration in the same way as Plato desired to solve them.

10. For example, A. Meinong's treatise concerning the *Empirical Basis of our Knowledge*¹ seems to me to be very significant. I should like to emphasize the following points: Knowledge does not consist in mere conceptions but in conceiving and judging (cf. *Theaetetus*, 186d ff.). Each judgment has its content, just as each conception (cf. *Theaetetus*, 189a: "he who thinks, thinks of some individual thing").² By an act of thinking and by an act of judging, this subjective content is referred to a concrete object (and this individual object is real).³ Whatever we think of is the object of thought; that about which we pass judgment and which finds its natural expression in positing something is said to be objective. A judgment is true when it has a fact for its object. (Cf. e.g., *Parmenides*, 134a or *Republic*, 413a: "Does it not seem to you that he who conceives real things attains truth?")⁴ Every perceptual judgment includes the judgment that a thing is so and so, but it also includes the existential judgment. Naturally the existential judgment lacks necessity. But in spite of this, a part of its content also possesses immediate intuitive certainty; it is that part which includes the inner experience of distinguishing between definite perceptions. "I know that I

¹ In *Abh. zur Didaktik und Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft*, I, Heft 6, 1905.

² ὁ . . . δοξάζων . . . ἐν τι δοξάζει.

³ ὁ δ' ἐν τι δοξάζων . . . ὄν τι.

⁴ οὐ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθεύειν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι.

now see light, hear a noise, etc., in a manner so perfect that it excludes every error and that it can scarcely be improved upon." (Cf. *Theaetetus*, 179c: "It is more difficult to prove that the impressions which an individual has¹ and from which corresponding perceptions and opinions arise are not true. But perhaps this is not the right procedure: It may be impossible to prove them false, and he who affirms that they are evident and that they constitute knowledge may after all be right".) E.g., the awareness of pain at any moment cannot be subdued in or removed from consciousness by any objection. The most generally accepted doctrine is that on the basis of the perceptual content of our conceptions, to which belongs the qualitative nature which differentiates one conception from another, we infer that the characteristics of the object are the cause of this content. But unprejudiced observation of the actual conditions in the perception of a sensible object shows the facts to be otherwise. Most of the time we apprehend the object of perception immediately. "Everyone can produce evidence that that which appears as different, like, equal, really is different, like, equal." By the nature of the content of our conceptions "a certain psychic act apprehends an object of a definite nature." This is "the ultimate fact of all knowledge" about whose reality we may no longer inquire. To me the important point here is, and this has been frequently emphasized in other similar propositions, that knowledge is concerned with objective facts which are not inferred; on the contrary, the act of knowing, even where it is concerned with external perception, apprehends the objects immediately in a manner which can be understood by every unprejudiced person (we need only remind the reader that we experience such things daily). This objective fact which we apprehend by our conceptions is exactly that which Plato calls the Idea. In the degree that we really know, i.e., conceive reality, we apprehend the Idea. It is self-evident that a sensible object or a representation or—as Meinong expresses it—"the

¹ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστω πάθος, cf. p. 138.

object of appearance" participates in the Idea or is influenced by the Idea, provided that there are Ideas and that the whole notion of an appearing object, which forms the basis for our conceptions in so far as they are correct, is not to be rejected as vain and perverted. For only in so far as we demand an objective basis for our correct conceptions, in order to differentiate them from mere fancy, do we arrive at the concept of the Idea. According to this consideration, this Idea, from the very beginning, stands in permanent relation to the appearances. How this participation or this being affected is to be understood, what the relation of the Idea to the sensible objects or to the content of the ideational process is, remains inexplicable for Plato, i.e., he does not know how to substantiate it any further, nor how to deduce it from anything else. But he believes that he can describe it. By describing the process of judging, he presents the indisputable facts—in spite of contradictory features—in a manner understandable by everyone. Similarly, Meinong says that there is something enigmatical in the fact "that an activity of psychic life shows itself capable of apprehending a physical reality;" but if one considers this achievement as mystical and impossible, instead of regarding it as an "ultimate fundamental fact," then one is on the way to "deny all knowledge." Who does not, in connection with this assertion, recall the words of the *Parmenides*, "if someone does not want to admit that things have their Ideas . . . he will utterly destroy the possibility of arriving at a rational understanding of things"?¹

II. Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen*, partly by raising questions and partly by attempts to solve them, remind me in many ways of Plato's efforts to clarify the epistemological problem by determining the concept of truth and that of reality; these concepts form the essence of that which may be called the Platonic theory of Ideas. Again I shall call attention to certain propositions upon which I shall comment, so as to make the

¹ Page 152 above.

comparison with Plato easier. "In the strict sense of the term, the concept of knowledge implies a judgment which not merely pretends to be true, but which is justified in making this claim." "The real Being of things and of factual complexes exists in related truths or truth complexes. . . . While executing an act of knowledge or . . . while living in it, we are 'concerned with the factual' which the knowing act knowingly means and posits. And if it is knowledge in the strictest sense of the term . . . then the objectivity is originally given." The facts of the case are now not presumably but really before us, and with these facts the object itself appears before us as it is, i.e., it appears before us exactly as it is found in this knowledge and not otherwise. We have seen that in order to describe objective reality Plato also sets out from the relationship which exists between the concept of objective reality and the concept of truth and the knowledge of truth. He describes this relationship exactly as Husserl describes it. The *Kritizismus* of our Kantians and quasi-Kantians looks upon this as a dogmatic error of Plato; this error it wishes to excuse indulgently by the fact that the whole of the ancient world was not able to attain the height of an unprejudiced position. In spite of this judgment, Husserl and Meinong, if I understand them correctly,¹ have not refrained from returning to the old, supposedly inferior position which was hampered by fateful prejudices. No doubt, they discovered that the advantage, which the critical philosophy claims, is not to be found in it. The words "truth" and "knowledge" themselves derive their meaning only from the recognition of a relationship between subjective

¹ To me these two modern philosophers are more difficult to understand than the aged Plato. Their terminology demands a special study; this I do not care to make because I cannot derive the corresponding profit from it. I may, therefore, do them an injustice by explaining their statements as I have done here. But in case I have really understood Husserl and the other heralds of "phenomenology," I must reproach them for constantly endeavouring to retract halfway, and by all manner of limiting additions weakening that which they at first affirmed in contradiction to the prevailing Neo-Kantianism. In this procedure they are most certainly not Platonists.

and objective reality. Only a psychic subject can know, and that which it knows cannot be without relation to it. Even truth cannot be thought of as something not knowable by the understanding; and only in so far as reality is known, do we call it truth. At this point I feel certain that, as Platonist, I am in full agreement with Husserl who says that "undeceived by the traditional¹ prejudices" the thought process is to be taken as it is really given in the phenomena,² viz., as types of meaning "whose content has such and such meaning; and we are apt to look behind these meanings for something which might and could be otherwise interpreted than just meaning, significance." This is more precisely expressed in the words "what 'meaning' is is as immediately given to us as is given what a colour or a tone is. It cannot be further defined; it is a descriptive last thing and no one can deny that what we signify, when we use words meaningfully, is the objects which we name and the meaning they have for us."

The recognition of realities which are not of an individual or singular nature and which give validity to words, which in a certain sense are always used generally in a predication—all this Plato regards as the condition of the possibility of knowledge which differs from uncertain opinion. The same meaning I find, e.g., in Husserl's statement: "Just as we do not, with reference to the concrete individual, mean the particular but the universal, the Idea, so with reference to the several acts of such ideation, we gain the certain knowledge of the identity of these ideal unities which are meant in the individual acts." I can scarcely be wrong when I take the word "Idea" here used by Husserl as in every way identical with Plato's Idea. Elsewhere Husserl also calls this objective basis for the subjective universal idea "ideal or universal object" and in justifying this expression he again comes close to Plato's position. This is shown by the remark that this expression

¹ He, no doubt, means the critics who start from Kant.

² That is, as they are given in immediate self-observation or introspection.

is to be taken as an indication of the validity of certain judgments, which are not made about perceptible details of an object whose correlative "evidently" (in so far as the judgments are valid, i.e., contain truth) must have ascribed to them the status of a "truly existing object." The proposition: "The ideal objects truly exist"¹ sounds altogether Platonic. But about the nature of these objects nothing is as yet predicated, just as Plato when he introduces the term *Idea* still leaves it undecided how the nature of the *Idea* and its relation to sensible objects are to be more exactly described.

It has recently been recognized by certain scholars that Plato's epistemology still has great value for our time. Natorp has especially emphasized this in his book, *Plato's Ideenlehre*, and in various short articles.

¹ II, 124.

CHAPTER II

PLATO'S LOGIC

In spite of my detailed investigations on the subject, to which I must refer for most of the details, to this day Plato's prodigious achievements in the FIELD OF LOGIC have been little noticed. Plato founded the science of logic and made it a useful instrument of reason in its conflict with eristic, which grew out of the Parmenidean formula: "Being is," and "let no one at any time impose the conviction on you that Non-Being is." Henceforth, this formula lay like a ban on the minds of the thinkers who wished to let the existing world first of all arise in their imagination; thus all of them—Anaxagoras, as well as Empedocles or Leucippus—no longer dared to believe in a qualitative Becoming, a welling up or an issuing forth from an inner essence; they were satisfied with one kind of Becoming. Because of its strong impression on the senses, this Becoming, frequently of an impetuous nature, impressed simple man with its indubitable reality—motion in space, change of position, displacement. For a long time it also lay like a ban on the daring mind of Plato; for in the *Phaedo* he is still convinced that every characteristic, every attribute of an object is found in that object because it participates in the Idea of this attribute, and it is here that he expresses the law of identity in a way which closely resembles the rigidity of the Eleatic formula. And yet this statement of the *Phaedo* goes far beyond mere tautology. Its meaning is not merely to remind us that we must firmly hold to every concept which is identical with itself, but it is also to emphasize that such a logical demand would be entirely worthless if the unchanging concepts did not have an objective basis in an unchanging reality. Moreover, when with his judgments of logical necessity, he infers from the nature of snow that it is never warm, from the nature

of the soul that it can never die, he indicates new paths to be followed.

With determination and with the best of results, he pursued these paths in his investigations as to what meaning the word "being" has in a predication; these investigations were begun in the *Sophist* and concluded in the *Philebus*. Here he shows that every thought, whether it is expressed or not, assumes the form of a proposition or a judgment. Its purpose is to express positively or negatively causal relations between one concept and other concepts. A concept can only be apprehended in these relations or in this manner of mutually affecting another concept. The reality or being which we may predicate of a concept consists in these relations. Again the meaning of all Being, of all reality, which we may think or predicate is nothing else but being determined in a certain manner. If, in the concept of Being or any other concept, we wish to abandon our effort to determine the definite characteristics (being thus and so), and if we ignore (as the Eleatics wish us to do) determining its relations to or its difference from other concepts, then this concept dissolves itself into an indeterminate and undifferentiated nothing—which can neither be thought nor predicated. From this it becomes evident that every logic must have a firm basis in experience; it must justify itself on this basis before it can proclaim the law of identity.

Plato did not wish to write a textbook on logic. Long sections of the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, the *Philebus*, and the *Parmenides* are, however, nothing but a *collegium logicum* written with the express intention of making the reader a skilled dialectician, i.e., of making him skilful in critical exposition to others. In addition to the doctrine about the judgment already sketched, we have in these sections an account of the laws of thought, a doctrine of the categories, methodological rules about the formation of concepts, reflections about analogy and valid conclusions. In what follows I shall briefly sketch the most important points.

I. THE LAWS OF THOUGHT

In its most concise form, THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION can be derived from the *Sophist*, where it is said that teachers who know how to refute deep-seated, false opinions can take inadequately based propositions, place them side by side, and show that "they contradict one another about the same things which stand in the same relation and which are considered from the same point of view."¹

THE LAW OF THE EXCLUDED MIDDLE may be inferred from the following demonstration in the *Sophist* (250d): "If something is not in motion, must it not be at rest? Or what is no wise at rest, must not that again be in motion? Yet Being showed itself to be outside of both these conditions. Is this possible? No, it is altogether impossible." On the silent acceptance of this position is based the fundamental preference for dichotomy in the classification of concepts. We shall hear more of this later. Besides, the comment, which we shall then meet, that dichotomy does not apply to all things, and the various examples which prove to be exceptions and which analyse the concept into more than two parts, indicated the knowledge of the fact that the law of the excluded middle is applicable only to the characteristics which exclude one another, as the parts of dichotomy exclude one another; these parts are related to one another as affirmation and negation are related.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON is expressed in the *Timaeus* (28a) as follows: "Everything that becomes must of necessity come into being through a cause. It is impossible that a thing can come into Being without a cause." But the *Philebus* (26e) says: "It is necessary that everything which comes into Being comes into Being through a cause." And

¹ 230. Aristotle's well-known statement, "It is impossible that the same thing, when considered from the same point of view, has and does not have a certain characteristic," is closely related to this.

immediately after, it is said that the cause differs from the agent in name only. The agent and the cause are the same.¹

2. THE CATEGORIES (AND NEGATIVE DEFINITION)

The main passage in which the relation of the concept of Being to other concepts is investigated was discussed above² to the extent that the interlinking of Being and Non-Being was shown. In this same connection it was shown that the concept of Being stands always and necessarily in a mutual relationship to that of identity and difference, to that of permanence and change, to motion and rest; but in all this, Being retains its own nature and does not pass over into these others, any more than any of these concepts can pass into it.

The significance of these definitions becomes even clearer if we take into consideration the definition of Being which is given in another passage of the *Sophist*: Being is nothing but the power to affect and to be affected. Action and passion are correlative concepts which cannot be thought unless one thinks of at least two things, one of which is regarded as that which acts and the other as that which is acted upon. Non-Being, which may be predicated of a thing, cannot mean non-action and non-passion; it merely means the negation of a definite action or passion which belongs to another thing.

This exposition may give the impression that the three pairs of concepts, Being-Non-Being, identity-diversity, motion-rest, are accidental examples of concepts of a very comprehensive and universal nature rather aimlessly chosen from an innumerable and incalculable mass of concepts, and that the task of the dialectician to determine the many-sided relations of the concepts is infinite, even if one were to confine oneself to the

¹ In this connection it must be remembered that every being, as the *Sophist* had determined, is something endowed with the power to produce. Cf. *Sophist*, 265b: ποιητικὴν πᾶσαν εἶναι δύναμιν, ἥτις ἂν γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσαν ὕστερον γίγεσθαι. Cf. also *Sophist*, 219; *Gorgias*, 476b ff.; *Lysis*, 221c; *Hippias*, I, 297a.

² Page 171 f.

highest concepts. But upon serious reflection, this impression disappears. Plato could not remain ignorant of the fact that concepts of like universality (or like in extension, according to the customary expression of to-day), such as those which have been investigated here, could only be of a very limited number. He also seems to have regarded wholeness or entirety, unity or simplicity, as well as their opposites, incompleteness, division, multiplicity, which are used by him in other parts of the *Sophist*, as of equal value with those which we selected.

In investigating the series of these generic concepts, it seems to me that the main purpose of Plato was to indicate the POSSIBLE PREDICATIONS which can be made about every conceived object. Since he himself so arranged them that two characteristics correspond as opposites, e.g., Being-Non-Being, identity-non-identity (diversity), rest-non-rest (motion), we may say that by subsuming these pairs of concepts under a more universal concept we have in them the highest points of view or the CATEGORIES from which every object may be considered. It also follows that a systematically ordered and exhaustive exposition of these points of view can at the same time give direction to scientific definition. For just as it is certain that every doubtful conceptual content is real—only as real does it stand in relation to our perceptual faculty and can it be embodied by us in a categorical statement—so is it certain that it is identical, that it is different, that it is either divided or non-divided, either spatial or non-spatial, changing or unchanging in time. If one wishes to describe this conceptual content accurately, one will have to determine whether the POSITIVE OR THE NEGATIVE PREDICATION in the individual categories is to be applied to it. Only in this manner does the meaning of its many-sided reality become clear.

At the same time it becomes evident that a negative predication also has a positive meaning, since it, at least, gives expression to the fact that the highest concept, which includes the negating as well as its contradictory characteristic, may not be rejected.

We shall introduce a few additional propositions which discuss the relation of the perceiving, judging subject to the objects about which the judgment is made. In the *Sophist*, we are told that a predication can take place only in the form of a proposition, and that it would have no meaning and could not be judged as true or false if the union of subject and predicate were not based on the definite relations between the things which they designate.¹ But in the *Theaetetus*² we are told that seeing, smelling, hearing, and other perceptions which we experience all have a corresponding special quality or manner of action of the perceived object and that, on the whole, sense-perception has sensibility or materiality for its object. This passage, if I understand it correctly, contains, among other things, the meaning that the investigation of such objects is only completed when we examine our organs one after another and direct them to these objects, since each of our sense-organs is concerned with a special phase and a special manner of action of the sensible object. On the basis of this, I should like to conclude that according to Plato's view a similar thing is true of the reflection which is based on sense-perception. We may say that thinking in general has the invisible for its object, but that the special forms by which we conceive an object in thought belong to a special type of invisible, objective reality. Even reflection about an object may not be concluded before all possible points of view³ have been made use of.

One could, of course, object that if Plato wished to be understood in this manner, he should have endeavoured to give a complete account of the possible points of view of the investigation. But only he who knows little about Plato's manner of exposition will raise this objection. For pedagogical reasons, he is not accustomed to make the argument easy for

¹ The existential judgment refers to the existence of such relations; it does not indicate their identity or agreement with Being. Cf. p. 171.

² 156c; cf. *Republic*, VI, 507c ff.; *Timaeus*, 67e.

³ Also cf. my *Neue Untersuchungen*, pp. 44-47.

his readers. Besides, the chapter on the inter-relatedness of the highest concepts alone contains this much: Every concept may be considered by itself as identical with itself because of its positive nature of being thus and so, just as it may be considered from the point of view of the attributes of other differing yet related concepts; since these attributes do not belong to the concept, they negatively designate it as being different. At the same time, though immutable in its nature, it stands in changing relations—this is what is meant by the participation of a concept in the universal concepts of identity, difference, rest, motion. Then, too, it is indestructible in its qualitative attributes, not dissoluble by logical operations (which distinguish differences in it and which may divide, heighten or lessen its intensity); i.e., it is independent of the subject yet, at the same time, limited by a rigid measure. It is a unitary summing up of an infinite many. It is Plato's conviction that this should fairly well exhaust the different points of view applicable to every object or to every concept.

3. THE FORMATION OF CONCEPTS AND THE SYSTEM OF CONCEPTS

The very heart of Plato's logic consists in the doctrine about the formation of concepts. The so-called "DIALECTICAL METHOD," which is characterized as the most important instrument of the philosopher and which differentiates him from the polished orator and the disputant (eristic), is, according to the description given of it, in the main nothing else but the art of forming logically correct and practically useful concepts. (The main passages concerned with this method appear in the *Sophist*, the *Statesman*, and the *Philebus*.)

The task of FORMING CONCEPTS always appears to have a double aspect, and it can only be solved in that a highest concept is determined for that which we investigate (the *definiendum*); this concept is then analysed into its natural species and types to the very last limits of the conceptual. This gives a kind of genealogical tree of the concept. Here the


concept in question is given a definite position, and by determining this position the concept is univocally defined. The lengthy divisions of a concept taken from art or science, which are constantly interrupted by new beginnings, and through which the reader of the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* must find his way, are intended to serve the purpose of initiating us into this two-fold task. The mistakes and the awkwardness in this analysis, purposely perpetrated and then corrected, clearly indicate that neither can the ascent to the concept be carried on with sure success unless we carefully observe the ramifications extending down; nor can we be successful with the descent to the concept unless we constantly refer it to its highest point. The *Philebus* (16b) gives expression to the difficulty involved in properly executing the methodological rules which were laid down for both sides of the definitive task. Socrates is made to say that he was always a friend of the described method, but that his efforts to arrive at the goal with it were only too frequently frustrated.


If the division of the concepts, as given in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, is put in the graphic form of a genealogical tree¹ (pp. 238-239), we shall obtain an excellent explanation of the task which is presented to the dialectical method. The scheme sets out from the highest concept of an art and is completely analysed only in one direction, viz., that direction which ends in the definition of the concept angling, or sophistic, weaving, politics. Only hints have been given of the other ramifications of the genealogical tree or the expert knowledge on which it rests. If these were followed up, the scheme would extend endlessly in all directions; for expert knowledge, real knowledge, includes all reality.²

The classification of reality is reflected in the classification

¹ Compare my discussion of this point in the *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 1 and pp. 71-73, whence I take the appended examples (see pp. 238-239). I shall translate the Greek terms.

² According to Plato, a reality which is not real to us and yet knowable for us is a monstrosity, since the power of action and passion by which it must show itself must in the end be made known to us.





of the material of knowledge. To present the tree of knowledge in its complete form would be identical with giving a complete view of all that which may ever become an object of our knowledge or of all the forms of reality.

In this comprehensive SYSTEM of such a view, there must not only be contained all the concepts, but also all the characteristics which may be used in defining each individual concept. If one thinks of this as an accomplished fact, it would be possible for us to prove all judgments which we may make as true or false by merely comparing them with the definitely determined conceptual relations. Thus all knowledge could be presented as an organized system of concepts. Such a classification would exhaust the whole content of logic without necessitating the formalities of syllogistic with all its artificialities. In order to understand why Plato values the dialectical method so much, one has to keep in mind the ideal execution and completion of this method. In the *Statesman* (285d ff.) Plato points out very clearly that he considers a single demonstration of this method very inadequate. The examples which he employed for practising the method were those in which he defined the statesman, the sophist, and finally the angler, or the weaver of woollen cloth.

It may, perhaps, be in order to remind the reader that in modern times Leibniz proposed a plan for reforming the Aristotelian-scholastic syllogism, a plan which apparently is in close agreement with Plato's purpose. Leibniz thought¹ that if the elements of our ideas were isolated and clearly symbolized by a simple sign language, by an "*alphabetum cogitationum*," we should, on the one hand, by a process of combination, succeed in discovering all possible knowledge; on the other hand, by analysis we could trace what is given to us in a complex form to the simple element and thus pass critical judgment upon it. The greatest gain to be derived from the introduction of such a sign language, as he prescribes it,

¹ According to Erdmann, *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, II, 2, pp. 111 ff. Cf. also Sigwart, *Logik*, p. 100, II⁴, pp. 670 ff.

is said to be that "every error in thought would immediately be revealed as an incorrect combination of the characters, and by applying the characteristic sign, we should have the means of discovering the error in a disputed point as we discover it in any other calculation. Similarly, where the given data are inadequate, we should at once see from the signs what the more careful definition lacks, since, if the signs were correctly chosen, this lack would have to appear as a gap or as not fitting into the scheme." If one should succeed in finding the correct signs or "characters," one would have "a cabala in the true sense of the word, and, expressed in these signs, each paralogism would appear as a barbarism or as an orthographic error."

It is, of course, no accident that Leibniz did so little to realize his ideal. Its realization would only be possible upon completion of all investigation. However, as an ideal, it has a regulative value for all investigation.

One could object to this whole method on the ground that it is impossible for human beings to attain absolute definitions, since all our knowledge remains imperfect, and since we can never arrive at a final statement of our knowledge in the form of a complete system. Yet in the meantime, we may once for all sketch certain basic lines of the system of concepts, and we need not fear that we must modify it because our experience has expanded. That is to say, there is nothing problematic about what I characterized as Plato's doctrine of categories; everything is irrefutably certain. But we may also give adequate definitions of the most universal concepts, such as that of the sensible object and that of the spiritual reality, and of those concepts subsumed under these highest concepts, without having to wait for an expansion of our experience. Besides, a complete exposition is at least possible for the small part of our knowledge which extends over the individual facts of our experience. This is shown in the *Philebus*. In referring to the division of the sounds and tones on which the sciences of linguistics and of music are based, Plato gives (17b-18d) an

example which not only explains the problem of knowing, but which also contains the final satisfactory solution for a limited field. The goal of comprehensive classification, which this example indicates, has in the meantime been firmly upheld by scientific investigation. This is most apparent in the efforts of the descriptive sciences in that they demand that the exposition be given in the form of a conceptual system; a system in which every form is assigned its respective place. From the account of a contemporary comic poet,¹ it is interesting to note how Plato, in his lectures in the Academy, diligently carried on the classification of plants and animals.

* * * * *

Of the rules which Plato lays down for definition, we already know one from his early dialogues. It reminds us that definition does not consist in enumerating examples or individual instances which are at the basis of the definition in question. Another warning (in the sense of the later accepted formula: *definitio ne fiat per idem*) was given in the *Theaetetus*,² where we are told to be on our guard against the circular definition.

Other rules, laid down for the formation of concepts in accordance with the "dialectical method," are proposed and elucidated by most carefully worked out examples in the *Sophist* and in the *Statesman*. These may be stated as follows:

A. Definition by ANALYSIS. Whenever possible analysis is to take place in accordance with dichotomy. But in doing so, the differentiating characteristic in accordance with which this division is made is not to be selected in such a way that in making the division that which is logically unequal is set over against itself.³ Then, too, the difference must not be imposed

¹ Epicrates. Compare *Platon*, I, p. 191 f.

² See p. 140. Such a warning also appears in the *Meno*, 79.

³ Hence the customary division of human beings into Hellenes and barbarians offends against this rule and is most unfortunate. Similarly the division of living things into men and animals is defective (*Statesman*, 262b-e).

from without and must not be accidental. Division should be natural; it should arise from those things which can be naturally¹ classified under a concept; and whenever dichotomy is unnatural, division must set more than two things over against one another, but always in as limited a number as possible. No intermediate member is to be omitted; it is not to pass by leaps from the *summum genus* to the *definiendum*;² otherwise gaps will appear in the meshes of the dialectical net.³ Also, only the uninterrupted division carried through from above downwards assures us that the concept which is to be defined really is subsumed under the highest concept.⁴

Because of this last reason, we may not stop with our logical division until we have found that the sought-for thing is a member of the series (and if possible this is to be accomplished by dichotomy); in fact, if the concept in question includes other concepts as sub-types, we must, for the sake of certainty and clearness, carry the division still further until we have arrived at the *infima species* which is no longer divisible. This follows from the admonition that no concept may be used which is in any way ambiguous; or to put it another way, that no concept may be employed which contains elements (types) which contradict one another in important points; instead the descriptive definition of a thing which we try to understand must be clearly and unambiguously stated.

B. Definition by SYNTHESIS. The rule to be applied here states that we must at all times consider the ESSENTIAL and ignore the non-essential.

Naturally, we miss the simple criterion for what is important and what is essential. Yet I believe that we are always pursuing a course which leads to the attainment of this criterion—it is found whenever a concept is subsumed under purpose and interpreted from that point of view. Frequently we also meet

¹ *Statesman*, 262ab: μή σμικρὸν μόριον ἐν πρὸς μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ ἀφαιρῶμεν μηδὲ εἶδος χωρίζ. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέρος ἅμα εἶδος ἐχέτω. Cf. also 289b.

² *Statesman*, 263e; *Philebus*, 16d f.

³ Plato uses this figure in the *Sophist*, 235b.

⁴ For example, this becomes evident from *Sophist*, 226a–231c.

such statements in the earlier dialogues. They appear especially in the *Cratylus*.¹ The same is true of the conclusion of the first book of the *Republic*. We may observe, Socrates tells us here, that everything in the universe has its peculiar nature, its special purpose which cannot be realized at all or as well by anything else. And the virtue of a thing consists in the fact that it is in the proper condition for this fulfilment of its nature or its purpose. We may say that this is essential for everything—this enables it to accomplish its special purpose well and nobly, a purpose which differs from the purposes of other things, and which either cannot be attained at all or cannot be attained as well by these things.² The mistakes which are made in the search for definition are mostly caused by giving undue consideration to certain accidentals. For example, it is non-essential to the ruler of the state what external limitations are placed on his powers. The only essential thing is whether he attains the right goal with statesmanlike insight.

We have a similar position in the comments of the *Philebus* (53ab): If we wish to know the nature of white colour, the question is not that of examining as much white as possible, but rather of examining a white which is absolutely pure, unmixed, and uncorrupted by any admixture. Let this example suffice to make us realize that we can only understand the nature of pleasure correctly if we consider pure, unmixed pleasure; that is to say, a pleasure free from any additions which we may experience, free from the pain which we feared in advance, or which afterwards might appear in the form of remorse. Here we could again ask: What is "pure" white? What is "pure" pleasure? By what characteristic do we differen-

¹ Compare p. 97 f. above.

² Compare the convincing statement of *Republic*, I, 353a: "The end of each thing is that which it alone can accomplish or that which it can accomplish better than all the other things" (previously, 352e, it was said, "we may assume the end or use of the horse and of every other thing to be that which an individual can accomplish with it alone or best"). Cf. also *Republic*, X, 601 ff; this is closely related to similar passages of the *Cratylus*.

tiate them from the "impure"? To this the answer would be: That which corresponds most closely to the nature of white colour, or to the nature of pleasure. This answer could also be inferred from the considerations of the *Philebus*; but the *Statesman* expresses it even more simply. This answer has shown us that there is an absolute nature of co-operation of the powers of the real world; this nature is untouched by subjective arbitrariness. There must also be a natural climax for the process caused by this co-operation; moreover there must be a clear TYPICAL FORM for every phase of this process of developing things or psychic activity, a form which the expert knows and uses as the standard. The description of this typical form indicates the essential feature of a thing. The art of measuring, which "according to the natural characteristic (NATURBESTIMMTHEIT) given for everything which comes into Being" determines the beautiful or the proper form, is entirely based on the study of natural conditions.¹

A statement of the *Timaeus* is especially instructive. Here (76de) we are told that if we wish to understand the nature of finger-nails, we must look not to man for whom they are meaningless, but to animals for whom claws and hoofs have a great and manifold meaning. No doubt, at the basis of this lies the conviction that we can best know the purpose of a thing by considering it in its most highly developed form, and that this form must be taken into consideration when we define its nature and when we determine what is essential and what is non-essential to it.

If the essence is that which makes the realization of the end possible, then by characterizing the purpose we also describe the IDEA.² In things which develop by themselves that characteristic which pleases us most appears as the purpose of this development. We justify our judgment on the assumption that

¹ See p. 177; also compare *Republic*, 504c, *Laws*, 716c.

² The Greek expression $\delta \epsilon \sigma \tau \iota \tau \acute{o} \pi \rho \acute{\alpha} \gamma \mu \alpha$, which is identical with the in-itself-ness ($\acute{\alpha} \nu \tau \acute{o} \kappa \alpha \theta' \acute{\alpha} \upsilon \tau \acute{o}$) or the Idea of a thing, we may also translate (cf. p. 93) as the "essence of the thing."

an ordering lawgiver or creator of the world wanted to produce that which we find to be the most beautiful; in this reflection upon God's creation, we try to think God's thoughts after him. In so far as we succeed, we discover the laws of development which constitute the essence or the Idea of the developing, individual thing. The question about the definition of a word, a question which already arises in the earliest of Plato's dialogues, could therefore be satisfactorily answered by indicating the purpose of a thing.

The only thing to be remembered is that for Plato the concept which he tries to define is also intended to designate the cause of all the individual phenomena in which it finds expression. Consequently, we may say that conceptual Being is already designated in certain of the early dialogues, which do not yet use the word "Idea," as an ACTING POWER. Thus, in the *Laches*, Socrates finally formulates his question about the nature of courage as to what "power" we indicate in this manner.¹ Before this he tried to show others that it was a matter of discovering what young people must learn to become as virtuous as possible. Thus he asks in the *Gorgias*: What can the art of man accomplish?² And from the *Euthydemus*, 11 b-d, we can see that a good definition of the concept of piety would be that which determines the cause of its existence; whereas that characteristic of piety which Euthyphro, the augur, gives (viz., to be loved by the gods) is an effect, but not the essence of piety. The meaning of the problem of every definition becomes clearer after Being has been defined in the *Sophist* as a power, and after the negative predications about Non-Being have been clarified (cf. p. 172 above). There is no contradiction involved if a definition states the purpose of a thing and also incorporates an effective cause. On the contrary, the *Timaeus* expresses it as a fundamental proposition that teleological and ontological explanations must at all times supplement and accompany each other. Both are also readily

¹ *Τίς οὖσα δύναμις . . . ἀνδρεία κέκληται*, 192b. Cf. pp. 100, 104.

² *Τίς ἡ δύναμις τῆς τέχνης τοῦ ἀνδρός*; 447d.

brought into harmony. With reference to purpose, the question is always about something which must yet be realized and which cannot be conceived except as being bound up with Becoming, generation, development.¹ Reflective thought must at all times subsume this under causation.

It is true that in purposive action the preconceived notion of the final result itself is active as a cause, but not as the only cause. In the *Phaedo* (98c ff.), Socrates gives as the cause of his death his own decision to subordinate himself to the judgment of the people. If he had decided to flee, this decision would have led to his flight and to his now being in safety in another country. However, the decision alone would not have produced this; the nerves and the muscles of his body would have had to carry out his resolution.² From this follows the important logical distinction between real causes and co-causes or secondary causes (*αἰτία* and *συναιτία*); a distinction which is once more made in the *Statesman*.³ This differentiation must also be borne in mind when we are in search of the answer to the question: What, according to Plato, are the essential and the non-essential characteristics of a concept? E.g., statesmanship (in agreement with the views expressed in the earlier dialogues) is defined in the *Statesman* as the art of leading the citizens of a state to happiness. This is a teleological definition. But as a product of the statesman, its object can only be completely understood if the way to attain the purpose is also indicated. And this AETIOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION, when it is correctly and adequately given, may then be taken as an adequate substitute for the teleological definition. The

¹ Most understandable is the combination made by the two points of view which can be applied to the realm of human action in which all teleological interpretation has its origin. The word *ἔργον* has a double meaning; it may designate the activity which is striving for a goal or it may designate the attained result. Early in life we learn from our experience that we cannot attain a purpose which is contrary to the order of nature, that in order to realize certain purposes we must discover and choose very definite means toward that end.

² Compare *Platon*, I, 552.

³ *Statesman*, 281d ff. Similar views are also expressed in the *Timaeus*.

most important condition or main cause of happiness, according to Plato, is moral excellence, which in turn depends on the correct moral judgment. For that reason it is in order to define statesmanship as the art of leading citizens toward morality.¹ And by this the same thing is meant as was meant by the definition previously advanced.² It would also seem that for the attainment of happiness favourable external circumstances are necessary, such as health and the capacity of the body for work, since the body is to be a worthy instrument in the service of the soul. Yet a definition of statesmanship which takes into consideration only the care for the physical well-being of the citizens would be altogether wrong. It would make secondary considerations the main considerations and crowd out the essential by the non-essential.

I may, therefore, replace that aspect of a definition which indicates the purpose by naming the cause;³ but it is wrong if, instead of naming the purpose, I indicate the secondary cause.⁴

The relation between the causes and the ultimate end at which they aim⁵ will be that every addition, every more careful definition of the cause, will also appear in a corresponding and a more careful definition of what is produced by it; whereas such relations do not exist between the secondary causes or the non-essential characteristics of a concept and its effects. If the soul came into being through the harmonious union of the elements of the body, as Simmias (*Phaedo*, 85e ff.) is inclined to believe, then the more perfect the bodily harmony is, the more perfect would the soul have to be; but this clearly contradicts the facts of experience. If the knife is an instrument

¹ Or in accordance with the Socratic-Platonic statement that morality is rooted in correct insight (*ἀρετὴν σοφίαν εἶναι*); morality as an art is to help them attain this insight; this art is also called education.

² And yet only an *αἴτιον*, the condition for the attainment of the final purpose, has been indicated in this definition. This is similar to the definition which the *Statesman* gives of the woollen garment which the weaver produces; it consists in describing the process of making it.

³ Of *αἴτιον*.

⁴ *συνάττια*..

⁵ The *τέλος*.

for cutting and the word an instrument for conveying thought, then the purpose of cutting and that of conveying thought must be the better attained the better the instrument is and the greater the skill which employs them. This is in agreement with experience. And again, if the statement which Protarchus defends against Socrates in the *Philebus* were right, viz., that pleasure is identical with the good, with the state of desireless perfection and happiness, then every enhancement of pleasure would have to bring us closer to this ideal condition, and the more a man experienced pleasure the more perfect he would be. He would be more perfect in a moment when he experiences more pleasure than in another moment when he experiences less pleasure.¹ Since this is wrong, it was also wrong to identify pleasure with the good. The most we can say for pleasure is that it is a secondary characteristic of perfection.

4. DEDUCTION AND MANNER OF PROOF

Apparently syllogistic reasoning cannot be found in Plato. Conscious of their own powers and encouraged by Aristotle's criticism, philological expositors of Plato's dialogues have tried to find false conclusions here and there. The philosophical expositors have been more cautious with their criticisms.

Plato considers it self-evident that as soon as it is shown that anyone argues contrary to the laws of thought—as the leaders of the conversations of the dialogues often show their opponents to be doing—he must admit that he has been honourably refuted and that he must consider his assertions as untenable. In addition to the laws of thought set forth in our textbooks on logic and which we mentioned above, Plato recognizes another law of thought which I cannot definitely formulate, and by which he rejects the *regressus in infinitum*.

¹ For example, cowards (as Socrates argues against Callicles in *Gorgias*, 498a ff.) who rejoice over the departure of an enemy would thereby be more perfect and better than the courageous ones who regret the departure of the enemy. Cf. p. 52 above.

Plato not infrequently carries on an exposition in such a manner that he suddenly shows us that the introduced thought process demands for its certainty a repetition of the last step, which in turn requires a similar substantiation. In all this, the meaning is obvious. As soon as such a proof has been advanced, the whole structure of thought must fall. Two examples make this very clear. In the *Theaetetus* the objection was raised that the concept of a false conception was contradictory, since the content of this conception would at one and the same time be known and not known. This objection is to be refuted by thinking of the learning process as follows: (1) the mind is thought of as wax on which the material to be learned is impressed; (2) it is thought of as a cage (the cage of memory) in which the flighty content of knowledge is confined. The impressions in the wax may afterwards become effaced; the caged birds, if one wishes to use them, must again be caught.¹ Thus mistakes are possible. But against this position the following is advanced: He who makes this mistake would nevertheless "appear to himself as one who knows about the things of which he is in error." And the puzzling questions would at all times remain: "Will anyone who knows a thing consider it to be identical with something else which he also knows? Or will he mistake that which he knows for that which he does not know, or that which he does not know for that which he knows? Or do you again wish to tell me that for the various types of knowledge and of ignorance there are again higher types of knowledge, which their possessor keeps in who knows what kind of ridiculous cages or waxen blocks, and that as long as he possesses these he knows, even though he does not have them at hand in his mind? And thus you will see yourself forced to go round and round in a perpetual circle, without accomplishing anything."² In the *Parmenides*, the hoary Eleatic says that the reason which induces Socrates to assume the Idea as existing beside and participating in the

¹ Compare p. 139, note 1.

² According to Apelt's translation of the *Theaetetus*, 200bc.

innumerable individual things must also induce him to assume innumerable Ideas which are subordinated to one another. For just as there is the Idea of size for the individually observed things which appear as large, so one would have to find for this Idea and the individual things an Idea which would subsume and unite them. This must also happen for the Idea of higher and of lower rank as well as for the individual objects. Again and again this process would have to be repeated.

The fact that this objection in either case is not justified according to Plato's meaning, and that it is merely to serve as an impetus for us to present the true relation ever more clearly to ourselves, adds nothing. If the objection were justified, the recognition of the infinity of the regress would abolish the assumption which leads to it.

The law from which this follows may be stated thus: Every inference, every development of thought, must have an absolutely firm basis, must rest on a *ικανόν*. This principle we have already derived from the *Phaedo* (p. 120). It will become even clearer if we also discuss the HYPOTHETICAL INFERENCE OR MANNER OF PROOF which is carefully¹ described there. The direction given us (p. 129 f.) states that in conceptual investigations we must at all times set out from the firmest possible fundamental assumption. From this assumption we are to draw all conclusions and to examine them carefully. If a contradiction appears, the assumption made must be rejected as useless. Otherwise it is not yet certain. If it is doubted, we are to go beyond it and deduce it from another, a simpler, and more certain assumption, which in turn would have to be grounded by a still further regress. This description of the procedure is supplemented and perfected by the arguments of the *Parmenides*. There it is said concerning it: "Not only must we in all instances set out from the positive fundamental assumption and take into consideration the conclusions which follow from it, but we must also consider the opposite, negative assumption." An affirmed hypothesis and a negated

¹ Before this it was less accurately described in the *Meno*.

hypothesis present two possibilities in contradictory form, one of which must be true. Thus it is also true of the antithetical series of development which proceed from these hypotheses that one is correct and true, the other incorrect and false; and that when both are presented to us for a decision, our decision will vacillate less than if our attention is one-sidedly fixed upon the consequences of one hypothesis.

The hypothetical explanation is always offered in such a way that a doubtful proposition is to be brought into logical relations with propositions which have absolutely determined validity, and by which it is to be judged. Even the simplest conclusions of which the *Phaedo* (105b ff.) speaks belong to this class. E.g., it seems to be definitely ascertained that fire, in accordance with its nature, is warm and warms other things. Let us say the temperature in a room rises; then we must inquire about the cause of this phenomenon. The rise in temperature could be readily understood if one could establish that a fire had been made. If anyone should question that the increase in temperature is the necessary effect of the fire, then we should have to fall back upon still more general concepts; and it would be very difficult to pursue this course with certainty until we had arrived at a proposition which no longer contained anything hypothetical or problematical, and about whose empirical validity there could be no doubt. In other words, it would be difficult to arrive at a proposition which was really "adequate" (*ἱκανόν*). In other instances, it is easier by regress to arrive at the definite point from which we may again proceed with further inferences. E.g., the statement that it is wrong to practice evil is assured universal and unreserved acceptance as soon as we can show that by practising injustice man makes true happiness impossible for himself. It is self-evident that each man strives for happiness, "and we do not have to ask: Why does the individual in question want to be happy? Evidently the answer is final" (*Symposium*, 205a).

To consider whatever is "adequate" as self-evident is

always a feature of certain knowledge. Inasmuch as it provides the support and the basis for the knowledge deducible from it, its realization is for the knowing subject the basis for the belief in the validity of knowledge, i.e., it is the ultimate "ground of knowledge." At the same time, in so far as it is really adequate for the establishment of our knowledge, and in so far as the subsequent deduction of the yet doubtful propositions is correct, it must be the actual basis of the objectively real content of these propositions, i.e., it must be the "REALGRUND." Whenever we desire proof, we are not in search of reasons which convey only subjective conviction—such convictions are necessarily also shared by him who dreams and by him who is insane and has all kinds of fantastic imaginings; on the contrary, we demand an absolute basis for that which we consider subjectively true and which gives it the nature of objective reality or universal validity.

Thus we are once more brought back to the doctrine of Ideas. Plato expresses this very thought when he considers the "Idea"¹ as the basis for the persistence of characteristics and of things; and he makes knowledge consist in the apprehension of the Idea. In this it becomes evident how closely logic for him is bound up with ontology and epistemology. The peculiarity of knowledge is that it is true or that it grasps reality. In other words, knowledge is only possible in the form which makes the thought-content be exactly as we conceive it. This is impossible with what is given in perception. For, as the *Theaetetus* (153c ff.) shows, sense-perceptions become definite when a motion which proceeds from the perceptible object meets a motion which proceeds from the perceiving

¹ Whenever Plato uses this word in its peculiar meaning, he wishes to do no more than give expression to the demand for proof of a real basis (*Realgrund*) and to confirm the conviction that there must be such an objective basis for every individual trait of reality, a trait which can be described by a true, correct assertion. Or, to express it another way, he uses it to designate the merely postulated and the sought-for basis without which the concept of truth would be destroyed by sceptical attacks.

subject; and, like these motions, sense-perceptions last only a moment. But the judgments by which we characterize our thoughts express permanent characteristics by words; therefore even when they refer to what is perceived by the senses, they designate not what is momentary and subject to change, but what is permanent. As something permanent it is valid not only for the individual phenomenon in which it is not perceived by our senses, but also for innumerable, similar phenomena; thus it will constitute the general nature of all of them.

For that reason, even if we ascribe to these invisible essences, the Ideas, only a problematical (hypothetical) reality (Plato introduced the Ideas in this sense, and he is always conscious of this fact; even in the *Timaeus*, 51c, he again raises the question whether in the end the individual sensible object, which is given and which is changing in space, after all does not constitute the only reality), uncertainty disappears when, by postulating it, we examine the pros and cons and take our argument one step farther back to the next assumption. If the Ideas were removed from reality, there could be no precise correctness of our conceptions, no strict truth in predication, no difference between opinion and knowledge, and everything would disintegrate in a subjective fog. This cannot and must not be. The *Parmenides* (135c) assures us that if that were so, every meaningful exposition¹ would cease. Even the immediate intuition of all those who do not wish to recognize the Ideas testifies against it. In their practical relations all recognize that the difference between the true and the false is objectively grounded.

In accordance with these conclusions, we may say that every Idea is "adequate," and that with the apprehension of an Idea the preliminary hypothetical nature of every proposed assertion takes on apodictic certainty. Yet what guarantee have we that we have ever apprehended an Idea existing "in nature" ² with our conception, whose content we describe by a word?

¹ The entire δύναμις τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι; see p. 152, note 1, p. 153.

² ἐν τῇ φύσει. *Parmenides*, 132d. Cf. pp. 150, 153 f, 217 f.

and that the togetherness of characteristics by which we characterize our concept is not merely an artificial construct of our imagination? In the end, it is only the successful, logical classification of this concept with other concepts of a higher, of the same, or of a lower rank, and the classification of all these concepts in an all-embracing system of concepts, which will give us this guarantee; but we never experience such an embracing system of concepts.

In the *Theaetetus*, Plato tried to ascertain how the concept of knowledge or of knowing is to be conceived. He rejects a series of attempted definitions: Sense-perception with its fleeting content cannot contain immutable truth. The interpretation of this content is subject to error, contradiction, and refutation by those who interpret it otherwise. It consists in mere uncertain opinion. And if one were to maintain that knowledge is correct opinion, one would have to have a criterion which would enable us to say under what circumstances an opinion is right and not wrong. Sometimes it is said that knowledge is correct opinion accompanied by the LOGOS.¹ But upon closer examination, this definition is also abandoned as useless, because we cannot say in what sense this ambiguous term (logos) is to be understood, so that the statement will be true that, by the addition of logos, opinion becomes knowledge. In the *Sophist* and the later dialogues we were given a new meaning of logos; we were given the definition which was arrived at in accordance with methodical rules, and which begins with the highest generic characteristics and gradually descends to the last *differentia specifica*. If we understand the term in this sense, then the answer last proposed to the question, what is knowledge? is corrected as follows: Not correct opinion plus logos, but logos alone constitutes knowledge. Opinion ceases when the definition of the concept has been attained. Knowledge arises when a highest concept is related to the concept of a special form of Being, which was to be understood by giving the continuous development of its

¹ Cf. p. 140.

characteristics. Accordingly knowledge in the form of final definitions is possible with reference to the highest generic concepts, the categories, and their interdependence, and apparently also with reference to the characteristics of concrete objects, whose narrow spheres can, in a certain way, be indicated. Furthermore, absolute knowledge is also to be had in negative judgments by which the effort to make positive assertions, because of the contradictions which follow from their conclusions and which are directed against incontestable facts, is rejected as a failure.

In conclusion, only a few more comments concerning INFERENCE BY ANALOGY. Through mere hints and in an abbreviated form Plato uses it frequently; he does this to make comparisons fruitful for investigations. The *Statesman* sets up as a rule for analogy that it be drawn from what is known, from what is closest at hand, from the minute and the easily observable. The rule itself is there derived from a concrete example, the simplest example which can be given: that of children in school learning to read. Yet Plato is clearly aware of the fact that analogy may lead astray. The *Protagoras* already hinted that comparisons and analogies are only to serve the purpose of sharpening our observation for investigation and of indicating the direction for focusing our attention; but that we can at no time deduce absolute proof from them. In the *Phaedo* (92d) Simmias comments: "Conclusions which are based on probabilities¹ are, I know, deceptive; and unless one guards against them, they will be extremely misleading, not merely in geometry, but also in everything else." In the *Theaetetus* (162e) the following criticism is expressed: "You make use of probability, yet the geometrician who made use of probability in his calculations would have to forgo all claim to recognition." Even in that important analogical inference

¹ διὰ τῶν εἰκότων. For Plato this means, as the *Timaeus* shows, pretty much the same as δι' εἰκόνων, so that we must naturally think of inferences by analogy. We read later in the passage of the *Theaetetus*, τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε and εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογία τε καὶ εἰκόσι λεγομένους λόγους.

of the *Philebus* that the soul of man comes from the world-soul just as the elements of the human body come from the elements of the body of the universe (*Philebus*, 29a ff.), the hint is given that the inference does not carry necessity. According to Plato an inference which passes from the like to the like can only justify itself as a heuristic principle, i.e., for the establishment of an hypothesis which must yet be tested.

CHAPTER III

PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

1. In the *Timaeus*, Plato set forth his THOUGHTS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD, the cosmos. The fact that he lets the Pythagorean of that name, whom he represents as a statesman and natural philosopher, continue the discourse on this subject almost uninterruptedly, while Socrates, as well as others, is an almost silent listener, clearly indicates that on this subject he (Plato) is greatly indebted to the friendly Pythagoreans of Southern Italy—among whom we must not overlook the famous mathematician Archytas. Yet this can hardly mean a relationship which is essentially different from that with the Eleatics, similarly hinted at in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, over against whom Plato nevertheless maintains his independence. We can also show that his Pythagorean friends owe no less rich and profitable spiritual stimuli to him than he does to them. It is altogether in accordance with Plato's own meaning when *Timaeus* prefaces his discourse with the comment, with which he afterwards frequently interrupts the exposition, that in such descriptions it is not a question of scientifically established results, but of PROBABILITY of a higher or lesser degree.

Then he develops the following thought: The things which affect our lives and which are given in our sense-perception are all subject to change, i.e., they are in a constant process of becoming different. Each stage in the process of development through which things pass is caused by another stage which preceded it, and it in turn will cause another succeeding stage. It is therefore impossible, if we start from any stage and trace the process of development gradually backward, to arrive at a real beginning. If we review the ground covered, we are always concerned with parts of the whole process of development. While we thus search in vain for the beginning of the

infinite series, there arises in us in a remarkable manner the impression of a completed whole and of perfection, and we experience this impression as pleasant and call it the perception of beauty. But what is the nature of beauty? Matter or the physical in and by itself is never beautiful. In accordance with its nature, matter is void of every definite characteristic. Only the ensouled physical object which is illumined by thought is beautiful. Therefore, a spirit (or soul) must dwell in all parts of the physical, sensible world, which we find beautiful. The whole WORLD appears to be FORMED and ruled BY A SPIRITUAL POWER.

In accordance with probability, however, we may picture the origin of this wonderful beauty and order, which is the consequence of the reign of this power, as follows: In his innermost nature, God is good. Therefore he desired space-filling matter, which stands over against him, to be as good as possible. This matter was in a state of chaos, driven about in indefinite and lawless fashion, a condition which would not have been knowable in any of its individual aspects, and whose total impression would in no way have been satisfying. At this point the divine demiurge entered the picture. He established order by giving the whole mass a spherical form. The sphere he made of four fundamental elements regularly employed to form stereometrical bodies. These elements he fashioned as the building blocks for the cosmos in varied quantities, and so small that they are imperceptible to our senses. In connection with this framing of the universe and as a consequence of it, each body received a definite motion which would separate all like bodies from other bodies, and would bring them closer together if it were not prevented by collision with things of a different nature. Gradually, they found their compensation in a spiral movement of the whole mass; this spiral movement caused individual bodies, attracted to and influenced by one another, constantly to change their form and their motion. At the same time the body of the world was endowed with life and a soul; that is to say, in addition to the mechanical impulse

which it received, it was (at the same time) endowed with a principle of motion which works from within and which strives for a purposive development. This took place mediately while the individual heavenly bodies and the earth, which moves in the centre of the universe and about the axis of the heavens, were receiving their souls from the fiery elements. By means of this soul, these bodies acted upon the coarser, material particles which are more difficult to move, and they gained such an ascendancy that the creatures which gradually came into Being on them were also endowed with life and a soul. In this manner, especially on the earth, living beings of different species and genera, and, as the most perfect of them all, man arose; to him it is given not merely to perceive with his bodily organs, as do animals, the impressions from the things surrounding him, but also to marvel at and to know the whole universe; in doing so he thinks the Creator's thoughts after him and finds his happiness in imitating God's activity as much as possible.

These are the fundamental thoughts of the dialogue. Here I can go into the details only to the extent that they appear to me to be of philosophical significance.

Just as the eternity, the non-beginning, and the indestructibility of matter and energy¹ are for all Greek physicists unquestionable assumptions, so they are also for Plato. He expresses himself most clearly on this point when he characterizes the demiurge's forming the chaos into an ordered cosmos. He tells us that in this perfect condition, produced by divine intervention, the world should and will remain eternally young and full of life. Every interference is excluded by the fact that nothing remained outside of the world; consequently no want

¹ I have always been strongly and curiously impressed by the assertion of our scientists that the law of the CONSERVATION OF ENERGY was an achievement of modern science. The merits of these men, who have shown that this law asserts itself under forms and conditions which seemed to defy it, are great enough without trying to increase their fame by attributing to them an honour which does not belong to them.

had to be satisfied from without and no undesirable surplus had to be discarded; instead, by their interaction, the parts of the whole with their want and their abundance, with their power to attract certain things and to repel others, constantly supplemented each other; thus all action and passion took place¹ in the closed cycle of the world itself.

2. About certain fundamental concepts of physics we are told the following: MATTER may be defined as that which acts in space. From the definitive statement of the *Sophist* that "Being is the power to affect or to be affected by another" (cf. p. 170), it follows that a FORCE OF INERTIA is necessary for spatial existence; by this force an object resists any effort to be crowded out of the space which it occupies. From this it follows still further that the motion of a body, i.e., motion from one space into another, needs a special impulse. This is in reality a proposition of the Platonic doctrine of motion.

Plato conceives GRAVITY to be the movement of one body toward the greater mass of another body which it fundamentally resembles. If we were to imagine beings, he says, who could move about on the surface of the ring of fire, which is separated from that of air, as we move about on the earth, and if they were to examine the gravity of the elements which are most largely represented there, they would find that if they raised parts of fire into the air, and placed them in a scale, fire would show the same resistance which the earth shows to us in similar experiments. Thus fire, which is light to us, would be heavy to them. Whatever interferes with this impulse of bodies to move (as, e.g., the scales interfere with the earthly body tending toward the earth) experiences a heavy pressure which is proportional to "the size" (i.e., MASS) of the impeded body.

While Plato immediately connects his assumptions about gravity with the conception of the spherical form of the cosmos, he develops with perfect clarity the corresponding conclusions

¹ 33d. ἀντὶ γὰρ ἑαυτῷ τροφήν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φθίσιν παρέχον καὶ πάντα ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάσχον καὶ δρῶν ἐκ τέχνης γέγονεν.

about the meaning of directions above and below. He maintains that naturally opposite locations in the spherical universe are only those of circumference and centre. If one thinks of a uniformly solid globe as being placed at the centre, it would not be attracted in any direction, but it would be suspended in equipoise. If an individual were to traverse the surface of this globe, he would, after he was halfway round,¹ point with his finger over his head in exactly the same direction as he did when at the beginning of his journey he pointed in the direction of his feet. The same direction would be for him at first down and then up. To this also belongs what the *Phaedo* (108e) said: The parts of a spherical body equiform in all directions from the centre cannot displace each other (for this reason a spherical body—the earth is meant—placed in the centre remains in equipoise).²

The *Parmenides* defines the concept of MOTION in the same sense as the *Phaedo* does that of Becoming, viz., the passing from one state into its opposite.³ Plato, however, recognizes that there can be no change without time,⁴ and that time with its opposites to the present of the past and the future cannot take place without motion.⁵ Thus the notion of motion includes temporal relations, and the concepts motion and time cannot be defined independently of each other.

According to Plato, physical objects, bodies, which as such contain different elements, and especially extended parts, cannot be in a state of complete rest.⁶ This proposition supplements his concept of matter. No doubt, he had already arrived

¹ *σὰς ἀντίπον*, 63a.

² *Phaedo*, 108e f. Anaximander had already grasped this thought.

³ E.g., *Parmenides*, 162b f; cf. *Phaedrus*, 70e. For an explanation of the concept of motion in this universal sense, which includes every change and is therefore identical with Becoming, we may take a passage from the *Theaetetus*, 155b: "That a thing which was not before should be afterwards is impossible without having become and without Becoming."

⁴ *Parmenides*, 151e ff.

⁵ *Ibid.* and *Timaeus*, 384 ff.

⁶ E.g., see *Republic*, 530b, where this proposition is expressed with reference to the fixed stars.

at it in connection with his theory of perception, as that is presented in the *Theaetetus*, and it is again deduced from the definition that Being is the power to act. For perceptible Being must be active in the realm of sensation, and motionless activity is self-contradictory. It also follows from the clear understanding of the nature of time. Apparent permanence or REST IS THE MAINTENANCE OF EQUILIBRIUM.

That the internal changes which a body experiences as a consequence of the subtraction or the addition of elements, and as a consequence of the change in starting points (*Ansatzpunkte*) of acting forces, can maintain a perfect equilibrium under certain conditions, is shown by the description of the interaction of the parts of the cosmos, in which its life is active. In the strictest sense, what is true of the cosmos, viz., that during all the changes it maintains its absolute equilibrium, is in a lesser degree also true of the particular objects in which we can perceive no change. This is particularly true of organic bodies or living things which, while in their full strength, replenish their losses by taking nourishment.¹ Furthermore, according to Plato, the purely mechanical motion must take place within a CYCLE because of the universal extension and impenetrability² of space-filling matter. With this principle, Plato seeks the solution for a large number of striking phenomena which, of course, cannot be adequately explained by it—e.g., the motion of a projected body, the flow of water, the striking of lightning on the earth, the power of attraction manifested in the magnet and in amber, the swallowing of food, rhythmical breathing.

3. The various types of motion which Plato recognizes can be graphically presented as follows:—

¹ The *Symposium* (208a) makes the comment that the elements of the living body are constantly renewed by the ever-changing elements; and then it transfers the thought of the apparent maintenance of the equilibrium between action and reaction to the psychic realm. Cf. below, p. 284.

² Cf. *Platon*, II, p. 327.

MOTIONS

I

The motion of the individual body carried out by itself (and equally in all its parts) = *φορά*.

1. Involving no change of place, rotation on a fixed axis; involving change of place:

- (a) gliding (sliding)
(b) rolling.

II

The motion of the body in its (active and passive) co-operation with other bodies (and that not equally in all its parts) = *ἀλλοίωσις*.

1. By maintaining the existing constitution (*ἔξις*):

- (a) Loss of parts through a breaking-up process (*διασχιζέσθαι* or *διακρίνεσθαι* and *φθίνεσθαι*);

- (b) Absorption of foreign elements (*συνγκρίνεσθαι* and *αυξάνεσθαι*).

2. By changing the existing constitution:

- (a) By the destruction of characteristics (*ἀπόλλυσθαι* or *διαφθείρεσθαι*):¹

- (1) By breaking into fragments (*διάκρισις*);

- (2) Through mixture (*σύνκρισις*).

- (b) By the appearance of new characteristics (*γίγνεσθαι*).

4. I should like to make a few additional comments. Since knowledge of all the characteristics of an object can only be given us by the motions in which it is, or parts of it, and which serve as a stimulus to set our sense organs in motion, then that WHICH DIFFERENTIATES TWO CHARACTERISTICS is necessarily a difference in the MOTIONS OF THAT THING. In the *Theaetetus* Plato prescribes a special perceptive organ² for all types of sensible qualities; in the *Timaeus* he attempts to base the

¹ Cf. with this *Parmenides*, 162e: τὸ δ' ἀλλοιούμενον ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι μὲν ἕτερον ἢ πρότερον, ἀπόλλυσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῆς προτέρας ἕξεως.

² *Theaetetus*, 156ab. Similarly it was pointed out in the *Republic* that the light given off by the sun can only be perceived by the radiant eye, 508a.

characteristics of the objects, and the impressions produced by them, on the motions given with the form and the size of their basic elements.

In the *Republic* the hint was given that we become aware of motion not merely by perceptible changes of position and by the audible succession of tones, but also by the perceptions of our other senses, such as sight, smell, taste. Of course, the wise man has not yet appeared who by his mathematical achievements would make the spheres of these organs also accessible to science, as the astronomer has done for the eye and the expert in acoustics has done for the ear.

We are told that MOTION BY IMPACT from without can only come into Being in that two contiguous bodies are or become different from one another in some way. Otherwise they would not disturb each other reciprocally in their condition; what is absolutely alike would be motionless.¹ And if it is necessarily (cf. above) true that the sensible object, the material body, changes, i.e., that its parts are in motion and influence each other, then this presupposes that these parts are not completely alike. The belief is also expressed in the *Timaeus* that in all eternity they would never become perfectly alike. Provision is made against such a possibility by a meaningful mechanism which is based on the fact that matter, which in its ultimate nature is the same and formless, was formed by the demiurge, who put order into chaos (even into the smallest particles, imperceptible to our sense organs) after the pattern of the regular stereometric bodies; in doing so he imparted a particular motion to each of the fundamental elements which drives them apart, each one to its "natural place." At the same time the universe was set in motion; this motion drives the masses toward each other, and causes the contiguous, individual forms to adapt themselves so that the overpowering mass becomes master of the motion of the many different small particles. From this constant reaction there must follow a constant labile equilibrium.

¹ *Timaeus*, 57d, cf. 58a.

In these conceptions, which I cannot pursue here in detail, the following seem to be the most important features:—

First, the main characteristic of every material consists in spatiality; therefore the fundamental differences of material things must be given in spatial attributes.

Second, since these spatial characteristics have as their cause a rational, order-producing mind, they must be of such a nature that inquiring reason can clearly know them, and by making use of them can disentangle and clearly order the confusion of that which is given in sensation. It is for this reason that Plato is searching for the essence of the empirically observed differences of the regular bodies described by stereometry.

Third, every physical object has its particular motion, which is conditioned by its form.

I could venture only uncertain conjecture as to why, under these conditions, Plato did not assume five rather than four ELEMENTS, and why he considered three of these elements as more closely related to each other than the fourth is related to them. These conjectures I do not wish to repeat here.

5. In many expositions of Platonic philosophy, we find the conception that Plato identified SPACE with materiality or MATTER, and that he allowed his fundamental forms or ELEMENTS to come into Being by delimiting empty space. That is wrong. I shall here, however, present only one fact which clearly testifies against this. Like Kant, Plato emphatically appeals to the certainty of geometric science. He has not the slightest doubt that a strict scientific knowledge of space and its relations is possible. On the contrary, the uncertain basis of what is individual he designates as something not altogether knowable, as something "dark, scarcely believable."¹ It would seem, then, that for Plato this must be something different from space. I believe that, instead of identifying this enigmatic thing with space, we should say: The only thing clear in it is

¹ Compare, p. 203 f.

its spatial relations; only they do not exhaust its nature. And while one geometrical figure is completely identical with a congruent second figure, and while one stereometric body is identical with another stereometric body, they nevertheless differ in an enigmatic manner in that they occupy different positions in space—space (cf. p. 210), therefore, shows itself as the "*principium individuationis*"—and in that the space-filling concrete things differ from one another and in that each changes in space, whereas the parts of space remain unchanged. Therefore, it is not space with its spatial attributes which is enigmatic, but filled space or, perhaps better, space-filling matter or the relation of space to matter; this relation can only be described, but not apprehended. Plato, of course, tries to grasp the nature of matter in that, with his theory of the elements, he reduces its attributes to spatial characteristics. Frequently and clearly, however, he gives us to understand that his identification of bodies which have been stereometrically determined, or which have been delimited by clearly describable surfaces, with sensible bodies of a definite experiential quality remains problematical. Therefore he always advocates this identification as a probability, but never as a truth. And if we are, e.g., told in a passage (*Timaeus*, 53d), "this is the fundamental assumption which we make regarding the origin of fire, etc. . . . But the principles which are prior to these God alone knows and he of men who is dear to God," we should not mistake the fact that here matter is already presupposed as something existing, to which mind gives knowable forms by limiting it by means of triangles.

6. Every careful reader of the *Parmenides* will observe that Plato was fully aware of the difficulties implied in the concept of space as well as in that of time. From the discussion of the concept of time, there given, we need only select those propositions in which this APORIA is most clearly expressed: "It is impossible that a thing which was previously at rest should afterwards be in motion, or that that which was previously

in motion should afterwards be at rest without experiencing change.¹ . . . But there is no time in which it is possible for a thing to be at once neither in motion nor at rest. . . . When does the change take place? since neither that which is at rest, nor that which is in motion, nor that which exists in time can change. . . . Does this strange thing, the moment,² in which a thing would then be while changing really exist? For the moment seems to imply that from it change may take place in two directions. For a change does not come from a state of rest, as long as a thing is still in rest, nor from the state of motion, as long as an object is still in motion. The moment rather is wedged in between motion and rest as something curious, as not belonging to time; into this moment and out of it what is in motion changes into rest and what is at rest changes into motion.”³

We can neither perceive nor really conceive the beginning nor the end of time. Every attempt which we may make to set up temporal limits appears just as arbitrary as that of setting up spatial limits. Thus boundaries can only be determined for parts of space and parts of time. Beyond these finite parts, time and space stretch into infinity. The concept of an all-inclusive time may, therefore, be identified with that of eternity. In the *Timaeus*, however, Plato is opposed to this identification. He lets God (the demiurge) create time when He forms the cosmos, and that by assigning the sun, moon, and the planets their respective places in the heavens and by determining their special courses. We are told⁴ that He would gladly have endowed His world with eternity. “But it was impossible to bestow this (attribute) in its fullness on a created thing. Thus it occurred to Him to make a moving image of eternity; this image He made eternal⁵ and moving in accordance with number. This image we call ‘time.’ Before the creation of the heavens, there was neither day, nor night, nor month,

¹ ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

² τὸ ἐξαίφνης

³ *Parmenides*, 156cd.

⁴ *Timaeus*, Chapter 10, 37d ff.

⁵ ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἐνὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα.

nor year; these came into Being with the creation of the heavens. But all these are parts of time, just as the 'was' and the 'will be' came into Being as species of time. These we now unconsciously but wrongly ascribe to eternal essences. For we say of these essences that they 'were,' that they 'are,' and that they 'will be'; when strictly speaking 'is' alone is applicable to them, whereas the 'was' and the 'will be' are only properly applied to things Becoming in time; for both are motions. On the contrary, that which is always immovably the same cannot in the course of time become older or younger; neither has it ever, nor does it now, nor will it ever become older or younger. In fact, nothing of what generation entails for the moving things of the perceptible world is applicable to it. All these are rather creatures of time, which imitates eternity and moves according to a law of number. The same is true of such statements as: What has become IS in the process of Becoming, what will become IS about to become, what is not IS non-existent. But all these expressions are inaccurate."

7. It is pointed out¹ with reference to the concept of space that we fall into error if we ascribe space to the eternal unchangeable essences; the same is true of the concept of time. But as there is supposed to be true knowledge only of what is eternally the same, and as of the other things there are at the most only correct conjecture and opinion, we may doubt the accuracy of the ideas of space and of time, as well as the conception of motion, or that of Becoming which includes spatial and temporal relations. And yet it is not Plato's intention to withdraw all support from these notions and concepts, as the Eleatics attempted to do. He realizes that by doing so all scientific investigation would be made impossible. He merely wishes to clarify the irrational aspect of these concepts; he is so little interested in denying the actuality of their content that by his strong emphasis upon it he refutes Eleaticism. Thus it is in the *Timaeus* that he makes fundamental contribu-

¹ *Timaeus*, 52b; cf. above p. 217 f.

tions to a THEORY OF PROBABILITY which, in its highest form, appears to him as the highest attainable goal for the explanation of nature. He does this by applying the concept of the image to the perceptible world as a whole, to the cosmos. Plato had previously made use of this concept to make clear the relationship of the perceptible, changing things to the invisible, abiding essences, the Ideas in and by themselves. This is one of the most fundamental principles of the *Timaeus*. It is necessary that the image be embodied in perceptible matter. It is this very embodiment in the sensible with its spatial and temporal characteristics, and the peculiar nature of the matter used in modelling this image, that differentiate it from its prototype, or original. The most important task in describing it is the stating of its conceptual content which is in agreement with the original. Our judgment about it is teleological, i.e., its point of view is that an image should reproduce its original. The closer it comes to this ideal, the more highly the image is valued, the more successful it is as an image. Yet it is impossible to have an absolutely identical reproduction. This would no longer be an image, but the original itself.¹ Thus the material, which conditions the form of the image, appears as a hindrance or imperfection: and since it, too, must be described whenever we describe the image, our description is necessarily inaccurate and uncertain. In the *Timaeus* this connection is already indicated (cf. above, p. 254, note 1) by closely relating the word which expresses mere probability, in contrast to what is most certainly known, to the word which means image.

The two thoughts that the whole visible world is an image of an invisible reality and that it is animate are related, in that both imply that we cannot fully understand the world by merely analysing it and indicating its material elements. They differ, however, as follows: The animate is self-sufficient; whereas the image is dependent on the activity of an artificer who affects it from without, and the attention of the thinking

¹ *Timaeus*, 52c.

observer will be turned away from the image and directed on the artificer.

8. Incidentally we have already¹ had noteworthy testimony that in the Academy there was great activity in BOTANY. This is confirmed by other reports concerning classifications in the botanical and the zoological fields.²

The description in the *Phaedrus* of the span of horses hitched to the chariot of the soul has often been considered by horse-lovers as evidence of Plato's careful observation of animals. This also becomes evident now and then from isolated comments such as the statement of the *Phaedo* (85a): "No bird sings when it is hungry or cold or in any way uncomfortable; not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor the hoopoe, of which it is said that because of grief they sing mournful songs; neither do the swans sing for grief." Nor is the knowledge to be disdained which the *Timaeus* shows of the anatomy and physiology of the human body. Plato fully realizes the close relationship between man and animals; this is most clearly shown by the criticism which he directs against the usual classification of living things into the two sub-types of animal—man—which are set over against one another. For his part, he considers man to be the most highly developed form of the animal type; but all along the line from the bottom to the top he notices (according to *Timaeus*, 91d ff.) gradual transitions. A consequence of this conception is that Plato derives³ valuable suggestions from the comparison of animals with men.—In the *Laws* we find the thought expressed that living things adapt themselves to the conditions of their environment.

9. Peculiar to the Platonic philosophy of nature is the thought that EVERY MOTION IS INITIATED BY AN IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE; and that this principle may be called the SOUL. We have, indeed, seen that two contiguous bodies which are not qualita-

¹ See p. 242.

² Cf. also *Statesman*, 265b ff.

³ See, e.g., *Laws*, 814b, 836c; cf. p. 350 f.

tively the same—i.e., which differ in their fundamental structure and in their motions—act upon each other and reciprocally produce motions in each other. We were also told that the creator, the orderer of the world, provided that these motions never cease. Mind was the originator of all motion; and the *Sophist* informs us that mind can only reside in a soul. Mythologically it is stated in the *Timaeus* that the ordering Deity (the demiurge) implanted a soul into the world when He made it. Besides, all organisms have their special souls as an indwelling principle of motion. Of course, it remains a mystery how these souls act; how they initiate bodily motion which, when once begun, is mechanically transmitted by impulse and impact. But let us be honest: The riddle which here confronts us has to this day been solved by no one. And not everyone who has spoken or written about this is as clear and tells us as clearly as Plato that his words have no scientific value. It is true that heterogeneous elements become entangled and involved in the Platonic concept of the soul, which¹ is the principle of motion for the physical realm, and which is also endowed with characteristics which we call “psychical.” It is also true that serious defects of presentation arise, and that we cannot refrain from objecting that such passages as *Timaeus*, 37a–c (47bc), tax our understanding with conceptions which we cannot grasp. These passages describe the motion of the whole or the motion of the stars in words which identify it with the perceptions and thoughts of the world soul. And in the *Laws*, 894a, thought itself in its “movement” seems² to become concrete and to take on extension and form in space. ✓

10. ASTRONOMY in particular was greatly advanced by Plato. From valuable details which we can gather, partly from scant references from his own writings and partly from later reporters, we know that Plato made noteworthy contributions

¹ A similar position was already held by Thales.

² Cf. also *Timaeus*, 71b.

to astronomy. We also know that Plato at first zealously studied the theories of his predecessors; that he then tried to make the most careful observation of the celestial phenomena and give an explanation of them; that he was constantly exchanging his thoughts with Pythagorean friends; that for many years he collaborated daily with such men as Eudoxus, Heraclides, and Helicon; that to a ripe old age he was inquiring, stimulating, learning. But about all this I can only set down a few points in a brief summary.

Until his old age, Plato assumed as an unquestionable fact that the spherical earth rested motionless in the centre of the universe. But the striking irregularities of the orbits of the sun and the moon in the heavens, and the irregular orbits of the planets through the sphere of the fixed stars, appeared to him to be incongruent with his firm belief that a rational spirit rules in the world. Convinced that all these irregularities must be grounded in our mistaken conceptions, he set the problem for his students and co-inquiring friends in the Academy to explain¹ the origin of this deceptive appearance by geometrical constructions and calculations based on simple, uniform circular motions. And in co-operation with them, as he tells us in the *Laws*, and taught in his old age by others, he saw the untenability of his former cosmological views and radically changed them. He may also have been forced to draw this conclusion on the ground that he became more and more convinced of the proposition that no sensible object can remain in motionless, absolute rest.² Therefore, this could not be assumed of the earth. Aristotle, who rejects the rotation of the earth on its axis, believes it to be a Platonic notion which he finds expressed in the *Timaeus*, from which, however, it cannot be proved. Theophrastus, the oldest Greek historian of astronomy, tells us that in his old age Plato rejected the notion that the earth occupies the centre of the universe. Two of Plato's immediate disciples developed cosmological

¹ For more detail, see *Platon*, II, p. 368.

² Compare p. 262, note 6.

systems; one of these, Heraclides, represented the visible motion of the fixed stars, and with them the corresponding movements of the planets as only apparent, and based them on the real motions of the earth. For the further movements of planets he discovered a double possibility of presentation by means of simple orbits, according to which either all the planets, or at least Mercury and Venus, were made satellites of the sun which moves about the earth; or the earth was taken out of the centre of the universe and was given, in addition to the rotation on its axis, an orbital movement about the sun, which was placed in the preferential position, the centre of the universe. A third disciple of Plato, the editor of his literary remains, with whom Plato must have stood in close contact in the last years of his life, also seems to hint at the doctrine that the motion of the earth was the true cause of the apparent movement of the heavens.

Once these two suggestions about the motion of the earth, which was at first thought of as motionless, and the removal of the earth from the centre of the universe were grasped—there is no doubt that Plato himself considered them—and if, in addition, some of the planets, which were from antiquity regarded with the same reverence as the earth, were made satellites of the sun, then philosophical theory, whose task¹ it is to exhaust all logical possibilities and to test them by ferreting out their ultimate consequences, must also attempt to show what conditions would exist if one were to assume that all planets moved about the sun, and, finally, whether one might not also consider the earth as a satellite of the sun. It is not necessary to assume that new observations of celestial phenomena would have to be made in order to propose a new theory. Conversely, the examination of the new theory could have given the impetus to more careful observation of individual phenomena and to new discoveries.

In conclusion we may say that the astronomer Schiaparelli was not wrong in his judgment that Plato should be recognized

¹ According to *Parmenides*, 136a ff.; cf. above p. 152.

as one of the boldest pioneers in this field, as one of the greatest forerunners of Copernicus.¹

II. We can already see from the *Phaedo* how seriously Plato and his friends in the Academy were engaged with the problems of geognosy. Yet from the discussion of the theories as there given, we are unable to gather precisely the narrator's own meaning. The only thing clear is that at that time Plato accepts the spherical earth suspended in the centre of the universe, and that he regards the countries and oceans known to the Greeks of his day as a small part of the earth's surface. What Berger² reads into this text is also probable, viz., that Plato accepted the Pythagorean division of the surface of the earth by two circular oceans intersecting at right angles; the two oceans are Oceanus flowing from north to south, and an ocean in the equatorial region flowing from west to east; the surface of the earth is thus divided into four inhabited continents, separated by impassable boundaries. One of these continents is the ecumenical world surrounding the Mediterranean. Friedländer's³ suggestion is also probable, to wit, that the *Phaedo* reveals a youthful and audacious attempt to take the old Ionic conception, which divided the disk-shaped earth into land and water, and to transfer it to the globe. Mythological features are, of course, so intimately interwoven with the rest of the description that an understanding of the whole is consequently made rather difficult. The *Timaeus* and the *Critias* give us a much clearer picture which, in parts, is also excellently executed in detail. Friedländer believes⁴ that the

¹ Let us not overlook the fact that Copernicus himself was aware of the close relationship between his thoughts and those of the Hellenic astronomers. The dedicatory letter of his work *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* addressed to Pope Paul III and various expositions in the work itself, which were suppressed by the first publishers and were not published until our day, testify to this.

² *Geschichte der wissenschaftlichen Erdkunde der Griechen*,² 1903, p. 215.

³ *Platon*, I, 1928, p. 254.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 258.

"fundamental difference" between it and the older picture of the *Phaedo* "will be evident to everyone." Here "the surface of the earth has become a unity, and is opened to further investigation and further discoveries." We must, indeed, marvel at Plato's description of the Attic landscape in which he shows himself as the keenest observer and judge of characteristic features.¹

12. According to Plato, astronomy consists in applied mathematics (this is also true of acoustics, cf. p. 265). In this position inheres a one-sidedness which induced² him to minimize scientific experimentation. In his estimate of mathematics, however, Plato shows himself as spiritually akin to the founders of modern science.

The *Philebus*³ gives us a division of the concept of human knowledge into a technical half and a theoretical half. He tells us that it is only by counting, measuring, and weighing that the individual branches of the first half can attain certainty, and⁴ overcome the vagueness of sense impressions and the uncertainty of the crude handicrafts which rely solely on sense-impressions. Number, quantity, and weight can be mathematically dealt with. But philosophical mathematics differs from the mathematics applied to these things; it (theoretical mathematics) deals with pure numbers, which consist of equal units, with surfaces and bodies not given in experience and whose motion is given only in thought. Only this pure mathematical theory possesses complete accuracy, and involves no contradiction.

The *Republic* contains a passage which presents this even more clearly. Here we are told that we must never strictly

¹ *Critias*, 111 f. With similar vividness he describes (114e ff.) the capitol of the inhabitants of Atlantis situated in the midst of fertile country, with its magnificent harbours, its active commercial intercourse, and its shipping. No doubt this is in accordance with the observations which Plato made on his journeys, especially to Syracuse.

² For further detail cf. *Platon*, II, 387-392.

³ *Philebus*, 55d ff.

⁴ Thus I supplement from *Republic*, 522c ff.

follow the perceptible presentations of mathematical relations. As we can clearly see from geometry, such a presentation can only give hints, can only be used as a symbol. Not even the greatest artist, a second Daedalus, could give an accurate, concrete picture of the mathematical concept by making a model of it or by making drawings of it with a pencil. And if we think of him as having executed his representations with the most painstaking care, we shall find that "a person, who is at all acquainted with geometry, would upon seeing them consider them most exquisitely executed, but he would find it ridiculous to take them seriously with the hope that in them he could grasp the truth of the relation of things equally large or twice as large, or of any other definite proportion." Let us attempt to present even more clearly this imaginary example conceived by Plato himself. The triangle constructed of wood or metal bars, or drawn on the blackboard, is to realize the concept of the triangle, and is itself, because of its material form, not merely different from the triangle of the mathematician, but even the figure which is marked out by the immaterial lines of these forms is different (i.e., it is something no longer perceptibly concrete, but something which has come into being through the combining activity of the mathematician, and lies between sensibility and pure form)—at least such is Plato's conviction. He is of the opinion that it is impossible to embody a thought accurately in a material form; e.g. (I add this by way of explanation), so that three bars, which meet and form angles, extend in perfectly straight lines and meet in such a way that the sum of the angles is exactly equal to two right angles.

Can we agree with this conviction? I consider it very important that we become clear on this point. Fundamentally, the dispute between Plato and his opponents concerns the same point as that about which Kant quarrelled with Hume, viz., the *a priori* of science in general, which is especially noticeable in mathematical propositions. I believe that it is not merely the Kantians who will side with Plato. The objec-

tions which Plato brings against pure empiricism are well grounded.¹ When judged on principles, his attitude toward scientific research is scarcely different from that which, e.g., Newton took in his famous *Philosophiae naturalis principia*.

I believe that the criticism brought against Plato by Aristotle, Zeller, and most of the modern interpreters is due to the fact that these scholars did not know enough about mathematics and physics to be able to follow his arguments, and that they did not give an adequate account of the actual status of all theories which describe the nature of the phenomenon, and which explain the individual event by "laws." Incessantly and without profit they repeat that Plato was given to idealistic dreams, that in a superfluous manner he duplicates reality without contributing anything toward an explanation of its enigmatic nature, and that in addition to the world of sensation in which the individual events take place, events which are subject to error, he postulates and "hypostatizes" as real a faultless, pure Idea. At any rate, it remains true that the best instruments cannot make perceptible what is imperceptible in its nature, viz., the inner connectedness of the appearances and the law which is thought to be governing it, and that it is only our conception of it which can give organization and unity to the mass of empirically collected data, and which can give a basis for science.

For scientists to-day, mathematics is without exception the most important equipment for the problem under investigation in their special field. And so far as Plato promoted mathematics, all will agree that he had an understanding of its peculiar endeavours. Very few individuals have advanced

¹ I find that Natorp's judgment about Plato's arguments here discussed is in complete agreement with my own; he says, "experience is by no means rejected; it is merely inadequate, its head is lacking, as it were, if it does not issue in theory. And if it should not be directed toward this goal, then we should really have to guard against its losing itself in investigations which no longer have any scientific nor any sensible value. One cannot say that this is a useless warning. It is not that even to-day."

mathematics as much as did Plato. I cannot go into details here. But whoever considers it will surely find the judgment of such experts as Usener and Cantor justified: that "Plato contributed infinitely more to mathematics than any one individual with every effort could ever have achieved," that his lectures in the Academy "cannot be too highly valued for the history of mathematics," and that beginning with a certain period "the Academy takes the leading rank in the history of Greek mathematics."¹ How greatly Plato valued the study of mathematics we know from the *Republic*, where he considers it as the best and even indispensable preparation for profitable philosophical studies. We also know that he devoted much time to the study of mathematics in the Academy.

13. Something must also be said about TELEOLOGY, which Plato so frequently applies in his interpretation of the process of nature (this is specially true in the *Timaeus*), and about the world soul. Let us parallel the mythological account there given of the formation of the cosmos with the Kantian-Laplacian theory of the formation of our solar system. The most striking difference between it and the exposition of the *Timaeus* lies in the fact that according to the Kantian-Laplacian theory everything happens in accordance with mechanical causation. In certain respects, this explanation goes much farther than the one given in the *Timaeus*. On the other hand, however, it leaves certain questions unanswered for which a solution was sought in the *Timaeus*. From the co-operation of the power of attraction and that of repulsion, which the ejected mass received when it was torn from the periphery of the central body in the direction of the tangent, the elliptical orbit, which it henceforth describes around the central body, becomes intelligible; and on the basis of the relation of its own mass to its velocity the diameter of the orbit becomes

¹ Usener in the *Preuss. Jahrb.* LIII (1884), cf. *Platon*, Bd. I, p. 189; Cantor, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, I³, pp. 215 and 213.

intelligible. But why have our Earth, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, etc., just the masses that they actually do have? Why were not larger or smaller masses than these torn away by the centrifugal force? Why was the swiftness of rotation of the central body exactly that which we can calculate from the observed facts and not some other? As soon as one attempts to answer these questions, one will find that the assumed condition at the beginning of things, with which the story of Becoming begins, is no real, original condition. At this point Kant accepts the given as the actual.¹ Plato, who did not yet possess the means of calculating the mass, the distance, and the courses of the stars, seeks to make his thought fruitful by saying that a spiritual power ordered the world. Setting out from this thought, he ventures a construction² and unfolds his scheme of the structure of the universe according to intelligent relations with simple numbers ordered in harmonious proportion.

We shall have to prefer the Kantian construction to the Platonic. But the reasons for this preference are very likely to be sought only in the fact that Kant had access to more data which he could work over and systematize; whereas, as has gradually been discovered, the audacious construction of Plato was not in agreement with the results of progressive investigation.

Aside from the question as to the ultimate reason for the division of matter in the cosmos, given in our experience, the Kantian construction of the heavens leaves another question completely out of its picture; namely, the question about the origin of living things and of man. As we have seen, from the very beginning Plato put to himself the task of explaining the cosmos in such a way that this question received the greatest emphasis. If he wished to make the non-mechanical intelligible by deducing that which does not consist in spatial relations, or that which does not come to be through changes in space from what was previously given, he could not avoid associating a

¹ The same is true of other modern philosophers of nature.

² This is similar to his attempts in physics to reduce the elementary difference of matter to simple stereometric, basic forms.

spiritual power with the stuff from the very beginning, nor could he avoid positing this power as forming the stuff.

The consequence of this was the teleological explanation. Plato, however, is clearly conscious of the great difficulties which stand in the way of its universal application. Whether the rejection of teleology is advantageous to scientific investigation, or whether the spiritual can be clearly and intelligently described, let alone conceived, without teleology are questions which I do not care to discuss now. Freely translated the concluding paragraph of the *Timaeus* reads: "We have shown how this world came into Being. It is singular, and came into Being of its own accord. It is perfect in its nature and in its appearance; it is visible and embraces all fullness of the visible; it is a living organism in which all other mortal and immortal organisms¹ have their Being; it is the visible image of God whom we can conceive in thought alone." From this it follows that the invisible and immaterial in this world, that is to say, the "soul" which the demiurge is supposed to have given to the world as the purposive power working from within, is not different from what in the *Philebus*, 30d (which by the way has many parallel passages), at one time is called the "soul of Zeus." It also follows that we are to understand nothing else by this but the forming deity itself, or the essence of the organizing powers working in the cosmos. From this again may be concluded that the whole account of how the creative spirit formed this world from chaos is not to be taken literally, that it is only a myth. Creation is not to be thought of as a single event starting from a definite point; it takes place without beginning. From eternity, God is the all-embracing, all-sustaining, all-quickenings spirit; and the world lives God's own life

14. It is not easy to give a clear description of Plato's views on PSYCHOLOGY. One reason is that he so often speaks of the nature of the soul in pictures and myths, whose essence is not

¹ This refers to the stars. I call attention to Th. Fechner who also looked upon the stars as "a higher type of animated beings."

easily detected. At times he also speaks of the soul and its relation to the body in terms of Orphic and Pythagorean theories, without clearly indicating to what extent he himself regards them as true. In the *Republic* (cf. p. 73), Plato distinguishes three parts of the soul: the rational (calculating),¹ the courageous or spirited,² and the appetitive³ part. In the *Timaeus* he assigns these to different parts of the body: to the head, the heart, the liver. Yet even in this division, we are not clear to what extent they may be taken literally, since elsewhere Plato decidedly emphasizes the simplicity of the soul. All attempts have failed to find in Plato a gradual clearing up and a development of the concept of the soul, and to make use of the different statements for the chronology of the dialogues. We need not be surprised at this; for they have tried to consider the mythological explanations as of equal value with other statements.—It cannot be maintained with certainty that Plato was convinced of the immortality of the soul as that is taught in the myths of the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*. Schleiermacher clearly recognized that the scientific proofs which the *Phaedo* wishes to advance do not aim (cf. pp. 94 f., 120) at establishing the continuance of the individual, personal characteristics of the soul after it has been separated from the body which retains the appetitive and the courageous and spirited parts of the soul.

Men have debated and written much about these matters, and I believe that it would be of little profit if I were to review the pros and cons of the arguments. The real meaning which concerns the contested points is not at all in the realm of psychology, but in that of ethics and theology. And it will probably be well to consider them more carefully in connection with the ethical and theological expositions.

15. However, many of the statements with which we were concerned in our discussion of the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* are of psychological value. We found there an almost flawless

¹ λογιστικόν.

² θυμοειδές.

³ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

exposition of the origin of human knowledge. Above all such questions as: What gives rise to sense-perceptions? How do they take place? How do we form the judgments which are based on sense stimuli? To what extent are they true? What gives rise to error? are not merely raised, but by clear-sighted exposition they are clarified to such an extent that the description has been largely reduced to definitive explanations, some of which at least may, according to Plato's meaning, most certainly be taken as final. In this connection, I am thinking of the following statements: "I conceive the matter as follows: When the soul reflects, it does nothing else but converse¹ with itself, in that it puts questions to itself and answers them with yes and no. But when either gradually or suddenly it has arrived at a decision and unhesitatingly maintains the same predication, it has what is called opinion. Therefore I call opining speaking and opinion I call an expressed proposition; only a person does not express this proposition aloud to others, but silently and to himself."² As antithesis, we have the definition of the concept of the word or of speech, whose peculiarity consists in the fact that he who passes a judgment "expresses his thoughts by the voice . . . in that he gives form to his opinion in the stream which flows from his lips, as in a mirror or in water."³ Previously, it was said that the word "opining" ("conjecturing") characterizes the condition in which "the soul in and by itself is engaged with true Being" in contrast to perception, in which an external stimulus by means of sense organs incites the soul to activity.⁴ Furthermore, the following propositions belong here: It became apparent "that false opinion consists neither in the relation of perceptions to one another, nor in the relation of the conceptions to one another, but in the union of perception with the conception of the mind."⁵ False opinion is "a false application of the conception to perception."⁶

¹ διαλέγεσθαι.

² *Theaetetus*, 189e ff.

³ *Theaetetus*, 206d.

⁴ *Theaetetus*, 187a.

⁵ *Theaetetus*, 195.

⁶ *Theaetetus*, 196c: διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλαγή. This would, indeed, as is shown later, confine definition within too narrow boundaries.

In the *Sophist* certain of these conclusions of the *Theaetetus* are once more renewed in the following statements: "Are not thought and speech the same, except that the conversation which the soul carries on with itself and which takes place within the soul and without uttering sounds is called thought? . . . Whereas the stream which flows from thought and passes through the lips, accompanied by sounds is called speech." By speech (propositions), we are told, affirmation and negation take place. So far as these are produced by the soul in silent thought, they are to be considered as opinion (conjecture, judgment). Or "When opinion gets into a certain condition not of itself alone, but through a sense-perception, can one call this condition anything but appearance?"¹ "And since speech (the proposition) can be true or false, and since thought appears to be the conversation of the soul with itself, and since opinion is the result of thought, and since what we call appearance consists in a union of perception and opinion, it necessarily follows that with reference to these things which are akin to language, error must in part and in certain cases arise."²

In the *Phaedo*, apropos the question about the origin of recollections, certain laws of the combination of thoughts (later called association of ideas) are ascertained. The similarity of content between two ideas or the circumstance that two objects are joined through formal relations, e.g., contiguity in space, or that at one time they appeared to us as related, is considered the cause why the presence of one of the two ideas in our consciousness recalls to consciousness the other idea.—The *Symposium* makes the following excellent observations: "Just as the constituent parts of the living body are constantly being changed and renewed, so it is with the content of our knowledge. Not only does one part disappear while another part is being formed, but even every individual content changes. What we call RECOLLECTION testifies to the fact that a content may be lost. FORGETTING means the disappearance of something known; but reflection again gives us a new knowledge and so

¹ φαντασία.

² *Sophist*, 263e ff.

preserves in memory the content of knowledge, so that the content of knowledge appears to remain the same."¹ After Plato has illustrated in the *Theaetetus* with the wax and the bird-cage the process of forgetting as well as that of recollection, he once more returns to this matter in the *Philebus*, and shows² that if we wish to understand what memory is, we must, first of all, clearly understand what sense-perception is. "Let us assume," he says, "that some of the bodily excitations are extinguished before they reach the soul and so leave it unaffected, whereas the others pass through both soul and body and excite a shock in each individually, and in both together." Of the first type we may say that they remain unknown to the soul; of the other type that they do not remain unknown. But this remaining unknown is to be differentiated from being forgotten. "For to forget means to lose from memory. According to the described process, however, nothing has yet been recorded in memory." Therefore, whenever the soul remains unaffected by the bodily shocks, it is more correct to speak of having no sensation,³ and not of forgetting.⁴ "Whereas when soul and body experience the same excitation, and when both are moved together, one might very properly call this motion sense-perception." MEMORY may then be regarded as the preservation of sense-perception. From memory, as a general capacity, we distinguish recollection. It takes place "when the soul, all by itself or without the aid of the body, now recalls as best it can an affection which it previously experienced in conjunction with the body." The same is true "when the soul all by itself recalls a perception or a thought which was lost to memory."

16. The *Philebus* advances all these considerations in order to arrive at similar distinctions with reference to the sense

¹ *Symposium*, 208a (see p. 263). Cf. also *Laws*, 732b: "Where there is outflow, there must be influx; and recollection is influx of insight which was about to be lost."

² *Philebus*, 33d¹ff.

³ ἀνασθησις.

⁴ λήθη.

stimuli, as the *Theaetetus* had arrived at in the case of sense-perception. After several occasional attempts in earlier dialogues and after detailed investigations in the *Republic*, Plato gives us the concluding exposition on this point with a similar thoroughness as in the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus* when he summarizes and deepens scattered comments of earlier dialogues about the origin of perception and the opinions expressed about it.

It is impossible, he tells us, to understand pleasure if we consider it in and by itself, and if we do not at the same time consider its opposite, pain. All living things experience these two conflicting sensations. Pain arises from the disturbance of the natural harmony (i.e., the correct relation of the parts to one another) and the healthy conditions; pleasure is consequent upon the restoration of this natural condition.¹ The well-known experience of everyone with hunger and the satisfying of hunger, with thirst and the quenching of it, with intense heat and cooling off, with cold and warming up, makes clear what has been said. If no desire is bound up with them, they are disturbances of a purely physical type. On the other hand, each desire (e.g., for food or drink), as a striving directed toward the attainment of a goal, originates in the soul and is based on the fact that the previously experienced conditions of want or of emptiness, which were felt as painful, as well as the sensation of the pleasant replenishing of emptiness, were not altogether lost to memory, and that as soon as the emptiness of the body again arises, or if memory recalls an experienced emptiness, immediately the thought of replenishing occurs, and with it a desire for it. Thus the physical and mental are mixed in the so-called physical desires (e.g., the desire for food and drink), since they are caused by recollection and comparison. And then there are purely mental pleasures and pain; these arise when the soul is affected by mere conceptions or thoughts.

¹ The *Republic* says: Through the satisfaction of a natural need (*πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων*, 585d) or through the replenishing of our empty state (*κένωσις-πλήρωσις*).

The three groups into which the sensations are here divided may be described as PSYCHIC LEVELS. Fundamentally they are the same as those which the *Theaetetus* differentiated in its investigation concerning the origin of knowledge. The characteristic of the intermediate level is the activity of memory which alone makes comparison and preservation beyond the fleeting moment possible. Since consciousness, at any rate, is described by having the different experiences united into a psychic unity, and since it cannot be conceived without comparison and synthesis of acts separated in time, the first level must be void of consciousness. One may, therefore, doubt whether one may recognize it as psychic at all, whether it does not have its complete reality in mere bodily movements or changes, in processes which can only be described as physiological. One could, of course, object that this first level cannot exist at all, that a perception which remains unconscious is not a perception at all, but merely the physiological condition for a perception. A pain which remains unconscious, or a pleasure which remains unconscious, is not experienced as such, and is therefore neither pain nor pleasure. This is the very thing advocated by Plato. We have just seen how he describes perception in the *Philebus*.¹ Here he states that pleasure which is not clarified by any thought and which is not even bound up with recollection cannot be a good, since even awareness of its momentary presence is lacking. In the *Theaetetus* he says of sense-perception that in it an independent activity of the soul which is opposed to an external stimulus must be ascertained;² this independent activity makes perception possible. Accordingly, it is only by abstraction that the

¹ 33d, 34a: As an affection or motion arising from the body in which it originated and continuing till it reaches the soul; in being thus affected the soul is closely bound up with the body.

² As the *Theaetetus*, 185b ff., says that the activity of the soul, which passes judgment on the stimuli, has no special organ, so the *Timaeus*, 64a ff., affirms that the pleasant and unpleasant are appearances which accompany sense-perception but are not bound to a special organ.

momentary stimulus of the affections which do not "reach the soul" are isolated as something original, as a cause.¹

Even modern psychology has found it necessary to distinguish between psychic levels. That these psychic levels have a necessary physical basis was as certain for Plato as it is for modern thinkers. The *Timaeus*, above all, testifies to this. Of course, Plato's attempts to show the physical basis in detail failed, and had to fail, because the anatomical and physiological knowledge of his day was inadequate.

17. Just as the sensations of different levels mix, so the sensations of the same level can mix and a MIXTURE may either contain only like elements, i.e., only pleasure or only pain, or it may contain unlike elements. Contradictory elements of the emotional experience are apparent in the satisfaction of every desire. For example, the pleasure of eating is based on the fact that hunger is painfully felt, and the unsatisfied desire for food introduces into the unpleasant feeling of hunger a pleasant element when a person imagines that his hunger has been satisfied. At times, however, it is difficult to separate the mixed sensations into their respective elements. This, e.g., seems to be the case with anger, which consists of a mixture of exclusively PSYCHIC SENSATIONS. One should like to classify it with the painful affections and yet it includes, as Homer has pointed out, a strong sensation of pleasure. The mixture of the opposite mental sensations becomes immediately clear in longing and melancholy, or in the emotional state which we experience when witnessing a tragedy, viz., a state of Being "in which, amidst tears, we rejoice." It is less apparent in love, jealousy, envy, malice. That pain and pleasure are remarkably joined in love is expressed in the

¹ Very likely this is Plato's meaning with reference to men and the more highly organized animals. Lower animals, such as snails and oysters, at any rate, he believes to be completely given over to the stimulus of the moment, and they remain, therefore, in a state of psychic twilight. Cf. *Philebus*, 21c; *Timaeus*, 92b (*Phaedrus*, 250c).

Phaedrus myth and also in the derivation of the demon Eros from the union of Penia (poverty) and Poros (plenty).¹

Plato ingeniously discovered that the comic always contains an incongruity. In him who becomes aware of this contradiction, it evokes contradictory sensations which become mixed. Comedy takes advantage of this. The contradictory material used in comedies consists in the fact that an apparent, imperiously threatening power arises. At first we are frightened and fear for ourselves or for others, but at the same moment we recognize that the power is not in a position to execute its threat and so we rejoice over its imminent, miserable collapse. Or we admire or perhaps envy, as many who are blinded by appearances do, the man who boasts and who is puffed up because of imagined advantages; but immediately we discover the vanity and hollowness of that of which he boasts. In both cases the tension is released in the freeing pleasure of laughter.²

The natural DESIRES³ are a healthy and productive SOURCE OF PLEASURE for every living being. The strongest of these are the innate desire for food and the sex desire, which, to be sure, awakens late but then makes itself felt with special vehemence. Most individuals consider the satisfaction of this desire to be the greatest pleasure. It is true of all desires "that when they are properly guided, virtue arises, but when wrongly guided its opposite comes into Being."

A living being does not experience pleasure or pain (or both together) at every moment. If the theory is right, a condition in which neither disturbance nor the restoration of the natural condition is observable must be entirely void of sensation and must be characterized as an indifferent mood.⁴ At any

¹ *Phaedrus*, 246a ff.; *Symposium*, 203b.

² Compare my *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 148 ff.

³ *Republic*, 519a, 605b, 606bd; *Timaeus*, 89e; *Laws*, 794e ff., 797e f., 802cd. Cf. the Aristotelian definition: ἡδονή = ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως ἀνεμπόδιστος.

⁴ The following exposition had to be introduced in Chapter I. pp. 71 ff., where it was a question of how justice and injustice are related to eudemonism.

rate, not all bodily processes arouse an accompanying state of consciousness. For example, we are unaware¹ of the slow changes which gradually take place in growth. It is, of course, frequently denied that there are states which are void of sensation; and the knowledge of these states is made more difficult by the fact that other states closely contiguous in time, which reveal themselves as sensations of pleasure or of pain, shade off into them. If pleasure disappears, then its mere absence will appear as unpleasant; if pain ceases, the absence of pain will be taken for pleasure. This, however, merely shows the power of a law of contrast, which is also observable in sense-perception, when we see, e.g., grey next to black as white.² Just as this grey is nevertheless truly grey or just as the half-way point of a mountain, which a climber as a consequence of his position and the limitation of his vision takes for the summit, is different from the summit, so one may not identify the absence of pain with positive pleasure.

Contrary effects and mixtures make it very difficult to evaluate accurately the emotional values experienced within definite periods of time. A third source of deception is due to the fact that recollection is subject to error. Plato remarks that, while judging the intensity of once experienced sensations, temporal distance entails even greater mistakes than does spatial distance when we pass judgments about the size of objects seen. In general this shows that, with reference to a sensation of a contradictory nature given at any moment, memory seems to enhance pleasure, whereas pains seem to become gradually weaker. For this reason it will not be easy to practise the art of mensuration which, as we recall, was clearly demanded by the *Protagoras*, and which was to determine the absolute good by determining the excess of the useful over the harmful or of pleasure over pain. And yet, even after these observations, the art of measuring again appears urgently necessary. Its first task would consist in carrying through a rigid DISTINCTION BETWEEN TRUE AND FALSE SENSATION. As this distinction is not

Cf. Al. Höfler, *Psychologie*, p. 397.

² *Republic*, 585a.

commonly made, it is to be expected that objections will be raised. But Plato places great value on this terminology and tries to justify it by detailed expositions. He thinks that that sensation is to be distinguished as false which arises from an incorrect conception about actual relations, or which arises through false hopes and fears about the future. Similarly, a sensation of pleasure or of pain will be false inasmuch as error in recollection or the power to produce contrasts forms its basis.

True sensations are at the same time pure, i.e., they are not mixed with affections of opposite value nor are they accompanied by causal connections. Impure sensations contain as much error as a sensation of opposite value uncovers in them, whether this sensation is mixed with them, precedes or follows them. The most violent disturbances, which make themselves especially noticeable by their vehemence and which alone are recognized by the multitude, are impure and are false in their more significant meaning. Just as mistakes in our judgment (about anticipated or past joys or pains) confuse and falsify our sensations, so the "untrue" violent sensations in their turn falsify our perceptions and our judgments. The *Timaeus* expresses this as follows:¹ "Excessive pleasures and pains are to be regarded as the greatest disease of the soul. For a man who is excessively excited by joy or who experiences the opposite from pain while he seeks to pursue the former and to flee from the latter when it is not convenient, is unable to see or to hear anything correctly; but he is mad and is incapable of all rational conviction."² Further on we are told that love produces this condition.

Pure pleasures of a physical and sensuous nature are, e.g., those which are produced by perception of beautiful colours and lines, regular geometrical figures and stereometric bodies,

¹ *Timaeus*, 86b; cf. also *Philebus*, 63d f.; *Laws*, 863b.

² For that reason the *Laws*, 732c, requires that man retain his good deportment (the εὐσχημοσύνη); he is not to permit an excess of joy nor of pain (περιχάρεια, περιωδυνία).

and by pleasing odours and tones. They are of a softer and quieter nature and they stimulate and vivify without causing a feeling of want or pain either before or afterwards. In the spiritual realm they have their counterpart in joy known only to a few individuals; this joy is accompanied by the successful activity of the urge for knowledge. (In this the content of thought is to be ignored, the attainment and the retention of which can be of practical value; just as in pleasure, which is based on the activity of the sense organs, every meaningful thought-stimulating content of sense-perception must not be considered.) He who has realized this will seek to avoid the violent sensations and will prefer the less violent ones. The latter, at any rate, bring us closer to the highest goal of all striving, viz., happiness.¹ It can readily be seen that the enjoyment of the joys of knowledge and of moral satisfaction can only be harmonized with the quiet sensations, never with the violent or the impetuous ones.

18. The question about what really constitutes HAPPINESS and how the greatest sum of pleasure attainable by man can come about is answered by the *Philebus*, with due appreciation of the natural conditions, as follows: The question is always one of a mixture of pleasure and knowledge, a mixture which from the beginning would have to include the pure types of both.² An enhancement of the value gained thereby is yet to be produced by a mixture of all possible further knowledge. For also the impure pleasures which are perturbed by referring them to concrete, always inadequate conditions, show themselves to be compatible with the pure ones, and all mutually supplement each other in a unity in which we miss every absent part. In addition to the pure pleasures, the necessary ones must also be included in the mixture. On the other hand, the impure types must necessarily be kept at a distance. In the proposition of the *Gorgias* that the good can only be produced through order, we can already see a hint of the thought

¹ εὐδαιμονία.

² *Philebus*, 61c.

that it is a certain constitution of the soul which constitutes happiness. The *Republic* found an even more definite answer in that the strivings or the desires of the heart must be brought into correct relationships, and that this is accomplished by subordinating sensibility to the rule of reason. This subordination, we are told, is of the greatest consequence for the lower parts of the soul. For even sensuous pleasures are in their totality enhanced thereby, because reason, as the guide of the soul, will permit us to seek only such pleasures from which contradictory values need not be deducted. For the same reason ambition will attain greater satisfaction. This result appears exceedingly favourable, even without taking into consideration the peculiar pleasures which spring from the inner harmony of the various parts of the soul and which are experienced more and more by those who did not know them nor seek them. It is a peculiarity of every tendency (*Anlage*) that it must first be developed and that every activity strengthens it. But since the exercise of a tendency or impulse also brings¹ pleasure—and the stronger the impulse the greater the pleasure—every opportunity for pleasure at the same time also means a gradual enhancement of the pleasure which results from this activity. And again, the more the pleasure is enhanced, the stronger the motive becomes for the repetition of the pleasure-giving activity. The *Republic* also introduces the distinction between pure and impure or true and false sensations, and in comparing the various pleasures, it makes the value-judgment that the spiritual pleasures are greater and richer than the pleasures of the senses. The unique basis for the evaluation of the typical pleasures (p. 77 f.) for the three main types of human beings, important as it is, need not be repeated at this point.

I can merely indicate the many psychological observations which are scattered through all of Plato's writings. Because of their great perspicuity and freedom, we need not hesitate to compare them with the best passages of modern psychological

¹ See above, p. 288.

treatises. The most important of these are:¹ Characteristics distinguishing human beings from animals, women from men, youth from old age, conflicting temperaments of individuals and entire races; consideration of the dependence of the psychic nature of an individual on external conditions essential to human well-being (this includes the condition of the parents at the time of conception and procreation); the significance of good and bad habits (also in play), good and bad examples; description and evaluation of semi-conscious states: dreams and premonitions, intoxication, poetic inspiration, amorousness.

19. Without doubt, what Plato says about LOVE and the god who produces it belongs to the profoundest statements ever made on that subject. Since the common talk about "Platonic love" is so stupid and superficial, to the chagrin of all Plato scholars, I wish to go into detail again and to supplement what was said above (p. 66 f.).

The nature of sensuous love² is the impulse to break through the narrow bounds of the personal, physical existence and to produce results which are not confined within the temporal limits of individual existence, but are as much as possible boundless and infinite. The same impulse is present in the spiritual realm. Thus there is also a spiritual creation which perpetuates personal peculiarities through the transmission of precious thoughts and through the creation of morally significant constitutions.

"Those who are capable of procreation in the body betake themselves more to women" whose beautiful form attracts them,³ "and they seek to satisfy their love through them. They believe that by begetting children they will preserve their memory and win immortality and happiness for all time to come." Whereas those who are capable of spiritual creation are

For greater detail on the following questions see *Platon*, II, 452-469. Plato proclaims this love in the *Symposium* through the wise woman from Mantinea.

¹ For "beauty is the condition and at the same time the divine patron of generation and birth" (209a).

"pregnant in spirit" and seek contact and fellowship with beautiful souls, so as to produce wisdom and other virtues in them and in company with them. This type of fellowship is closer and firmer than that which is based on physical offspring. The fame which springs from these creations, i.e., from poetic creations or from the establishment of order in the state, is much greater and much more permanent than that which physical offspring can assure an individual. With this, philosophical enthusiasm is also referred to Eros and it can be subsumed under the same name which we use to designate sensuous love, i.e., the impulse which, it is said, infatuates human beings most, takes them away from spiritual creations, and makes them slaves of the senses.

We must supplement these thoughts of the *Symposium* from the *Phaedrus*. In the second speech of Socrates in this dialogue, love is classified as madness, not corruptible madness, but a kind of madness which is produced by God and which brings happiness. This madness is placed beside the inspiration of the poet and the divinely enlightened seer and expiatory priest. He who approaches poetry without experiencing the madness of the muses remains a bungler, although he may imagine that his skill will be sufficient to make him a poet: just as his rational art will be completely overshadowed by the art inspired by madness, so love, which is based on reason, is poor and worthless. It does not even deserve the name love. For true love is something demonic which overpowers a man. This ecstasy takes him out of his narrow personal realm of feeling and willing and drives him to sacrifice himself for others, and to the procreative transmission of his own being in the service of the species. This ecstasy brings greater happiness than any other purely rational activity could give him.

It was stated in the *Symposium* that love was awakened by beauty alone (at first physical beauty and then spiritual beauty). The *Phaedrus*, in which the whole doctrine about Eros is woven into a myth about the chariot, in which the human soul wings

its way through narrow passages to the heavens (cf. p. 109 f.), gives mythical reasons for this fact. The Idea of beauty, of which all beautiful things are images, has the advantage over the other Ideas in whose company it dwells in a holy place, in that it can impart as much of its own glory to the image as is necessary to arouse most easily in the beholder of the images the recollection of that ideal world which his soul once saw in its pre-earthly existence. Naturally, those whose souls during that journey about the vault of heaven were able to look at the ideal forms for only a few brief moments are predominantly attracted by earthly beauty. On the other hand, he "whose power of recollection is strong enough is seized by incomprehensible awe when he catches sight of an image of the things above" and "by this sight he is put in the mood of reverence"; "yet because he does not clearly recognize it, he does not know what is happening to him." From the more detailed description I select the following: "When he sees a godlike face or a physical form which excellently reproduces beauty absolute, at first an icy chill runs through him, then the after-pains of the former dreadful anxiety steal over him. Then he reverences him whom he sees like a god. And as he looks upon him, he is again seized by this shudder and then by unusual heat and perspiration. The effluences of beauty, which he perceived with his eyes, have inspired him. Like rain it falls upon the sprouting feathers" of his soul, whose lost wings now begin to revive. "There are heaving and struggling in the soul and the sprouting out of feathers brings the soul into distress. But as long as it beholds the beauty of the beloved and receives from the beloved the effluences which moisten and warm it, its pain will cease and it will be filled with joy . . . ; but when the soul is alone and withers, then the orifices of the passages through which the feathers push will dry and close up and impede the growing power of the feathers. This motive power, pulsating like the arteries, pushes against each of the clogged passages, so that the soul feels pangs in its whole Being and is thrown into excitement and pain. At the same

time, however, it is full of joy in that it clings to the recollection of the beautiful. . . .”

“From the rank of the beautiful ones, every one chooses the object of his love in accordance with his character. He looks upon him as a god, fashions and adorns him like a sacred image, so as to worship him and to rave about him. Indeed, if he did not fear the semblance of the worst kind of madness, he would bring sacrifices to his beloved as he would to a sacred image and to a god.” Each one during his journey about the heavens (one following the chariot of Zeus, another following that of this or that god) saw and chose the ideal prototype which each one now tries to apply as much as possible to his beloved, with the consequence that he takes the ideal much more seriously than ever before. Therefore, the follower of Ares, “in case he believes that he has been wronged by his beloved, is ready to kill himself and the beloved.” The follower of Zeus “has found and learned to love another who is by nature endowed to be a philosopher and a ruler and he will do everything possible that he become a philosopher and a ruler.” “Also the followers of any of the other gods, while following their god, seek a love with a corresponding nature; and when they have found him, they will, by imitating the divine pattern, by persuasion, and by formative education, to the best of their ability, lead the beloved to a similar way of life and a similar constitution of the soul . . . urgently striving to lead him to complete equality with themselves and the god whom they honour.”¹ This would be the goal. And “Platonic love” is to be understood in terms of this goal. The only correct feature of the current and confused conception of it is the fact that the sensuous plays a subordinate rôle in Platonic love. However, it nevertheless has an introductory and preparatory significance.

Certain perverted individuals have rummaged around so

¹ He who cares to may read more at length in Chapter 31 of the *Phaedrus*—preferably my translation (*Philos. Bibl.* Bd. 152), pp. 63–74.

long in Plato's description that they have twisted those passages which plainly speak of the sensuous activity of love as well as of its aberrations, so that they seem to offer embellishment for their own shamelessness. I cannot better refute¹ these men than with the words of Joh. Plenge:² "Certainly the fellowship of men on which the state and culture are based somehow rests on inclination, attraction, and the desire for union, and releases in its members spiritually creative powers which produce all their customs and which enrich their lives. But it is the misunderstanding of a naturally lewd individual to confuse this Eros with the active satisfaction of homosexual desire." And: "Because Plato is no preacher of morality, but a fertile spiritual poet to whom nothing human is foreign, he pursues the magic path to ultimate knowledge through all possibilities which he can see, in order to ennoble or to understand a custom which existed at that time. For what he experiences in himself as a spiritual impulse to create, i.e., the desire to fill the minds of youth with profound and mighty thoughts, is something which makes him seek the love and friendship of his disciples with unquenchable longing."

Similarly I make use of that beautiful statement recently made by H. Kutter:³ "Metaphor after metaphor. . . . He has achieved the highest: He has pictured Eros! To save this picture from the entanglements of a disgraceful custom—the love for boys—and to present it again in its original purity, to rediscover the divine spark in the darkest night of sensuality, 'conscious of the right path,' and to paint it unforgettably before the eyes of a debauched generation that vice is a falling away from and a perversion of an original, eternal love. THIS, and this alone, was worth a life."

A few questions still arise about the description of the *Phaedrus*. The main purpose which Plato pursues in this dialogue is, no doubt (cf. p. 134), the refutation of the claims of rhetoric. It is clearly pointed out to the reader that rhetoric

¹ On this whole question, cf. also *Platon*, I, 166–171.

² *Anti-Blüher*, 1920, pp. 9 and 7.

³ *Platon und Wir*, p. 298.

lacks sincerity and depth of understanding. These could be supplied by the rigid science, philosophy, if rhetoric subordinated itself to it and through it became based on psychology. So far so good! But how does Socrates' second speech, which praises the irrational in human nature, agree with this?—I see a supplement in it, viz., scientific reasonableness alone is inadequate for rhetoric. The speaker who wants to "touch the hearts" of men must "himself speak from the heart." His soul must be filled with that enthusiasm for high ideals which makes him lose himself and devote himself in love to others. It is true that the method of science or philosophy, as Phaedrus himself later shows, consists in the conscious, logical effort by which similar appearances, i.e., appearances with a common characteristic, are subsumed under one concept, and the general concepts formed in this manner are technically analysed into sub-types. Yet the root and source of philosophizing is the desire inspired by beauty for the supermundane, the sacrificing of the strictly personal wishes and strivings devoted to the sensuous needs of the moment. This, however, does not yet give a concrete picture of the whole meaning of the scientific Eros. ENTHUSIASM is not only necessary for the beginning but also for the continuation of epistemological consideration and especially for its successful conclusion. In and by itself this enthusiasm would be lost in the particulars of the experiences which incessantly come to us, and which it earnestly strives to analyse and to synthesize, without being able to arrive at a conclusion and thus bring about a whole with which it could satisfy the longing for unity and synthesis so deeply ingrained in our nature. Plato also includes under the term Eros that desire for unity which cannot be satisfied in the interminably extended realm of our experience, because he considers the essence and nature of the word Eros to be the striving for the expansion and the completion of his own, narrow personality. It is clear that narrow selfishness is opposed to this desire for an all-embracing unity, and we understand that selfishness can only be overcome

by love. I also believe that Plato correctly noticed that the searcher after truth on his fatiguing path needs the constant STIMULUS OF OTHERS, that he needs the help of men who encourage him and that philosophy is not practised profitably in the closed study, but only as "dialectic." That is to say, love for others and the consciousness that he is valued by them will enable the philosopher to give expression to intuited truths in scientifically ordered form or in guiding precepts. The Eros which moves his soul prevents him from giving himself to quietistic reflections. From certain testimonies of creative artists, we know how much personal participation meant for their plans and creations. For that reason I call attention to what a loss Schiller's death was for Goethe. Even for the man of science, there is no greater aid than a helpful understanding of and co-operation with his efforts and work by those close to him.¹ He who is denied this happiness will progress slowly and wretchedly.

20. One may also reflect on how much excellent psychology is embodied in the keen and clearly executed description of the persons who appear in the earlier dialogues (to the *Theaetetus*). Incomparably well done is the PORTRAYAL OF the four TYPES OF CHARACTERS which in the *Republic* are set parallel to the four defective constitutions (timocracy, plutocracy, ochlocracy, tyranny). And to these typical individuals there is added in the *Laws* a description which is meant to show the general, typical features of the history of Persia and Athens, and to

¹ Cf. Joh. Plenge, *Anti-Blüher*, p. 13. "The pleasure of spiritual creation arising from the relation of teacher and student, as Plato knew it, exists to this day. I know how you honour me and that there is hardly a sacrifice which I might bring which I could not expect of you. Of you and many another student! But what Blüher considers to be the end of a relationship between a man and a youth is for you and me an unrealizable thought, a baseness, a disgrace when we, bound by no authority, freely choose according to the nature of our relationship. . . . It is impossible that he who wishes to influence young men, because he should like to perfect them, make a wife of a youth."

show that a social order which includes civil freedom based on moral excellence and which subordinates individual arbitrariness to the state would bring about progress; whereas moral depravity would destroy this happy union and would initiate its decline.

Present-day thinkers have succeeded in rejecting the concept of the soul and yet they carry on "psychological" investigations. Against such efforts one might direct the critical comment of Socrates in the *Apology* that it is meaningless to speak of mules when one does not wish to have anything to do with horses and asses.¹ The comment of the *Theaetetus* also applies to this "association psychology." We hope, says Plato, that no one imagines "that in each of us, as in a wooden horse, there is perched an indefinite number of sense organs and that all these do not strive for and unite in one form, whether we call it soul or something else, in virtue of which and with the aid of sense organs we perceive everything perceptible."² It is true that I hold to the proposition (p. 120), that the notion of immortality in the sense that we understand it, viz., the survival of personality beyond the limits of earthly existence, was for Plato a serious problem; but it never became a dogma with him (even though he gives us a strong hint in the *Phaedo* to affirm this notion).³ On the contrary, he very definitely tells us in the passage of the *Theaetetus* just referred to that the soul in its empirical reality, i.e., in its connection with this earthly body, shows itself as the synthesizing unity of all psychic activity. Only this unity must not be identified with simplicity. For truly simple—as the criticism of the "friends of the Ideas" in the *Sophist* gives us clearly to understand—is only the contentless form of thought which may just as well be called nothing as something—in fact, cannot be named at all and cannot be clearly thought.

¹ *Apology*, 27e.

² *Theaetetus*, 184d.

³ The uncertainty of the proofs of the *Phaedo* is connected with the ambiguity of the concept "soul." We are not always certain whether we are to understand by it the principle of motion—cf. τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος (cf. p. 95)—or a psychic, spiritual being.

Furthermore, one might say that Plato's conception was that the nature of the soul cannot be better and more clearly described than by describing the activities by which it manifests itself.¹ We found (p. 170) that for Plato the question about the nature of a thing was identical with the question about the effects which this thing produces and experiences. In scientific psychology it is also our custom to proceed in such a way that we give a clear description of the psychic manifestations.

¹ As examples of manifestations of the soul (*ἔργα ψυχῆς*) are enumerated (*Republic*, 353) "to provide for, to govern, to deliberate and the like," and also "life"; or 437b, they are arranged in opposite pairs: "Assent and denial, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion." The reason for the difference in opinion and knowledge, as we saw on p. 105, is found (*Republic*, 477d ff.) to be a difference in their power and mode of action.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE LATER DIALOGUES

A. *ETHICS*

1. From beginning to end, Plato's thinking is concerned with practical life, conduct, *ETHICS AND POLITICS*. In all of his epistemological, logical, and psychological investigations, and in all his zeal devoted to mathematics and to the study of nature, he wishes to understand man, his needs, and his natural tasks. Thus we direct our study once more to Plato's practical philosophy.

We saw above that Plato's ethics is eudemonistically based. One might imagine that such an ethics, which directs man to the reward which moral action brings (or more correctly: to a reward inherent in moral intention, virtue), knows no doctrine of duties, no commands, no imperatives. As soon as it is fully realized that virtue is the sure and only way to happiness, the decision in favour of virtue must follow as self-evident from the necessity of nature. And wherever necessity reigns, there duty ceases and one need not command anything. Meanwhile, we must set over against this the fact that this clear insight cannot be attained during human existence, which never embraces all possible instances; that the foundation laid by our experiences is an inadequate basis for the final conclusion that what has so far stood the test (*viz.*, that moral actions guided by rational principles bring greater, completer satisfaction than does the pursuit of sensual and ambitious enticements) will show itself to be valid in all circumstances and in all individual instances of life. Nor is it adequate to appeal to the judgment¹ which others have declared to be the sum total of wisdom derived from their whole experience. For

¹ Plato makes use of this appeal as a proof which has great persuasive power. We are acquainted with this proof (p. 78).

at all times one may object: The case may be different when sensuality or desire for power and honour impels to an action which is contrary to moral principles. And if in a given moment, the impetuous vehemence of selfish desires shakes and threatens to undermine the value judgments and the fundamental principles so far maintained, it becomes evident that strict knowledge cannot substantiate them; only a faith based on analogy can do this, a faith which has a deep religious foundation. But where matters stand thus, where something is still lacking for clear insight into all connections, there the adherence to moral principles becomes a demand, a command of duty. That is to say the demands of duty will appear as the most appropriate expression for a life which is set over against a life of the highest ideals, the attainment of which would transfigure human life into holiness. The attainment of these ideals Plato considers to be as little attainable as do Christian writers on ethics. Long expositions of the *Laws*, the last of Plato's works in his old age, where the religious tone is so powerful (and in connection with this the intellectualistic so noticeably toned down), are in the same vein and, without forcing them, can be included in an ethical doctrine of duties.

2. Eudemonism is most apt to consider ethics as a doctrine of goods. Thus, from the very beginning, Plato makes frequent investigation about the SCALE OF VALUES or the gradation of values. Of the later dialogues, the *Republic*, the *Philebus*, and the *Laws* investigate the doctrine of goods.

The *Republic* once more establishes the unique value of spiritual and moral goods. It considers the philosopher's life as the most enviable, as he is privileged to pass from knowledge to knowledge until in his vision of the good he experiences the greatest blessedness which a man can possibly experience. Everything which advances him on his way thither, he considers a good; everything which impedes him and takes him away from this goal, he considers an evil. Since all so-called external goods, such as beauty, riches, strength of body, influ-

ential relations, will exert a detrimental rather than a helpful influence, it is clear that in such a case they are not goods. The *Euthydemus* taught us that in and by themselves these things are neither good nor bad; that it is their rational or irrational use which makes them the one or the other. In the *Republic*, Socrates wishes to say that justice is unconditionally and in all circumstances worth striving for, and that for its own sake and not for an external reward. Those who dispute his proposition demand that he prove that the just man would continue to practise justice, even if for its sake he would have to suffer the greatest persecution. The worst case is to be posited, viz., that maligned and misjudged, he will be "scourged, racked, thrown into prison, blinded; and finally, after suffering every possible torture, he will be impaled."¹ But in spite of this possibility, Plato has the courage to have Socrates decide in favour of the one who suffers innocently rather than in favour of the unjust man who succeeds in secretly practising his iniquity, and who by means of hypocrisy succeeds in attaining the reputation of a just man, so that he appears as an especially happy man to all who only observe him from without. As the devout person of the Old Testament prays, "Give me neither poverty nor riches; feed me with the good that is needful for me," so Socrates says, at the end of the *Phaedrus*, "May I have such a quantity of gold as only the wise can bear."

These propositions are confirmed by the investigations of the *Philebus* and of the *Laws*, investigations, to be sure, which, because of their abstract treatment, are in certain details difficult to understand. As proof, I submit the following: "The beauty of the body is not valuable, neither is its strength, nor its swiftness, nor its size, not even its health . . . even though many would like to believe this, nor is the opposite valuable; but rather the mean between these extremes is much more favourable to temperance and affords the greatest security. For the one type of characteristics makes the soul vain and

¹ *Republic*, 381e. If this passage were found in the Old Testament, it would have been considered a Messianic prophecy.

insolent, the other makes it humble and slavish. The same is true of the possession of money and property, and the same evaluation holds for them."¹ Or "All these things are a most valuable possession for just and pious people, but for unjust persons they are most corrupting; even sight, hearing, and the ability to receive sense-impressions, as well as the possession of all the so-called goods, unless they are accompanied by justice and virtue, are the greatest evil."² The true good and true virtue are identical. The good is even the essence of the beautiful, the praiseworthy. For only because it is good, i.e., useful in the most complete and most profound sense, does any behaviour or any psychic characteristic from which this behaviour springs deserve to be called by what the word "beautiful" (*καλόν*) expresses, and which he who speaks of the virtue or excellence or of the ability (*ἀρετή*) of a man wants to express. This relation is clearly and distinctly described in the *Republic*: "The best definition is and ever will be: the useful is beautiful, the harmful is base." "He is a vain fellow who regards anything but the bad as ridiculous . . . and who in his efforts to attain the beautiful sets as his goal something other than the good."³

3. Traditionally, four virtues were set up as the most important ones: wisdom, justice, temperance, courage. Plato gives special attention to these. In the *Laches*, the question centres upon the concept and the essential nature of courage, in the *Charmides* upon temperance, in the *Republic* upon justice. All these investigations reveal that the virtues must have their basis in a certain insight which may be put on the same plane with wisdom. According to the *Republic* and the *Laws*, these four virtues are of the greatest importance for the existence of the state. In the *Republic* they are defined with reference to the state.⁴ The wisdom of the rulers, in whose souls reason is

¹ *Laws*, 728c ff.

² *Laws*, 661a ff. Cf. the well-known saying of Jesus, *Mark* ix. 43 ff., "if thy hand offend thee, cut it off," etc.

³ *Republic*, 457b, 452de.

⁴ Cf. p. 73 f.

most pronounced, guides the state; the courage of the soldiers, in whom courage or the second part of the soul is most prominent, must defend the state; the justice of the state consists in "having each one practise his definite occupation for the execution of which he is best fitted by his nature," or in having "everyone, without desultoriness, perform his duties and not meddle with the affairs of others." Consequently we receive corresponding definitions for the virtues in the individual man; definitions which cannot be given without artificialities and which are not used independently of the thought-content of the *Republic*. The definition of justice is really the only one which is clear and satisfactory. It consists in having reason take over the rule and the care for the whole soul and with the aid of courage keep the senses and the appetites in check and in discipline. The definition of temperance expresses the same thought in other words; resembling the harmonious accord, temperance consists in having reason rule the desires and appetites of the soul which willingly subordinate themselves to reason—this confirms the former proposition that virtue, though variously called, is nevertheless one. For this reason, it matters little how many the instances of the specially named and described virtues are. In another connection, absolute veracity¹ is often especially emphasized. It alone, we are told,

¹ In certain cases Plato justifies the lie of necessity. The principle which he here follows is: He who cannot bear the truth must be spared; from him whom truth would throw into disconcerted confusion and drive to perverted actions by which he would injure himself and others the truth must be kept. The falsehood which he is offered in its stead is to shield him against disaster and injury. In this connection Plato uses the illustration that the lie is like poison. This illustration makes clear that he regards the lie, in and by itself, as something terrible and always dangerous. Just as poison only becomes curative in the hands of the trained physician, and can only be entrusted to him who is an expert in the care of the body, so the lie in general can only be used by those men who, as men with greatest insight and with greatest education, have been entrusted with the care for the spiritual health of the citizens. Emphatically Plato declares that—contrary to many of the current stories about the gods—God at any rate never lies nor deceives.

makes true friendship and confidence possible. Besides, Plato occasionally names as parts of all-round excellence: piety, excellent disposition, singleness of heart, simplicity, modesty, reliability of character; and again industriousness, consideration for others, communicative and helpful friendliness and courtesy, the preservation of decorum.

4. Perfect harmony of the soul and perfect justice are the terms which include everything else, and which best describe THE MORAL IDEAL. If they are given the religious turn, they mean godlikeness. The *Theaetetus*¹ characterizes the goal of all human striving as *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* which consists in the progressive development of moral character and saintliness.² Plato gladly calls him who comes near to the moral ideal "divine" or—and thus we shall use the Greek expression *θεῖος* more appropriately—"divinely favoured."³ It is evident that man can only approach the goal; he can never attain it. We know that Plato was called "the divine" by those who knew him. And we can understand this characterization best if we read the verses⁴ which Aristotle dedicated to Plato's memory—to the memory

Of that unique man
Whose name is not to come from the lips of the wicked.
Theirs is not the right to praise him—
Him who first revealed clearly
By word and by deed
That he who is virtuous is happy.
Alas, not one of us can equal him.

¹ 176b. Cf. also *Laws*, 716c: ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄν εἴη μάλιστα.

² In δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι.

³ In the final section we shall see that the *θεία μοῖρα* which is not so far removed from our conception of divine "grace" is of significance for the development of every man.

⁴ The Greek verses are as follows:

ἄνδρὸς, δὲν οὐδ' ἀλγεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις,
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς
οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὥς ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίγνεται ἀνὴρ.
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτά ποτε.

Recently they have been printed and discussed by W. Jäger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 107 ff.

5. There are passages in the Platonic dialogues in which a common or "so-called CIVIC" VIRTUE IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM VIRTUE IN THE STRICT SENSE OF THE TERM, OR PHILOSOPHIC VIRTUE. The expositions are not always clear and a certain hesitation is noticeable. At first the matter is presented as follows: The common usage of words, which Plato follows when it is not a matter of careful definitions, considers as virtue every spiritual disposition which is advantageous when rightly used; as, e.g., quick apprehension or determination of will, intrepidity. But Plato teaches (p. 304 f.) that all these natural advantages may bring misfortune to the individual if they are not guided by the proper moral insight. The virtue which deserves this name has the certain, unmistakable characteristic¹ that it is something good which shows itself as good under all circumstances. It is noteworthy that in the myth of the *Republic* Plato describes a soul which, shielded and led by the beneficent order of the state, spent its former earthly existence blamelessly; but now, in its choice of a new career, is blinded by the external glory and, in its hasty choice, selects the lot of a tyrant which is accompanied by terrible scenes of horror. By this Plato does not wish to say that a life spent in the blamelessness of civic virtue is in itself not of greater value than that of the wicked man. Elsewhere, he tried to convince us that such a life, with its quiet peacefulness, brings a greater sum total of happiness than that other life. He also knows, and he assures us of it, that good habits are of great value. Nevertheless, only clear knowledge of all the conditions is adequate guarantee for the future; philosophic thinking by the dialectic method alone can attain this knowledge. For that reason true virtue appears to be philosophic virtue. But immediately a serious objection arises: Can anyone attain this perfect, one-sided, and yet all-round virtue?

The description of the Idea of the good which transcends Being, as that is given in the *Republic*, reveals that even the mind of the most indefatigable and most successful thinker,

¹ Cf. p. 46 f.

who is at all times bound to the coarse, physical body, will not be able to attain it. Not even the concept of the good is supposed to be completely knowable and describable. But then the question arises whether the philosopher, as long as he seeks, strives, and errs, has any advantage in his zealous search for this concept over other perplexed individuals who (in case eudemonism is right) also strive for the same goal of the good. We may admit that complete insight would make one perfectly good, save one from all mistakes, and keep one from every evil. It can by no means be proved, however, that in the realm of the imperfect, in the realm of mere probability, the degree of morality depends entirely on the degree of knowledge. Evidently Plato himself did not share this opinion. For that reason the civic virtues retain a certain value for him. From the point of view of the individual's life in the state, civic virtue is most certainly not indifferent.

It is in the *Republic*, which presupposes the community life and which wishes to regulate it, that we have this description of the highest goal of which only philosophic natures can attain a foreboding vision with great difficulty. In this connection it would seem as if the purely theoretical consideration of things alone were worth while. We cannot deny that there is a certain duality; for by the side of the practical ideal, which lies at the basis of the whole outline of the best state, there is another in accordance with which the individual "forms himself" in solitary meditation. Or perhaps we should say, the theoretical consideration does not stand by the side of the practical, but rather, like the ideal of the mediaeval monks, it seems to rise above the practical and to devote itself to the service of the universal, and to promise its followers extraordinary bliss and rapture in the halo of a special virtue, viz., that isolated philosophic virtue which alone is worthy of this name, and which is different and is separated from the mere civic virtues of the various vocations, including that of the ruling philosopher of the state. This is mysticism, and it introduces QUIETISTIC FEATURES into the description of the life of the

philosopher; these features are similar, as we may recall, to characterizations of the *Phaedo* and the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium*. If, however, I am not mistaken and if the exposition here given is right, then the ideal of the philosophic, private life with its non-civic virtue remains in a hazy background. It could not be more clearly expressed, because it is incompatible with the efforts which the author of the *Republic* directed on practical activity, and it is to be considered merely as a remnant of momentary moods of earlier times.

In his OLD AGE, when he wrote the *Laws*, Plato completely ABANDONED the special virtue and the special holiness of the private philosophic life. Not the slightest trace of it can be found anywhere. On the contrary, in the Third Book we are struck by a few statements which very clearly express the equality of those highly intellectually endowed and scientifically trained with those who are not so endowed and not so educated. We are told that individuals who do not know how to preserve the harmony of their emotions with what their reason designates as right "should never be entrusted with a position in the state and must be looked upon as ignominious, even if they were skilled thinkers who possessed all possible imposing knowledge and who had attained unto every mental dexterity;¹ whereas those are to be looked upon as wise men who behave just the opposite from these, even though, as the saying goes, they know neither how to swim nor how to read, and in recognition of their good sense they are to be entrusted with the offices of the state."² It is noteworthy that at one time also in the *Laws* the comment is made which suggests that the high praise bestowed on that unique philosophical virtue based

¹ Besides, let us not forget that the *Republic* maintained that the best intellectual talents did not save one from vice; as a matter of fact they could be misused and put in the service of conscienceless dexterity in all things (*πανουργία*); that under the wrong leadership and harmful influence the philosophic natures become worst; that because of this the positions of responsibility within the state can only be entrusted to individuals whose character and intellectual ability have been tested.

² *Laws*, 689d.

in knowledge should be toned down. As the legislator is to indicate the favourable conditions under which he can manifest his successful activity, he requires a state which is under the leadership of an absolute ruler who must, among other good characteristics, possess moderation (temperance): "Namely," we are told, "what is commonly called temperance, not that temperance of which one might wish to speak in a reverential tone by calling it wisdom,¹ but that characteristic which is manifested in children and animals as a gift of nature, in that some of them indulge in pleasure and others refrain from indulging."²

6. The VICES are the opposite of virtue. They constitute the greatest evils in human life and make those who practise them unhappy. The following are given as bad personal characteristics: intellectual laziness and foolish self-conceitedness of knowledge, shameless arrogance, lack of discipline and intemperance in pleasures, injustice, cowardice—they correspond to the four cardinal virtues; then impiety, shamelessness, baseness of mind, narrow-mindedness, pettiness, envy and miserliness, severity, a sullen and unfriendly disposition, tyranny, disputatiousness, untruthfulness, perfidy and unscrupulousness, effeminacy, unchecked desultoriness and vanity which wants to know and to do all things but which only touches the surface of all things.

Indolent ἀμαθία,³ which is based in self-conceitedness,

Λαως, 710a: σωφροσύνην . . . τὴν δημόδῃ γε . . . καὶ οὐχ ἴν τις σεμνύων ἴν λέγοι φρόνησιν προσαναγκάζων εἶναι τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἀλλ' ὅπερ εὐθὺς ταῖσι καὶ θηρίοις . . . ξύμφυτον ἐπανθεῖ.

One cannot help noticing the contrast to *Republic*, 430c, and to *Laches*, 196e.

¹ This word is always used by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues as the opposite of σοφία and φρόνησις, and is set over against the command of self-knowledge or self-examination. It indicates the absence of the desire to think about, to reflect on, and to be instructed about the world and man's place in it; it designates a being satisfied with his inadequate knowledge which is confused by all kinds of mistakes and which has been derived from traditions and customs.

appears as the greatest defect; one may say as the root of all corruption and perversity. It prohibits self-examination, which the disciple of Socrates considers as the presupposition for the correct mode of life and as the highest moral duty. Considered from another point of view, the greatest evil and the root of all base intention is envy or narrow-minded, petty, hard-hearted selfishness which begrudges our fellowman, who is akin to us by nature, what good he may enjoy and which rejoices in his misfortune. God, whose nature is supposed to set the norm and to indicate the direction for us, cannot wish to bring evil on anyone nor to begrudge him good.¹ He formed the world in unselfish goodness desiring that everything should as much as possible² become like him. The truly good man also does not know envy and gladly shares the best that he has with others. The citizens of a well-ordered state will be united in love and friendship.³ As petty egoist, the "tyrannical" man is above all else envious and unhappy in the feeling of gnawing envy.⁴

7. Let us now pass from the particulars to a general perspective. I have already given⁵ a preliminary view of Platonic ethics. If I were to characterize as simply and as briefly as possible the fundamental position which includes everything found in the dialogues discussed above, then the following expressions occur to me: EUDEMONISM, INTELLECTUAL DETERMINISM. It must still be shown whether this characterization also holds for the later dialogues. In this connection expositions in Chapter 7, Book II of the *Laws* seem to be of importance.

If we wish to use the German expression, we should say: *Verstocktheit*; religiously expressed, we should say: It is the sin which desires no improvement, it is, therefore, the "sin against the Holy Ghost."

¹ "Envy is excluded from the celestial choir." *Phaedrus*, 247a.

² *Timaeus*, 29e.

³ *Laws*, 693b f.

⁴ In this point as in so many others we can see a close resemblance between Plato's philosophy of life and that of Goethe. A compilation of passages listed under "*φθόρος*" in Ast's *Lexikon* and under "*Neid*" in E. von der Hellen's *Register zu Goethes Werken* will make this clear.

⁵ See Part I, ch. I, especially pp. 60 ff.

The leader of the conversation—an unnamed¹ "Athenian" whom we may without hesitation identify with Plato—affirms that the good, temperate, and just man enjoys complete happiness which is altogether independent of the external circumstances under which he may live. On the contrary, everything which is ordinarily praised as good, such as health, longevity, unlimited power, riches, as well as courage, is an evil for the unjust man and only makes him unhappier. It can be a blessing only to the good man and so it constitutes a good. Those who converse with Plato can scarcely grasp this. They admit that the unjust man with all his external power lives a miserable life, but they doubt whether he is unhappy.—This is the position which Polus advocated in the *Gorgias*.—However, the leader of the conversation in the *Laws* lays greatest emphasis on the fact that moral excellence and well-being (happiness) are identical. This appears to him to be absolutely certain, more certain than the most apparent truth, "more certain than the proposition, Crete is an island." As lawgiver, he says, he would inflict the most severe punishment on him who would say that there are men who are bad but live a pleasant life, or that the advantageous and the useful are not always identical with what is just. Besides, he did not know how the gods or human legislators would support the admonition to obey their commands, if they had to admit that we must differentiate between ways of life, one of which was the most pleasing and the other the most just; and that he who chooses the first is happier but less just than he who chooses the second. For if a son were to ask his admonishing father: "Do you not wish, father, that I get as much pleasure and happiness out of my life as possible? But you constantly admonish me to live as just a life as possible";

¹ The persons appearing in all of Plato's dialogues are named with the single exception of the "stranger from Elea" in the *Sophist* and in the *Statesman*, who also develops Plato's thoughts, and this Athenian (and minor characters, such as the porter in the *Protagoras* and the prison attendant in the *Phaedo*). Even in the *Laws* the two other characters are named. The Lacedaemonian's name is Megillus, that of the Cretan is Cleinias.

then he who was being asked would be embarrassed and would not know what rational answer he could give. "If, on the contrary, he should say that the most just life includes the greatest happiness, then without doubt everyone who understood this answer would want to know still further what the law considers as good or beautiful in this just life that is superior to the enjoyment of pleasure. And in truth, what good which is separable from the pleasant could befall the just man?" Every example of the good which one might select, however, such as honour, refraining from wrong-doing, shows that it is not only good and beautiful, but also pleasant. It is necessary that the legislator emphasize this, since no one freely chooses anything unless he expects more pleasure than pain from it. It is the lack of experience which causes some (especially in their youth) to be mistaken about the true condition of the good life, in that they consider, as it were, right-doing and wrong-doing from afar; as a consequence the impressions are blurred and, depending on the viewpoint of the beholder, the one as well as the other may appear as pleasant or as unpleasant.¹ There can be no doubt about the eudemonism or hedonism of the man who wrote these words. I am of the opinion that this even includes his determinism, from which Plato himself inferred rigid conclusions.

8. These inferences are really made in that section in which Plato advances the PRINCIPLES OF PENAL JUSTICE. There he proceeds from the concept of punishment. This concept can be correctly understood only in connection with that of outrage or wrong. As the Greek words *ἀδικία* and *δίκη* give us to understand, the two concepts fit each other accurately. An outrage, as a transgression of the law, must be punished; and punishment may in no case be inflicted except where there has been a transgression of the law. For Plato the law does not

¹ 663ab; cf. 664b. This whole trend of thought can be seen in its clearest and most precise form in my *Platos Gesetze, Darstellung des Inhalts*, p. 37.

consist in the rules prescribed by man, but in the ideal demands of justice. Therefore the transgression of the law is an offence against these demands.

What does justice demand? Most certainly not the performance of certain definite external actions or the refraining from such actions; but, as we were told in the *Republic*, a definite condition of the soul, a definite attitude and direction of the will, in which reason rules the appetites and sensibility. And if reason, as ruler of the soul, commands an individual, then he will seek his happiness in that which is most valuable, viz., in spiritual goods. It is this right and healthy relationship between the parts of the soul which the legislator desires to assure and whenever it has been disturbed to restore it. To this end he makes use of punishment, which is supposed to be medicine for the sick soul. In accordance with the degree and the manner of the defective and perverted constitution of the soul, the means for restoring the order of the soul will have to differ, i.e., it has to be more or less forceful and painful.

The wrongdoer at all times acts involuntarily; yet there is a great difference whether his reason has been put to sleep by lack of thought, or is overpowered by passion, or enslaved to sensuality. The effect must be equal¹ to the cause or to the force which produced it. If a man is free and is master of himself, he may, of course, make mistakes, but he can do no wrong. For as a free agent he wills the good.²

¹ For that reason the punishments are intensified for the backslider. Wherever the will is so completely suppressed and enslaved that there is no longer any hope of freeing it, only the destruction of the individual remains. In his *Gesch. d. antik. Kommunismus* (p. 408, note) Pöhlmann fittingly remarks: "With Rousseau, Plato could have said of his state that the force which he imposes on the disobedient means nothing else but an invitation to be free." In this connection, we may also cite *Laws*, 670c, "we force, so to speak, the will upon the people." And *Laws*, 875cd: "It must never be allowed that reason is enslaved to and dependent on anything; it must rather rule all things if, in accordance with its nature, it is to be true and free."

² Therefore, from the comprehension of the concept of freedom and good will, there follows for Plato not merely the opposite position to Kant's rigoristic ethics with its "categorical imperative," but also the

Under these conditions, it is beside the point to consider any punishment as bad or dishonourable and to consider those punishments which are meted out for great crimes as especially bad. For as certainly as justice itself is never bad, but, on the contrary, is always something praiseworthy and beautiful, so the application of justice, of punishment, must be praiseworthy and beautiful. Only injustice or wickedness, against which¹ punishment is directed, is bad.

While Plato does not discover in the involuntariness of bad actions a reason to mitigate the harshness of the law—he even advocates capital punishment—he nevertheless does not refrain from insisting that the blame for the perpetrated wrong is not to be placed solely on the evildoer, but that THE WHOLE COMMUNITY IS ALSO GUILTY. In the *Timaeus* this principle is expressed with the greatest resoluteness as follows: “Nearly all reproaches about unbridled and shameful lusts, made with the notion that evil is voluntary, are unjustified. The reasons why a man becomes evil are a bad disposition of the body and neglected education; but each one experiences this as something disagreeable and against his will. And as far as the production of pain is concerned, here too the body becomes the cause of many evils for the soul. And if to this is added . . . a bad form of government and if everywhere in the city, both in private and in public, evil conversations take place and if, in addition, the educational material absorbed

opposite position to the accepted opinion of our times, as well as to that of ancient times. That is to say, Plato demands that punishment be meted out for “involuntary” wrongs. This, alone, he considers evil. This evil arises from the enslavement of reason from whose insight the free act of the will springs; whereas the strivings which spring from irrational stimuli are involuntary and slavish. The customary and otherwise generally accepted distinction between a wrong voluntarily and involuntarily committed is based on a confusion of wrong and injury. Ordinarily, injury merely demands that the damage be made good (and according to circumstances religious expiation).

¹ For that reason no one need fear the disgrace of a punishment, but one should fear the disgrace of wickedness, of injustice. This was already advocated in the *Gorgias*.

from youth up is in no way suited to curb these evils, then for these two reasons all bad individuals become bad and that contrary to their will. The blame must, therefore, be placed more on the parents than on the children, more on the educators than on those being educated. We should take advantage of every opportunity to exert all our effort to make use of the means of education, of one's profession, and of science to escape vice and to attain its opposite, virtue."¹ The *Republic*, as well as the *Laws*, also regrets the evil influence which everywhere the whole order of the state, the bad customs of the community, and the tyranny of public opinion have upon the individual.

No interference with the execution of punishment arises from the consciousness of co-responsibility which each individual, as member of the social group and of the state, must have when he passes judgment on the evil deed of a criminal. This, of course, is true because punishment is not only a protection for him who is threatened by wrong, but it is also a benefit for him who is punished. From this logically follows a CONSIDERATION WHICH IS FREE FROM PASSION. Anger, which naturally arises against the offender, as well as every feeling of hate toward him, will be suppressed because it is ill-founded. It is touching how the highly gifted author of the *Laws* admonishes himself to control his anger at the sight of the failures of younger people. "For it must never be that both sides be deprived of their reason; the one, by the insatiable thirst for pleasure; the other, by becoming excited about it."² In the *Laws* the offenders are again and again characterized³ as unhappy, as deserving of sympathy. In this, no doubt, sympathy is expressed. But this too must not become a passion, a weak yielding sympathy. No one is to excuse himself and to consider himself free from all reproach, because he is subjected to an overpowering force. Plato's determinism is not to be understood thus. At all times, he rejects self-satisfied conceit

¹ *Timaeus*, 86d ff.

² *Laws*, 832a f.

³ See, e.g., 731d, 832a, 854b, 873a, 905a, 934b.

of knowledge; to examine oneself, to educate oneself is always obligatory, a prescribed duty. This is¹ in agreement with the deterministic theory.

9. In my large work on Plato, I concluded the exposition of his ethics with a comparison of it with Kantian and Christian ethics. What I there set down as the net result, I shall give again here: In this attempted comparison, Platonic ethics did not make a bad showing. In content, it showed itself to be no less noble than Kantian ethics; and the advantages which are customarily assigned to Christian ethics did not seem to be absent from it. In fact, all the Greek church fathers recognized that Plato's ethical views and demands came exceedingly close to those of Christianity. A still further comparison with Kant might, in a certain way, prove to be favourable to Plato. The twisted and forced proof by which Kant squeezes other carefully considered, material formulas from his formal principle of universal validity, to which he also gives corresponding expression in the first formulation of his commands, becomes superfluous on the clearly eudemonistic basis of Plato: and the digression into petty commonplace, which is somewhat unpleasantly noticeable in Kant, is avoided by Plato in that from the beginning he includes the realization of the state in the natural purposes of man.

B. POLITICS

For the Greek everything which has to do with the constitution of the state naturally belongs to ethics; therefore not merely does the realm of law belong to it, but the whole of POLITICS in its widest sense. From the narrative part of the *Seventh Letter*, we know how important politics was for Plato. We can also discern this from the *Gorgias* (cf. p. 55), as well as from the three dialogues which by their titles make known that they are intended to deal with political questions, viz.,

¹ As I attempted to show in *Platon*, I, p. 440.

the *Republic* (the ideal state), the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*. Let us consider these three dialogues in order.

I. THE PLAN OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE, submitted in the *Republic*, is as follows: At the head of a well-ordered state is to be a single man of unusual endowments and virtue, who, by indefatigable work, has acquired all attainable knowledge, and from the commanding height which he has attained can see and judge better than anyone else what is most beneficial for the community of beings which he is to rule. Besides, he will pursue no other purpose than to care for the well-being of the community to the best of his ability. This man is to rule the state in accordance with his own free judgment, responsible to no one except to his own conscience.—It may be that there are other men who fairly well equal him in insight, education, and excellence of character; if so, he will share his rule with them, either by having them alternately take over the power or by some other arrangement upon which they may agree.

But if the prosperity of the whole group is to be assured at all times, then the order of the state must not depend on the life of one individual. Arrangement must be made, so that at the death or the retirement of one leader of the state another not less able is ready to take his place. This can be assured only by the careful education of him who is fit to succeed him; and this education must be begun as soon as possible. First, however, we must know who, when carefully educated, will develop a like excellence as that of the chosen one whom he is to replace. It is primarily a question of finding the best-endowed individual at the right time; that is to say, before he is in any way spoiled by neglect or bad influences. From these considerations, it therefore becomes necessary that the STATE DIRECT EDUCATION AND PUBLIC INSTRUCTION. For only by careful and long-continued observation of children growing up together and by constant comparison of their behaviour and their achievements can we make the necessary selection of the best. The teacher and educator will soon detect the

outstanding differences of abilities or aptitudes. It will not, therefore, be difficult to classify them into groups. From that mass of human beings whose natures are less susceptible, lazier, and duller, he will separate that small number of those who apprehend more quickly, who are more sensitive, who are, at all times, more eager to learn something new, who easily bear the mental exertion connected with it, and who do not become vain or haughty because of their achievements. The mass can soon be left to itself. On the other hand, the more capable ones, after they have mastered the elements, are to be instructed gradually in more fundamental and more difficult branches of knowledge. This will make selection more and more possible. Finally, when the instruction leads beyond the empirical sciences and semi-abstract mathematics to the philosophic observation of things, the number which can follow profitably and with real understanding is small. Philosophical instruction has to advance proof for the assumptions of the other sciences; it has to determine clearly the fundamental concepts from which they set out and thus to relate them to each other. Above all else, it must clearly indicate man's place in nature; it must, therefore, make clear how man should regulate his life in order to be able to satisfy most completely his natural striving for happiness under the existing conditions in which he finds himself; it must show how individuals in their mutual striving toward this goal can aid each other best, while uniting into an organized community. In other words, philosophic instruction has to determine the HIGHEST GOOD for the individual and for the majority of men living together in the state; it must also indicate the right path for the attainment of this highest good.

He who has a correct notion of the relations which are implied in this concept of the good¹ will satisfactorily form his life, and he will also satisfactorily direct a human commonwealth.

¹ It is at all times a concept of relations: One can think of the good only as good for a subject; and the good which we seek is supposed to be good for man and to correspond to his nature.

He who has wrong notions about it will make mistakes from which he and others will have to suffer; the more distorted his notions are, the more he and others will have to suffer. Only that man could attain satisfaction who had clear, certain, and complete knowledge of what would be good for him and of what would bring him happiness; similarly only that state could attain satisfaction whose leader had such knowledge about the general well-being of the state and acted in accordance with it. THE HIGHEST GOAL OF ALL INSTRUCTION is to lead to this knowledge; by this instruction the individual who is capable of pursuing profounder studies is educated for and is enabled to take over the duties of the statesman.

Of course, this goal is not completely attainable. Human reason cannot completely comprehend the content of the good. It is not even easy to form a non-contradictory opinion about the good which, because of the varied relations to which the word refers, appears infinitely ambiguous. Besides, it would be possible for us to know and to describe the objective basis of that which is contained in all the conceptions of the good ("the Idea of the good," as Plato expresses it) only if we knew all reality in the universe, and especially man's innermost nature to which that which is good for him is related. Even to the most capable and best-educated thinker the conception of the good is made known essentially through premonition. The opinions which originally force themselves upon us about the good can by reflective examination be gradually freed from contradictions and so can be refined. Thus, step by step, we may progress in our knowledge. We can indicate individual, formal features which belong to the good and we can also convincingly show that certain conceptions of the good are false. As long as the concept of the world remains a plan only partly completed, however, we cannot exhaust the concept of that which manifests itself in the harmonious accord of the universe in all its individual parts.

Nevertheless, from the difficulty of this task something follows which is of importance for the ideal state. It is only by

constant effort and practice of the powers of the human mind to know that we can avoid gross errors about the practically adequate concept, and that we can increase the insight which we have attained concerning it up to a certain time, or that we can heighten the degree of its probability. If the state which has been brought into a tolerably good condition by a philosophic leader wishes to maintain this condition, it must provide that scientific studies, which enabled that leading statesman to unfold this noble conception of the problems of the state, be practised by others. This again demands provision for as thorough an education as possible for the oncoming generations. If this demand is met, we may expect steady progress in knowledge. This expectation is the more certainly based if the state, as Plato demands of it, in addition to the scientific education of the talented, also provide for a no less careful supplementary physical education; and if it employ all conceivable means to favour the union of the most talented men with those women who are also above the average of their sex, in order gradually to produce a noble race of the highest capabilities. With such an arrangement, the younger people will from generation to generation outgrow their predecessors, who were similarly endowed; and the standards for the highest achievements, as well as those for the average achievements, will constantly be raised. A further consequence will be that the well-managed state will be able gradually to improve and to perfect its laws. Of course, there will be only a few outstanding intellects who can fully understand what in formerly accepted doctrines has been corrected by criticism, and to what extent the existing body of knowledge has been supplemented by new discoveries. These are the individuals who are marked out as the future leaders of the state; the ablest one in their ranks is chosen to be the leader. For at all times the philosophers are to be the rulers, in order that the evils in the world may be lessened.

This proposition about the PROFESSION OF LEADERSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO RULE given by nature to the PHILOSOPHERS

is most important for the whole Platonic ideal state. It is almost the only proposition which, according to Plato's statements, is entirely incontestable and must have validity for all time; whereas most of the other detailed arrangements become antiquated and may be subject to change. For when Plato of his own free will clearly admits that he was unable to describe correctly the objective content of the good which alone serves as a standard for the formation of the state, and when he just as definitely expresses the hope that continuous reflection, under external conditions which become constantly more favourable, will succeed in progressing more and more in knowledge, and if, just because of this expected progress in knowledge, he does not bind the leader of the state to any law, he grants the philosopher of coming ages the right to make such changes as he deems necessary in the laws which he himself made. These changes would be an improvement. But Plato can never abandon the contention that he who is to have this power must of all men possess the greatest insight and excellence; therefore the rules which are to enable such an individual to obtain the reins of power are valid for all time.

2. The most striking of the other arrangements which Plato decrees for the organization of the state are of four types: They are concerned with the classification of the citizens according to their vocation; the abolition of the family and private property for the defenders and the officials, the "guardians," of the state; putting man and woman on the same level; and finally the censorship of art. What is said about the first three points can be described as follows:

The citizens of the state are to be divided into THREE CLASSES (professions). Those without a profession may not remain within the confines of the state. The lowest class consists of that great mass of human beings who by the aid of their hands produce economic goods which serve physical needs. It is divided into a great many groups, each of which has its special work, and in their guildlike exclusiveness stand over against each other.

Above the PRODUCING CLASS (both of food and of goods) is the CLASS OF GUARDIANS, i.e., the defenders of order and of peace. Their duty is to defend order and peace; their chief practice, therefore, is with weapons of defence. They are strictly prohibited from taking any part in the productive life; just as those who belong to the class of the peasants and to that of the tradesmen may not engage in the arts of war. They are supported by the rest of the inhabitants of the state like an army of mercenaries. Their real activity, however, is not merely the brutal art of war. On the contrary, they are also required to do intellectual work. Not only are all of them instructed in the customary branches of a good Athenian school, but in addition to this they receive mathematical instruction which extends over a period of years. Beginning with the twentieth year, and after they have devoted two or three years exclusively to the building up of the body and to military training, there begins for the most talented and the most capable in the group a more thorough and more systematic education, whose purpose it is to correlate the different sciences and to give a comprehensive view of them in their relation to one another and to the nature of Being. He who distinguishes himself in this course of instruction and shows his philosophic ability through his understanding of this approach—at the same time he fulfils his military duty and such other duties as are imposed on him—will, at the age of thirty, with those like him, be once more distinguished by another selection; he will be transferred from the class of ordinary guardians to that of the RULERS or the “perfect guardians,” which as the highest class rises above and rests on the others. The novices must be in this group for five years and must receive additional theoretical, especially philosophic, instruction. If this instruction is successful, they must descend from the height of their cosmic contemplation to the levels of everyday life. So as not to be inferior to others in practical experience, they must spend fifteen years here as officers and occupy other important positions in order to prove their ability here also. Finally,

those who have been found to be theoretically and practically irreproachable are at the age of fifty to be led to the goal itself. Now they must direct their spiritual eye to the source of light, the good itself, in order that henceforth they may not only regulate their own lives with a view to the good and help other individuals, but also, as often as that is necessary, relieve one another in the management of public affairs and as educators provide that, when they have departed for the Isles of the Blessed, others just as capable as they themselves were will take their place. In this manner the absolute ruler of the state logically emerges from the perfect guardians, the incumbents of the higher offices and of the positions of authority.

This much will suffice concerning the professional classification of the citizens.

3. According to Plato's system, something further immediately follows from the arrangement arrived at for the higher classes. If, as defenders and rulers of the state, they are required to devote all their time and energy to the common weal and if they have the care for their personal support removed from them, they must not only refrain from the acquisition of property but they must also completely abandon the POSSESSION OF ALL PRIVATE PROPERTY in order that nothing may take their thoughts from the consideration of the well-being of the whole group. THEY MAY NOT EVEN HAVE A FAMILY; they may have neither wife nor children whom they can call their own. They are to live together in unadorned barracks, where they are also to eat their simple meals. They are not, however, to be forced to life-long celibacy. Such an arrangement would not only be unnatural for a large professional class; but it would also be wrong, because, if the ablest were permanently excluded from reproducing, it would be impossible to reach the goal of producing a higher race by eugenic breeding (this must never be lost sight of); instead there would necessarily result a gradual lowering of the general average in strength of body as well as in intellectual ability. Plato therefore demands

the temporary marriage of his guardians with women who equal them in ability. He prescribes that these marriages be entered upon only when the individuals are mature and in their full strength. For women the age limits are put between twenty and forty; for men, between thirty and fifty.¹ As is the custom with the other marriages, so these are to be solemnized by festivals accompanied by prayer and sacrifices to the gods. He also makes the most careful arrangement for the children issuing from these marriages; they will be taken over by the state and most carefully reared. How often such marriages shall be celebrated will be determined by the needs of the state at the time, since the number of its citizens is to be kept stationary as much as possible.

Closely connected with these arrangements is the requirement that WOMEN ARE TO BE GIVEN EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES WITH MEN. Among them, too, there is a class which rises above the mass of women of various gradations; the members of this highest class are given special privileges, and duties are imposed which demand corresponding renunciations. The physical and intellectual education of the girls is to be the same as that of the boys; and if they accomplish the same things as the boys, they are to be given the same rights and privileges. It is self-evident that the women of the guardian class also may not possess any private property and that they too must refrain from having their own family. The substitute which Plato offers the women guardians is the same as that which he offers to the men guardians. It consists in temporary unions only. The children which issue from such unions also do not belong to the mothers. They belong to the community, the state, which immediately takes charge of them and places them in a nursery equipped for the care of children; here they are entrusted to the care of proper nurses.²

¹ *Republic*, 460e.

² For a certain period of time, the mothers are to come regularly to the nursery to nurse the infants; but they are to be relieved from all other care for them, and no mother is to know and recognize her own child.

4. If in our day we ask: What are the mistakes of this state? we shall find that the answers differ. I shall indicate all those OBJECTIONS which appear to me to be worthy of consideration; then I shall examine them in detail. They may be stated as follows:

(1) The most important needs of the community comprising the state are ignored. E.g., there is almost a complete absence of laws about the appointment of officials, about the institution of law courts, about the punishment of criminals.

(2) The great mass of the citizens of the state is completely neglected. The proud, intellectual aristocrat attributes no other meaning or significance to the mass of citizenry except that he regards it as the means for feeding and clothing the higher classes. This, we are told, overestimates the intellect and underestimates nobility of character, as if the brightest were most virtuous, and as if the individual with limited intellectual powers deserved no attention and care.

(3) Connected with this is the fact that Plato, in spite of the severe criticism which he brings against all existing states, because of their repeated party upheavals and party feuds, left their basic evil, slavery, untouched because he did not consider it as the fundamental evil of all states.

(4) The Platonic state violates human nature; its noblest impulses are bound by the legislation of the state concerning artistic creation, and above all by the abolition of the freedom of choice in the selection of a wife and by the abolition of permanent marriage for the guardians. These arrangements are altogether intolerable and most corrupting.

Upon closer examination¹ the first three objections prove to be inadequately grounded and are for the most part based on misunderstandings. E.g., it is true that the MASS OF CITIZENRY in the *Republic* does not receive thorough consideration. Plato's greatest attention and care are devoted to talented natures which tower above the average. But while they are educated in his state to be the leaders of the others, the greatest

¹ Cf. *Platon*, II, 575-609.

care is taken of and the best arrangement is made for the mass of men who are entrusted to them. There is no lack of repeated assurance on the part of Plato that the careful selection and education of the guardians are not merely for their special interest but are always undertaken with reference to the well-being of the whole state; that the denials and the sacrifices which are imposed on the ruling classes for the sake of the prosperity of the whole community must be demanded of them under all circumstances.

As for the reproach which is concerned with Plato's intellectual pride which caused him to despise¹ the common working man, we may say that it is sufficiently refuted by the quotations cited above; numerous passages can, however, still be added.²

In an article of the year 1909,³ I showed that SLAVERY has no place in the ideal state of the *Republic* and that its very constitution and fundamental principles nullify it. And even though the contrary opinion has been staunchly repeated, it has not come to my notice that anyone has attempted since then to contest my arguments seriously and scientifically. One would think that before repeating the traditional reproaches one would be warned to be cautious by Plato's own evaluation of the barbaric world and (cf. above) by his ridicule of the ill-founded pride of the Hellenes over against it.⁴

The fourth objection, indicated above, is not easily refuted. The reasons which Plato himself gives for demanding and defending a community of wives and children of the guardians—or more correctly: their being without family responsibilities—are the following: It necessarily follows from the fundamental

¹ The passage which Ed. Zeller cites from the *Republic*, 421a, only expresses the opinion which is self-evident for every educated man of our day, to wit, that "whoever thinks like a soap-maker" or like "chum tailor and glove maker" does not constitute the most important element in the state.

² As, e.g., *Gorgias*, 512b ff.; *Republic*, 500de, 600a, 400de (397e, 433); *Theaetetus*, 174d ff.; *Laws*, 677cd.

³ *Philologus*, LXVIII, 229–59. I briefly stated my reasons again in *Platon*, II, 596–609.

⁴ Cf. also *Laws*, 819ab, 951b; *Phaedo*, 78a; *Republic*, 499c.

principle that the guardians may not possess any property. It seems necessary to him to follow this principle to its logical conclusion, since it alone can remove the temptations of the soldiers, temptations inherent in the possession of power. Otherwise they would misuse family life by exploiting the helpless masses; they would form parties among themselves by whose wrangling the whole state would be disrupted. Besides, Plato feels that the goal of improving the human race can only be attained if the practical experiences of animal breeders are also applied to man, and that, therefore, not the inclination of the individual is to decide what marital bond he shall enter, but the judgment of the experts who are interested in producing the best offspring. I believe that this will do away with the misunderstanding that special freedom in matters of sex was granted to those who excelled intellectually as if they were "supermen," towering above the average person, and that they were set above obedience to the laws and regulations which were valid for the masses. They were freed from permanent marriage, but not because they regarded a permanent marriage as a hindrance to their libertine inclinations. The question was not that of providing them with a comfortable privilege, but of imposing great sacrifices upon them; the question was not one of abandonment and turning sensuality loose, but of limiting it. The required abolition of the family is much more closely related to celibacy than it is to the practice of "free love" preached by libertinism.

The reason why celibacy was introduced by the medieval clerics is the same as that of Plato for depriving his guardians of family life. They are not to be hampered by any personal cares; nor are petty cares to keep them from their main duty of looking after the welfare of the whole community. When the leader of the state calls upon them to perform a serious duty, they are not to hesitate, they are not to ask questions. That is to say, they are a class of guardians who are ready to fight, at all times resolved to sacrifice their lives. However, Plato did not think of relieving all members of the state from

family obligations; to do so would not have made for a gradual improvement of the race, but for its gradual deterioration.

Not only do the regulations referred to (p. 323) about marriage and the rearing of children, enacted for the members of the guardian class, arise from Plato's calm, calculating deliberations, but also the rules which forbade the giving of too much care to the infirm and the weak. As far as I can see these regulations apply to all classes. In all this, the guiding principle always is that by improving the physical nature of men, their intellectual ability and their moral character are improved; and in this manner their happiness is also heightened and increased. Zeller is therefore quite wrong and beside the point when he says¹ that in the Platonic state marriage was "debased to a politico-economic breeding of human beings." The expression politico-economic signifies something purely external, something which is concerned with the preservation and multiplication of physical goods;² and the reason Plato criticizes the Athenian statesmen (not merely in the *Gorgias*, but also in the *Republic*) is that they were dominated by the politico-economic point of view. If Plato appeals³ to the experience of the animal breeders who, in their effort to improve the species, actually pursue economic ends, this does not mean that he wishes this to be considered as the highest end for the breeding of human beings. Certainly not! His ultimate purpose is always moral perfection. Since a healthy, physiological basis is necessary for moral perfection, he considers marriage of and procreation by the ablest citizens an unavoidable and holy duty. And I am of the opinion that Plato is superior to his modern critics in that he not only clearly recognizes that the psychical is conditioned by the physical, but that also in accordance with this knowledge he sincerely strives to formulate his rules. He is not satisfied with superficialities. An emotional nature may consider this as crude. But he who

¹ *Philosophie der Griechen*, II, I⁴, p. 909.

² It corresponds to *χρηματιστικόν* used by Plato.

³ *Gorgias*, 479b.

demands rational justification for this judgment will find it only in fatalistic or quietistic convictions.

Furthermore, I have the impression that Plato himself did not quite trust his proposal to abolish the private family. It is especially noteworthy that he makes this proposal rather hesitatingly and expresses the fear that he may lead his friends astray in a highly important matter and thus do the greatest harm.¹ He is quite conscious of how much depends on whether his proposal is practicable or not—and naturally if evil consequences should result, he would not only regret them but he would insist on the immediate removal of their cause.²

5. Let us now ask: What was Plato's meaning? WHAT WAS HIS PURPOSE IN ADVOCATING HIS PLAN OF THE STATE? There can be no doubt about this purpose. Several times Plato compares his task to the activity of the artist who sketches an ideal picture.³ He comments that just as the artist is not obliged to prove that the individual characteristics of his picture are to be found anywhere in nature as he painted them, so he is not obliged to prove the reality of his state, i.e., as existing somewhere in space and time. And he adds that in accordance with the nature of things it is impossible that the concrete, which really appears in the world, should possess as much truth as that which is merely thought, the ideal. (Therefore, one should not demand of him any more than that he indicate the path by which we can best approach the ideal state which he described.) But in another connection he says: Under ordinary circumstances the rational man must confine himself to bringing his own soul into the proper disposition. In the ideal state, of course, another goal will arise for him: The care for the group, political activity. The question is not whether such a state actually exists here on earth; at any rate the philosopher is not concerned with any

¹ 451a.

² This also follows from what was said above, p. 323 f.

³ Cf. my book, *Platons Staat, Darstellung des Inhalts*, pp. 70, 2 ff., and 85, 26 ff.

other state. And "he who wishes to see it, may see its prototype in heaven,"¹ in order that he may at least pattern his personal relations after this prototype. In accordance with the terminology familiar to us from the *Phaedo*, we may designate this celestial prototype as the "Idea" of the state, with which any existing state here on earth agrees only imperfectly; but the more perfect such a state is, the more it resembles the prototype. Plato had this Idea² in mind when he sketched his state. His success in copying it depended on the incisiveness of his understanding and the skill of his representation. But even the most successful copy contains no guarantee that it may also be reproduced point for point in concrete conditions of any existing, mundane state.

All of us, no doubt, share the convictions of Plato here presented about the relation of a sketch of an ideal to concrete reality. Scarcely one of the many propounders of ethical systems as a whole, or of a system of politics and of society, imagined that with his presentation he would achieve the result that in a large community all his proposed principles and requirements would be recognized as right and be minutely followed. On the contrary, each one of these authors, no doubt, hoped that some few would approve his thoughts and would take them as their guide; otherwise, there would be no sense in his giving expression to them. Each one of them also probably thought that with the aid of his book he could be useful and bring happiness to those individuals who would listen to him. This opinion was probably fostered by the conviction that what the author of the book proclaimed as the ideal was no chimera, but met the real conditions of human nature. Accordingly this ideal would be based on the universal order of things;

¹ See above, p. 222.

² It is clear that here too we may understand the term "Idea" as signifying the objective basis for our conception of a thing. The appeal to the celestial prototype indicates that Plato is not presenting chimerical dreams, that knowledge of man's place in the scheme of nature is to serve as the prerequisite for the state which corresponds to human nature.

i.e.—as Plato expressed it—one could read it in the heavens. And as he also says: Even if it does not exist anywhere and never could be realized, it is nevertheless true and it OUGHT to be realized.

But Plato does not wish to ask anything of human beings which would not be useful to them. He believes that otherwise no enlightened person could follow his desires; on the contrary, everyone would have to follow his desires as soon as he completely understood them. By connecting the useful with that which is prescribed as duty, we may understand how, in addition to the clear knowledge of the fact that the ideal can never enter completely into the forms of the perceptible world, the hope also arises that in the course of infinite time and under favourable circumstances the ideal demand will at least be realized for a short period of time. Thus Plato repeatedly and emphatically says that what he demands is not just a pious wish, but something realizable. Consequently the contradiction between these assurances, and my previously mentioned exposition of the impossibility of the complete realization of an ideal, would be only an apparent contradiction, in that, contrary to the objections of timid individuals, the possibility of a progressive approach to the ideal condition is for practical purposes identical with the attainment of this goal. Besides, when carefully considered, the assurances very probably refer only to the execution of individual, difficult measures, but not to the whole.

The most effective means for the improvement of moral conditions (in connection with the already discussed relation between duty and happiness) must be education. Yet Plato probably clearly realizes that theoretical instruction is not sufficient to bring the mass to the right path, once it is entrapped in false conceptions and deceived by swindlers; on the contrary, force is necessary to accomplish this. He also indicates how he must proceed who has the power and who undertakes to introduce somewhere the constitution and mode of life described by him (Plato). He would have to begin by ELIMI-

NATING FROM THE CITIZENRY all bad and contrary elements. The simplest way of introducing it would be to banish to the country all the inhabitants of a city who are more than ten years old and to take the children, who completely depend on their leader, and to educate them according to the proposed principles. Of course, in this manner the desired condition of the state, in which perfect friendship and mutual trust between all citizens is to prevail, can only be brought about gradually. But since it cannot be attained in any other way except that all citizens be well educated, the sudden realization of the ideal is necessarily excluded. We must recall the saying that the good which has once been realized in the order of the state will make itself felt in ever larger circles.¹

Therefore, if strong measures are necessary for beginning the practical foundation of the good, we may nevertheless conclude that its further development will proceed quietly. We may even ask whether we may not think of the end of this development as the existence of a millennium which will embrace the whole earth. From the very beginning, as Plato unfolds his ideal state, he does not think merely of his country; nor does he think only of the Hellenic world. That which he has to teach is to benefit the whole of humanity. He says, "If political power and scientific knowledge (philosophy) are not united in one person, then there is no end of evil for the states and also for mankind in general."² To begin with, he thinks of establishing a Hellenic ideal state; and the size of this state, according to his instruction, is to be moderate and easily surveyable.³ However, the expression just used is also valid in the sense that the inhabitants of a city who have ordered their affairs well will also propagate the movement, which they have initiated, by extending it beyond their narrow borders.

In the form of an appendix to the doctrine of the state, Plato describes four defective forms of the state and sketches

¹ *Republic*, 424a: καὶ μὴν πολιτεία, εἴανπερ ἅπαξ ὁρμήσῃ εἰς, ἔρχεται ὥσπερ κύκλος αὐξανόμενη. Cf. p. 272.

² *Republic*, 473d.

³ *Republic*, 470e, 423b.

for us certain negative counterparts of the ideal community. These descriptions of timocracy, plutocracy, democracy, and tyranny contain a treasure of political wisdom whose value is too little regarded. The same is true of the discussion which considers the origin of social organization to be based on the natural needs of man. Unfortunately, space forbids my giving examples of the whole discussion.¹

These sections throw some new light on the ideal state. We can determine its concept by indicating the purpose which it serves and thus we arrive at the proposition: In accordance with its ideal concept, society exists for procuring the greatest amount of happiness for the persons living in it. Therefore, it seems that the first social organizations entered into by men without careful reflection are not adequate for the concept, that these "temporary states" are not yet states in the full and true sense of the word. We arrive at this result by the reflection that the spiritual needs of human nature, which are most deeply rooted in it, can find as yet very little consideration in these communities. However, if we also wish to apply to the state the point of view, according to which the "necessarily given nature" is to serve (p. 178 f.) as a standard for everything developing in time, then we should always find group organization to be in accordance with this standard wherever society is in a process of development. This development enhances the happiness of the citizens and increases their numbers wherever attention is directed toward the awakening of the spiritual capacities, toward the activity and the strengthening of the powers inherent in these capacities, and wherever morality comes into Being and education, the important means of furthering it, is perfected. On the other hand, in the *Laws* Plato pronounces the harsh judgment about all existing states, which he knows, that they are organizations more for disorder and civic strife than for order and unity.²

¹ Again I refer to the detailed discussion of my *Platons Staat, Darstellung des Inhalts*, and my *Platon*, II.

² *Laws*, 715: *στασιωτείας, ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας τούτους φαμέν*, and 832c: *τὰς οὐ πολιτείας . . . , ἄς πολλάκις εἴρηκα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν λόγοις, δημοκρατίαν*

The striking tutelage of art in the Platonic state is connected with the express purpose of the state and with the educational task which arises from it for the ruler. Not only do we come across the demand of the statesman in the *Republic* that citizens subject themselves to his will, but we meet it also in the *Laws*. And since it is there based on a more elaborate theory of education, I consider it in order, for the present, to put aside those suggestions of the *Republic* which are related to this point.

6. The *Statesman* is most closely connected¹ with the *Sophist*, the introduction of which gives us the theme for both dialogues, namely, to define a sophist and a statesman, so that it may become clear how both are related to each other and to the philosopher. The result is that the sophist appears as an imitator of appearance and as a master in dissembling, but by his conjuring skill he can play the rôle of philosopher before the mass; thus he is fundamentally different from the philosopher, who strives for nothing but knowledge of truth and of reality. Similarly the demagogic, popular orator, who blindly harangues about the good and bad, the weals and woes of the state, is also fundamentally different from the real statesman who has insight into the highest aims of human life and who, therefore, possesses the right standard for the judging of all human arts and human striving. Between the lines we can read that the sophist and the demagogue are united in one person, and that the true philosopher is identical with the true statesman.

We are prepared for the DEFINITION OF THE STATESMAN by having his work compared with that of the weaver. Just as the good weaver weaves a piece of cloth which is to be strong

καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ τυραννίδα. Τούτων γὰρ δὴ πολιτεία μὲν οὐδεμία, στασιωτεῖται δὲ πᾶσαι λέγοντι ἂν ὀρθότατα—with this it is represented as contrary to reason, as complete deformity. Presumably present-day states would be no less harshly criticized by Plato. Cf. *Epistles* VII, 326a.

¹ Cf. p. 176.

and beautiful from threads of opposite nature, the firm threads forming the warp, and the soft, loosely spun threads the woof; so the statesman has to take care that the opposite mental characteristics are woven into harmonious unity, that is to say, he has to see to it that the fiery, quick temperaments and the gentle, deliberative and moderate ones of the citizens whom he guides mutually supplement each other. Above all he must see to it that those men who have as much as possible combined these two opposite natures hold the leading positions, i.e., that they participate in the government, or that men of quiet and gentle temperament stand at the side of and are in agreement with those of an easily excitable and courageous temperament. The simplest means to arrive at such an arrangement is the spiritual bond of a common conviction as to what constitutes the general duty and vocation of mankind. Wherever that exists, the natural differences in ability and disposition will adjust themselves to such a degree that they will lose all ruggedness, that the stormy natures will become calm, that the quiet natures will fortify themselves and that both, in a stimulating and vivifying manner, will mutually influence each other. Therefore, the greatest task of the statesman is to bring about this accord concerning the highest ideals of life by instruction and education. In addition to the spiritual there is also a physical bond which consists in adjusting the differences by expressly arranged marriages. For the conclusion of these marriages, considerations as to comfort, money, or noble lineage must not be the deciding factors; but only that point of view must be decisive which insists that the natural endowment of the one finds its completion in the other; otherwise one-sided traits would reinforce themselves from generation to generation and after a few generations would develop into effeminacy or brutality. To retain our analogy of the weaver, we may say that this bond is easily formed for him who has previously woven the spiritual in that he has established among the citizens uniformity of conviction about what is right and good. He who is not capable of performing this task of the weaver

is no true statesman.¹ Whereas he who has the necessary knowledge for it—perhaps the most difficult and most important knowledge to be had—deserves to be called by this distinguished name or by one of similar meaning, viz., that of ruler or king, and it matters little under what actual conditions he is privileged to work; even when he has no opportunity, he is to show his kingly art.²

In many ways the expositions of the *Republic* are substantiated by the *Statesman*, written at a later time. And yet here we hear nothing of the division of the citizens into three classes with strict division of labour; this division constitutes one of the most striking features of the *Republic*. Nor do we find in the *Statesman* the slightest trace of the psychological assumption on which the three-fold division, as that is found in the *Republic*, is based.³ Similarly, it lacks every indication of the abolition of private property for one part of the citizens of the state and of the fundamental thesis of equality for men and women.

Certain other differences between the two dialogues are not important; as, for example, when the *Statesman* gives six types of the "temporary" states. He arrives at these by distinguishing between monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, and then he introduces into this division the distinction of how the position of power was obtained, whether by force or lawlessly or whether by voluntary consent or lawfully.⁴ We will not do violence to

¹ *Statesman*, 309d.

² 292e ff.

³ Cf. above, p. 73 (282).

⁴ In this connection the following judgment ensues: In so far as the governments are lawful, one can live best under a king, less well in a democracy. Conversely, if they are unlawful, it is easiest to live in a democracy which, since its authority is divided, lacks power and vigour, so that, when compared with the other constitutions, it can accomplish little good or evil. The worst existence is to be found under a tyrant. On the other hand, the rule of classes occupies an intermediate position even here—whether (as ἀριστοκρατία) it holds to laws or whether (as ὀλιγαρχία) it is not concerned with them. Thus there would result the following gradation: lawful monarchy, lawful aristocracy, democracy regulated by law, unbridled rule of the masses, party rule of the few, tyranny.

the meaning of the *Republic* if we duplicate, at least in part, the typical constitutions by also distinguishing a lawful and an unlawful subtype. And even the *Statesman* does not take very seriously the division of the different types of constitutions and their evolution. At any rate, the explanation is given very much in the spirit of the *Republic*: Everything depends on whether the leaders of the state are informed and are experts or not. Therefore, the well-ordered state can only be under the leadership of one individual or under that of a few. If they rule without the consent of the citizens and break existing laws, they are fully justified in doing so, provided they have rightly understood their responsibilities, provided also that they direct the state with understanding, with justice, and that to the best of their ability they maintain and advance the citizens in true virtue. It is ludicrous if we criticize a statesman who, contrary to law and tradition, brings about a better and more rational justice and higher virtue and morality in the state. Even if he goes contrary to all possible other rules and regulations, he does not thereby sin against the spirit of his art, the art of statesmanship, which seeks to base and to promote the good in human society.¹

It is, of course, impossible for one individual to decide on all cases; just as it is impossible for the teacher of gymnastics, who groups many students for common practice, to take into consideration the special needs of each individual in the group. Therefore, general regulations and LAWS, whether written or unwritten, are good and useful as a makeshift. He who has the power to make such laws, however, must also have the power to change them and to replace them by new ones.

7. To his great work, the *Laws*,² Plato gave the following form: An Athenian, a Lacedaemonian, and a Cretan are

¹ *Republic*, 296c.

² Cf. my detailed work, *Platos Gesetze, Darstellung des Inhalts*. Leipzig, 1896.

exchanging ideas about the constitution of the state and about legislation. The Cretan is the first to explain how the legislator of his own city has directed all his legislation concerning public and private life with a view toward war. He approves this and the Lacedaemonian heartily agrees. The Athenian raises objections: The concern about the internal conditions of the state is even more important than the concern about its external relations, i.e., its position of power with reference to other states. Just as peace and friendship must exist among the members of a household and in the circle of relatives of the individual, so peace and friendship must exist among all the citizens of a state. These are most important for the growth and the prosperity of a community. The condition in which good understanding is arrived at by a mutual limitation of rights is to be preferred to the condition in which one part of the citizens—even if it should be the better part—possesses unlimited power, obtained by uprooting or by subjecting the opposing part. Theognis rightly praises the man who shows himself to be honourable and trustworthy in civil strife as being superior to all others. He it is who is a hero in the full sense of the word; he is not only courageous and steadfast towards the pain and dangers threatening him from the enemy, but also courageous and steadfast toward the temptations of sensual enjoyment, conceit, and force. The foremost duty of the legislator must be to train such men, and he must search for all possible means by which to attain this end. Reason commands this and law must be the expression of this demand.

This is in entire agreement with the *Republic* and the *Statesman*, and it characterizes the highest goal of legislation or public order, viz., the production of the moral excellence of the citizens, who will be happy in this excellence. Then follow expositions about the certain means for the attainment of this goal, viz., education. Psychological considerations lead to the realization that intellectual as well as physical education must begin in early youth and must continue to old age; the

preparation for public festivals and dances is to provide opportunity for this continued education.

8. Then follows an HISTORICAL REVIEW which covers a long period of time and which is to test the correctness of the principles advanced so far.

The legislator may learn the following lessons from history: He must not tolerate absolute power. Absolute power will of necessity make a tyrant of a youthful king. But complete democracy is also dangerous. The happiness and the prosperity of the group depend on the right mixture and combination of monarchy and democracy. But how is this mixture to be produced from existing conditions? The Athenian maintains that a good legislator must always be present to lay the foundation for the happiness of the state. But the most favourable conditions which the legislator could wish for himself, as the actual preliminary condition for the application of his knowledge, would be that the power of the state be in the hands of an absolute ruler¹ who is young and excellently endowed, and who has sufficient self-mastery and temperance to inspire complete confidence in him as a legislator of greatest insight; by his power such a ruler will carry out what will be for the well-being of the whole community. Furthermore, since the establishment of a new order which goes contrary to the trend of old customs will always face great difficulties, the most favourable conditions would present themselves where an entirely new city was to be founded.

9. For the founding of such a new city state, the following principles are laid down: The inhabitants are to consist of citizens and slaves. In their political claims and duties, all citizens are to be essentially equal. The firm basis for citizenship consists in having each individual family possess a plot of land which is to be as much as possible of equal value with the others. From this follows the location of the city for the prac-

¹ A *τύραννος*. We would say a dictator.

tically necessary division of the state; it is to be a location which includes a certain number of lots. The size of these lots is determined by the fact that each must adequately supply a family with food. It is essential for the whole state and so for the expansion of the state that the military strength of the combined families be adequate to defy any attack by the enemy. The lots are indivisible and inalienable; their boundaries are well marked and described in public records. Each lot is also provided with an inviolable outfit, including the necessary implements.¹ The working of these lots is done by slaves—it would be more correct to say by a villain peasantry. They receive a good share of the produce of the cultivated fields. To the owners of the land they must deliver only as much “as is necessary for moderate living.”² Even in the state sketched in the *Laws*, there is to be no accumulation of fortunes. It is, therefore, not necessary to produce more than the population can consume. The maximum amount of personal property allowed is put at four times the amount which each family under all circumstances must have for their establishment and for the management of their property. With reference to the difference between the lowest and the highest amount possessed by anyone, four different classes of wealth are formed. The officials also keep exact record about the status of personal property; these records record every unusual increase and every loss. Thus the right of possession is, at all times, perfectly clear.³

A sojourn up to twenty years may be granted to foreigners. They are permitted to engage in trade in the market-place,

¹ Very likely consisting mainly of animals and implements; for the citizens are not to possess silver and gold. It is decreed that the monetary fines imposed may never be so great as to diminish the necessary means of the one fined to carry on the cultivation of the soil.

² *Laws*, 806e.

³ Disputes over titles of possession are decided as much as possible in accordance with the public records of ownership; if their evidence is not decisive, then the three oldest of the guardians of the laws adjust matters within three *Laws*, days. 914d.

in handicraft, and industry; they may also offer their services as teachers of the gymnastic and the musical arts, as comedians and the like, and they have no contributions to make from their earnings, nor do they have to pay a sojourner's tax. The state is satisfied if they are engaged in productive trade for its citizens and if they obey its laws, whose protection is also assured them. Since they have no political duties, they are also deprived of political rights and their treatment for certain misdemeanours differs from that of the citizens. Like slaves, they must expect corporal punishment under certain conditions.

10. The DUTIES of the citizens are very simple. They have to prepare and keep themselves ready for military service and, in case of need, they must defend their country with arms and must also aid neighbouring states, in case these are unjustly attacked by an enemy. In addition, each citizen must rear and maintain a family. Then, too, each one may some day be in the position where he will have to take over the affairs of the state, i.e., in the event that he should be elected to some public office. One might think that the citizens lead a rather comfortable life. But this would not be in accordance with Plato's purpose. He takes express caution against such a conception. A comfortable life, he says, would most certainly lead to effeminacy and, in time, into slavery brought about by other, more hardened natures. But the truth of the matter is that there is enough and more than enough work for the citizens to do. The high task of training the body and the mind to the greatest achievements requires all of their time. It is even necessary that they make use of their time in accordance with a strict schedule of work which holds for men and women. Early in the morning after a brief night's rest, the work is to begin. In addition, here as in the *Republic*, common meals are instituted, which are under proper supervision and which are accompanied by regular sacrifices. The consequence of this is that all divide the day in the same manner.

We are more definitely informed about the regular activities

of youth. There is universal compulsory EDUCATION for boys and girls from the ages of ten to approximately the eighteenth year. Naturally, the schools are concerned with the physical as well as the intellectual training of the pupils. For three years they are instructed in reading and writing; for four years they are to receive instruction in vocal and instrumental music and in language. Then we are told that in a general education, a certain elementary knowledge of arithmetic, of geometry, and of astronomy must necessarily be acquired; at least to the same extent that each child in Egypt acquires such knowledge in play.

Even the GAMES and exercises of the pre-school years are carefully regulated. By means of these games at a very early age the child is to be taught to co-operate with other individuals, to subordinate itself to another's command, i.e., it is to be taught obedience. In part the children will invent their own games; but under the direction of the supervisors they will be taught definite, purposeful, and good games.

It is also noteworthy that the demands made of the school are also made of the mothers; in rearing their children, they may not neglect to exercise the left hand in addition to the right. Plato remarks that the Scythians serve as a good example in this particular. Every ability must be fully employed, in order that it may not deteriorate because of lazy habits. Evidently by nature both hands are equally capable. In a serious combat he who has trained both arms equally well will prove to be superior to his opponent who is skilled only in the use of his right arm.

He who has graduated from school will find a certain incentive for continuing his gymnastic and liberal training in the FESTIVALS which are every month regularly arranged in honour of the many gods and in which the whole community participates, celebrating them with dance and athletic contests. So as not to lose the skill acquired in the use of weapons, special military festivities are provided. These also take place once a month and last at least one day, but they may last

longer. Whether they shall extend beyond one day depends on the free judgment of the government, which also has it in its power to determine in each individual case whether only a part of those capable of bearing arms shall participate in the manœuvres or whether all shall participate, and whether the women and the children shall be present. Special arrangements are also made for the military training of the young men.

II. In order to understand fully Plato's suggestion about the combined intellectual development of adults, we must proceed from Plato's THEORY OF EDUCATION. In doing so, we may very well bring in isolated expositions from the *Republic*. From it we already know that Plato incorporated as part of the purposes of the state the cultivation of virtue (and piety), that he thought of all education as civic education; thus he brought the art of education, pedagogy, into the most intimate relation with the government of the state. The leader of the state must be the educator of the citizens; he must be the state pedagogue. These convictions can also be amply substantiated by very definite statements from the *Laws*. Besides, in the *Republic* we find the statement that education by means of the two customary branches of gymnastics and music (i.e., the training of the body and the mind) must be begun with the little child, because even before its mind can be trained, it unconsciously experiences the educative or deteriorating effect which all the objects of its environment, the objects of nature, and the objects of art with which it comes in contact, the tones which it hears, have on its nature. By pleasant and playful activity of its powers, it is to be brought into the spiritual disposition which its reason will later learn to recognize as the right one. From such propositions follows the demand for the strict supervision over all products of the artisan and of the artist by the philosophical leaders of the state. In the *Republic* we find such provisions as: It is thought that whenever irregularity and disorder set in in play it is something which concerns only the form of recreation and of entertainment; the consequences, however,

will be serious rebellion against the customary morality and law in all realms. Conversely, it is by well-ordered play that the education of the young generation is most certainly equipped with a sense for the good. And just as play is here represented as the most important beginning of all education in childhood, similarly the exhortation is also given for the education of later years that it be conducted more in a playful spirit than with force, since force is unworthy of a free man and is not appropriate in spiritual matters, such as learning.

To supplement these propositions, we may take the following from the *Laws*: Education (*παιδεία*) is instruction in perfect virtue, in the possession of which man is morally good and in which he follows the commands of reason or the laws of the state, which are the expression of a higher reason. It is primarily concerned with consciously putting all of man's inclinations and desires in the service of that one goal. To attain this goal, education must begin with the child as early as possible, even before the awakening of its understanding. In the meantime, it can employ two impulses of human nature,¹ impulses which manifest themselves very early, and without any definite purpose begin to make themselves known in play, viz., the impulse to move the members of the body and the impulse to produce sounds. The unhampered unfolding and the activity of these impulses are accompanied by a sensation of pleasure; this activity becomes pleasant play and it is always begun with renewed pleasure. Thus, at the same time that this impulse is strengthened by practice, the habit is developed of manifesting it in a definite direction. The free, playful expression and activity of these impulses can take place in various ways and in various directions. If the determining of the direction is left to chance or purposive, evil influence, it may greatly stray from what reason prescribes. The task of education consists in obviating

¹ The *Republic* expressed the conviction that education can only set out from the natural impulses of human nature and can only develop existing inclinations; that it cannot put anything into man for which he does not have an inclination. Cf. also p. 292 above.

such a departure; therefore, it must do away with all influences which bring these deviations about, and by regulating the playful activity, it must bind this activity to measure and order and so keep it in harmony with the precepts of reason. Thus from the very beginning education produces a good character in the children whom it directs. Their games will have a nobler content and more beautiful forms. For beauty is visible expression of moral character. We are told that its artistic completion finds expression in the bodily movements in dance, while the formation of sounds finds expression in melodic song which accompanies the dances and which embodies good thoughts; both are joined in the festival dances given in honour of Apollo and the Muses.

With this a firmer basis is given to the proposition that the regularly scheduled festivals with their dances are means to keep alive the spiritual interests of the citizens. But almost immediately something additional follows. If the festivals are really to accomplish what Plato demands of them, viz., that they serve as an important educational means for all citizens, then the artistic presentations must be well prepared. The choruses into which the whole citizenry is divided according to age evidently serve the purpose of their preparation. He speaks of choruses for boys, for young men, and for older men.¹ We are told that the Muses and Apollo are the patrons for the first two; that Dionysus² is the patron of that for the older men; and that separately all three practise "dances" and "songs" at their regular gatherings. At times he also mentions choruses for girls, for young women, and for older women.

In these choruses I see a supplement and continuation of school, from which they differ in that foreigners serve as paid

¹ The "old ones," γέροντες, including men from 30 to 60 years of age.

² We cannot discuss the custom of drinking wine at the meetings of the men's chorus and also at certain carousals of the young men instituted by the state, arranged in accordance with the principle that wine "rejoices the heart of man" and that "*in vino veritas*" makes itself known. Compare what I have said on this point in my commentary to the *Laws*, p. 58, and *Platon*, II, 683-690.

teachers in the schools and only impart the indispensable basis of knowledge and technical skill; whereas here the citizens and the children of the citizens gather, in order to cultivate freely their spiritual interest. I think of their meetings and their practices as taking place daily and as occupying a good part of the day (which is also rigidly divided for work, even for those who have outgrown school).

12. In addition, special arrangement is made for the scientific and practical PERFECTION OF THE BEST-ENDOWED NATURES. Beginning with the first years of their membership in the chorus of old men, i.e., from the thirtieth year on, these outstanding individuals may be asked to attend the sessions of a committee of government or the council of state, which take place daily before sunrise at a time of day when it is most quiet and when the time is less taken up with other matters.

Under the title "committee of government" or "council of state," I should like to include the regular members of the so-called early assembly, or as it is more frequently called the nightly assembly. The following are the highest officials of the state of the *Laws*: The director of public instruction with his immediate predecessors, the members of the highest judiciary body (about fifteen in all), the ten oldest members of the college of regents, the guardian of the laws,¹ as well as those men who, with the permission of or upon the commission of the state, have been on scientific journeys in foreign countries and who have given satisfactory reports on them; all these are old men who are still active and in good health. Each one must at least have passed his fiftieth year; most of them are closer to seventy than to fifty. Each one of them has to select from the number of young men an individual whom he introduces into this illustrious circle as the man who enjoys his special confidence and whom he is educating as his personal aid. This body of men, meeting every morning, plays a very important rôle. The duty of these men, we are told, is to supervise the laws.

¹ We shall speak again of all these offices later.

They must have a clear understanding of the purpose and the goal of the state and must not only know that it is the excellence of the citizens which makes the state perfect and that this excellence is to be the undeviating guide for all politics, but they must also have exact and certain insight into the nature of human excellence, and they must show this insight in their own actions as well as in their judgment of the actions, the regulations, and the arrangements of others. This is only possible if they have a more thorough and a more complete education than that which is prescribed for the masses, if they know how to apprehend the concept of all individual and among themselves differing presentations, if they recognize this concept as the dominating unity to which all must be referred, and if, when setting out from such a unity, they discover¹ the many isolated conditions and things in which this unity is active. In particular, they must have a more profound insight into the nature of God than the masses, who must be satisfied with following the authority of tradition on these matters. As much as possible, they should give a scientific basis for their religious belief by acquiring knowledge of the human soul and of reason, which is active in the order of the whole world and which manifests itself in the orderly movements of the stars. Thus in a certain sense they will represent the EMBODIED REASON OF THE STATE. Here a thorough education in philosophy is demanded of the members of the guardian council of the state, and thereby also for the highest offices of the state of whose incumbents the council of state is composed. This requirement is similar to the requirements laid down in the *Republic* for the philosophically inclined natures which are to be educated as the rulers of the ideal state.²

13. I shall omit from my discussion the excellent, hortatory introduction to the LAWS ABOUT MARRIAGE, which are appended

¹ *Laws*, 965c and 963c.

² It is also true that the "perfect guardians" are the embodied reason of the state. The wisdom of the state consists in their wisdom, just as its courage consists in the courage of the second class. See above, p. 73 f.

to the lawful provisions about the division of the citizenry into classes. But I must call attention to one peculiarity which, as it seems to me, is worthy of being imitated. I mean the introduction of the "guardians of marriage" who are selected from women who have proved themselves and who in an exemplary married life have reared children; these guardians have as their duty to keep a watch over the married life of newly weds, and to this end they are provided with tactful and practical instructions.

The discussion of marital relations naturally leads to the question of what treatment is accorded WOMAN in the state of the *Laws*. The fundamental principle holds that the feminine sex must be educated as much as possible for the state. If the legislator should completely neglect the women who constitute one-half of the citizenry, then his work is only half done and he can produce only half of the happiness which would otherwise follow from his laws. The Athenian leader of the conversation believes that a definite plan of life, i.e., a daily routine of work, is without doubt as necessary for the women as it is for the men. And however much they may object, the common meals are also to be extended to them. But, during these meals, they are to remain by themselves and separated from the tables of the men. Gymnastic and musical exercises, as well as contests, are also arranged for them. Naturally therefore they must attend the gymnasia and the schools. But separation of sexes is expressly prescribed here and that from the sixth year on. Yet the objects of their exercises are not different because of this.¹ The girls also are to be able to ride, to use the bow, the spear, and the sling. Detailed arrangement is made for the young girls to engage in military exercises to the extent that they may know how to use the weapons and to be able to dance in armour. The women, on the contrary, are to learn to manœuvre and carry out strategical plans, in order,

¹ Besides it is said, 802e: The songs for the choruses for women must differ in quality of tone and rhythm from those for men; they must correspond to the different characters of the two sexes.

we are told, that in extreme necessity they do not show themselves less able and more cowardly than birds who defend their brood. The limiting of women's military duties is compensated for by the duties which a woman has to assume as mother. It is presupposed that a woman during the first ten years of her marriage gives all her time and energy to children.

The highest offices of the state are filled only by men.¹ But there are other, highly important offices which are filled only by women. In addition to the office of guardian of marriage, there is that of supervisor of play. And in various councils women sit at the side of men.

14. Besides, it seems to me that from the rather detailed arrangements about THE OFFICES AND THEIR INCUMBENTS the following is worthy of note: The college of the "guardians of the law" together with the council constitutes the real government. These must be irreproachable men from fifty to seventy years of age.

The council of the people,² which shares with the "guardians of the law" the care for the current business, is to be selected by voting and consist of an equal number from each of the four property classes. The active and passive right to vote belongs to all adult citizens.

The council of selected magistrates constitutes a type of disciplinary court or the highest court of justice.³ We have met all these councillors as members of the council of state. In age they range from fifty to seventy-five. It is said of this body of men that they are to embody the Idea of justice, which as the one ruling principle lies at the basis of all regulations of the state. But their task is to supervise the functioning of all the other offices of the state.

The office of minister of education is considered as the most important office in the state. The man who holds it must in

¹ It is hardly believable that, according to Plato, a woman could ever have held the highest position in the ideal state of the *Republic*.

² The *βουλή*.

³ Zeller says, Supreme Court (*Staatsgerichtshof*).

every way be, as much as possible, the ablest man of all the citizens. Only those guardians of the law who have children by legitimate marriages, if possible boys and girls, are eligible for this office. The term of office is five years.

We know that in the *Laws* and in the *Republic* the education and instruction of the citizens appear as the first and highest duty of the state, that all regulations of the state are to be evaluated according to what they contribute to this. We know that the whole organization of life is considered as part of the means of education, that in addition to gymnastics and music, i.e., in addition to the games, the various subjects in the curriculum, the sciences, the plastic arts, and the handicrafts must also be viewed from the pedagogical viewpoint. Among other things we are told that no poet is to be allowed to show his poem to any person until it has been approved by the director of education and has been judged as worthy of distribution. (This, of course, applies to other artists also.) Thus we understand how Plato lets the aged Athenian assure us that the man who holds this office has few quiet hours, because he is fully conscious of his great responsibility. We also understand why express authority has been given him to enlist as his aids whomever he pleases of men and women, and whomever he considers to be fit for this work.

It is self-evident that the minister of public instruction must belong to the council of state.

The responsibilities of this highest official coincide in many ways with those of the guardians of the law, of whom it is also incidentally said that they are to co-operate with him. His aids, however, are the supervisors of the schools and of the gymnasia, the directors of the different choruses and festivals, as well as the women supervisors of children's games.

We also hear of such other officials as supervisors of the city, the market, and the country; officers of the army; priests, treasurer of the temple, etc.; and finally different classes of judges.

Especially noteworthy is the great difference in the mode of

election which is employed for electing the various individuals for the different offices. All details are carefully arranged, in order to meet the requirement that the government shall steer for the middle course between absolutism and democratic freedom.¹

The provisions concerning JURISDICTION and the judiciary officials, the measures for assuring the DEFENCE of the state, and the excellently conceived AGRARIAN LEGISLATION, with its statistics concerning production and its prudent provision for the cheap distribution of the produce of the land, probably deserve fuller consideration. But in this limited exposition there is no room for this.²

15. At this stage, I shall consider only a few propositions which throw light on these points. It is stated, "Even the filling of vacancies in the court is in a certain sense the choice of magistrates." And the fundamental contention is advanced that all citizens take part in the administration of justice, since by doing so they become most clearly conscious of the enjoyment of their civic right; whereas "he who is excluded from the responsibility of participating in trials, believes himself entirely excluded from the state." And "Each state would cease to be a state if its courts were no longer properly administered." The games for the youth and all gymnastic exercises and competitions are so arranged that they may serve as a preparation for serious, warlike purposes. Military service covers a long period (for men it extends to the sixtieth year); and it is taken very seriously. (In case of necessity even the women who can bear arms and who have been trained in the use of arms are called upon to defend their country.) In case of need all the citizens, in a very large measure, dispose of the produce of an individual field; this is done in accordance with the expressed

¹ Plato says of the manner of election of the council, *Laws*, 756e: ἡ . . . αἵρεσις οὕτω γιγνομένη μέσον ἂν ἔχοι μοναρχικῆς καὶ δημοκρατικῆς πολιτείας, ἥς ἀεὶ δεῖ μεσεύειν τὴν πολιτείαν.

² Again I refer to my works: *Platos Gesetze, Darstellung des Inhalts*; *Platos Gesetze, Kommentar zum griech. Text*; and *Platon*, II.

provision that no person, who through no fault of his own but through misfortune got into difficulty and was incapacitated to earn his livelihood, shall suffer in the state; not even a slave.¹ In managing and cultivating his plot of ground, the owner is bound by state regulations which determine the limits for everything which is concerned with the feeding of the populace; only within these limits may the cultivation of the soil and the breeding of animals take place. Thus, in various ways the fundamental proposition is expressed that the individual has his share of the land and his house assigned to him as his property, but he may regard what is thus given him only as a portion of property which belongs to the whole community, and he is to use it in this sense. At the same time, it is impressed on him that he is to remember the sacredness of his native soil.²

All laws are so made that they give a great deal of freedom to the judge in passing judgment. For, we are told, wherever the judges' benches are filled with men who are educated and who possess good character (and a good state sees to it that this will take place), there, in addition to the few model cases in accordance with which matters can be decided, it is enough to indicate certain limits within which the judicial imposition of punishment must take place. Only in states whose judiciary system is bad (where the elections are carried out with cowardly secrecy, or where in the execution of justice open partiality is shown by giving expression to approval or to disapproval) would it be necessary to determine in detail the exact penalties for all conceivable cases.

Again I must pass over the very noteworthy details of

¹ Therefore, the state can and must suppress begging. The beggar is expelled from the state, *Laws*, 936c.

² Thus, at the end of Bk. II, we read: "Just as there must be a definite limit set for the various products of the land and the entire food supply, so the vine will be cultivated on a very limited and on a very small scale." And in *Laws*, 740a we have the general principle expressed that every one of the citizens "consider the particular plot of ground which is his by lot as being the common property of the whole state and that, since the earth is their parent, they tend her more than children tend their parents."

legislation concerning murder, beating to death, bodily injury, depriving of freedom, robbery, and the regulations of trade and of the exchange of goods. Yet I should like to mention that great care is given to the PROTECTION OF THE WEAK (including the slaves) and that strict penalties are imposed for exploitation of their weakness and the abuse of one's advantage. E.g., a guardian of the laws who, as member of the guardians of orphans, was found by judicial investigation to have neglected his duty, must expect not only a fine but also removal from office. The physician or the teacher of gymnastics who has sold a sick slave as a healthy one must, upon complaint, not only take him back for the same price but he must repay double the purchase price paid for him. While the average person, who, through superstition and witchcraft, is engaged in the mixing of salves and potions and other similar things, can in accordance with the decision of the court be more or less severely punished, the physician, the seer, and the augur who practise these things shall be condemned to death. He who takes the fruits of the field from his neighbour is subject to a relatively severe punishment, whereas this same crime is otherwise considered a mild offence. If a citizen has an illicit relation with a slave and a child is born as a consequence, she will thereby win her freedom (but she with her child must leave the country). No one shall suffer for crimes which he himself has not committed. For that reason a penalty must never extend to the offspring of the guilty person. If, by sentencing the father, the children have lost their provider, they are treated like orphans and receive the corresponding care from the state.

CHAPTER V

PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF ART

1. Among the peculiarities of Plato's ideal state, we have already noticed, among other things, the strict SUPERVISION OF ART by the ruler of the state.¹ The demands have a puritanical rigidity. They are so stated that one might think that the person who proposed them was void of all artistic sensitivity and understanding. The only poems the poet is permitted to write are "hymns to the gods and songs in honour of virtuous men." And the artists working in the plastic arts—even the simple tradesman—are no less limited. They too are "in need of supervision which is to keep their pictures or their buildings or some other work coming from their hand from representing bad, ignoble opinion, lack of discipline, and barbarity." He who does not want to submit himself to this limitation "must be deprived of his trade," in order that young people do not "like young cattle on a noxious meadow" carry away a greater evil (the corruption of their souls²) from the representations of wickedness which are daily offered them in small doses by their whole environment as their spiritual nourishment.

The dwellings, rather the barracks, in which the guardians (men and women) of the state spend their lives, in common with all their colleagues, are very simply furnished; the guardians are even forbidden to make use of objects of gold and of every article of adornment.³ Plastic art also plays a very minor rôle in the *Laws* with its regulations concerning luxuries which permit neither gold, nor silver, nor ivory to be offered to the gods; they permit only wood and stone and woven articles and limit the work of the artist on these things to one day.⁴

¹ See pp. 328, 337.

³ *Republic*, 416e f.

² *Republic*, 401b.

⁴ *Laws*, 955e f.

And yet Plato was endowed by nature with the highest artistic gifts, so that he could, as tradition about his youth tells us, earnestly strive to compete with the great tragedians of Athens for the palm of victory. How profound and how lasting the impression was which he received from the poetical achievements of others is clearly evinced by the words with which he speaks of Homer.¹ It is part of the tragedy of his life that he who so keenly felt in his being the fire of the divine madness of the poet² had to deny himself free artistic activity. It is not without reason, even if at times with serious misunderstanding of his greatest gift—the scientific-philosophic—that he is often called the poet among philosophers. His marvellous style with its life-giving freshness, its union of flexibility, of abundance and power, of splendour and precision, and its play of hilarity and dignity, has no parallel in the entire literature of the world. Plato knows that it is not the well-thought-out rules and the careful application of them which make the artist, but something incomprehensible which springs from the hidden depths of human nature. Nevertheless, he seeks to tone down this ardour, to dam up this tide which streams from this source, by rules which are to be carefully followed. At the border of the state, he hospitably entertains the imitator of Homer who seeks admission and shows him all honour “as if he were a holy, wonderful, and lovable man”; but he does not admit him.³ The reason is “there are no such people in our state.” And we have to be “satisfied with drier and less charming poetry and fables, BECAUSE IT IS BETTER TO DO SO.” Similarly in the *Laws*,⁴ Plato denies entrance to the tragedians. “Do not believe that thoughtlessly we shall erect your stages in our agora and permit your actors with their speeches and their beautiful voices, which are heard above our own, to harangue our women, children, and all the people in order to spread different doctrines from our own about human endeavour with which we, too, are concerned.” In such rude

¹ Especially 595bc and 607c ff.

² *Republic*, 398a.

³ Page 85.

⁴ *Laws*, 817a ff.

language Plato rejects the best which his native poetry offered him.

He cannot do otherwise. Because the artist's blood flows in his veins, he knows better than the cold critics the dangers of the emotional drive which, through the enjoyment of flattering performances, leads to over-confidence which is no longer subject to reason. "If you admit the honeyed muse¹ of epic or lyric verse to the state, then pleasure and pain will rule the state" rather than reason and its laws.²

With the decay of rigid and chaste art, the decay of morality begins. This is also the meaning of the saying of Damon: "Nowhere are modes of music changed without at the same time affecting the most important laws of the state."³ Thus it was in Athens. Deterioration and barbarism originated in music and in the theatre. It began in that poets who were gifted, but who had not attained maturity in aesthetic taste, were lost in "obscure and wild excitement and were too susceptible to the stimuli of immediate pleasure," and confused the heretofore strictly differentiated styles, as if there were no truth in art and as if the true standard for its creations were simply the pleasure which it produces, regardless of whether it is pleasure of a noble or of an ignoble nature. In this way they spoiled their public, which now began to claim for itself the right to decide in matters of taste. The places where formerly one could quietly and reverently contemplate art were now filled with noise. And the tumultuous critique once let loose went further and soon recognized no authority. Therefore, that with which artistic performances are concerned is of the greatest importance. At all times, the question is whether the individual becomes good or bad in the state. Hence no exception may be made; not even of poetry.⁴

In excluding Homer and the tragedians, Plato himself is not altogether at ease. He feels the loss too keenly and is in search of a means to replace it. Much which produced poetic inspira-

¹ ἡδυσμένη μοῦσα.

³ *Republic*, 424c.

² *Republic*, 607a.

⁴ *Republic*, 608b.

tion will no doubt be useful and will be able to stand before the strictest moral judgment. All we need is to be selective. In the *Laws* this duty is imposed on the directors of public festivals. They are urged to have as large a collection of usable poems as possible and are constantly to be on the look-out to increase this store. In the *Laws* it is also recognized that formerly the theatre was an institution for the moral education of the people, and it is indicated that through wise legislation it can again be made such in the future.¹ Plato also compares the fundamental introductions which, according to the pattern given in the *Laws*, are to introduce the criminal code of the law, with poetic words which greet the human emotions in a friendly vein. Some have thought that he wanted to replace drama by his philosophic dialogues. But this is wrong. That all such substitutes are inadequate for him is evident from the fact that—already in the *Republic*—he calls on impartial persons to defend the poets whom he exiled. Only too gladly would he like to be shown, by convincing proof coming from eloquent lips, that the “joyful poetry” is not merely pleasant but also useful for the ordering of the states and for the life of man.²

2. But in what, according to Plato, does the nature of art consist? What task is set the artist and how does he proceed in his activity? We would say: THE OBJECT OF ART IS THE BEAUTIFUL. The task of the artist is to produce the beautiful. It would seem that with this the purpose, as well as the nature, of art were defined. The only question which still needs to be answered is: What is beauty? Plato asks this question and that quite early in the *Greater Hippias*, where, to be sure, he does not yet find a satisfactory answer. The *Republic* gives us additional help and finally we obtain a thorough exposition of it in the *Laws*. Here we are told that the opinion of the many is “that in competitive achievements those deserve the first

¹ *Laws*, 659b.

² As we shall see, Aristotle tried to make this defence later. Schiller made a much better and more convincing defence.

prize who put us into the happiest and most pleasant frame of mind." But it is clear that this answer would lead to complete subjectivism; for¹ each one is best pleased with that which corresponds to his nature and education. Therefore, Plato says, "I shall grant the multitude this much, viz., that artistic productions must be judged according to taste (ἡδονή); this must not however be the taste of the next best, but rather that artistic achievement will be most beautiful which brings pleasure to the best and those adequately educated." Shortly before² he had advanced the definition: "All figures and melodies"—we may say all perceptible forms—"which are concerned with a good attribute of the soul or the body, whether indirectly or directly, are beautiful; whereas the opposite is true of those which are concerned with a bad attribute of the soul or of the body." Already in the *Republic* the statement is made that THE BEAUTIFUL IS AN EXPRESSION OF THE GOOD, of temperance, courage, ingenuousness, superiority, etc. The symbolic expression of psychic characteristics is possible³ in every form of external existence, in all matter. Noble and ignoble forms are to be had everywhere. Even the whole manner of man's external appearance, his mien and his attitude and behaviour toward others, must be considered. Plato regards him as an artist who shows⁴ nobility of character in this manner. He intentionally placed this characterization of the genuinely virtuous man over against the art of the tragic poet and the actor who wish to represent a character which is foreign to them, a character into which they must enter and understand. In the *Laws* Plato replies to the tragic poets who

¹ Cf. p. 77 f.

² *Laws*, 655b.

³ *Republic*, 400d ff. "Eloquence, good disposition, noble posture and good inner discipline depend on truly good and noble intention." This must be considered "in its widest extent for painting and every related activity; the same applies to weaving and embroidery, to architecture and to the production of all vessels. But this also applies to the development of the body and of all living things. For everywhere there is noble and ignoble conduct," etc.

⁴ The same is true of him who, because of such virtue, produces order and leads others to do the same.

seek admission to his state: "We ourselves are composers of a tragedy which we desire to make as beautiful as possible. The whole organization of our state is proposed as an imitation of the best and most beautiful manner of life which we consider to be, indeed, the most genuine tragedy."¹ Just as the pleasant produces an appearance of the good, so the charming, the alluring produces an appearance of the beautiful; but this appearance does not endure and shows itself to be deceptive in that the pleasure which the pleasant and the charming offer vanishes and may even change into its opposite.²

If art is to represent the beautiful, it will attain this essentially in that it makes the good strike our senses. From this follow its laws and the standard which we must apply in order to know whether or not the achievements of art deserve recognition. Whenever it produces the ugly, it is contrary to its peculiar task; it is an offence against the laws of art; and critique of art and aesthetics must pronounce this offence ugly.³

We can also set up certain FORMAL CONDITIONS or laws which an object of art must meet in order to be beautiful. These laws demand the correspondence of the external form with the thought-content or symmetry; they also demand, when the object is considered externally in and by itself, the proportion and agreement of its parts or harmony. That which the *Philebus* includes in the class of the mixed (cf. p. 108 f.) is beautiful because it possesses these characteristics.⁴ The cause for this

¹ *Laws*, 817b. In Plato's sense, we may, of course, also speak of a comedy of life—as a matter of fact he himself uses that expression in the *Philebus*, 50b. This comedy is played by those people who, through the expression of their mental characteristics, make themselves ridiculous in the presence of rational judges in that they consider the unimportant to be important and who because of trivialities forget the high goal.

² I wish to call attention here to the main thoughts of Schiller's aesthetic reflections being in agreement with Plato's.

³ Cf. *Statesman*, 296b ff.

⁴ Cf. *Philebus*, 25e. "Everything which puts an end to the fluctuations between opposite characteristics by introducing number produces symmetry and harmony." And 26a, "Gaining control over the cold and the hot, it lets the all-too-much and the unlimited disappear and

symmetry, etc., in the objects and the events of nature, in good weather or in a healthy development of the body, is the rational creative power which has produced the right mixture between the infinite, the unlimited, and its opposite, that which sets limits and bounds.¹ In human products the cause of symmetry and beauty is to be sought in the rational adaptation to the conditions of nature, i.e., the observation of the law which nature has prescribed² for the development of things, or it is to be sought in the divine inspiration³ of the creative artist. Through proportion and all round agreement, the most intimate relations conceivable between the parts will be established and these will be united into a unitary whole.⁴ The wholeness, or, as modern writers on aesthetics have defined it, unity in the manifold, is an essential characteristic of beauty. In fact, this says nothing which was not already contained in the assertion about the close relationship between the beautiful and the good. For the good can persist only through order and agreement. The *Gorgias*⁵ tells us that. This statement is also substantiated⁶ by the expositions of the *Philebus* and the

produces measure and fitness (τὸ ἔμμετρον καὶ ἅμα σύμμετρον).” We may also say that that is beautiful which clearly corresponds to “the necessary essential nature” (ἀναγκαιὰ γενέσεως οὐσία). *Statesman*, 283d; cf. p. 190 and the notes there given.

¹ ὁρθὴ κοινωνία *Philebus*, 25e. Compare also Schiller’s statement—“every beautiful form of nature,” as, e.g., the “architectonic beauty” of the human body, is “the visible expression of an Idea.”

² The *Statesman* (284a) says of all the arts (τέχναι) that they must take into consideration the origin of the standard (μέτρον)—one might substitute for this, it must take into consideration the ἀναγκαιὰ γενέσεως οὐσία—“in that they help the standard to become actual, they produce everything good and beautiful.” ³ The *θεία μανία*.

⁴ Cf. *Timaeus*, 31e f.

⁵ See above, p. 53.

⁶ *Philebus*, 64d ff. “Every mixture, whatever its nature or duration may be, in so far as it lacks limit and proportion, must necessarily destroy what is mixed in it and above all must destroy itself. No mixture comes into being in this manner; but in truth only . . . an intricate confusion.”—Whereupon it is said, “Now the good” (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις: the power of the good—with whose characteristics the investigation of the *Philebus* is concerned) “has fled into the realm” (really: the nature, τὴν φύσιν) “of the beautiful. For correct limits

Timaeus. But of the concept of the whole it must be said that it must be teleologically defined or determined in accordance with an Idea. Wherever a person finds beauty, there an Idea makes itself known in sensibility, i.e., there is something eternal, whole, and good. Therefore, the enthusiasm which the sight of the beautiful arouses (as well as the striving for eternal content, for infinity, and for all-sufficiency or perfection) is already in the form of knowledge; consequently knowledge also presses for communication. The activity of the artist, who clearly embodies his idea in concrete forms, is related to the activity of the philosopher, who sharpens the observation of others, so that they can see the Idea even in confused presentations and conditions which are difficult to comprehend. But the power which enables an individual to transcend the confused details and to attain the height whence he can clearly view the Idea is the soul-inspiring EROS.¹

It is, of course, also necessary that the artist have a sure hand or voice and the necessary skill, in order to incorporate his ideal in the material with which he is working. This requires a certain amount of technical education which, for that very reason, may not be neglected. Yet it would be ridiculous to regard it² as the most important and to consider what it can achieve to be in and by itself artistic achievement and beautiful. E.g., if someone were to come to Sophocles and Euripides and were to represent himself as a tragic poet of equal rank with them, because he knew how to give long or short compositions, or compositions which are threatening or which arouse sympathy or fear, or if the person who knows how to tune harps and proportion (*συμμετρία*, symmetry) follow everywhere upon beauty and virtue." Later, 15a, beauty, symmetry, and truth are once more given as the constituent characteristics of the good. *Timaeus*, 87c, "Certainly, everything good is beautiful, but the beautiful is not without measure"; and 30c, "It was and is impossible for the best man to produce anything but the most beautiful." The good can find expression only in beautiful form.

¹ Cf. above, pp. 66 f., 85, 109 f.

² It only produces the indispensable, preliminary conditions, τὰ πρὸ τῆς τέχνης. *Phaedrus*, 269b. Cf. also above, p. 247 f.

correctly were to consider himself equal with the harmonizer, he would in his delusion be a poor simpleton.¹

The demand for symmetry or agreement as the condition of beauty is directed to the end that the form must be in agreement with the content and must be determined by it. To have the form in its technical achievements predominate is offensive to the finer feelings. While the uneducated marvel at the virtuoso and jack-of-all-trades, the educated person is repelled and almost offended by his skill which lacks in thought and in soul.

The *Timaeus*² informs us that the agreement between soul and body is of the greatest significance. The entire training of the body as provided for in the *Republic* has for its goal to establish as much as possible a perfect agreement between the soul and the body. And "where moral beauty of soul is united with a corresponding beauty of body, both being of the same mould, there will be the most beautiful sight for him who can see."³ On the contrary, an improper relation between soul and body results not only in sickness, but in all kinds of evil. And from the corruption of the soul there will arise ugly, distorted, hideous forms.

We have been told that artistic products must be evaluated according to the pleasure which they give, i.e., in accordance with a judgment of taste; they are not, however, to be rejected in accordance with the taste of the great mass but in accordance with that of the best and most educated men.⁴ There is,

¹ *Phaedrus*, 268c ff.

² *Timaeus*, 87d, "For health and sickness, as well as for virtue and vice, no proportion and no disproportion are more important than that proportion which exists between soul and body." That is, "if a strong and in every respect a mighty soul at the same time has for its vehicle a weak and less capable body or if the converse relation exists between these two elements of the living being, the whole is not beautiful, for it lacks proportion in the most important relationships. But when the opposite is realized, there appears to everyone who can see the most beautiful and the most lovely sight."

³ *Republic*, 402d.

⁴ These would be the men who—according to the expression of the Orphic poem, cited further on—have reached εἰς ὦραν τῆς τέρφης.

therefore, a good and bad, an educated and uneducated or perverted taste.¹ But what is correct, good taste? The *Laws* maintain this can be decided only by critical understanding. This will bring to consciousness that it would be a gross error if, e.g., one "should accompany words which were written for men by dance rhythm and harmonies appropriate for women, or if the songs and dances for free men were accompanied by rhythms which are appropriate for slaves and the rabble, or if noble rhythms and dance movements were accompanied by a harmony or a text which is in conflict with those rhythms." Similarly it is wrong to combine voices of animals, human beings, and instruments and noises of every description for the production of an effect, or to separate rhythm and dance movements from harmony, harmony and rhythm from the text, to put bare words into metre or to employ the barren music of the lyre and of the flute. And it is ridiculous to think that all who have been drilled to sing to an accompaniment and to keep time also possess an adequate knowledge of good and bad melodics and rhythemics.

3. When Plato, in the *Republic*, considers the essence of art to consist in IMITATION, he seems to pursue a different path for an understanding of art from what is here given. Yet if we place this explanation, which is not easy to understand, in its proper setting, it would seem that nothing special is to be said by it. We recall from the theory of Ideas that the relation of the individual phenomena to the Idea is frequently described as an imitation of its essence. The Ideas are, therefore, the prototypes of sensible objects. In the *Timaeus*, we have the description of how the demiurge looks to an eternal prototype and shapes the cosmos into a form of perfect beauty. In a more careful description we are told that what is patterned after an eternal prototype is always beautiful; whereas that which the human artisan has patterned after the prototype of a sensible thing is ugly. From this I conclude that the true artist

¹ Cf. pp. 53, 76 f., 79, 361.

always produces in accordance with an Idea (the beholding of which generates in him an inspiration bordering on madness), but never in accordance with its images. In doing so, he imparts to his product the noble stamp of beauty. One may logically divide the concept of imitation in various ways; but the division which aesthetics alone considers holds to the distinction whether an Idea is imitated immediately or mediately. Every Idea, however, which on a material basis has been given expression by the good imitation of the artist, not merely transfigures the form, but, because it has spiritual content and belongs to a realm of Ideas united in harmonious order, which can only be understood teleologically, its appearance in visible phenomena has at the same time a certain moral significance. Thus everything agrees with what the other propositions offered us.

4. F. Finsler¹ says that "it is impossible to obtain a continuous PLAN OF A PLATONIC POETICS." This is true. On the basis of isolated expositions, we cannot give a closed theory. Nevertheless, it seems to me that no great gaps remain if I summarize what was referred to above and if I supplement it with minor additions and psychological propositions as follows:

Every artistic activity is free play. In its origin and nature this activity arises from the need of the artistic nature to create, and is similar to the activity of the child which aimlessly moves its limbs and utters meaningless sounds; only gradually does the child by reflection learn to understand and master these activities and to refer them to prototypes. We are told that the poet, in particular, is driven by an urge which he himself does not understand; but an urge which, like a spring, causes him to bubble forth what has been put into his soul by a super-human power, by an inspiring deity. And just as the artist produces without strenuous effort, with the pleasure of free

¹ *Platon und die aristotelische Poetik*, p. 215. Zeller expresses himself similarly. *Phil. d. Griech.*, II, I⁴, p. 936 f., 944.

play, so his product generates a natural pleasure in the beholder and listener who finds it "beautiful." Therefore, it belongs to the nature of art that it be pleasing and entertaining, and whoever produces¹ boredom or disgust in the spectators has defeated his purpose. For that reason manifoldness and change are desirable. But the manifold must be ordered; by a guiding thought it must be subordinated to a law and formed into a unity. That which Socrates sets up in the *Phaedrus*² as the requirement for a speech, viz., "that it must have its own body, in order that it lack neither head nor feet, but that it have a body and extremities which are adapted to each other and to the whole," is true of every artistic creation. The many impressions and the disorderly change in which these impressions come to us will no doubt entertain us, stimulate the senses, and produce blinding momentary effects, but they will leave the deeper needs of our nature ungratified and they cannot, therefore, give lasting satisfaction, and in time repetitions will be taken more and more indifferently. From the very beginning the sensitive man will not be contented with this; he will also demand that the form which presents itself to him have a good and true content; and the taste of each individual can under proper guidance be so educated that he will value the content, the thought (which is embodied in the form and which illumines it) more than the form; besides he will experience as unpleasant every incongruity between form and content as a lack of style. Conversely, through the evil influence of perverted education the taste will be perverted and ruined. Since art, in so far as it is creative,³ is rooted in the innermost soul, the peculiar nature of the artist reveals itself in its products, and in this sense its creative activity is self-portrayal.⁴ If the technical difficulties of mastery of the material have been

¹ Like the singer, Meles, *Gorgias*, 502a (cf. *Platon*, I, p. 414).

² 264bc; cf. 269c.

³ That is to say, in so far as it is true and genuine and is not merely practised as an acquired skill which can give only second and third hand imitations.

⁴ Plato also includes this under "imitation," cf. p. 362.

overcome¹ through practice, noble and good attitudes and thoughts of the artist's soul find beautiful expression. The bad and the ignoble can, of course, be presented in a striking form through technical skill, but in the last analysis it will nevertheless be ugly; it cannot give "true" pleasure, whose surest sign is that it will never end in disgust (for true pleasure is deepened and enhanced with every repetition), but only an apparent, a fleeting momentary pleasure, which is soon followed by an insipid or bitter after-taste. While the enjoyment of that true, healthy pleasure, which is stimulated by the spiritual power of high and noble thoughts, lifts and ennobles man, widens the narrowness of his view, generates the feeling of belonging to other good people and arouses the forebodings that all powers of the world meet and co-operate, the alluring and sickly art produces the opposite effect. The multitude of the uneducated or of the perverted, whose heart is open to the charms of this alluring and sickly art, is injured by enjoying them; they fall into epicureanism, into insipid indulgence in weak, pathetic, and sentimental emotions or into crude sensuality, and thus either sacrifice their steadfastness of character or give up their human dignity. Therefore, it is one of the most important duties of the state to supervise art and play—art is the most distinguished type of play—in order that it preserve its citizens from corruption and harm and by educating their taste fill them with the desire to strive for the truly beautiful. It is only by rejecting all enticing appearances and by pursuing the beautiful that the truly good can be attained.

¹ Cf. *Phaedrus*, 269d

CHAPTER VI

PLATO'S THOUGHTS CONCERNING GOD

1. In several of the preceding chapters we became aware of a realm which is not accessible to clear knowledge. It is true that Plato, as he has Socrates express it, "wants to trust nothing else in himself except rational reflection."¹ But if he recognizes the rigid demands of dialectics as always justified and considers its procedure alone as scientific, he never imagined that it was fully adequate to attain the desired goal, to apprehend truth in its full application to the whole field of reality.

Dialectics is not able to give a complete view of the totality of the "world" or of the "all." To give such a picture we must make use of our imagination. Just as it is impossible for our calculating understanding to grasp the totality of reality, the universe, it is also impossible for us to apprehend the spiritual power (God) which pervades the universe. And as for the thoughts of God—who could be so bold as to say that he could think them after him from beginning to end? And God's purposes—who could fathom them to the extent that he thereby might be able to carry through a teleological explanation of the world? In the *Phaedo*,² Socrates states that after several vain attempts, he has abandoned the hope of giving a teleological explanation of the world process. Nevertheless, Plato is firmly convinced of God's rule in nature, of the dependence of the world and of the world process on God. The two postulates that there is an ineffaceable difference between the true and the false and between the good and the bad—these are fundamental assumptions of every scientific theory of knowledge and of every scientific ethics—are proof for him that

¹ *Crito*, 46b; see *Platon*, I, 386. Cf. Fichte's personal testimony: "My heart is motivated by perfect clarity; it could not but be that the attained clarity at the same time touched my heart." As quoted by K. Fischer, *J. G. Fichte*², p. 307.

² *Phaedo* 99d. Cf. *Platon*, I, p. 553 and above, p. 130.

reason rules the world. And he cannot and does not wish to abolish these postulates to whose validity the life and death of Socrates bear testimony. Besides, he sees that all other people make these distinctions for their actions, even those who question their validity. He could see in their abandonment a weakening of man's power of willing and of action,¹ a lowering of his significance in the world, the surrendering of his dignity. Thus knowledge is based on faith, and it is impossible to describe with scientific accuracy the nature of this basis for faith. Only presentiment can penetrate that far; only hints can be given concerning it by imaginary pictures and myths. This Plato clearly expressed. Therefore, we must not look for a non-contradictory description of God's nature and his relation to the world and the things in it, to man and his interests. We must not reproach him if, upon examining all his statements, we find that they cannot be brought into full and clear agreement.

2. Is God IMMANENT in the world or is he TRANSCENDENT? For both views evidence can be produced from Plato's dialogues. We need only go to the *Timaeus*. The divine demiurge who forms the chaotic material in accordance with his thoughts and who in his unenvious goodness wants to make all his products as much as possible like himself finds in the end that he is successful;² this demiurge appears before us much like the transcendent Creator of the Old Testament. But he placed a soul in the world. The more we consider this world soul, whose thought processes regulate the details of the creations, the less we can differentiate it from the soul of the creative god or from God himself. We may with certainty say that this soul is immanent.

Or perhaps we wish to hold to the assertion that the demiurge proceeded like a human artisan, in that he had an image of that which he wanted to produce. This comparison again

¹ *Phaedo*, 90d; *Meno*, 86b; cf. also *Theaetetus*, 151d.

² *Timaeus*, 37c.

reminds us of the transcendence of God. But the comparison is inadequate. For the human craftsman, e.g., the carpenter, who makes the bed, has as his prototype an "Idea" of the bed which is independent of his thought content. This independence has its basis in God who gave reality to all things, and so to human organization¹ with all its physical and spiritual abilities, with all its needs, and with the ideas of purpose which spring from these needs, such as that of the bed. But we cannot say and cannot conceive how we are to think a prototype of the only, unique, all-inclusive world before it appeared in its visible form infused with supernatural powers and produced by God; we cannot know how to affirm the independence of this prototype as being outside of and set over against God, who existed either alone before the creation of the world or beside whom we could assume only the chaos of unorganized and unformed matter. The Idea of the world can be conceived only as God's purpose and as being grounded in his spiritual nature. If the *Timaeus* informs us that God in his goodness "desired that everything be as much as possible like himself," he himself evidently was the prototype after which he patterned the world, and looking at himself he took from the fullness of his own Being that which he imparted to the world. And again when we differentiate between the notion of purpose and the act of creation in God, and set these two different aspects over against the purpose which has been realized in the phenomena, God appears to remain transcendent. This appearance will be substantiated when we try to present the realization of his purpose as a process which is perceptible to us. Here it becomes necessary to introduce the distinction of different periods of time, before which or at the beginning of which we see only God but not yet a world. Yet Plato leaves no doubt that he does not consider this manner of visualizing things as the

¹ The conviction that we also received our reason from God is expressed in the *Republic* as follows: The Idea of the good, i.e., the creator of the good in the world, is the cause of the knowability of the real and the cause of rational knowledge. See also *Timaeus*, 41cd.

correct one, that the conception of God derived in this manner of reasoning is fallacious. If God, whose nature is unchangeable, exists from all eternity, then in accordance with the laws of his nature,¹ he must have acted from all eternity in the same way according to the same purposes, and with the same results as he does to-day or has done or will do at any time. What could he have done before he created the world? His goodness would at all times have driven him to create this world and at no time was any limit placed on his power.²

3. What of the PERSONALITY of God? Here, too, we cannot give a clear and simple answer. We may, of course, ask what is personality? If we determine the meaning of this term from our human point of view—we cannot do it in any other way—does not the transfer of this human point of view to some other being involve an anthropomorphism of the most questionable type? But let us not be disturbed by this thought; let us ask whether the Platonic God is a thinking, feeling, and willing Being.

Could Plato ascribe feeling to God? In the *Philebus*, he tells us that God does not know³ pain and pleasure. And yet he will hardly deny that God enjoys perfection with a sense of pleasure. The animated cosmos, an image of the creator, according to the *Timaeus* is a "blessed god," and—this seems to have more proof—good people are supposed to be "loved by God." Plato likes to use this expression frequently. But if we may speak of God as a loving Being, then it can no longer be questioned whether God feels.⁴ We are told so frequently

¹ In accordance with *θελα ἀνάγκη*; cf. pp. 108 f., 373 f.

² Cf. p. 258 f.

³ *Philebus*, 33b.

⁴ We must question the comparison of God's love with the love of a father for his children. And yet even Plato uses the picture of a father when he speaks of the relationship of God to his creations. In the *Timaeus*, he repeatedly calls God, from whose goodness the thought of creation proceeds, the father of the world; he also speaks of God's providence (28c, 30b, 41a, 42e, 71d). In the *Apology* and in the *Phaedo* God's care for us, who are in such need of a higher guidance and help, is presented as the conviction of Socrates. In various dia-

that God wills, that he always wills the good for the whole world and for every feeling being, and that his understanding orders everything, that I need not advance proof for these assertions. And if Plato, at times, speaks of divine destiny,¹ we most certainly have in this an expression of a belief in providence, which resembles the Christian conception so much that we can scarcely be wrong if we take these two words in the sense of having the world-ruling power take a personal interest in the fate of a people, nay of an individual. As proof for this statement I refer to such passages as *Laws*, 875c, 780c, 691de, 696a, 748b, 811c; *Apology*, 30a ff.; *Republic*, 499bc, 500d; *Meno*, 99d, and above all to a lengthy passage from the *Laws* whose essential content we shall present in a moment.

We found, however, that God is scarcely distinguishable from the world soul. If we bear in mind that, in the *Timaeus*, the framework in which the divine demiurge casts his wonderful structure and the invisible system of lines and spheres which give direction to active powers are made from this world soul, then the world soul appears to be nothing more than the all-inclusive concept for these powers whose activity is exhausted in unconscious, teleological activity, and nothing seems to remain for personality. But clear agreement is lacking here also.

4. In another connection the thought was impressed on us that the highest Idea, the Idea of the good, is nothing else but God.² From certain quarters objections have been raised against this identification. We are told that, according to Plato, God as personal spirit is a soul, the highest soul, but not Idea; for the Idea is impersonal. I regard this position as erroneous. As I understand it, there is nothing in the general concept of

logues Plato enthusiastically presents the doctrines of certain religious sects (the Orphics and the Pythagoreans) which maintain that we belong to the gods and that every person is under special divine protection. From the whole tone one can feel that Plato is inclined to agree with them, except that he, like Socrates, believes that in these matters he cannot give a definite answer.

¹ *θελα μοῖρα, θελα ἐπιπνοια*.

² See p. 130 f.

the Idea which would exclude personality. I repeat, the Idea is nothing more than the designation of the objective basis of a conception; this objective basis assures validity to the conception and gives certitude to it. Everything then depends on whether that which gives security to the good in this world—so that consequently the conception of the good is no idle dream—is a personal Being or not.

We say that all powers, and with these everything in the universe, are ultimately grounded in God or in the highest Idea. For all practical purposes this means the same thing; only for our point of view it is not altogether indifferent. I believe that this too is a difference which is merely conditioned by our point of view whether we designate the highest Idea, as that is done in the *Republic*, as the Idea of the good, or whether we designate it as the Idea of Being, the Idea of reality or as the Idea of the world.¹ It seems that logically the concept of the good is not identical with the concept God; nor is it identical with the concept of the world, nor of reality, nor of Being. And yet, if it can be shown that the good (as something actually existing, as Idea) consists in complete agreement of all segments or characteristics of reality; that there can be no reality apart from the totality of active powers, which in their activity are conditioning and in turn are conditioned by every individual being; that therefore the world, which embraces every real being, is in its nature a living and animated organism; in addition that a uniform co-operation and interaction can be produced only by a spiritual power which rules the world, and can be assured only by the rule of this power; then the conceptual explanations of the variously sounding words such as Being, world, God, and good can be reduced to one and the same formula, and the concepts which they designate are identical in content. And then too that which as "Idea" gives them their validity and their right² will also be one and the

¹ Cf. pp. 130 f., also 82, 84.

² The whole structure of the world appears meaningful and purposeful because it is good and because we know it and apprehend

same. Whether personality belongs to this Idea or not is something which must yet be investigated.

Previously¹ we were also concerned with the question whether Ideas could not be understood as divine purpose. We may perhaps express this as follows: According to their logical content the Ideas are divine thoughts, a part of the content of God's way of doing things. Only by abstraction can we separate and distinguish the two; just as we can separate God from the world by abstraction. For the totality of reality, i.e., the invisible and the visible, is given with and through God. The conclusion of the *Timaeus*² confirms us in this conception. Here the world appears before us as "singular, as having come into Being of its own accord, as perfect in its nature and in its appearance, as a living organism in which all other mortal and immortal organisms have their Being"; in short, the world stands before us as "the visible image of God whom we can conceive in thought alone." From this statement we can see that God's will to give to this world the best possible form was completely realized. We may, therefore, say that God's power is adequate for the realization of all his thoughts.

5. Nevertheless, Plato frequently speaks of a NECESSITY WHICH IS ALSO BINDING FOR GOD. With visible approval, he mentions³ it thus in detail. For this reason we apprehend its perfect goodness, purpose, and harmony (beauty). Therefore, we may designate the *γαθόν* as the meaning and the content of *οὐσία* (cf. above, p. 130 f.). In fact, if the good alone can exist, the two are one and the same; but logical abstraction separates them, in that it approaches the nature of what is given from a different point of view. If it could carry its considerations through from this viewpoint, then Being and the good would be identical. But as matters stand, gaps appear between what from one or from another point of view falls into our field of vision; and the filling of these gaps can be attempted only by the imagination, and only be surmised and believed (this is of special importance for the field of ethics). Our consideration, which wishes to understand the divine according to human analogy, is forced to separate intention and execution whenever it is a question of purpose.

See note, p. 158 (p. 371 f.).

² Cf. above, p. 281.

Protagoras, 345d; *Laws*, 818de; cf. also my commentary to the *Laws*, p. 211 ff.

the old poetic expression, "not even the gods can war against necessity." Very frequently the *Timaeus* indicates limits and opposition, which are supposed to have interfered with the carrying through of God's reason and purpose, and because of these limits and this opposition the imperfections of the world are supposed to have come into Being. This contradicts what was said a moment ago. But the contradiction is only apparent and caused by inexactness. The real meaning of such expositions is that nature is determined by a purpose, and that in this determination it cannot at the same time serve an entirely different purpose. If and in so far as the one purpose is limited or excluded by the divinely-positing realization of some other purpose, it is only the confused, defective human conception which still insists on thinking of and justifying this purpose as part of God's plan. God cannot have conflicting and contradictory purposes. Several times hints and definite expressions¹ are given that the causes of visible reality and of Becoming in this world appear only as divided and separated opposites for the limited human understanding. An understanding which grasped everything at one glance and apprehended the whole universe (this is physically impossible for our sense-perception) in its unlimited perfection would also deduce material Being and its principle from God; it would see in this physical Being the realization of a divine purpose and so would eliminate its apparent defect; it would also see that space and time are part of the beauty and the perfection of the world and that it is, in fact, impossible to conceive a more perfect world than the existing one.

The laws of logic and of mathematics, in short all laws of thought, belong especially to this necessity which is binding for the gods. This is natural; for it can at no time be God's will to go contrary to the necessity which inheres in reason itself and which is grounded in its nature. No rational Being can will what is contrary to common-sense and contrary to reason. Even with our limited understanding by which we

¹ Cf. *Timaeus*, 29c, 34c, 48c, 53d.

judge everything, we too can see that our reasoning would end in nonsense and irrationality if the laws of logic were invalid. The fact that they are strictly valid and that they exclude the realization of certain thoughts, viz., the confused, the contradictory thoughts, is no imperfection, no deficiency, but a perfection of reality. Therefore, what we should like to designate as limitations of God's power are inferences which follow from God's own nature; they follow from his power and are not real limitations.

This is true not only of the continuity of thought but also of the interconnection of action. Here there are moral necessities for God; but these, too, belong to his original nature and again constitute a part of his perfection. God is good. "The good person never harbours ill-will toward anyone. Free from this desire, God wanted that everything should be as much as possible like himself." He cannot and could not will anything else. All gifts which he gives can only be good. But moral necessity is closely related to logical necessity. According to Plato,¹ that is morally good which is based on reason. It would be self-evident and necessary that a person who had complete knowledge could only wish and do the right and the good. For the "wise" man there would be no duty, if we understand by duty the command which is imposed by another will; duty would be replaced by that inner necessity for right action. Naturally, there can be no duty for the all-knowing God.

6. The best which God could possibly realize, he at all times brought into Being. But THE HIGHEST GOAL which God set for HIS CREATIVE ACTIVITY was the EXISTENCE OF MAN AS A BEING which was CAPABLE OF MORALITY and which really used and trained this ability. It would be irrational and therefore impossible that with this purpose of God the conditions for man's activity in the world were so made, the circumstances so ordered, that moral action were contrary to his own well-being. On the contrary, we may assume that God saw to it and still

¹ As we have indicated above, pp. 41 f., 58, 69, 302; as well as elsewhere.

does that happiness is attained through virtue. God himself can only show his perfect goodness in that the cosmic order, which he brought into Being, makes this happiness possible and that from the moral point of view it appears as satisfactory, or to express it more concisely, that it appears as moral. Everything external must be subordinated and must appear as secondary to this highest purpose, and it is as it is for the sake of this purpose. In order to exclude doubt about the reality of certain propositions, the *Phaedo* demands a teleological explanation which is to show that the present order of things is the best for every existing thing, as, e.g., the form of the earth and the place which it occupies, and that any other order would be less good, less perfect; this whole position can now be more clearly stated as follows: Everything had to become as it is, in order that the wonderful organization of man could come into Being and that his body, which is made of the earth and dwells on the earth, could under the influence of cosmic powers be formed into the vehicle of the rational soul, and be made the basis for its psychic and moral activity. For example, in the *Timaeus*¹ we are told that the eye, whose wonderful adaptation for the needs of the body is described for us by physiology, was made so wonderfully by God that the desire to know,² to investigate, might be aroused in us by the wonders which it enables us to see. The erect posture was given to man that he might contemplate the stars of the heavens and study their courses, whose regularity produces in us the notions of number and of time.

7. If we try still further to determine the divine nature, there can at least be no doubt about the following: In comparison with man who possesses his advantages with limitations, God possesses all characteristics belonging to man unconditionally and in the fullest degree. God's existence includes all fullness of Being. His thoughts are through and through rational and clear, and their representation in concrete form is of perfect

¹ 47a ff.

² φιλοσοφία.

beauty. His wisdom is omniscience, his power omnipotence, and his knowledge and activity are not limited in space and time nor by space and time. His goodness is perfect goodness; his will is holy. BECAUSE GOD IS PERFECT, HE IS THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS, and not man, as Protagoras had thought: "For nothing imperfect is appropriate for a measure."¹ It is totally wrong to think of God as being like man. It is unbelievable that he should change and take on various forms as mythology recounts. In his eternal and omnipresent reality, which transcends all time and space, he is unchangeable. We may conceive the divine spirit to be like the human spirit, in that we think all deficiencies and limitations of the human spirit as being removed. The most foolish thing of all is when people accuse the gods of things which they regard as weaknesses and errors in their equals, especially when it is a matter of moral shortcomings.

The divine Being is, of course, one. And if Plato occasionally uses different names of the gods, it is merely a convenient use of the customary language which no careful reader can misunderstand.

8. Plato was personally, as was Socrates, a pious man. All the daring of his rationalistic, heretical thinking did not undermine the firm basis of his belief in God. In his last and unfinished dialogue, which was to be a bequest² to his people and which in fact, as a recent scholar expresses it, became the catechism of morality for later Hellenism, he formally lays down his creed which, at one and the same time, contains an earnest admonition for religious sceptics and a THEODICY. I shall here give its main ideas. "My son," the exhortation begins, "you are still young; time will teach you to abandon much of what you now consider to be right and to accept the opposite view. Therefore, wait until that time comes before you set yourself up as a judge about the most important things. . . . This

¹ *Republic*, 504c: ἀτελές γὰρ οὐδέν οὐδενὸς μέτρον.

² Cf. *Platon*, II, 589.

much I can tell you, that not a single person of those who in their younger years shared the opinion that there are no gods held to this conviction to his old age."

That there are divine powers in this world, that the wonderful order and regularity with which the heavenly bodies move can only have come into Being through divine reason, impresses itself with convincing clearness on every reflecting observer. The belief in a world-ruling power which is concerned with all details is hampered by the many evils which occur daily in our world. But if the good, human ruler of the state does not lose sight of the little things because of the great, we may not assume that God does his work and dispenses his providence in one-sided narrowness. Every individual thing in the universe, even the smallest, is so arranged that a unified, beautiful accord and harmony of all things come into Being. With the purpose of establishing the perfect happiness of the whole, the fundamental laws of all Being and Becoming are so determined that the infinite, individual motions and changes of each thing follow of themselves from them, and that all the consequences ensuing from these motions result from meeting other changing objects. Even freedom of choice, which the human soul retains, cannot interfere with the fixed, divine order of things, cannot annul divine plans. Every decision and action, which transform the soul, in that they move it, have predetermined consequences for it. At the most, there remains for the demiurge, who beholds human activity which takes place within fixed bounds, the task of moving the individual soul from place to place, as a player moves a pawn in chess in accordance with rules which he himself has laid down.¹

But that person who lacks a comprehensive view of the whole world should not venture to pass judgment from the point of view of the fate of the individual. If his vision were not so limited, he would see that what appears to him as

¹ It is surprising how closely G. Th. Fechner's thoughts also agree at this point with those of Plato. I refer to his work *Über die Seelenfrage*, pp. 118 ff., 124, 134.

defective is nevertheless the best possible, and the injustices about which he complains he would see as the just order of things. Each one is placed in that position where his corruptness will do the least damage or where the good in him will bring the greatest benefit; and each one will also find as much happiness as he deserves by the self-willed nature of his heart. This takes place in this life when the good man associates with the good and the bad with the bad, and correspondingly each one receives good or bad from his like. The same is true of the life hereafter, whatever its nature and condition may be. This order is irrefutable. No one can claim that he can escape divine punishment; likewise no one will lose the reward for his virtue.

But Plato must still refute the notion that the gods, whose existence and participation in the affairs of men cannot be doubted, can be bribed, and that they do not punish unjust gain if a part of it is offered them in sacrifice. He rejects as too ridiculous¹ the conception which lowers the morality of the gods to that of the average person. Thus it may be taken as a proved fact that there are gods, that they are interested in human beings, and that they never deny justice.

9. Firm in his conviction that this article of faith can be scientifically demonstrated, Plato has no scruples to establish in the *Laws* a court for the trying of heresies; this court has power to pronounce the death penalty not only on atheistic criminals and pious hypocrites but even on obstinate, outspoken atheists. If we observe that this court was instituted by the highest tribunal, whose members represent the ruler of the state who is bound by no law, and that they, like the ruler, have been raised to this position of power through public trust, which their intellectual superiority and their moral excellence inspired, we will not find this entrusted power to be as bad as

¹ And the indulgences which Orphic priests offered for sale to rich evil-doers as absolution for themselves or for deceased relatives are most disgraceful. *Republic*, 364b.

it at first seems. In this connection, we must also remember the following: Not only in the *Laws* but also in the *Republic* we are repeatedly assured that the most important doctrine, with which everyone from youth up must be familiarized, is that happiness depends on justice. It is demanded that every means be used to keep anyone from spreading views which contradict this proposition. The heresy of those who are to be kept within bounds by the penalties provided for in the paragraph on religion evidently consists in the denial or in the doubting of this proposition and its profounder meaning, and in the lack of faith in the superiority of the divine, i.e., the rational, the moral powers over the irrational, the immoral, the evil in this world; in short, it consists in a timid PESSIMISM, which cannot logically make rigid demands on the individual who advocates it nor on others. Besides, the religion which Plato desires to support by the laws of the state is not a religion which originated in tradition, and which claims to be in the possession of revealed maxims and precepts for life. Even if, as religion, it goes beyond experience, and with the aid of the imagination advances hypotheses which cannot be strictly proved, they are, nevertheless, entirely based on rational considerations. The important doctrine about the existence of a cosmic order, which assures man that virtue and happiness go together, lets moral excellence appear¹ as the natural fruit and the necessary confirmation of piety; but, on the other hand, it vouchsafes the possibility of determining by rational considerations not merely what is morally good, but at the same time what is pious or what is the will of God. In a religious conflict, as in every rational exposition, the contending parties oppose each other with equal rights and on the same basis.

¹ In the *Apology*, 29a and 35d, Socrates says that if he were restrained by fear from doing that which he recognized to be good, and if he flattered the judges in the customary manner and denied the rigid truth, then he would really show, as he is accused, that he did not believe in the rule of divine powers. Therefore, he cannot recognize a belief in God which does not manifest itself in right conduct, in conscientious fulfilment of duty, in good works.

In the discussion which is to convert him, the religious heretic may convince the masters who are to perform this task of the falsity of certain points in their assumptions, and bring them over to his position. Then they will honestly strive to accord him justice and recognition. We need not fear that the measures directed against the atheist imply the suppression of honest and free investigation and of independent opinion. The *Laws* inform us that serious study of the natural sciences is in accordance with God's will, a sacred duty. Anxious souls fear that this study will endanger their pious faith. All guardians of religion in their care for the individuals must be acquainted with it. It is inconceivable that they should at any time consider the investigation of scientific facts and the appeal to such facts as a crime.¹ A suit involving heresy cannot be concerned with the externalities of the cultus. It is also noteworthy that Plato expressly refutes the accepted opinion which finds the ultimate ground for impiety in moral impurity.

10. Finally, in WHAT RELATION DOES MAN STAND TO GOD?

At any rate, God and man are not on the same plane. The relation between man and God is not such that it would be possible for human beings to render God a service, to show him benefit, to reward him for the good which they have received from him. Therefore, to try to influence God by bringing him sacrifices and by making vows or by uttering prayer formulas has no meaning. Sacrifices may be brought; when a sin is committed, atonement is not to be neglected; and it is good if the thoughts of man are very regularly directed in sacred ceremonies to the divine ruler of the world. But in this it is not a question of the size of the gift, but only of the attitude of the one who brings it. This was clearly stated in

¹ To the great chagrin of the strict adherents of the existing order in whose name Meletus accused Socrates of impiety, this very rationalistic critique, which Socrates at all times applied to the most sacred traditions, is considered by him as a professional duty (*Apology*, 29e) imposed on him by God. And Plato seems to be in entire agreement with this.

the arguments of the *Euthyphro*.¹ Later in the *Laws* it is said: In conjunction with all other living things, we may consider ourselves as a marvellous form produced by the hands of the gods, made either as their plaything or formed for a serious purpose.² We belong to and are the slaves of the gods³; consequently with reference to the gods we are completely without rights, without a claim. Like puppets, we are directed by God on the strings of our desires.⁴ But it is against the realization of man's complete dependence on God that the following confusing questions are brought: How is it that we are driven into ways which lead away from God? Why is it that our sensual nature with such restlessness seeks satisfaction in things, whose enjoyment violates the principles of reason? How is it possible that we have to assume responsibility for our actions, which spring from a disposition which has been given us by God? The disquieting feature of these perplexing questions, no doubt, produces the despondent mood from which is forced the statement that "human affairs do not deserve great enthusiasm."⁵ And yet this is not to serve as an excuse for careless and slovenly behaviour. As human beings, we have our divinely willed calling, the fulfilment of which ennobles us and brings us happiness. It consists in that we do the good, just as God does the good—and this good we cannot do to God but only to our neighbours—and in that we fight every evil which goes contrary to the divine nature. As described in the *Apology*, Socrates considers it his divine duty

¹ Cf. also *Republic*, 364b ff. (above p. 382, note).

² *Laws*, 664d: Θαῦμα μὲν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἡγησώμεθα τῶν ζώων θεῶν, εἴτε ὡς παῖγνιον ἐκείνων εἴτε ὡς σπουδῇ τινι ξυνεσθηκός. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτό γε γιγνώσκομεν, and later, 803c, ἄνθρωπον . . ., ὅπερ εἶπομεν ἔμπροσθεν, θεοῦ τι παῖγνιον εἶναι μεμηχανημένον (καὶ ὄντως τοῦτο αὐτοῦ τὸ βέλτιστον γεγονέναι). Cf. above, pp. 259 f., 268 f.

³ The *Phaedo* (62b) already expressed it in this manner. Cf. also *Apology*, 29d, 30ab.

⁴ *Laws*, 844e.

⁵ *Laws*, 803b: ἔστι δὴ τοίνυν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα μεγάλης μὲν σπουδῆς οὐκ ἄξια, ἀναγκαῖόν γε μὴν σπουδάζειν. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ εὐτυχές. The εὐτυχές is a fortune given us by divine grace; without adding anything, without σπουδῇ (which does not exclude error and perversion), we may enjoy this as we enjoy an innocent game.

to regulate his own affairs, and to admonish his fellow-citizens—including the strangers within the city—to know themselves and to reflect whether they lead the right kind of life. This self-giving love for his neighbour, which he practises by giving up every comfort and in spite of bringing enmity and ingratitude upon himself, is his religion. In this worship, which he practises with zealous conscientiousness, he shows his piety. Such genuine piety is indeed well pleasing unto God. In the manly battle¹ which it demands against evil, we may expect help and protection from God.

PRAYER is the simplest means at the disposal of the pious person when he desires to approach the deity. Plato also values and urges prayer. Evidently it is not merely as an accommodation to the practices of the many that he prescribes sanctification through prayer² for decisive moments.

The regularly arranged, public religious festivals are to instil in all citizens the proper religious attitude of a joyous devotion to God. The songs rendered by the festive choruses praise the power and goodness of God and the joy of piety.³ In prayer the most important thing is that man approach God with sincere reverence and that he purify his heart of all haughtiness and of all arrogant desires. Nothing is to be asked of the gods which is not good for the recipient, but which would rather be only an evil, as some things (e.g., riches in gold and silver)⁴ are for which thoughtless and superficial people do indeed pray. The prayer of Socrates at the end of the *Phaedrus* may be regarded as a model prayer. It is directed to the gods of the locality which, after a weighty discussion, he is about to leave. It is as follows: "Grant that I may become beautiful in the inward man; and may my external possessions not conflict with my inner self. May I consider the wise to be rich. May

¹ Cf. *Phaedo*, 90e; *Theaetetus*, 151d.

² E.g., *Republic*, 459e, and *Laws*, 115a, when marriages are performed. In the *Timaeus*, 27c, prayer is very generally recommended for beginning every undertaking. Cf. also *Timaeus*, 48d; *Critias*, 106ab; *Symposium*, 220d.

³ *Republic*, 607a; *Laws*, 664 ff., 801a ff.

⁴ *Laws*, 801b; cf. 687e.

my burden of gold be such as only the wise can lift and bear." The other prayer in the *Phaedrus*,¹ the one directed to *Eros*, is also noteworthy. Socrates asks that the god forgive him for his first speech made after the manner of Lysias and that he accept the counter-speech, that he be gracious to him and that he do not spoil for him the art of influencing young people, an art (the art of love) which he had given him, but that he bless him with further success. To this is appended an intercession for Lysias and *Phaedrus*.²

In the *Symposium*, *EROS* was described as mediator between God and man. We were told of him that he was identical with the desire, which was stimulated by the charm of the beautiful and which cannot be satisfied on earth, for the eternal possession of the good, and so the desire for truth and knowledge. The great ardour, the inspiration bordering on madness, which this desire also imparts to the winged soul, according to the *Phaedo*, is god-inspired. All this we can now reconcile and understand better. All good things come from God and are grounded in God. But so does all reality—the logically ordered system of the invisible realm of Ideas and the visible cosmos—have its basis in God. The ecstasy which seizes a man who thoughtfully loses himself in the contemplation of the visible wonders of nature, and sees in them the Idea, is gradually led beyond the confusion of the senses to the loftiest height. Thus *Eros* leads him who desires to know and who searches for truth, as well

¹ 257ab.

² Also from the *Laws*, 732cd, where we are told what man may expect of God, we can gather what a worthy content of prayer is:—namely that God "do not enhance the need but lessen it when the good which he gives is threatened with failure, and that he turn the present hardship to advantage," but conversely, that he at all times preserve and increase the good for us. About the possible effect of intercessory prayer, we may compare *Laws*, 931cd: "If, as we believe, God hears the imprecations of a father or a mother who has received the meanest maltreatment from his or her children, must we not then also consider it to be natural that if the parents are honoured by their children and are thereby made happy, and that if they pray to the gods for the happiness of their children, these petitions also are heard and granted by the gods?"

as him who follows pure beauty; both seek the greatest happiness, the unconditioned good, in truth and beauty; both are in this manner led to God.¹ In God all human longing finds rest.

To the very end I have reserved a question which could have been discussed in the psychology or the ethics, but which is better discussed here in connection with theology. It is the question about the FREEDOM OF THE WILL. We shall only make a few comments on it. An exceedingly great difficulty lies in the fact that we cannot understand how man, as a creation of God, can act contrary to the will of God, and how by doing so he can become guilty before God. Or when we observe that some, through good fortune, are shielded from the temptation to forsake the right path, and thus can easily maintain their peace of soul, whereas others are overcome by temptations pressing in on them and then are unhappy in their inner strife, we ask whether God, who is just and good, does not lead and uphold all his creatures with the same friendliness, whether he does not hold all in his hand with the same certitude and firmness, or—in so far as we may speak of love—whether he does not love all with the same love? May we speak of those who are estranged from and who are hated by God as over against those who are loved by him? On the one hand, we have the conviction that all of us have received our endowments from God, and that with our destiny our education is determined by God; on the other hand, we have the insight that every reproach which we make to God, who is perfect and without blemish, is foolish and insolent. It is also a fact of our experience that in actions which our own conscience considers bad we cannot rid ourselves of the plaguing feeling of inner strife and guilt.

¹ The expositors of Plato have later taken the personification of Eros in the *Symposium* as the sincere opinion of Plato, and so have turned the psychic mood of him who is inspired by love into a real demon. This is similar to what Iranian and Christian theology did with the spirit of prayer, "who helps our weakness and with unutterable sighs pleads for us before God."

When Plato, in his effort to convey these contradictions to us, employs mythological stories about the immortal, immaterial soul as it wanders, in accordance with divine justice, through heaven and hell and is repeatedly incarnated in human or animal form for a new, earthly existence, he wishes to express the fact that he does not succeed in solving this contradiction in a scientifically satisfactory manner. Only the kernel of the myth, viz., the statement that "God is blameless and that the blame falls on man who has chosen his own lot," has real meaning. The contradiction of this statement with the deterministic theory, which Plato substantiated elsewhere in a strictly scientific manner, is exactly the same contradiction which again and again engulfed Christian theologians when, on the one hand, they attempted to carry the thought about God's omnipotence to the end and when, on the other hand, they tried to think to the end the notion about God's goodness and justice, or that of human freedom which issues in moral self-determination. In these notions inheres the difficulty that the nature of the infinite, with which this discussion is always concerned, cannot be grasped by our finite, limited understanding and cannot be put into concepts.

As for the objections customarily brought by the timid guardians of morality against intellectual determinism, Plato tried to meet them with his doctrine concerning the conditions of EUDEMONISM, which penetrates far beyond the superficial conception of this ambiguous concept, and reaches down into the profound depths of the human soul. Morality, he thinks, consists in the mastery of the sensual and ambitious desires by reason, which by strenuous effort asserts its superiority in the conflict. The delight derived from this successfully withstood battle is included as essential to the consciousness of moral excellence (this we may call good conscience), and constitutes the real content of true human happiness. He who has realized what really "makes for his peace" is by this knowledge determined to do the good; just as he who finds his salvation in vain trivialities is thereby driven into wrong paths. From

this it again follows that no objection can be brought against God if he granted man the freedom to do evil; but that this freedom does not logically contradict the dependence of an individual's will on his own convictions and the fundamental nature of his whole Being. But it is irrational to praise moral excellence and at the same time to think away or to abolish the striving for moral excellence, or the battle against that which stands in its way. This is as irrational as it is to demand that the numbers three and five have the characteristics of even numbers.¹ The greater the effort which an individual had to exert in the conflict with opposing conditions, the greater also was the evil of the weak who succumbed to the dangers of this conflict; and the more must we not only praise the moral worth of the former individual, but the greater will be the satisfaction which he himself enjoys from the fact that he, with the help of the gods (cf. *Laws*, 906a), remained victorious in the conflict with evil powers.

I know no modern ethics which has replaced these principles with others which are better founded and more convincing.

I bring this presentation to a close with the same statement with which I closed my larger work on Plato. In this I tried briefly to characterize Plato's meaning for all time. To me, he is a philosopher second to none; an artist of first rank; a man favoured by God as few others have been; unforgettable for all time; releasing spiritual powers which have been a blessing to many and which will continue to be a blessing for all time.

¹ This the necessity which God himself must obey forbids.

INDEX OF DIALOGUES

- Apology*, pp. 27, 47-48, 301, 374, 383 f., 385.
Charmides, pp. 27, 45, 80, 112, 306.
Cratylus, pp. 27, 62, 97-100, 112, 113 f., 142, 170, 171, 181, 187, 244.
Critias, pp. 27, 276, 386.
Crito, pp. 27, 48.
Euthydemus, pp. 27, 62, 101, 112, 246, 305.
Euthyphro, pp. 27, 46, 100, 102, 385.
Gorgias, pp. 27, 49-61, 80 f., 84, 121, 181, 282, 314, 317, 319, 329, 331, 363, 369; relation to *Protagoras*, 56 ff.
Hippias, Greater, pp. 27, 28, 39 f., 61, 85, 101, 104, 360.
Hippias, Lesser, pp. 27, 37-40.
Laches, pp. 27, 40-41, 100, 104, 306, 312.
Laws, pp. 28, 131, 223, 271 f., 285, 289, 291, 300, 304 f., 306, 308, 311 ff., 318 f., 329, 336, 340-356, 357 ff., 366, 374, 376, 382 f., 385 f., 390.
Lysis, pp. 27, 63-66, 84.
Meno, pp. 27, 62, 102 f., 112, 121, 125, 130, 139, 148, 198, 242, 371, 374.
Menexenus, pp. 27, 62-63, 80.
Parmenides, pp. 27, 40, 118, 124, 134, 142, 144, 147-167, (its peculiarity, 160, 165), 168, 195 f., 197, 206, 213 f., 219, 221, 223, 224, 226, 231, 251, 254, 262, 264, 267, 268, 274
Phaedo, pp. 27 ff., 33, 68-71, 87-95, 102 f., 104 f., 113 ff., 119 f., 124, 127 f., 130, 132, 142, 148, 154, 175, 182 f., 185, 186, 206 f., 222, 230, 251, 252, 256, 262, 271, 275 f., 282, 301, 311, 314, 329, 333, 370 f., 373, 379, 385, 386.
Phaedrus, pp. 27, 29, 32, 85, 109-111, 133 f., 159, 162, 175, 181, 289, 295, 305, 313, 365, 368, 386.
Philebus, pp. 27, 59, 173, 178, 181, 185, 189-198, 202, 206, 207, 209 ff., 223, 231, 232, 236 f., 241, 244, 257, 276, 281, 285, 287, 291, 292, 304, 305, 362 f., 373.
Protagoras, pp. 27, 42-45, 57, 59, 60, 80, 100, 103, 129, 256, 290, 314, 376.
Republic, pp. 27, 59, 71-86, 105-109, 122, 123, 128, 129, 134, 142, 156, 159, 167, 175, 187, 207, 211, 215, 219, 224, 244, 262, 265, 276, 279, 282, 286, 289, 290, 300 f., 304, 306 f., 309 ff., 316, 318, 320, 328, 329, 331, 335, 337, 346 f., 353, 357, 360 f., 365, 366, 372, 374 f., 380, 382 f., 385, 386.
Sophist, pp. 27, 29, 32 f., 128, 134, 142, 148, 156, 164, 167-176, 183 f., 185, 189, 192 f., 195 ff., 207, 223, 231, 232, 234, 235, 236 f., 242, 255, 261, 272, 282 ff., 286, 301, 314, 337.
Statesman, pp. 27, 176-189, 192, 198, 223, 232, 234, 237, 242, 255, 314, 337. Relation to the *Republic*, 339, 341, 362.

Symposium, pp. 27, 66-68, 83, 95-97, 127, 159, 176, 284, 289.
Diotima's speech, 66, 80, 85, 95 ff., 127 f., 134, 294, 311, 386,
387, 388.

Theaetetus, pp. 27, 29, 32 f., 113, 134, 135-144, 160, 167, 170, 171,
172, 173, 176, 180, 181, 182, 184, 198, 205, 207, 212, 214, 219,
223 f., 235, 250, 253, 255, 263, 264, 282, 284 f., 286 f., 300 f.,
308, 329, 371, 386.

Timaeus, pp. 27, 128, 131, 154, 156, 175, 187, 194, 198-223, (Com-
parison between *Timaeus* and *Philebus*, 202 f., 208, 209 f.),
245, 254, 256, 258-272, 273, 275, 279 ff., (Conclusion of
Timaeus, 281), 282, 287, 288, 289, 291, 313, 318, 363, 365,
366, 371 f., 373, 374, 377, 386.

Dialogues which can be dated: *Lesser Hippias* and *Protagoras*, before
the trial of Socrates, pp. 39 (note 1), 60 (note 1).—*Gorgias*, about
390, p. 55.—*Symposium*, probably shortly after 385, p. 29.—*Republic*,
about 375-372, p. 134 (note 2).—*Phaedrus*, about 370,
p. 134 (note 2).—*Theaetetus*, 369 or 368, pp. 28, 134, 176.—*Parmenides*,
probably 367 or 366, p. 28.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

Academy, pp. 24, 175, 242, 271, 273, 279.

Adam, A. M., p. 32 (note 1).

Adeimantus, pp. 73, 82.

Aeschylus, p. 21 (note).

Alcibiades, pp. 22, 68.

Anaxagoras, pp. 89, 230.

Anaximander, p. 262.

Apelt, pp. 39 (note 1), 143 (note 5), 250 (note 2).

Archytus, pp. 24, 258.

Aristippus, pp. 44 (note 2), 57 (note 1).

Aristophanes, p. 66.

Aristotle, pp. 30 f., 111, 115, 119, 155, 157, 187, 232 (note), 240, 273,
278, 289 (note 3), 308, 360 (note 2).

Berger, p. 275.

Blüher, pp. 298, 300.

Bonitz, p. 105.

Burnet, pp. 32, 33.

Callicles, pp. 51 ff., 71.

Cantor, p. 279.

Chamberlain, pp. 116, 118, 119.

Charmides, p. 23.

Cicero, pp. 27 (note 1), 187 (note 3).

Copernicus, p. 275.

Cratylus, p. 30.

Critias, pp. 22, 23.

Daedalus, p. 277.

Damon, p. 359.

Dion, pp. 24, 25, 26, 27.

Dionysius I, pp. 24, 25.

Dionysius II, pp. 25, 26.

Diotima, pp. 129, 134.

Empedocles, p. 230.

Eudoxus, p. 273.

Euripides, pp. 21, 364.

Fechner, pp. 281 (note), 381 (note).

Fichte, p. 370 (note 1).

Finsler, p. 367.

Friedländer, p. 275.

Glaucon, pp. 72, 82, 128 (note).

Goethe, pp. 68 (note), 115, 216 (note 1), 217, 300, 313 (note 4).

Gorgias, p. 49.

Helicon, p. 273.

Heraclides, p. 273.

Heraclitus (and his doctrine), pp. 30, 99, 112, 131, 135, 141.

Hermogenes, p. 97.

Höfler, p. 290 (note 1).

Homer, p. 288.

Hume, p. 277.

Husserl, pp. 113 (note), 124 (note 3), 226 ff.

Isocrates, p. 134.

Jäger, p. 308 (note 4).

Jesus, pp. 39, 69 (note), 306 (note 2).

Kant, pp. 123, 158, 167 (note), 266, 277, 316 (note 2), 319; Kantian-Laplacian theory, 279; Kantians, 113, 227.

Kutter, p. 298.

Leibniz, p. 240.

Leucippus, p. 230.

Locke, p. 210.

Lysias, p. 134.

Meinong, pp. 113 (note), 124 (note), 224 ff.

Meles, p. 368.

Meletus, p. 46.

Natorp, pp. 111 (note), 143 (note 5), 229, 278 (note).

Newton, p. 278.

Parmenides, pp. 147 ff., 152, 166, 172, 230.

Planck, p. 113 (note).

Plato, *see* table of contents and subject index.

Plenge, pp. 298, 300.

Pöhlmann, p. 316 (note 1).

Polus, pp. 50, 53, 58.

Protagoras, pp. 97, 112, 135, 138, 140, 179, 380.

Pythagoreans, p. 31 f.

Rousseau, p. 316 (note 1).

Schiaparelli, p. 274.

Schiller, pp. 300, 360 (note 2), 362 (note 2), 363 (note 1).

Schleiermacher, pp. 133, 282.

Schneider, G., p. 46.

Schuppe, p. 116.

Siebeck, p. 217.

Socrates (and his doctrine), pp. 22, 30, 32, 38, 39 f., 45, 47, 59 f.,
68, 89, 111, 158, 370 f., 373 (note 4), 380, 383 (note), 384 (note).

Sophocles, p. 364.

Stesichorus, p. 79.

Susemihl, p. 204 (note 4).

Taylor, A. E., pp. 32, 33, 44 (note 1).

Theaetetus, p. 172.

Theognis, p. 341.

Theophrastus, p. 273.

Thrasymachus, pp. 72, 73, 80.

Timaeus, p. 258.

Usener, p. 279.

Zeller, pp. 31 (note), 187 (note 1), 196, 278, 329 (note 1), 331, 353
(note 3), 367 (note).

Zeno, pp. 147 ff., 152, 166.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

- Absolute, the, = that which does not stand in relation to anything, pp. 151, 157 f.; it is unknowable and unreal (cf. the simple, and nothing), pp. 174, 196 f.
- Abstraction, the abstract, pp. 163 f., 175, 177, 180 (note), 182f., 184, 191 f., 196, 202 (note), 208, 214 f., 217, 287, 376.—Cf. the concrete.
- Acoustics, p. 265.
- Actual, the, refers to fact, pp. 139, 156 (note 3), 169, 170 f., 195 f., 204 f., 206, 224 f., 254 f., 269.—Cf. the given, history.
- Anger, pp. 288, 318.
- Animals, pp. 242 (note 3), 245, 271, 288 (note), 312, 389.—Animal breeders, p. 330.
- Antipodes, p. 262.
- Appearance (deception) and Being (reality), pp. 108, 164, 185, 337, 362. Appearance *vs.* Idea, essence, *which see*.
- Art (and handicraft), p. 108.—Task and purpose of art, pp. 53, 176 f.; every art pursues a purpose, p. 180 (cf. expert knowledge).—Theoretical and applied aspect of art (= science), pp. 150 f., 176 ff., (cf. art of measurement), 184, 187, 188, 276. Creative art as playful activity, p. 367; as imitation, pp. 156 (note 4), 362, 366 f.—The art of forming oneself, pp. 361, 368. Nature and task of art, pp. 360 ff. (cf. beautiful); laws of art, pp. 362 f.; truth in art, p. 359; education (*which see*) by means of art, pp. 358 ff., 367, 369; defects of art, pp. 365 f.; the art of flattery, pp. 359, 368 f.—Supervision of art, pp. 328 f., 337, 346, 353, 357 f.—The artist is related to the philosopher, pp. 293 f., 364; *see also* madness.
- Art of measurement: two types, pp. 176 f., 179, 182, 186, 245, 276 f. *See also* art, expert knowledge, comparison.
- Athens, deterioration of art and morality in, p. 359; the statesmen of, pp. 54 f., 331.
- Astronomy, pp. 265 f., 272 ff.; cf. stars.
- Attribute, *see* quality, the given.
- Banishment, p. 335.
- Barbarians *vs.* Hellenes, pp. 242 (note 3), 329, 335, 345.
- Barracks, pp. 326, 357.
- Beautiful, beauty, pp. 50, 66, 95 f., 110, 158 f., 187 f., 190, 194 (of the starry heavens), 199 (of the world), 214, 245, 259, 295 ff. (beauty arouses love), 366 f. (that is beautiful which is formed after an eternal prototype, i.e. after an Idea), 387 f.—perceptible bodily beauty and imperceptible immaterial beauty, 66.—The beautiful as the form of the good, 66, cf. 306; as expression of moral

excellence, 348, 361 ff., 366 f.; its unconditioned, value, 61, 85;—genuine and presumptive beauty, 362, 368.—Vision of the beautiful (= of the Idea of the beautiful), 66 f., 92, 95 f., 128 f., 364.—Cf. art.

Becoming, pp. 90 f., 128, 182, 232, 262;—qualitative becoming, 230.—Basis (stuff, matter) of Becoming, 198 ff.; cause of coming into and passing out of Being, 232; everything Becoming finds its end in Being, 193 f.; it is conditioned, 198.—Becoming is only half real (which see), 123, cf. 198.—Reality in Becoming (*ὄντως γιγνόμενον*), 183, 212; necessity of Becoming, cf. law, logic; knowability of Becoming, 124, 177, 179 f., 183, 198.—Placing Becoming over against Being, *which see*.—Cf. motion, reality, knowledge.

Begging, p. 355 (note 1).

Being = reality, *which see*; its opposite, Non-Being and appearance, *which see*. Being itself = the peculiar nature of things, pp. 87 f., cf. 375 (note 2).—Being and Becoming as opposites, 82, 95 f., 136 f., 141 f., 147 ff., 164, 168 f., 171 f., 182, 188, 198, 200 f.; yet related, 209, 268 f.—Being is, 230; it is timeless and spaceless, 268.—Being is intertwined with the changing, 198.—Unrelated Being does not exist, 140 f., 173, 240.—The predication of Being (cf. logic) means being determined (or being conditioned), it is a relation between the subject and the predicate of a proposition, 168, 172, 230 f., 234 f.—Being = being thus and so, 172 f. (The ambiguity and relativity of the concept of Being), 178 f., 191 f., 230 f., 235.

Body in relation to spirit, pp. 293 f., 301, 310, 317 f., 330 f., 338 f., 360 f., 365.

Botany, pp. 242, 271.

Cause = agent, p. 233; only of the concrete (not the abstract), pp. 198, 209; cf. logic.—Cause = the objective basis. *See* Idea (of the good, 130); cause according to the *Philebus*, 189, 191 f., 193 f., 197, 202, 210.

Chance, pp. 193 f., 199, 217 f.

Change, *see* motion, Becoming.

Children, care of; nurseries, pp. 326, 327.

Choruses for the practice of dance and song, p. 348.

Christian, pp. 304, 305 (note), 319, 374, 388 (note), 389; *also see* Jesus.

Classes in the state, pp. 73, 77, 324 ff., 339.

Comedy, p. 289.

Comic, the, pp. 289, 306.

Communism, pp. 326 f., 329 f., 355.

Comparative predications, pp. 93 f., 176 f., 183, 189.

Comparison of size and of values, pp. 43, 53, 68, 78, 149, 160, 176 f., 179 f., 183, 187, 189 f., 215 f., 290, 314 f.

- Composite, opposite: simple (= the sensible, opposite: immaterial), p. 88 f.
- Conceiving; *see* knowledge, sense-perception, thinking, logic.
- Constitution; *see* state, soul.
- Concrete, the, pp. 178 f., 208 f., 212 f., 214 f., 216 f., 222, 331 f., 362 f.; its opposite: the universal, the abstract, *which see*.
- Contrast, producing of, pp. 78 f., 289 f.
- Cosmos: concept of the world, pp. 175, (cf. 131, 217); totality of cosmic reality, 193, 322, 375.—Form of the cosmos, 261 f.; the cosmos as living, as ensouled, 175, 216, 270 f.; as organism, 261 f., 281, 374 f.; perfect as image of God, 281, 375 ff., 381; a blessed god, 373.—The origin and order of the cosmos (demiurge), 193 f., 198 f., 222, 259 ff., 367 f.—World soul, 199, 272, 279 ff., 371, 374; cosmic order, 143, 383.
- Courage, pp. 40, 45, 51, 52, 74, 84, 100, 306 f., 341 (opposed to the enticements of pleasure).
- Criticism (*Kritizismus*), p. 227 f.
- Cycle, transformation of matter, pp. 200 f., 261; of motion, 263; of life, 87 f.
- Death, pp. 47 f., 54 f., 68, 87.—Capital punishment, 317, 356, 382.
- Desire; *see* striving.
- Determinism; *see* eudemonism, freedom of will.
- Dialectic, dialectical method, pp. 99, 185, 231, 233, 236 ff., 370 f.
- Drama, cf. art, theatre (life).
- Dreams and delusions, pp. 136, 187 f., 204, 218, 226, 254 f.
- Duty, pp. 132, 188 f., 303 ff., 313, 319, 334, 378, 384.
- Earth as mother of human beings, p. 199.—Form and locus of the earth, pp. 159 f., 262, 273. Sacredness of native soil, p. 355.
- Education, pp. 38, 305 (highest goal of education, 322), 318, 320 ff. (supervision of education and of the educational system by the state), 334, 337, 338, 341, 345 ff.; (education consists in guiding the impulses, 289 f., 347). Education through art (*which see*), 359–369.—Compulsory education, 345.—Technical education, 364 f., 369 f.
- Eleaticism, pp. 128, 141, 142, 162, 164 ff., 172, 230, 231, 258, 269.
- Elements, pp. 199 ff., 220, 259, 265 ff.; original elements (principles of Being), 167 f.; primeval form of life, 216.
- Empiricism, pp. 278, 299 f.
- Envy, selfishness, pp. 76 f., 288, 299, 312 f., 378; opposite: love.
- Equality, pp. 51, 88, 269 f.; *see also* similarity—EQUILIBRIUM, 263 f., 265.
- Eristics (antilogicians), pp. 101, 112, 138, 142, 156 (note 3), 162, 165 (note 1), 173, 230 f., 326.
- Eros, son of Penia and Poros, p. 289; *see also* love.

Error; *see* knowledge, truth.

Essence, pp. 87 f. (opposite: appearance), 96, 142 f., 170 f. (consists in effective relations), 193, 243 ff.; *also see* Idea—That which is essentially related (*οἰκεῖον*), 65, cf. 158.

Eternity; *see* time.

Ethics, pp. 57 f., 303 ff. (cf. table of contents.—Attempt to give a basis to ethics, 42, 45 f., 68, 84, 187 (*but see* 61 f.), 370, 376 f.—Moral law, 189 (note 2). Moral judgments, 61 f., 143, 159 f., 179 f., 206 f. Morality, 389 f.—Goal of ethics: to be like God, 143, 308.—Cf. measure, good, eudemonism.

Eudaemonia, which is in possession of the highest good, is the goal of all striving, pp. 65, 83, 252; its content, 292.

Eudemonism (and intellectual determinism), pp. 38, 40 f., 58, 68 ff., 80 f., 83, 143, 160, 188, 214, 219, 252, 292, 303 ff., 308, 313 ff., 317, 319, 334, 341 f., 369, 378 f., 381 f., 389.—For the good man there is no evil, 48.—Cf. knowledge, virtue, perfection, good.

Evil, pp. 64 f., 71. Evil as involuntary, 316 ff., cf. 365. Freedom to do evil, 390. Struggle against evil, 382, 390. Association with bad men, 110, 143.—Cf. the good.—For the good man, there is no evil, 48.—Wrongdoing is evil, 47, 48; conceitedness (spiritual blindness, *ἀμαθία*) is the greatest evil, 62; vices are the greatest evils, 312.—Punishment of the guilty person is freeing him from the greatest evil, 51.

Expert, the, pp. 49, 51, 53, 57, 65, 69, 71, 97 ff., 180, 184, 188, 245, 307 (note), 330 (cf. 316, note 1), 340 f., 368.

Expert knowledge, the basis for the claim to administer and to rule, pp. 63 f., 69, 71.

Fairy tales, p. 122.

Festivals, pp. 342, 345, 348, 360, 386.

Finite, the; the limit and the limited; the limited in the *Philebus*, pp. 189 f., 197, 207, 362 f.

Force, pp. 334 (346, cf. play).—Coercive measures of the state, 335, 339 f., 341 f.

Form; *see* unity, the whole, knowledge, matter (stuff).

Freedom, its dangers, pp. 301, 342.—Freedom of the will, 315 ff., 381, 388 ff.

Friends of the Ideas, pp. 33, 169, 170, 174 f., 183 (note 1), 186 (note), 196, 301.

Friendship, pp. 63 f., 308, 314, 335, 341.—Cf. love.

Given, the; its fundamental characteristics, pp. 136, 154, 161 f., 174, 178 f., 185, 192 f., 196 f., 198, 208, 213 f., 218, 220, 225 ff., 244, 267 f., cf. 280.—*Also see* the actual.

God, pp. 95, 124, 131, 150 f., 199, 259, 267, 281 f., 307 (note), 308,

312 f., 370 ff., (cf. table of contents).—God as ideal and norm, 109 f., 143, 177, 297, 308, 380.—As creator of the Ideas, 108 f., 156 (note 4), cf. 158 (note 1), 188; of man, 199, 281, 377; as former of the world, 208, 216 ff., 259 ff., 265, 366, 371, 374.—God can only give the good, 378, and all good things come from him, 388.—The necessity to which God is subject, 109, 219 f., 372 f., 377 f., 379.—Belief in God, 85; knowledge of God, 350;—gods, 109 f., 203, 295 f., 345, 380, (Dionysus, Apollo, the muses as patrons of the choruses, 348).—God-inspired (*see* madness); loved by God, favoured by God, 308, 373.—Cf. reason, cosmos.

Good (*vs.* evil), pp. 42 ff., 71 f., 81, 133, 188. Order, the correct organization constitutes goodness, 53, 60, 74, 190, 194 (note 2), 259, 292 f., 316, 333, 346 f., 364. Beauty, symmetry and truth as characteristics of the good, 364.—Relation of the good to the useful, 63 f., 306, 314; to the beautiful, 61, 85, 362 f.; to pleasure, 81, 83, 358 f.—The so-called goods, 305 f., 309, 311 (note 1), 313, 386 f. Three types of goods, 72, 304 ff., 331.—The good is highest purpose of all human actions, 53, 61, 65, 83, 252, cf. 292 f., 321; it possesses objective reality, 61 f.; it is the source and original ground of all reality and of all knowledge of reality (83) to which it gives its meaning, 376.—It is impossible to attain indisputable knowledge of the good, 83, 127, 134, 322, 324.—Knowledge of the good is the only unconditioned good, not wanting to know (*ἀμαθία*) the good is the greatest evil, 53, 61, cf. 38, 303, 306, 314.—Cf. perfection, virtue, God, eudemonism.

Guardians of the ideal state have no family responsibility, pp. 326 f., 329 ff.

Gyges' ring, p. 73.

Habit, pp. 294, 309, 342, 345, 346 f., 360, 368.

Hades, punishment in, p. 73.

Health and disease, pp. 136, 181, 187, 190, 248.

Heavy and light, p. 261 (difficult, 177).

Heresy, courts for trying, p. 382.

Hideous, disgraceful, pp. 50, 314, 316, 362 f., 369.

History, lessons from, pp. 300, 342.

Holiness, p. 304.

Homer and the tragic poets in Plato, pp. 358, 359 f.

Hygiene, racial; *see* man, improvement of.

Idea—doctrine of Ideas, pp. 10, 30 f., 87–133 (especially, 88, 105, 110 f., 113, 118, 129 f., 131: the Idea is known reality), 140–175 (especially 142, 152 ff.), 177 f., 183–224 (especially, 184 ff., 187, 197: the Idea provides a basis for true conceptions, 210 f.;

the Idea is their objective basis, 218 f.), 253 ff., 374.—Meaning of the word Idea, 82; ambiguity of the word, 157, 186 (note).—Limited use of the word, 143, 167, 186, 210, 223 f.—Synonyms, 92 f., 104, 141 f., 143, 156, 194 f., 197.—Especially the Idea as unchanging, permanent reality, 82, 95 f., 99, 183, 186 (note), 210 f.; as the only essential and real Being, 108 f., 208; as other worldly, 132, 150 f., 155 f.; as completely knowable reality (*but see*, 309, cf. knowledge), 210 f.; as principle of unity, 165 f.; as creator of beauty, 360 f.; as guiding principle or purpose, 98, 183 f., 245; as law of development, 178 f., 184, 376.—Ideas as presupposition of every meaningful affirmation and negation, 113, 152 ff., 206, 211 f., 253 f.—Embodiment of the Idea in reality (cf. art), 97 f., 177, 188.—Relation of the Idea to sensible objects or the relation of generic reality to the individual phenomena, 82, 88 f., 93 f., 95 f., 100 f., 106 f., 108, 109 f., 112 ff., 119, 126 f., 131 f., 147, 149 ff., 154 f., (the individual things desire to be what the Idea is), 165 f., 168 f., 185, 194 f., 201 ff., 207, 216 f., 225 f., 228 f., 270, 295 f., cf. 349 f., 365 f.—Relation of the Idea to immaterial objects, 185, 207.—Vision of the Idea, 305, 364, 367.—Gradual development of the doctrine of Ideas (preferred and contested Ideas), 147, 158 f.—The Ideas as forms of thought, 149, 156 f., 187 (note 2), 220; as hypotheses or postulates, 253 f.; as thoughts in God's mind, 158 (note), 371 f., 375 f., cf. purpose; as powers of God, 375.—Realm of Ideas, different classes and subtypes of Ideas, 118, 129 ff., 148, 159 f., 165, 184, 187, 197 f., 212 ff., 217 f.—Ideas of objects of art, 108 f., 186 f., 215 f., 371.—Two main types of Ideas, 186, 214 f.—Relation of the Idea to the classes of reality of the *Philebus*, 196.—The Idea of Being, 130 f., 374 f.; Idea of the good, 81 f., 105, 129 ff., 134, 305, 309 f., 324 f., cf. 349 f., 364, 372 f., 374 f.; the Idea of the Idea, 108, 150, 154 f., 156, 165 (note 1); Idea of life, 182, 216; Idea of beauty, 295 f.; Idea of space, 210; Idea of the world, 372, 374 f.; Idea of the state, 333.—Locus of the Ideas, 218 ff.—Irrational aspect of the Ideas, 209.—God as creator of the Ideas, 108, 156 (note 4), 188 (note 2).—The supposed hypostatizing of the Ideas, 278 f.—Modern parallels to the doctrine of Ideas, 115 (Goethe), 116 (Schuppe and Chamberlain), 244 ff. (Meinong and Husserl, cf. *also* 333 f.).—Difference between the Idea and the Kantian *Ding an sich*, 158.—Cf. reality, knowledge.

Ideal, pp. 177, 184 f., 188, 308, 332 ff., 334 f.

Incorrect, pp. 176, 181 f. (*vs.* in accordance with measure), 188, 193 f., 196, 336.

Image, reflected image, prototype and copy, pp. 63 f., 81, 110 f., 127 f., 150, 154 f., 156 (copy and original), 158 f., 185, 186;

- (eternal prototype), 198 ff., 203, 215 f., 268 (eternal image), 269, 332 f., 366 f., (eternal and temporary prototype), 371, 373 f., 376.—Patterns, 143, 153, 219 f., 222 f.; a pattern "existing in nature," 149, 153, 190, 214 f., 220; shadow of virtue or sham virtue, 69, 78 f., 96 f.; phantom of pleasure, 79.
- Imitation, pp. 288; artistic imitation, 105, 156 f., 361 f., 366 f., 368.—Cf. image, purpose, appearance.
- Immortality, Idea of and desire for, pp. 66 f., 87 f., 93 f., 102, 103, 114, 119 f., 175, 281 f., 301, cf. 364.
- Impulses, purposeless, pp. 367; their realization produces pleasure; education (*which see*) consists in mastering them, 289, 293 f., 347.—They drive us like marionettes, 384 f. The desire for food and the sex impulse, 289; desire to move and to speak, 347.—Cf. striving.
- Indulgences, p. 382 (note).
- Infinity of time (and space), p. 267 f.
- Innate impulses and their activity, pp. 66, 83, 159 f., 293 f., 311; other (*a priori*) concepts, pp. 91, 102 f., 114, 123, 148 (note 2), 197, 277 f., (cf. logic: postulates).
- Inspiration, *see* madness.
- Instruction, *see* education: subjects of and levels of instruction, p. 325.
- Intellectualism (*see* eudemonism), pp. 38, 313, (cf. 327 f., 334, 338), 378; rejected, 304, 311.
- Intermediate: between pleasure and pain, pp. 78, 289 f.; between good and bad (useful and harmful), 64, 65; between Being and Non-Being, knowable and not-knowable, 106, 108, 123, cf. 194 (note 2), 211 f. (cf. *also* 202 f.); between two extremes, 78 f., 290 f., 301, 306, 341 f., 353 f., cf. 337.
- Irrational, the, pp. 193 f., 208 ff., 215 f., 266 f., 270, 376 f.
- Justice, pp. 71 ff., 84 f., 305 (the suffering just man); 306, 315 f.—Relation of justice to happiness, 72 ff., 158, 306; cf. eudemonism.—Administration of justice and magistrates, 353 f., 366 f.
- King; *see* ruler, statesman; the kingly man, p. 79.
- Knowing, *see* knowledge.
- Knowledge, pp. 77 f., 135 ff., 211 f., 283 f. (confused by sensation, 291, cf. 304), 298. In contrast to opinion which is subject to error, knowledge has for its content Being, reality, 126 ff., 224 f., 226 f., 240 f., 253 f., and so attains truth (*which see*). Knowledge, semi-knowledge, ignorance have respectively as their objects Being, Semi-Being, Non-Being, 123 ff., 198, 200 f., 202 f., 211 f., (cf. 87 f., 183, 194 (note 2), 302 (note), as well as 169 f., 170 f.), 269 f.—Conditions of knowledge, 98 f., 123 f., 131 f., 141, 159 f., 166, 179 f., 183, 185, 191 f., 228 f.,

370 f., 378 (cf. logic, postulate).—Knowledge as something subjective (psychical) always refers to an objective content, to an "Idea," 140 f., 209 f., 211 f., (*see also* 200 f.), 214 f., 224 ff., 240.—The unrelated would not be knowable, 150, 208, cf. 164, 166, 172.—Knowability of the Ideas, 150, 195, 211 f.—Highest object and goal of knowledge (the Idea of the good), 106, 321 f., 325 f., 336, 349.—Knowledge is only possible in the light of the Idea of the good, 81 f., 132, 199, 372 (note), 375 (note 2).—Knowledge of individual appearances, 148, 156 f., 276 f., and of becoming things, 182, 220 f.—Certainty of geometric knowledge, 102, 266 f.—Rational knowledge (*φρόνησις*) as condition of virtue, 81, 87 f., cf. 61 f., 69.—Knowledge of an all inclusive mind (spirit), 132, (cf. 322), 376 f., 381.

Language (speech), pp. 97 ff., 155 f., 168 f., 178 f., 197, 202 f., 208, 228 f., 283 f.—Ambiguity of language, 139, 161 f.—Former of language, 98 f.

Law in conflict with nature, pp. 51 f., 71 f.—Law as a second best, 340 f.; it is superfluous for the ideal ruler, 320, 324 f., 326, cf. 339; lawful and unlawful rule, 339 (note 4).—Introduction to legislation, 360.—Law as expression of reason, 342, 347, (*but* cf. 360).—Law of the divine cosmic order, 143, 214.—Moral law, 189 (note 2).—Law of Becoming (law of development, objective law), 141 f., 176, 179 (note 3), 180 f., 184, 186, 188, 192 f., 198, 245, 336, 362 f.—Cf. necessity, state.

Learning: as recollection, pp. 87 f., 102, 109 f., 119 ff., 126 f.; playful learning, 345.—Cf. memory, education.

Lie, pp. 122, 307.

Life: not the highest good, pp. 54, 306;—power of, 182 (note), 199, 221 f., cf. soul.—Cycle of, 87.—Living things, 215 f., 263.—The world as the essence of all life, 215 f.—Being alive = animate existence, 174, (199, world soul)—The tragedy and comedy of life, 361 f.

Logic, pp. 88 f., 95, 100, 102, 104, 119, 124 f., 151, 169 f., 185 f., 207 (note 2), 208, 210, 230–257 (cf. table of contents), 298. ASSUMPTIONS of all logic, 170 f., 207, 252, 254 f., 370 f., 378. Axioms and postulates, pp. 82, 92 f., 105, 111 f., 120, 129 f., 206 f., 211 f., 226 f.—Exercises in, 161 ff., 231 f., 237 f.; vexatious questions in, 139. Form and content of a concept, 91 f.; the objective reality of conceptual contents, 88 (cf. "IDEA").—Classification of concepts, 194 f.; dichotomy, 231 f., 237 f., 242; system of concepts, 209 f., 217 f., 236 ff., 254 f.; classification, 157 f., 242, 270 f.—Univocal, 139, 161 f., 243; equivocal, 194 (of the Idea, cf. 186 (note)); 172 (of the concept of Being); 186 f. (of the unlimited); 255 f. (of the logos); 322 (of the good); 367 (of imitation).—DEFINITIONS,

103, 112, 162, 243, 245, 255 f.—Essence (Being), 243 ff., cf. 364 f.—Definition of form, 101; of Being, 147 (note), 167 ff., 173; of knowledge, 255 f.; of perception, of the judgment, of speech, 283 f.; of the false judgment, 171 f., 283 f.; of reflection, of retention, of forgetting, 284 f.; of love, 66, 294 f.; of the sophist, of the statesman, and of the philosopher, 337.—Circular definition, 81, 140, 242.—Regressus in infinitum. 150, 154 f., 258 f.—Correlative concepts, 65, 154 ff., 159 f., 164, 168, 213 f., 224 f., 233 (subject-object); 169 f., 240 (active-passive, doing-suffering); 190 f. (cause-effect); 202 f. (thought, thought-contents, Idea).—Concepts of relation, 65 (friendship), 66 (love), 133, 321 (note) (good). CATEGORIES, pp. 148 (note 2), 171 f., 197, 233 ff., 241, 255 f. The JUDGMENT with its predication of Being as fundamental characteristic of thinking, 167, 170 ff., 196, 207, 210 f., 224 f., 230 f., 235, 253 f.; negative predication, 170 f., 230 f., 233 f.; true and false predication, 173. LAWS OF THOUGHT, p. 232 f. Logical necessity based on the relation of identity, pp. 89 f., 113, 125 f., 170 f., 230 f., concepts and Ideas retain their identity, 147. Contradiction and opposite meaning intolerable, 90 f., 138, 141 f., 149, 157 f., 162 f., 169 ff., 176, 256, 267 f., cf. 378.—Logical deduction, 90, 230 f., 252; hypothetical development of concepts, 103, 120 f., 152, 161 f., 166, 203, 251; fictions, 261, 262, 314.—Principle of sufficient reason and real basis (*Realgrund*), 207, 232, 252 f.; Becoming, but not Being, causally conditioned (cf. cause), 121, 129 f., 132, 173 f., 197 f.—Causes and secondary causes, 199 f., cf. essence. Aetiological and teleological considerations, 200; cf. also “teleology.”—Analogical inferences, 255 f.—Antilogies, 153, 161 f., 165, 196. Paralogisms, 166.—Illegitimate inference, 203 f., 210. The “customary” philosophical METHOD of Plato, 108 f., 111 f., 113 (note).—Dialectical method, 236 ff., 299.—Ironical rejection of the solution of a problem, 142, 157 f., 219 (note 2).—Referring back to something else, 94 f., 99, 102, 105. Difference between the purely logical and the real. *See* abstraction.

Logos, pp. 130 f., 255.

Love (Eros), pp. 66 ff., 85, 109 ff., 289, 294 ff., 364, 387 f.—Levels of love, 95 f.—Basis of love is a need, a want, 64 f., cf. desire.—Passionate love, 79, 291.—Pangs of love, 295 f.—Platonic love, 67, 294, 297 f.

Luxuries, laws concerning, p. 357.

Madness (inspiration), pp. 85, 359 f., 362 f., 367, 387; *also see*, 291, 294 ff., 299.

Man: his relation to the cosmos, pp. 194 f., 260, 379; to animals, 271,

- 294.—Creation of, 199, 259 f., 280 f., 378;—divinely favoured men, 308, 374;—human organization, 66, 82, 159 f., 203 f., 213 f., 242 (note 3), 252 f., 260, 267 f., 292 f., 298 f., 310, 314, 317, 336, 347, 369, 371 f., 379, 387. Limits of human knowledge, 370, 388.—The tasks of man, 321, 386 f.—Types of character, 300 f.—Improvement of the human race, 323, 326 f., 329 ff.; cf. measure, knowledge, animal.
- Marriage, regulation of, pp. 323 f., 326, 330 f., 338, 385; guardians of, 350 f.
- Materialism, pp. 169 f., 193 f., 203, 254 f. (mechanistic explanation of the world, 199, 278 f.).
- Mathematics, pp. 102, 125, 258, 260, 265 f., 272, 276 ff., (philosophical or pure and applied mathematics, 276), 244, 321.—Mathematical sign language, 240.—Cf. number, measure.
- Matter, pp. 200 ff. (= extension, 204, 266), 207 ff., 265 f., 280 f., 377 f.; as acting in space, 261.
- Measure, standard of measurement, pp. 88, 176 f. (as norm), 181, 182 (note), 183, 187 f., 190, 191 f., 196, 245, 336 f., 339, 359 f., 363 f. What is in accordance with measure, 177, 182 (opposite: incorrect, *which see*), 362 f., 365.—Man the measure of things, 97, 111 f. (cf. 123), 178 f.; God the measure of things, 177, 308, 380.
- Megaric philosophy, pp. 162, 175.
- Memory, pp. 139 f., 285.
- "Mixed," the, in the *Philebus*, pp. 211, 362 f.
- Moment, p. 268.
- Morality, *see* ethics.
- More or less, pp. 189, 208.
- Motion, pp. 135, 181, 230, 258 ff. Types of motion, 141 f., 263 f.; cause of motion, 261 f., 265, 271 f. Motion and permanence, 141 f., 169 f., 173, 176 ff., 184. All sensible objects are in motion, 135, 262, 265 f., 273.—Corresponding motions of object and subject, 135 f., 253 f. Motion of "Being," 174, 198.—Cf. Becoming, reality, law, quality.
- Motion of the whole universe, pp. 265, 272.
- Musical, the, p. 366.
- Mysticism (and quietism), pp. 299 f., 310 f.
- Myths, mythological descriptions (in contrast to philosophical doctrines), pp. 55, 70, 102, 109 ff., 120, 122, 128, 131, 136, 159 f., 167, 175, 275 f., 280 f., 288, 295 f., 309, 370, 389.—Cf. presentiments.
- Name; *see* language.
- Nature, in contrast to arbitrary opinion, pp. 39, 45 f., 50, 57 f., 142; in the formation of words, 97, 99.—Philosophy of nature, 258 ff., 269 f.; study of nature, 383; characteristics of nature

- (cf. laws), 176, 245; prototypes existing in nature, 149, 152 f., 188, 213 f., 219 f.
- Necessity, pp. 176 ff., 179 (note 3), 183 f., 188, 199, 336; God bound by necessity, 109, 220, 372 f., 376 f., 390 (note).—Cf. law.
- Nihilism (and relativism), pp. 44, 61 f., 112 f., 184, 254 f., 360 f.
- Norm; *see* measure, art of measurement, normal size, p. 176 f.; normal condition, 182.
- Nothing, Non-Being, pp. 127 f., 164, 168 f., 176, 197, 212 f., 230 f., 233, 258.—Cf. logic, predication.
- Number, pp. 126 f., 164, 167, 179 f., cf. 268 f., 379; counting, measuring, weighing, 276.—Cf. mathematics.
- Object; *see* the given, knowledge, subject, thinking, objective relations.
—*See* logic, causal relationship.
- Opinion (*δόξα*), pp. 283 f.; as intermediate level, *see* knowledge; as an attempt to learn, 139.—True and false opinion, 139, 173, 283.—Difference between correct opinion and knowledge, 138 ff., 202 f., 211 f., 303.
- Opposite; *see* contrast; pairs of opposites, pp. 167, 170 f., 176, 189, 233 f., 302 (note), 362 (note 4).—Conflicting philosophies of life, 51, 54, 59; opposites supplement each other, 337 f.
- Optimism; *see* eudemonism, evil.
- Order; *see* good.
- Orphic, the, pp. 70, 282, 373 (note 4), 382 (note).
- Other world, pp. 82, 108 f., 119 f., 132 f., 222; cf. Idea, space.
- Party rule and party conflicts, pp. 341, 355.
- Pederasty, pp. 297 f., 300 (note).
- Perceptible (bodily, spatial moved; opposite: immaterial, etc.), pp. 126 f., 135, 168, 174, 185, 198, 200, 208, 212 f., 265 f., 273; differentiated in accordance with the ability of human comprehension, 123 (*but see* 263).—Cf. space, motion, body, knowledge.
- Perfection, pp. 66, 83 f., 143, 189, 364; perfecting, 65 f., 85, 323 f., 335, 308.
- Personality, pp. 301, 373 f.
- Pessimism, pp. 383, 385.
- Phenomenology, pp. 113 (note), 124 (note 3), 226 ff.
- Philosopher, pp. 74, 77 f. (= the kingly man), 93 f., 106, (*φιλόσοφος* vs. *φιλόδοξος*, cf. rhetoric, sophistic), 147 f., 296 f., 305, 310; like the artist, 295, 364, 387 f.; as leader of the state, 320, 323 f., 326 f., 335, 337, 350 f.; cf. statesman.—Conflicting philosophies of life of the philosopher and of the man of affairs, 51, 52 (philosophy advocates a "slave morality"), 54, 59, 143 f., 148; philosophical education, 320 ff., 349 f., basis of philosophy, 299; philosophy as dialectic, 300.—Cf. Plato.

Piety, pp. 46 f., 48, 100, 308, 385 f.

Place, natural, p. 242; *also see* space.

Plato, his life, pp. 21 f., 55 f., 88 f., 134; character, 298, 308, 380, 390; artistic nature, 358 f.; dialogues, 27 f., 112, 133 f.; their purpose, 112, 161 f., 231 f., 237; their form, 161 f., 176; persons in the dialogue, 168, 258, 294 (note 2), 314 (note), 340 f. Cf. table of contents. Deficiencies and ambiguities in Plato, 127 f., 134, 147, 149, 154 f., 161 f., 175 f., 192 f., 198, 213 f., (cf. 226 f.), 272, 288, 307, 309 f., 329 ff., 366, 370 f., 374 f. Misinterpretations of Plato by his critics, 59 f., 113 (note), 114 f., 119, 153, 161 f., 175 f., 185, 187, 196, 236, 266 f., 277 f., 282, 301 (note 3), 328 ff., 359 f., 374 f., 388 (note).

Play, pp. 134, 345 ff., 367.

Pleasure (and pain), pp. 42 f., 52, 59, 78, 81, 191 f., 286 f., 289 f., 293, 312, 314 f., 342, 347, 359 ff., 372 f.; as imitation of the good, 53, 361 f.—Measuring the intensity of pleasure, 286 f., 293 f. Three types or levels of pleasure, 73 f., 76 f., 84, 286 f., 293 f. Everyone is pleased with what corresponds to his nature, 360 f., cf. 296 f. Better and worse pleasures, 53, cf. 360 f., 365 f., 368. Highest (mental) pleasure, 109 f., 336. True, pure and false, impure pleasure, 78, 244, 290 f., (cf. 359), 370 f.—Phantom pleasure, 79.—Cf. striving, impulse, desire.

Poet; *see* madness, art, Homer.

Politics; *see* state, statesman; political resignation, p. 333.

Power (capacity, faculty), pp. 106 f., (cf. 140 f.), 148 (note 2), 169, 173, 182 (note), 192 f., 201 f., (power = Being), 208, 210, 211 f. (Powers differentiated by their objects and their effects), 233, 258. Distribution of powers in the world, 199, 218, 220 f., 245, 373 f.

Power and insight must be combined, pp. 335, 342; cf. philosopher. Ambitious striving for power, 54 (*see also*, 71 f., 314, 341).—Cf. rhetoric, sophistic.

Prayer, pp. 305, 327, 384, 386.

Predication (judgment); *see* logic.

Pre-existence, pp. 88 f., 102, 114, 119.

Premonition, *see* presentiment.

Presentiment, faith in contrast to knowledge, pp. 20, 129, 132, 135, 304, 310, 322, 369, 371, 375 (note 2).—Cf. myths.

Production (physical and spiritual) as the way to happiness, pp. 66, 294 f.

Prototype; *see* image.

Providence, faith in, pp. 47 f., 374.

Psychic; *see* soul; body.

Psychological, pp. 87, 121, 139, 170 f., 186, 207, 281–302. (Cf. table of contents), 339, 342, 344, 346 f., 361 f., 367 ff., 378.

Public opinion, p. 318.

Punishment, pp. 51, 53, 315, 356.—Fundamental principles of penal justice, 315 ff.; (monetary fines, 343).—Cf. force, evil.

Purpose, pp. 243 ff., 270 f.—Perfection is the highest purpose, 84, 132. Highest purpose and subordinated purposes (= unconditioned good and conditioned goods), 64; purpose as a good stands above the useful, 60.—Purpose and means, 65 f.; the purposeful, 177 f., 188.—Purposive explanation, *see* teleology; man's purposive activity, 188; especially that of the formative artist and the expert, 53, 177, 180, 216, 220, 362 f., 367, 371 f.—The purposive thoughts of God, 158 (note), 188 (note 3), 193 f., 198 f., 208 f., 215 ff., 245, 367, 371 f.

Pythagorean, pp. 70, 188, 258 ff., 273, 275, 282, 373 (note 4).

Quality, as the result of the motions of the object and of the subject, pp. 135, 140 f., 181 f., 187, 190 f., 253 f., 260, 264 ff.; change in quality, 200 f., 264 f.

Reality, the real (= Being): rejected definitions, pp. 167 (= body), 168 (= object of thought); proposed definitions: That which has the power to affect or to be affected, 148 (note 2), (cf. 140), 169 f., 173 f., 182 (note), 183, 193, 201, 206, 207, 210, 218, 221, 233 f., 261, 263, 353.—Reality cannot remain in rigid immobility nor can it change contrary to law, 141, 170.—Everything real is unity of plurality, a whole with parts, 165, 196; stands in effective relations, 163 f., and is at one and the same time objectively and subjectively conditioned, 198, 212 f., 237 f.—Completely real, half real, unreal correspond as objects to the three subjective conditions, knowledge, guessing, not-knowing (ignorance), 109 f., 112 f., 124 f. Knowability of reality, 132.—Two types of reality ("Being"), 88 f., 198 f., 206 f., 388; four classes of reality according to the *Philebus*, 189 ff., 206; the three basic elements of reality according to the *Timaeus*, 201 ff.;—generated reality, 189 ff.;—immaterial reality, 88 f., 90 ff., 97, 100 f., 138 f., 203 ff., 211 f., 217 f., 221 ff., 228, 272, 280 f.; cf. Idea, soul; reality as ensouled (cf. world soul), 174 f., 193, 215 f., cf. 374 f.—*See also* Being, cosmos, knowledge, logic (judgment), good.

Reason, mind: rationality of Being, pp. 174; of the world ground, 82, 84, 89 f., 130 f., 143, 159 f., 175, 193 f., 199, 201 f., 208 f., 213 f., 215, 217 f., 259, 265, 272, (cf. 280), 350 f., 362 f., 370, 374 f., 381.—Reason can only dwell in a soul, 272;—rational beings, 193 f.—The anti-rational, *see* irrational.—Cf. knowledge, God.

Relativity of Becoming, pp. 136; of knowledge, 137.—Relativism; *see* nihilism.

Rest; *see* equilibrium.

Rhetoric, pp. 49 ff., 53 f., 133, 137, 298 f., 337 (in Plato, 175, 368).

Riches (and poverty), pp. 305 f., 313, 343, 386 f.

Ruler, the art of governing, profession of ruling, pp. 71 f., 78 f., 323 f., (of the philosopher), 335, 338.

Sacrifice and atonements, pp. 73, 327, 344, 384.

Science; *see* art.

Self-discipline (*σωφροσύνη*), pp. 52, 74, 306, 311.

Self-conceit (*ἀμαθία*), pp. 312, 318.

Self, knowledge of, examination of, and its opposite. *See* self-conceit.

Self-sacrifice, pp. 67, 297.

Self-sufficiency, pp. 63, cf. 64, 80.

Sensations, p. 285 f.; cf. table of contents.

Sense-perception, pp. 135 ff., 214 f., 235, 263 f., 284 f. (different from stimulus, 285 f., cf. 287), 301. (Exposition and criticism of pure sensationalism, 135-138, 185, 204 f.); infallibility of subjective sense-perception (of *παρὸν πάθος*), 136, 138, 140, 224 f.—Inexactness of sense-perception, 126 f., 199, 200 f., 208, 211 f., 253 f., 276 f.

Shadow; *see* image.

Sickness, disease, pp. 136, 182, 187, 330 f.; as cause of mental infirmities, 318; disease of the soul, 292 f.

Similarity (and difference in essence), pp. 64, 127 f., 150, 156, 159 f., 178 (note 3), 270, 284.

Simplicity, pp. 88 f., 234, 301.

Size; *see* comparison.

Scepticism, pp. 62, 205, 253.

Slavery, pp. 75 f., 329 f., 343, 344, 356, 366.

Sophist, pp. 38 ff., 57 f., 62, 112, 337 (cf. 105).

Soul, as principle of motion and bearer of life, pp. 174, 198, 272, 301, 350; of reason, 271 f.—Achievements of the soul, 72, 302.—The soul of "Being," 174; world soul, 199 (cf. 215 f.), 281 (the soul of Zeus); soul of the earth and of the stars, 260.—Soul and body (mind and body), 70, 78, 87 f., 110 f., 114, 293 f., 301; both belong together (cf. subjective), 148 (note 2), 227.—The disembodied soul, 114, 119 (cf. 169 f.), 176 (note).—Parts of the human soul, 73, 282, 307; its enigmatic many-sidedness, 109 (cf. 385 f.); the wings of the soul, 110, 296. The unity of the soul, 282, 301.—The constitution of the soul, 74 f., 292 f.; on it depends happiness, 77; care of the soul, 70 f.—Transmigration of the soul, 389.—Cf. body.

Space, as *principium individuationis*, pp. 210, 267.—Idea of spatiality, 209.—Spatiality (not space) = matter, 204, 208, 265 f.; by nature irrational, 209 f., 258 f., 267 f.—Relation of space to materiality, 266.—Spatial and qualitative changes (cf. quality)

are two main types of motion, 141 f.—Universal extension, 263.—That which comes into being in space is perceptible with our senses, is the concrete, 202 f., is that which is in motion, 262, is that which is causally conditioned, 209.—The spatial-temporal in contrast to the logical, 163, 177 f., 183 (note 2); —non-spatial, immaterial realities, 154 f. (cf. 156), 203 ff., 216 ff., 254 f., cf. 272.—The hyper-heavenly place, 109 f., cf. 221 f., 333 f.

Spirit; *see* reason.

Spiritualism, p. 168 f.

Stars, pp. 260, 262 (note 6), 274 f., 379, 381; cf. astronomy.

State: blessings of state organization, pp. 48 f., 309; its opposite, 317 f.—Ideal concept of, 222, 336.—The ideal condition of, 340 f., 346.—Its excellence depends on the excellence of its citizens, 349, (cf. 73 f., 307, 350 f.).—Defective states, temporary states, 75, 301, 336, 339 f.—The state of the REPUBLIC, 73 f., 320–337 (cf. table of contents).—The state of the LAWS, 342 ff., its agrarian legislation, 343, 353 f.; laws governing commerce and industry, 343; duty to work, 344, 348, 350 f.; educational measures, 342 ff.—Council of state (nightly assemblies), 349 f., 382; the officials, 349, 352 ff.; jurisdiction 354; protection of the weak, 356 (cf. 330 f.); laws governing elections, 353 f. (cf. table of contents).—ART OF STATESMANSHIP, STATESMAN, pp. 53, 54, 68 (cf. 306), 322, 330 f., 337 f., 340 f., 346, (educator for morality), 349 f., 369.—Criticism of statesmen of Athens, 54, 331.

Striving, desire, pp. 64 f., 66, 83, 158 f., 214 f., 252, 286 (259 f., 313 f., 336).—Three fundamental characteristics of striving and levels of pleasure (*which see*), 73 f., 76 f., 84.—Cf. impulse, good.

Stuff; *see* matter.—Cycle of matter, pp. 200 f.;—organic change of matter, 263 f., 284;—matter (content) and form, 178 f., 188, 191 f., 197, 208, 214 f., 235, 365 f., 368; resistance of matter, 209.

Subject and object, pp. 135, 140 f., 155 f., 158 f., 169, 214 f., 224 f., 226 f.;—SUBJECTIVISM; *see* nihilism.

Sun, pp. 82, 128, 157, 264 (note 2), 268, 273 f., 279 f.

Symmetry, pp. 365, 368.

Syssitia (common meals), pp. 326, 344, 351.

Task and particular station (*ἔργον*), pp. 72, 303, 321, 344; cf. purpose.

Teleology, teleological consideration, pp. 130, 132, 180, 196, 200, 209, 279 ff., 364, 366 f., 370, 375 (note 2), 379.

Temperaments, pp. 293 f., 337 f. (312 f.).

Theatre, p. 359.—Marionettes, p. 385.

Theory, to be supplemented by experience, pp. 325 f., 349 f.

Thinking and thought-content, pp. 88 f. (objective reality of the thought-content), 155 f., 168 f., 196 f., 202 f., 214 f., 235, 283. —Thinking finds expression in effective relations between subject and object, 212 f. Every ideational act of thinking contains unity and plurality, 197.—Conceivable = capable of being thought out by the human understanding, 123 f.—Cf. knowledge, logic, abstraction.

Time, pp. 262 f., 267 ff; (time and eternity, 268), 373, 379.

Tragedy, tragedians, pp. 288, 364; in Plato. See Homer.

True, truth (cf. knowledge; opposite: false, error), pp. 81 f., 87 f., 89, 92 f., 105 f., 109 f., 111 ff., 121, 123, 125 f., 129 ff., 136 f., 138, 142 f., 153 f., 168, 173, 178 f., 181 f., 204 ff., 211 f., 226 f., 254 f., 283 f., 364, 370 f.—Truth in art, 359 f.;—certain, true predications, 89 f.;—true and false sensations of pleasure and pain, 290 f.—Without unity truth cannot be known, 162 f.; truth consists in having a predication refer to an Idea, 167 (note 1), 190, 195, 253 f.; true knowledge also of becoming things, 182.—Search for truth, 102 f., 123 f., 139.—Truth and PROBABILITY, 180 f., 199 f., 256, 267 f., 270.

Truthfulness, p. 308; its opposite: lie, *which see*.

Type, typical, pp. 182, 188, 191 (note), 194 (note 2), 215 f., 245, 301.

Tyrant, pp. 75 f., 309, 311, 339 f., 342.—The tyrannical man, 78 f., 314.

Unity (monad, henad, cf. "Idea"), pp. 195, 196 f., 206 f.; without unity, no knowledge (*which see*); no truth, 163 f., 166 f., 191 f., 196, 236, no beauty, 299, 364.—Unity and plurality (infinity), 147 ff., 163 ff. (167 f., 179 f., cf. 190 f.), 194 ff., 210 f., 233, 268 f., 349 f.—The soul as principle of unity, 301.

Universal; opposite: the particular, pp. 126 f.; as the content of our conceptions and of words, 154 f., 179 (note 3), 253 f.

Unlimited, indefinite, the, in the *Philebus*, 189 f., 197, 216 f., 362.

Useful, beneficial, pp. 60 f., 137 f., 180 f.; cf. good, purpose, pleasure.

Value, unconditioned value, pp. 61 f. (of the beautiful, 85), 66, 69.—Different kinds of value-judgments, 59 f.; moral value-judgments, *see* ethics; absence of value-judgments, 176.

Vice, p. 312 f.

Virtue, based on order, pp. 190 f.; on knowledge, 37 ff., 40 f., 42 f., 44, 45, 53, 58, 81, 83, 306; on the mastery of the desires, 289 f., 346; is unconditioned good, 309; cf. eudemonism.—The teachability of virtue, 44 f., 101, 103. Unity of virtue, 53, 62 f., 69, 307. Individual virtues, 81, 84, 101, 129 f., 306 ff.; compare justice, etc.; popular and philosophic virtue, 314 ff.—Sham virtue, 69, 77 f.

Virtuosity, pp. 365, 369.

War (and peace), pp. 245, 337, 342 f.; military service, 355; education for war, 325 f., 345 f., 351 f., 353 f.

Weaving, p. 337.

Whole, the (and parts), pp. 163 f., 167, 233 f., 258 f., 299, 362 f.

Wine, pp. 348 (note 2), cultivation of the vine, 355 (note 2).

Wisdom (its opposite: folly, also cf. evil), pp. 69, 74 f., 83, 137 f., 306 f.; differentiated from cunning, 311.

Women, more equality with men in the *Republic*, pp. 327 f., 339 f., than in the *Laws*, 350 f.

Zoology, pp. 242, 271.



GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD
LONDON: 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C.1
CAPE TOWN: 73 ST. GEORGE'S STREET
SYDNEY, N.S.W.: WYNARD SQUARE
TORONTO: 91 WELLINGTON STREET, WEST
WELLINGTON, N.Z.: 8 KINGS CRESCENT, LOWER HUTT

RECENT WORKS BY C. E. M. JOAD

Counter Attack from the East

La. Cr. 8vo. The Philosophy of Sir S. Radhakrishnan 7s. 6d.
This work consists of a presentation of the thought of the Hindu philosopher, Sir S. Radhakrishnan, with particular reference to its bearing upon the problems of the contemporary West. Radhakrishnan is a philosophical bi-linguist, equally versed in Eastern lore and Western philosophy. As such he is particularly fitted to act as *liaison* officer between the two worlds of East and West. His Hibbert lectures delivered in Manchester and London three years ago attracted attention chiefly because they offered to a generation which has largely lost its religion a solution, based upon the lecturer's fundamentally religious attitude to life, to its resultant problems of guidelessness and purposelessness. While not necessarily subscribing to this solution, Mr. Joad has sought to work out its application to current problems. The book is, accordingly more than a mere exposition of Radhakrishnan's thought; it contains a Prologue and an Epilogue by Mr. Joad, in which, after diagnosing the discontents of the times, he offers his own suggestions for their alleviation. These turn upon a renaissance of the sense of Values through education directed to the use of leisure.

Essays in Common Sense Philosophy

Cr. 8vo. New Edition containing New Introduction 7s. 6d.
To this reprint of Mr. C. E. M. Joad's first philosophical work the author has contributed an introduction indicating the lines along which his philosophical views have developed since *Essays in Common Sense Philosophy* was first published in 1919. He also describes the positions maintained in that book which have remained unaffected by subsequent developments. These are pre-eminently the criticism of Hegelianism, the exposition of a Realist theory of perception, and the establishment of the independent reality of universals. Particularly pertinent at the present time are the criticisms of the Hegelian theory of the State, the theory which underlies and inspires the Nazi revolution in Germany, and the discussion of the extent to which man's intellectual beliefs are determined by non-rational, temperamental factors. Are our reasons free, or mere tools of our instincts? This discussion has been rendered highly topical by the developments of psycho-analysis which have taken place since the book appeared.

Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science

Demy 8vo. 12s. 6d.
This book contains a critical examination of theories of the universe recently advanced on the basis of modern physics. The views of Professor Eddington and Sir James Jeans are in turn subjected to criticism on the ground that they rest upon a faulty theory of knowledge, which ignores the Realist movement which is the distinctive feature of twentieth century philosophy. Bertrand Russell's Neutral-Monism is also criticized. The author puts forward his own view of the status of the physicist's world and of its relation to the world we perceive, and discusses the relations between scientific objects such as electrons and physical objects such as chairs and tables.

· East and West in Religion

by Sir S. RADHAKRISHNAN

Cr. 8vo.

Author of *The Idealist View of Life*, etc.

4s. 6d.

This book deals mainly with the attitudes and approaches to religious life characteristic of East and West and offers further illustrations of the idealist view of life set forth in the author's Hibbert Lectures. It contains also many interesting reflections on current problems, such as Christians missions in India, pacifism psycho-analysis, and Yoga.

The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas

Medium 8vo.

by R. L. PATTERSON

21s.

This is a fresh treatment from a strictly philosophical point of view of St. Thomas Aquinas's conception of God. It is founded on a thorough acquaintance with the original texts and the work of recent scholars. Confining himself to the main subject of Aquinas's idea of God, the author is able to do justice by ample quotations to the details of the great doctor's doctrine, and also to indicate its central place in mediaeval theology, and its perennial interest for the history of thought.

The Horizon of Experience A Study of the Modern Mind

Demy 8vo.

by C. DELISLE BURNS

12s. 6d.

The Modern Mind is attracted by what is on the horizon of experience, the new forms of knowledge and of art. This book discusses the historical rhythm which, at certain crises, brings the horizon of experience into prominence after periods of synthesis. It attempts also to show that a philosophical view of experience as a whole should now depend less upon the conclusions of science and more upon the understanding and appreciation of works of art. Such works of art, in the modern forms of art, are treated not as objects to be observed from the outside but in reference to the process by which the artist creates them. Morality also is discussed, as an art of living in which in our day, the untried good is most important: and Religion is taken to include modern transformations of the traditional sense of what is divine, in many different lands.

The Will to Fuller Life

by J. H. BADLEY

Demy 8vo.

Headmaster of Bedales School

10s. 6d.

This is a study of spiritual development in continuation of the same writer's outline of psychology, *The Will to Live*. After discussing the nature and development of values in general, he here deals in succession with the ultimate values, truth, beauty, and moral good, and with the main forms—science, philosophy, art, social, and personal morality—in which the pursuit of these values has found embodiment, ending with some consideration of their bearing on what now lies before us. The whole is treated from the point of view that man is bound to take a conscious part in directing his further evolution.

All prices are net

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

